--- title: #12 Gray Area slug: 12-gray-area-896b8 url: /detay/12-gray-area-896b8 type: blog language: English entity: primary: #12 Gray Area type: blog categories: - name: Politics And International Relations slug: siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler url: /kategori/siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler tags: - influenza area author: KÜME Vakfı created_at: 2026-07-23T14:40:47.735147+03:00 updated_at: 2026-07-23T14:40:47.735165+03:00 image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/q1xsTlLZ7w4T21VgsSBphxRSaafsSLVt.jpeg --- # #12 Gray Area ## Article Content ### **The United States’ Rare Earth Elements Diplomacy** In recent days, the [United States](/en/detay/amerika-birlesik-devletleri-c691a/llms.txt) has taken three significant steps in the field of [rare earth elements](/en/detay/rare-earth-elements-01789/llms.txt). First, at the C5+1 summit held at the White House with leaders of five Central Asian countries, investment agreements were signed to advance cooperation in rare earth elements. Subsequently, the United States signed successive similar agreements with Indo-Pacific nations. Finally, last week, during a meeting with [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman](/en/detay/suudi-arabistan-veliaht-prensi-muhammed-bin-selman/llms.txt), Trump announced the U.S.–Saudi Arabia Strategic Framework, which highlights cooperation in rare earth elements. These three developments reveal that the United States is establishing a new geo-economic architecture aimed at breaking its dependence on China. Today, China controls approximately 70 percent of global mining of rare earth elements and over 90 percent of their processing capacity. These elements are used across a wide range of applications, from defense industries to electric vehicles. Meanwhile, the United States imports 80 percent of its [rare earth elements](/en/detay/nadir-toprak-elementleri/llms.txt) and remains heavily reliant on China for the majority of its supply. The United States’ first move in the rare earth elements sector came through agreements with Central Asian countries. At the C5+1 summit involving five Central Asian nations—[Kazakhstan](/en/detay/kazakistan-3/llms.txt), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—trade restrictions dating back to the Cold War were lifted, and joint investment and cooperation commitments were made in rare earth minerals. Following Traxys’ $1 billion mining agreement with Uzbekistan, the United States and Kazakhstan announced a comprehensive trade package worth $17 billion. Among its notable components are orders for Boeing 787-9 aircraft valued at $7 billion for Air Astana and investments in railway infrastructure. Beyond trade agreements, Kazakhstan became the latest country to join the [Israel](/en/detay/israilin-irana-yonelik-saldirilari-haziran-2025-d3/llms.txt)-backed [Abraham Accords](/en/detay/2020-yili-ibrahim-anlasmalari-74c23/llms.txt). Although the two countries have maintained diplomatic relations since 1992, Kazakhstan’s formal accession to this initiative symbolically supports Trump’s efforts to revive the Abraham Accords, which were presented as a diplomatic success during his first term. The United States’ second major initiative in the rare earth elements sector has taken shape in the Indo-Pacific region. New agreements signed consecutively with [Australia](/en/detay/iran-3/llms.txt), Japan, [Malaysia](/en/detay/guneydogu-asya-uluslar-birligi/llms.txt), and Thailand constitute a comprehensive effort to reconfigure regional supply chains. This framework is viewed as a critical pillar of the United States’ strategy to build alternative centers of production and systematically counter China’s regional geo-economic network. Under the agreement with Australia, both countries have pledged to invest $1 billion each in strategic projects over the next six months. The agreement with Japan, while less specific in terms of trade volume, is broad in scope. It centers on highly critical elements such as price stabilization mechanisms, streamlined permitting processes, geological mapping, recycling programs, and harmonized investment screening procedures. China’s economic influence in the region clearly explains the urgency of this countermove. Between 2005 and 2024, China invested over $10 billion in Australia’s mining sector. Chinese companies control approximately 75 percent of Indonesia’s nickel production capacity. The Kuantan Port in Malaysia functions as a critical logistical hub for China’s regional operations. Beijing has invested $69.4 billion in Indonesia, $37 billion in Malaysia, and $31.7 billion in Vietnam between 2005 and 2024, making it a decisive actor across much of the region’s mining, energy, and transportation infrastructure. On the third front, Washington has established a new strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. During talks at the White House, the two countries announced a new Strategic Framework covering heavy rare earth elements used in defense industries. Under this framework, the U.S. Department of Defense announced it will finance 49 percent of a new [rare earth element refinery](/en/detay/nadir-toprak-elementlerinin-saflastirilmasi-a1052/llms.txt) to be built in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia possesses some of the world’s most valuable rare earth reserves. The country’s “heavy” rare earth elements are essential inputs for the United States’ most advanced technologies, including fighter jets, missiles, and radar systems. Therefore, the new U.S.–Saudi partnership represents a strategic investment with direct implications for national security in terms of military capability, high-tech capacity, and energy transition. Viewed as a whole, Washington’s three initiatives clearly form complementary parts of a unified strategy. The Central Asian efforts aim to secure direct access to the extraction phase of critical minerals, while the new Indo-Pacific framework seeks to establish alternative centers for processing, refining, and converting these raw materials into intermediate products. The cooperation with Saudi Arabia serves to diversify the most strategically sensitive and high-value segment of the supply chain: the refining of scarce heavy rare earth elements. Together, these three pillars enable the United States to construct a multi-centered, geographically dispersed supply architecture designed to challenge China’s dominance across the entire production-to-processing chain. ### **Aid–Corruption Tension in Ukraine** [European Union](/en/detay/birinci-avrupa-birligi-orta-asya-zirvesi-2025-8228/llms.txt)’s new €1.35 billion aid package has intensified pressure on [Ukraine](/en/detay/abd-ukrayna-cidde-gorusmesi-2025/llms.txt) to implement reforms, while the resignations of the ministers of justice and energy amid a major corruption investigation have refocused attention on the “aid–corruption” equation. As [Russia](/en/detay/rusya-ukrayna-savasinin-3-yil-donumu/llms.txt)’s attacks continue, [Ukraine](/en/detay/ukraine-c00b8/llms.txt) now faces an increasingly delicate balancing act between securing funding and maintaining institutional credibility. The European Union’s €1.35 billion aid package to Ukraine brings to the forefront the question of how to balance financial support with anti-corruption efforts in Brussels–Kyiv relations. While massive financing is provided to a country at war, institutional oversight weakens and extraordinary powers expand. In response, the [EU](/en/detay/abd-ab-ticaret-anlasmasi-2025-7f7c0/llms.txt) approved the new aid with a clear warning: any backsliding on anti-corruption measures will put funding and the membership process at risk. The EU’s report classifies Ukraine among “strong reformers,” but it ties the sustainability of this category to the independence of anti-corruption institutions. Thus, EU aid has become a conditional mechanism shaping Ukraine’s post-war political architecture. Although Kyiv aims to complete negotiations by 2028, meeting EU standards is complicated further by the potential reaction from Russia. This tougher stance transforms the inevitable governance challenges Ukraine has faced during wartime into a strategic policy point for the EU. Brussels strives to ensure funds are used appropriately while simultaneously using them as a political instrument. Given that Ukraine’s reconstruction will require hundreds of billions of euros, its dependence on EU funds will persist in the coming period, granting the EU unprecedented leverage over Ukraine during its pre-accession phase. It is precisely within this aid–corruption equation that the recent scandal in Kyiv has further destabilized the balance. The resignations of Justice Minister German Galushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk, following allegations of large-scale corruption through the state nuclear energy company Energoatom, validate the EU’s concerns. The accusation that ministers diverted funds from energy budgets during wartime highlights the extreme strain on Ukraine’s institutional oversight capacity. While President [Zelensky](/en/detay/trump-zelenskiy-gorusmesi-28-subat-2025/llms.txt)’s demand for their resignations serves as a “confidence reset” message to both domestic public opinion and Brussels, it also constitutes an admission that Ukraine has not fully resolved its corruption problem. Brussels appears to have learned from the corruption issues that emerged after its rapid expansion in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in previous years. The EU now closely monitors whether aid reaches those who truly need it. In a country like Ukraine, where war conditions prevail, transparent distribution of funds is critical to preserving public trust in the state, ensuring the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, and sustaining social resilience. To prevent aid from being redirected by bureaucratic elites or local power networks, Brussels has imposed stricter conditions. This approach also aims to guarantee that civilians in Ukraine can access the support they urgently need. However, as conditionality strengthens, there is a risk that the speed and flexibility of aid will diminish. Therefore, for people living under the impact of war, it is vital that aid is not only monitorable but also operational without delay on the ground. Ultimately, one of the central issues in EU–Ukraine relations is the new power balance between aid and anti-corruption efforts. This balance will determine Ukraine’s success in post-war reconstruction and its path toward European integration. EU aid funds may be Ukraine’s lifeline, but they are also among the most powerful forces shaping the country’s future foreign policy trajectory and potential new dependencies. ### **How Secure Are Smart Cities?** Findings from tests conducted in Norway have triggered a new concern about technological security in Europe. It was discovered that electric buses manufactured by the Chinese company Yutong can be remotely stopped and completely disabled. Tests by the public transit operator Ruter revealed that Chinese-made vehicles grant manufacturers extensive access to their software, battery systems, and update mechanisms. What appears technologically as a practical “service access” carries entirely different implications in national security debates. The most critical aspect of this finding is that the risk is not merely a matter of “hacking.” The issue lies in the fact that a Chinese company directly controls access to the vehicles. This means that during any crisis, entire fleets of buses could be shut down en masse, paralyzing public transportation and turning it into a tool of political pressure. Socially, the issue runs even deeper. Over 300 Chinese-made buses are currently in active service in Oslo. Fundamental concepts such as public security, transportation continuity, and state capacity during crises are now intertwined with the geopolitics of product supply chains. Societies are living in an era where a single command can render the entire transit system inoperative—even if they are unaware of it. This development has reignited the long-debated European concept of [strategic autonomy](/en/detay/stratejik-otonomi-d1da1/llms.txt). New technologies such as smart cities, electric vehicles, and green transitions carry the potential to introduce new vulnerabilities into national security architectures. Similar risks are being discussed in Germany’s smart traffic systems and France’s rail infrastructure. Thus, the new technologies of the digital age are becoming mechanisms that generate societal fragility. Disabling the internet connection of Oslo’s buses to switch them into “localized control” mode is a short-term solution. The real issue is the extent of foreign digital dependency embedded in public infrastructure. This situation demands a comprehensive rethinking of an entire technological spectrum—from electric vehicles to power grids, from smart traffic systems to camera networks. Disabling public transit in a capital city can do more than cause a technical disruption—it can slow economic activity, reduce the mobility of security forces, and undermine public order. Moreover, such vulnerabilities may serve as silent cards on the table during international crises. Digital dependency is therefore increasingly becoming a matter of sovereignty. The possibility that a fundamental system like public transit could be used as a “card” in geopolitical tensions reveals that national security in the digital age extends far beyond physical borders.