--- title: #13 Gray Area slug: 13-gray-area-27b20 url: /detay/13-gray-area-27b20 type: blog language: English entity: primary: #13 Gray Area type: blog categories: - name: Politics And International Relations slug: siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler url: /kategori/siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler tags: - strategicandsecurity author: KÜME Vakfı created_at: 2026-07-10T11:38:12.875393+03:00 updated_at: 2026-07-10T11:38:12.875405+03:00 image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/6HPVfucVPe2oBgM6Ll6OeLG16Ou4Cbuy.jpg --- # #13 Gray Area ## Article Content #### **Iran: We Are Moving** [Iran](/en/detay/iran-2/llms.txt) President [Masoud Pezeshkian](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-president-says-capital-must-move-tehran-over-ecological-concerns) declared that due to deepening ecological crisis and water scarcity, [Tehran](/en/detay/tahran-2/llms.txt) can no longer sustain its role as the capital and that the country’s administrative center must be relocated. “We have no other option left,” said Pezeshkian, reigniting a debate that has been discussed in [Iran](/en/detay/iran-3/llms.txt) for years and bringing it back to the center of the national agenda. Moving the capital has been a recurring theme in Iranian history. Over centuries, the administrative center shifted between cities such as [Isfahan](/en/detay/isfahan-3/llms.txt) and Shiraz before being officially established in Tehran in 1786 by Agha Mohammad Khan, founder of the [Qajar Dynasty](/en/detay/kacarlar/llms.txt). The idea of relocating the capital from Tehran has been debated since the mid-2000s. Former Iranian President [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad](https://www.news24.com/evacuate-tehran-ahmadinejad-20100422) first proposed the move citing earthquake risks. Ahmadinejad’s proposal was later adopted by his successor Hassan Rouhani, who emphasized environmental concerns. In 2013, the [Iranian Parliament](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/24/iran-mulls-plan-to-move-capital-from-tehran) approved a proposal to relocate Tehran due to worsening water shortages. After a long period without concrete action, in January of this year, government spokesperson [Fatima Muhajerani](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501091082) announced that relevant institutions were revisiting potential relocation scenarios. Although approximately 18 million people live in Tehran, the city’s daytime population reaches 20 million due to commuters from surrounding areas. According to the latest reports from the Iranian Presidency, if current trends continue, Tehran’s population could increase by another 20 million over the next 30 years. This projection implies that the city’s infrastructure, transportation networks, and water and energy resources will be unable to cope with such a burden. The most urgent factor intensifying the debate over relocating the capital is [Iran](/en/detay/iran-f19ae/llms.txt)’s rapidly worsening water crisis. Scientists have long demonstrated that uncontrolled water use for urban consumption and agriculture has irreversibly depleted Iran’s groundwater reserves. Recent studies show that due to excessive groundwater extraction, Iran’s central plateau is sinking by 35 centimeters annually, resulting in the permanent loss of [1.7 billion cubic meters](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11086625/) of water each year. Rainfall across the country has also sharply declined. While the annual average should be 260 millimeters, last year it dropped to 140 millimeters, and this year it is expected to fall below [100 millimeters](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/02/iran-must-move-its-capital-from-tehran-says-president-as-water-crisis-worsens). Yet Tehran alone consumes one-quarter of the nation’s total water supply, placing the city in a critically unsustainable position. Reservoir levels are also at critical levels due to reduced rainfall. This summer, water levels in Iran’s 19 major dams remained between [3% and 15%](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/sep/21/we-must-change-how-drought-and-overextraction-of-water-has-run-iran-dry). With temperatures in some regions reaching 50°C, power generation at these dams became impossible. During this period, widespread [power outages](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/10/irans-triple-crisis-is-reshaping-daily-life) occurred across Iran, and the government’s appeals for water conservation triggered widespread public unrest. Iran’s water crisis also carries significant security implications. Last month, Israeli Prime Minister [Netanyahu](https://www.jns.org/netanyahu-israel-ready-to-solve-irans-water-shortages) explicitly addressed the Iranian people, stating, “If you change your regime, we will provide advanced water purification and recycling technology.” This statement reveals that water scarcity has become not only an environmental catastrophe for Iran but also a geopolitical vulnerability open to manipulation. Another structural crisis facing Tehran is air pollution. This issue has moved beyond being merely an environmental concern and has become a direct threat to public health and economic security. According to recent estimates from Iran’s Ministry of Health, approximately [59,000 people](https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/society/iran-air-pollution-linked-to-nearly-59000-deaths-last-year-health-ministry-official-says) (seven per hour) die annually in Iran due to illnesses linked to air pollution. The economic cost of these losses exceeds [17 billion dollars](https://www.newsweek.com/air-quality-will-kill-world-most-polluted-city-tehran-iran-11125555), surpassing Iran’s entire national health budget. Tehran’s geographical structure exacerbates air pollution. The city is squeezed between mountains, resulting in weak air circulation and the trapping of polluted air at ground level. This causes dense smog layers to form, especially during winter months, preventing toxic particles from dispersing for days. The situation is so severe that, as happened this week, school closures due to air pollution have become routine. Per capita carbon emissions in Iran stand at [9.03 tons](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/co-emissions-per-capita?tab=chart&country=~IRN), nearly double the global average. Iran’s climate policies are rated as “[critically insufficient](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/iran/)” in international assessments, indicating that current policies are far from reversing this trend. Despite limited new car imports, the country’s roads remain filled with aging vehicles, which remain one of the largest sources of pollution. Another factor accelerating the debate over relocating the capital is Tehran’s location atop two major [fault lines](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501091082). Experts warn that due to the region’s geological structure, the capital is extremely vulnerable to a major earthquake. This means Iran’s political, economic, and administrative center could be paralyzed in seconds. Given Tehran’s dense population, high-rise construction, and aging infrastructure, a major earthquake would not only cause massive loss of life but also immediately halt state operations, constituting a national security risk. Beyond these threats, relocating the capital is also a strategic decision for regime security. In recent years, capital relocations across the Middle East, as seen in Egypt, have often been motivated by a desire to establish a more secure and controllable center away from political risks. Tehran’s crowded, protest-prone location makes the selection of a less densely populated and more easily monitored alternative a significant opportunity for regime stability in Iran. The most seriously discussed potential site for the new capital is the coastal region of [Makran](/en/detay/makran-ki/llms.txt) in southeastern Iran. Although the idea of moving the capital has been debated for years, Pezeshkian’s administration is the first to formally propose this region as a viable alternative. Makran is also viewed as part of a broader economic vision centered on regional development plans. Chabahar, located in Makran, holds strategic importance as Iran’s gateway to the ocean. In 2013, Iran and [India](/en/detay/asya-2/llms.txt) signed an agreement to develop the [Chabahar Port](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/energy-diplomacy/india-iran-sign-agreement-to-develop-chabahar-port/10490), with India committing $2 billion to the project. Although progress has slowed due to sanctions against Iran, Chabahar remains one of Iran’s most critical logistical hubs for connections to South Asia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. While Makran appears economically promising, its location in Sistan and Baluchistan Province—a region with a predominantly Sunni population and historically tense relations with the central government—poses serious security and infrastructure risks. Moreover, Makran’s existing weak infrastructure and limited state capacity make a large-scale administrative relocation both financially and operationally challenging. In addition, unlike Tehran, which is centrally located and considered “protected” despite Israeli attacks, Makran is more exposed to external threats due to its proximity to the Pakistani border and its open coastal geography. Therefore, relocating the capital to this region could create serious security gaps both domestically and in relations with regional countries, especially Israel. Moving the capital to Makran would also entail a massive economic burden, comparable to the environmental and security challenges. According to Iranian officials, the total cost of such a transformation could exceed [100 billion dollars](https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/02/18/iran-mulls-moving-capital-to-lost-paradise-on-southern-coast). Considering the construction of new administrative buildings, the complete rebuilding of infrastructure, and the relocation of government institutions along with their staff, this project could become one of the most expensive state initiatives in Iranian history. How Iran’s struggling economy will manage this cost remains a major question mark. #### **Fake Political Figures in the Digital Sphere** Last week, X’s (formerly Twitter) new “location transparency” feature revealed that many political accounts on the platform are actually managed from entirely different geographies. The update showed that hundreds of thousands of followers of accounts supporting or opposing Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement were being operated from countries such as Bangladesh, India, the UAE, Kenya, and Nigeria. While X’s product manager Nikita Bier claimed the data was [99% accurate](https://x.com/nikitabier/status/1992820294864732411), many of these accounts were found to immediately change their names, update their profiles, or delete themselves after their locations were exposed. In response, X removed the feature from some accounts and announced a new update is forthcoming. Several accounts strongly supporting Donald Trump drew particular attention. The “America First” account, created in March and rapidly growing to over 65,000 followers, was found by X’s data to be [based in Bangladesh](https://www.businessinsider.com/x-shows-locations-users-about-this-account-2025-11). The account used the phrase “promoting good and resisting evil,” echoing a common Islamic moral principle, while identifying itself as “a former liberal who voted for Trump.” Similarly, the “Fan Trump Army” account, with over half a million followers and directly quoted by Donald Trump on his Truth Social account, was revealed to be [based in India](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj38m11218xo). After its location was exposed, the account’s owner updated its profile to describe itself as “an Indian who loves America, Trump, and Musk.” After it was revealed that the “Ivanka News” account, with over a million followers dedicated to Donald Trump’s daughter Ivanka, was being managed from [Nigeria](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj38m11218xo), its administrator shared the message: “We sincerely support the Trump movement even though we live outside the United States.” The account of 1.2 million follower Ian Miles Cheong, a prominent far-right social media figure, was also found to be [based in the UAE](https://www.forbes.com/sites/conormurray/2025/11/24/these-big-political-x-accounts-apparently-arent-us-based-exposed-by-new-x-update/). Similar patterns are evident among anti-Trump accounts. A 52,000-follower account identifying itself as “a proud Democrat” and “professional MAGA hunter” was found to be [based in Kenya](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj38m11218xo) and was deleted shortly after its location was exposed. Similarly, the “Trump Is My President” account was revealed to be managed from [Macedonia](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/x-new-location-transparency-feature-questions-origins-maga-accounts-rcna245487) and was quickly shut down. The same identity manipulation is also visible in pro-Israel accounts. For example, the “VividProwess” account, with nearly half a million followers and regularly posting anti-Palestinian content, was found to be [based in India](https://www.newarab.com/news/xs-new-feature-exposes-global-locations-pro-israel-bots). The account, which endorsed the destruction of [Gaza](/en/detay/gazze-aec2e/llms.txt), also produced propaganda content praising Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and promoting stronger India-Israel relations. While discussions often focus on social media’s role in misinformation or polarization, the influence of fake identities and anonymous bot accounts is frequently ignored. As shown, today a user thousands of kilometers away can construct a false identity—as a former liberal, a Trump enthusiast, a MAGA hunter, or an anti-immigrant American worker—and post content under that persona. Moreover, these digital identities, despite being completely detached from geography, personal experience, citizenship, or class context, retain the power to generate strong emotional responses. As a result, debates across digital platforms—from politics to sports—are sustained by the monotonous imitations of bots, forcing “real people” with more complex value systems to choose sides within this polarized environment. Thus, the digital world, once assumed to reflect real users, is increasingly becoming a network of echo chambers intertwined with identity manipulation. When the emotional foundation of the political sphere is manipulated, societal decisions themselves become susceptible to manipulation. In such an environment, the very essence of public discourse—the encounter and negotiation of diverse experiences—is nearly impossible. While X’s location transparency update has made this fragile structure visible, the issue goes beyond a technical “transparency” problem. The real question is who is using the digital sphere’s capacity to generate political legitimacy, with what motivations, and how. It remains an open question why users in less developed countries manage such accounts and what incentives they receive. All these examples show that the digital sphere is increasingly detached from the “real” external society, transforming into a medium dominated by globally manufactured caricature identities. In such an environment, the distance between the supporters of political rhetoric and those affected by political decisions widens, and public debates increasingly resemble simulations directed by artificial identities rather than genuine human encounters. #### **Surviving Under Rain and Fire in the Middle East** This week, the Middle East was shaken by two dark scenes in [Syria](/en/detay/suriye-2/llms.txt) and Gaza. In southern Syria, Israel’s heaviest recent strike killed [13 people](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp89k31krz4o). On the same days, torrential rains in [Gaza](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/heavy-rains-flood-dozens-of-tents-for-displaced-palestinians-in-southern-gaza/3753465) destroyed tens of thousands of tents housing Palestinians who had already been stripped of their right to shelter by Israel. These images, emerging from the destruction caused respectively by Israel’s direct military operations and the structural consequences of its genocidal policies, lay bare the chasm between Israel’s “security” narrative and civilians’ struggle for survival. The attack on the Syrian village of Beit Jinn, which killed children among others, was presented by Israel as a routine “militant operation.” But this explanation conceals the broader context: this operation constitutes a de facto violation of the demilitarized buffer zone, considered inviolable since the 1973 ceasefire. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel has quietly advanced in southern Syria, redrawing borders on the ground and eroding international agreements through military force. This approach reveals that Israel’s claim of ensuring security has become a practical mechanism deepening power vacuums in the region. Meanwhile, events in Gaza demonstrate once again that Israel’s genocidal policies persist even during so-called ceasefires. The collapse of dozens of tents and their being swept away by wind may appear at first glance as a natural disaster, but it is in fact the direct result of human-made destruction. Indeed, Gaza’s infrastructure has been almost entirely destroyed by Israel’s two-year-long bombardment. Nearly all buildings and roads have been leveled, and the majority of water and sewage lines are nonfunctional. As a result, rain is no longer a seasonal weather event but a direct threat to human habitation. Today, approximately 900,000 people who survived the attacks are struggling to survive amid mud and rubble. Across Gaza, 1.5 million people are fighting to survive without access to even the most basic needs: no electricity, no clean water, no healthcare, and Israel’s ongoing blockade is making these conditions worse every day. Although there is a visible difference between tents destroyed by rain and homes destroyed by bombs, what unites them is Israel’s systematic rendering of civilian living spaces uninhabitable. When these two events are placed side by side, it becomes clear that every step Israel takes under the banner of “security” generates new forms of insecurity for civilians in the region.