--- title: #1 Unmanned slug: 1-unmanned-90356 url: /detay/1-unmanned-90356 type: blog language: English entity: primary: #1 Unmanned type: blog categories: - name: Defense Industry Technologies slug: savunma-sanayi-teknolojileri url: /kategori/savunma-sanayi-teknolojileri tags: - unmanned - strategicsecurity - Technology author: KÜME Vakfı created_at: 2026-07-16T16:07:54.554062+03:00 updated_at: 2026-07-16T16:07:54.554072+03:00 image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/FpDxqkaqeQGAeG1ra38aOmZRxbH3Eeee.jpg --- # #1 Unmanned ## Article Content Traditional war doctrines are being fundamentally transformed by the rise of autonomous technologies. The 21st century battlefield is being redefined by artificial intelligence, data fusion, and network-centric capabilities. [Unmanned systems](/en/detay/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-technologies-709cb/llms.txt) are no longer merely remotely controlled vehicles; they are becoming operational actors that process battlefield data in real time and set the limits of operational speed. The “Unmanned” bulletin examines the latest developments in autonomous technologies, innovative applications, and global trends. In our biweekly issues, we analyze strategic directions, technical breakthroughs, and transformations that will determine the future of autonomy in defense and security. ### **In Four Days, the Future of Türkiye’s Air War** Three critical tests conducted last week marked historic milestones in transitioning the unmanned air combat concept from theory to practice. Intensive tests carried out on November 17, 18, and 20 generated excitement among unmanned technology experts both in Türkiye and globally. The performance demonstrated by [KIZILELMA](/en/detay/bayraktar-kizilelma-720337/llms.txt) signaled the transition from the drone paradigm focused on ground targets to the era of unmanned combat aircraft designed for air-to-air engagements. During the flight on November 17, the [TOYGUN](/en/detay/aselsan-toygun-100-62795/llms.txt) electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), embedded within the airframe, was activated without requiring an external pod. The system successfully detected, tracked, and laser-designated targets. This approach simultaneously grants [KIZILELMA](/en/detay/bayraktar-kizilelma-b9385/llms.txt) stealth and precision targeting capabilities by reducing its detectability. Similar architectures have previously been seen only on manned fighter aircraft such as the US-made F-35 fifth-generation platforms. The successful testing of this architecture on an unmanned combat aircraft places Türkiye among the small group of nations possessing this technology. On November 18, the test brought together the “national trio” in a single flight. KIZILELMA flew with the new-generation MURAD AESA radar, capable of detecting and locking onto targets at long ranges. It was also armed with the national air-to-air missile [GÖKDOĞAN](/en/detay/gokdogan-fuze-a1587/llms.txt), which enables engagement within visual range. During the same flight, target detection, tracking, designation, and weapon release were tested in unison. This demonstrates the functioning of the “see, decide, shoot” cycle. The natural question that arises is: when and under what conditions will the first real air-to-air engagement occur? During the flight on November 20, KIZILELMA conducted a coordinated flight with two [F-16](/en/detay/f-16-fighting-falcon-7a55b/llms.txt) aircraft. KIZILELMA locked onto an F-16 simulating a target and achieved a direct hit in an electronic simulation, as [reported](https://baykartech.com/tr/haberler/bayraktar-kizilelmadan-tarihi-sinav-f-16ya-kilitlendi-simule-atista-tam-isabet/). Thus, three critical points were validated in a single test: the seamless integration of manned and unmanned aircraft in flight formations; the real-time target data exchange between the aircraft and its missile; and the compatibility of flight dynamics with the domestically developed missile mounted under the wing. This scenario suggests a future operational model in which F-16s focus on command and protection, while KIZILELMA serves as the strike element extending the engagement envelope. Air-to-air combat demands rapid decision-making. Therefore, KIZILELMA cannot be expected to transmit every piece of data to the ground. It must generate meaningful summaries onboard and present a clear picture to the operator. In the short term, the operator will set target priorities and authorize fire, while KIZILELMA manages execution. In the medium term, as more natural command methods are introduced, the human decision-maker and unmanned executor system will operate with even greater speed. The decisive factor will be the ability to convert sensor data into reliable fire conditions. All these developments demonstrate that technical progress is accelerating toward [Selçuk Bayraktar](/en/detay/selcuk-bayraktar-a5779/llms.txt)’s goal of having “more than ten KIZILELMAs in the air by the end of 2026.” If this pace is maintained and the first real air-to-air engagement is successfully completed, KIZILELMA could assume the historic position of “the first unmanned combat aircraft to conduct an actual air-to-air engagement” in global military literature. The real test, however, will be sustainability. The true measure of deterrence will lie in the production volume of the national missile, its diversification for various missions, and the development of a doctrine enabling forces to employ them regularly. The achievements observed in four days can be viewed as a solid beginning of a long journey. ### **Can China Conduct a Robotic Amphibious Assault on Taiwan?** One of the most closely watched questions in the global strategic landscape is when and how China might act against Taiwan. China views Taiwan as part of its own territory and aims to end its autonomy, whether through diplomatic means or, if necessary, by military force. In this context, China’s exercises and preparations targeting Taiwan are well known. However, footage recently released by the media from an amphibious landing drill has drawn considerable attention. Robot dogs sprinting toward enemy shores, drones descending from above, and paratroopers advancing with mechanical assistants carrying machine guns... Is Beijing planning to assign the most dangerous tasks in a potential operation against Taiwan to unmanned systems? The outcomes of the drill, however, are not yet impressive. Robot dogs sent to deliver explosives to the shore were easily destroyed by defensive forces. FPV drones intended to soften enemy positions failed to produce the expected impact. On paper, this broad family of unmanned systems was meant to play a decisive role in breaching the landing line. In practice, however, troops reverted to older methods and were forced to advance under fire. Commanders of the drill openly acknowledged in the simulation scenario that heavy losses would have occurred at this stage. This picture does not diminish China’s pursuit of unmanned systems. On the contrary, it underscores its intent to saturate defenses with low-cost, expendable platforms. Yet a significant gap remains between the intended concept and its practical performance. China’s fundamental challenge in planning a high-risk operation across the strait is achieving a balance between the supporting role of unmanned systems and the indispensable role of human forces. Looking at the broader picture, unmanned systems are already delivering significant results in certain areas. Their impact is now tangible across a wide spectrum, from long-range kamikaze drones to tactical reconnaissance platforms. Capabilities such as disrupting frontline formations, pressuring command nodes, and limiting mobility are now demonstrated with concrete examples. However, these successes have not yet spread across all domains. In complex offensive operations—particularly in high-intensity tasks such as obstacle clearance and position suppression—the performance of these systems has not yet reached expected levels. Nevertheless, the motivation to leverage the capabilities offered by unmanned systems appears to persist. Although China’s drill did not achieve its desired outcome, the trajectory of technology, declining costs, and increasing system diversity point toward a future battlefield increasingly dominated by unmanned elements. ### **Can the US Withdraw Its Troops from Europe Using Drones?** Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a permanent military presence in Europe. However, financial pressures have at times led to efforts to reduce this presence. President Obama withdrew two of four US Army brigades stationed in Europe between 2012 and 2013. About a year after this controversial decision, Russia invaded [Ukraine](/en/detay/ukraine-c00b8/llms.txt) and annexed Crimea. During Trump’s first term, plans to withdraw thousands of US troops from Germany sparked widespread debate within NATO. During the Biden administration, following Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022, additional forces were deployed to Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, the Baltics, etc.). With Trump’s potential return to office, the debate over troop withdrawals from Europe has resurfaced. Romania’s Ministry of Defense stated in October 2025 that the US plans to reduce the number of troops stationed along Eastern Europe’s flank, including those based at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania. NATO Secretary General [Mark Rutte](/en/detay/mark-rutte-4e294/llms.txt), however, emphasized that the potential consequences of this decision have been exaggerated, affirming that the US’s overall presence in Europe remains intact. Within the context of the Trump administration’s strategic pivot from Europe to Asia and Latin America, Benjamin Jensen from CSIS proposes replacing large mechanized units in Europe with more cost-effective and rapidly deployable drone units. In Jensen’s so-called “substitution” model, NATO allies would provide tanks and infantry, while the US supplies reconnaissance, strike, and electronic warfare [UAVs](/en/detay/uav-and-uas-systems-f5951/llms.txt). This approach would reduce costs and enable rapid deployment of mobile drone brigades to countries like Poland during crises. The model envisions rotating smaller, more flexible units of around 250 personnel equipped with approximately 500 FPV UAVs and octocopters, replacing traditional thousand-person heavy battalions. Jensen highlights the importance of enhancing the survivability of “MALE” (medium altitude, long endurance) class UAVs due to their ability to remain airborne for 24 hours and carry heavy munitions like Hellfire. He also notes that establishing new drone units within the US National Guard would reduce costs and provide flexible combat capabilities for distant regions such as the Pacific. If Washington transforms its European commitment into a more “unmanned” structure, it could simultaneously signal its continued commitment to allies on the continent and respond to domestic political pressures by reducing military personnel. Such an approach could allow the US to maintain its global responsibilities while achieving a more manageable cost structure. However, the implications of this transformation for deterrence and power projection remain an open debate. While the rapid deployability and intense firepower of unmanned systems are significant, it is still unclear how much they strengthen the perception of “resolve” in the eyes of adversaries. Therefore, the political signaling value of unmanned options must be carefully evaluated alongside their military effectiveness. ### **Is the EU Pursuing the Wrong Strategy in Drone Defense?** An opinion piece in Reuters argues that the European Union is pursuing the wrong strategy in drone defense. In response to growing Russian threats, the EU has unveiled a new “Defense Preparedness Roadmap.” According to Pierre Briancon’s analysis in Reuters, this plan reveals that Brussels has missed its target on drone defense, one of the most critical components of modern warfare. The analysis contends that the European Commission’s initiative fails in three key areas. First, the analysis criticizes the choice of institutional framework. The EU is not the right platform for a common defense policy. Officially neutral members such as Ireland and Austria, and countries far from the front line like Spain, have little incentive to incur high expenditures. More importantly, two key NATO members with significant military power—Britain and Norway—are not EU members and thus fall outside this plan. According to Briancon, the “coalition of the willing” previously mentioned by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer could have served as a more natural platform for such initiatives. Second, the funding model is deemed flawed. The plan expects the seven countries closest to Russia—the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania—to bear the full cost of a “drone wall.” According to the analysis, these nations’ combined defense spending (65 billion euros) is already very high. The analysis argues that a significant portion of this burden should be shared directly by the entire bloc, for example through common EU borrowing. Finally, the plan ignores Ukraine’s expertise. Kiev has become Europe’s primary supplier of small UAVs, with nearly 100 domestic manufacturers. The lessons of war have transformed Ukraine into a formidable FPV power. According to President Zelensky, Ukraine produces four million drones annually and could double that output with sufficient funding. The analysis argues that Brussels should focus on funding this vast, battle-tested industry. This would enable Ukraine to better defend itself and generate revenue by selling combat-ready systems to neighboring countries. Various opinions exist on this issue. Ultimately, the widespread consensus is that Western Europe’s air defense systems are critically inadequate against “small, slow, low-flying threats and drone swarms.” To fill this critical gap, countries like Germany may turn to Türkiye. Indeed, a senior bureaucrat from BAAINBw, Germany’s defense equipment procurement agency, told DW Turkish that Berlin must pursue cooperation with [Türkiye’s defense industry](/en/detay/baykar-technology-39fd9/llms.txt). The official emphasized that Türkiye is “quite advanced” in this field and stressed the urgency of establishing contacts and closely examining the matter as soon as possible.