--- title: #15 Gray Area slug: 15-gray-area-0b13c url: /detay/15-gray-area-0b13c type: blog language: English entity: primary: #15 Gray Area type: blog categories: - name: Politics And International Relations slug: siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler url: /kategori/siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler tags: - SecurityStrategy author: KÜME Vakfı created_at: 2026-07-16T12:52:22.827119+03:00 updated_at: 2026-07-16T12:52:22.827129+03:00 image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/hm3BJEzJZGncsbXHlv9Ul5nyNCiKCdJQ.jpg --- # #15 Gray Area ## Article Content ### **Being American During the Trump Era** A series of developments in the [United States](/en/detay/united-states-of-america-1bfcf/llms.txt) have once again revealed that immigration and citizenship policies are directly tied to the imagination of the nation. Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review President [Donald Trump](/en/detay/donald-j-trump-a20c0fa4/llms.txt)’s executive order aiming to restrict birthright citizenship, while simultaneously introducing new measures requiring tourists eligible for visa-free travel to the U.S. to disclose their social media histories. In addition, Trump’s characterization of Somali-origin U.S. citizens such as Democratic Representative [Ilhan Omar](/en/detay/ilhan-omer-43b00/llms.txt) as “garbage,” and his description of Europe as “weak” on migration, have drawn attention as further developments fueling debates over immigration and citizenship in the U.S. These steps, framed around the themes of society and security, are shifting the discussion of “what it means to be American” onto legal, political, and cultural terrain. The case accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court, where conservatives hold a 6-3 majority and three justices were appointed by Trump himself, is based on an executive order signed by Trump on the first day of his second term. This order denies automatic citizenship to children born in the U.S. to parents who are undocumented or living under temporary status. Lower courts previously ruled that this order contradicts the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1868 to guarantee citizenship to former slaves and their children. This amendment is grounded in the principle of *jus soli*, which grants citizenship to anyone born on national territory, in contrast to *jus sanguinis*, the principle of citizenship by bloodline. The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision will set a symbolic threshold affecting not only future children but also millions of people currently in the U.S. who acquired citizenship by birth. Regardless of the outcome, the message is already clear: American citizenship is no longer an unquestioned status. Although these individuals are legally American, they are increasingly excluded from political discourse. Recent statements by Trump regarding Somali immigrants further illustrate the direction of this political rhetoric. Trump explicitly declared, “I don’t want them in our country,” and added, “If we continue to take garbage into our nation, we are on the wrong path.” He also labeled Somalia a “hellhole” and urged Somali-origin Americans to “go fix your country.” These actions are bringing the debate over “being American” back into the public sphere, more visibly than ever. While legal steps are taken to restrict citizenship rights, rhetorical exclusion of the U.S.’s “other” citizens continues. Thus, American citizenship, once seen as a beacon of hope for people from all corners of the world, is being reshaped by the Trump administration around a vision of security. While citizenship debates continue, U.S. border security is being redefined through digital data. Plans are underway to expand social media screening, previously applied to students and H-1B visa holders, to include citizens of countries eligible for visa-free entry. Under this new policy, individuals will be required to disclose their social media histories for up to five years. Trump defends the policy by stating, “We don’t want the wrong people entering our country,” emphasizing that this will function as a form of pre-screening. The proposed definition of “wrong people” includes those who, based on their social media history, advocate for, assist, or support foreign terrorists or other threats to national security, as well as those involved in illegal [antisemitic harassment or violence](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1dz0g2ykpeo). When considering cases in which individuals who participated in protests against Israel’s genocide in Palestine—primarily on university campuses—have been arrested on grounds of “antisemitism,” it becomes clear that these phrases in the draft law are open to extremely broad and ambiguous interpretations. In other words, being in America or being American is now only possible within narrowly defined boundaries. Moreover, Trump’s harsh rhetoric on immigration is not confined to the U.S. His recent statements about Europe frame migration not merely as a technical security issue but as a “civilizational crisis.” Declaring Europe “weak” and “decaying,” Trump directly links this to migration policies, portraying migrants as a threat to the cultural and political integrity of the West. Trump’s portrayal of migrants as a threat to Western cultural and political structures reflects an understanding reminiscent of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis. In this view, migration becomes a political issue framed by the imperative to “protect Western civilization,” placing debates over identity, belonging, and cultural superiority at the center. These steps taken by [Donald Trump](/en/detay/donald-trump-6142d/llms.txt) in recent weeks are justified under the banner of “national security.” As a result, the concept of security is increasingly intertwined with identity politics. Citizenship and even the right to travel are now evaluated not through individual actions but through origin, identity, and allegiance. The United States, long celebrated as a land of hope for immigrants and proud of its open society, is now veering toward an exclusionary national vision that places security above freedoms. ### **Russia’s Foreign Fighter Network** In recent days, Bohdan Okhrimenko, General Secretary of Ukraine’s Prisoner of War Coordination Center, announced that 136 foreign fighters from 37 different countries had been captured. Analysis of these foreign fighters reveals that the majority come from low-income countries, lured by promises of employment and legal residency. Russia is using this system, built on economic vulnerability, to meet its manpower needs in the war. Russia’s strategy on this issue is clear: compensate for declining domestic motivation and manpower by recruiting new fighters from abroad, often individuals driven by desperation. The UK Ministry of Defence revealed that Russia recruited over 1,500 foreign fighters between April 2023 and May 2024 alone—a figure that underscores the scale of Moscow’s military manpower shortfall. To the Kremlin, foreign fighters serve two purposes. On one hand, they fill gaps left by casualties; on the other, they are deployed as “expendable manpower” along the most dangerous frontlines. In short, although foreign fighters constitute a small numerical fraction within the Russian military, they are a critical indicator of how heavily the war’s sustainability now depends on external sources. What makes this picture even more striking is that Russia’s pool of foreign fighters draws from diverse global communities. Data shows Moscow targeting economically pressured populations, migrants, and students. North Korea leads the list. An estimated [12,000 North Koreans](https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kuzey-kore-rusya-saflarinda-savasmak-icin-asker-gonderdigini-dogruladi/3550346) have been sent to Russia to fight under a bilateral agreement. Another major source for Russia is Central Asia. According to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, at least 2,715 Uzbeks, 1,599 Tajiks, 1,190 Kazakhs, and 687 Kyrgyz are fighting on Russia’s side. It is also alleged that migrant workers from Central Asia are systematically deployed to the frontlines. These communities, due to both economic vulnerability and legal insecurity, are among the most easily targeted for recruitment. Belarusian fighters also stand out on the list. [1,338 Belarusians](https://united24media.com/latest-news/putins-foreign-legion-recruits-from-128-nations-fight-against-ukraine-13875) are fighting alongside the Russian military as a concrete manifestation of their country’s political support for Moscow. Another significant source is Africa. Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently revealed that over 200 Kenyans were deceived by Russia with promises of $18,000. Ukrainian officials report that over 1,400 Africans from 36 countries have joined Russian units. In addition to these countries, fighters from diverse regions—including Somalia to Syria, India to Nepal, China to Serbia—are also present on the battlefield. Another notable example is Cuban fighters. Estimates suggest that around [20,000 Cubans](https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-06-09/russia-recruits-cubans-for-the-frontlines-in-ukraine-its-all-been-a-scam.html) have joined the Russian military for various motivations. In parallel, Ukraine recently decided to shut down its embassy in Havana in response to these developments. There are also volunteers from Europe and the U.S. who have joined the Russian military out of ideological motives or simply in pursuit of adventure. One such individual is Michael Gloss, the son of a senior CIA official. Gloss joined the Russian military in 2023 and was killed in the ongoing fighting in Donetsk, despite all efforts by his family to bring him home. Russia’s recruitment of foreign fighters is also occurring in occupied Ukrainian territories. Russian security forces actively encourage young male students to enlist. Military career events held on university campuses, coupled with threats that those who refuse Russian passports will lose access to education or social benefits, have transformed these areas into systematic conscription zones. Moreover, there are allegations that in checkpoints across occupied Ukrainian territories, young men are being forcibly registered, and some are even taken from their homes and transported to mobilization centers. As a result, many Ukrainians are being forced to fight against their own country. This reveals that Russia is simultaneously using coercion and identity politics to enhance its military capacity in occupied regions. Digital advertising campaigns on social media platforms play a crucial role in Russia’s ability to access such a broad pool of foreign fighters. Last year, only 7% of recruitment campaigns targeted foreigners; this year, one in every three campaigns is aimed specifically at non-Russians. These campaigns primarily target Russian-speaking citizens of former Soviet states and populations in African countries. The second pillar of Russia’s foreign fighter network is its cultural institutions and diaspora organizations. Entities like Rossotrudnichestvo attract individuals through educational scholarships, vocational training, or visa facilitation, drawing them into official Russian channels. This process often begins as seemingly innocent cultural engagement but quickly shifts into a propaganda pipeline steering individuals toward “military career opportunities.” The harshest method is coercion through labor migration. Migrant workers in Russia face threats of losing their residency permits or citizenship rights. At least [20,000 Central Asian migrants](https://bcfausa.org/institute-for-the-study-of-war-russia-drafts-20000-central-asian-migrants-to-fight-in-ukraine/) have been forced into the Russian military through threats of deportation or revocation of citizenship. In this environment, where economic and legal insecurity converge, migrants are pushed toward the frontlines with virtually no alternatives. The promises Russia makes to foreign fighters quickly evaporate once they reach the frontlines. Many are initially offered non-combat roles such as construction, road building, logistics, or kitchen service—appealing opportunities for those motivated by economic hardship. Yet a significant number are thrust into frontline assault units after only a few weeks of accelerated training. All of this demonstrates that Russia is increasingly reliant on foreign manpower to sustain its war. While foreign fighters temporarily fill battlefield gaps, this reliance exposes the structural fragility of the war’s legitimacy and Russia’s military capacity. Thus, the network of foreign fighters emerges not as a sign of Moscow’s strength, but as a necessary, forced strategy to keep the war going. ### **The Year of the Defense Tech Unicorn** [According to Forbes data](https://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciapark/2025/11/28/thanks-to-drones-china-and-ukraine-a-record-number-of-military-startups-became-unicorns-in-2025/), 2025 was a landmark year for defense technology, marked by record investment and the reshaping of the global security architecture through an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Investors poured over $48 billion into defense-focused startups this year, highlighting the growing role of technology firms in modern warfare dynamics. Startups valued above $1 billion are termed “unicorns.” This year, ten defense technology companies achieved unicorn status, surpassing the total number of unicorns in the sector between 2010 and 2015. The combined valuation of all active defense tech unicorns today stands at approximately [$495 billion](https://www.techloy.com/global-defense-tech-startup-funding-hits-record-high-in-2025-as-the-sector-becomes-venture-capitals-new-obsession). This surge in startups reflects the transformation of the defense industry into a rapidly scaling global technology sector. Behind this shift are not only private capital but also state spending. Global defense expenditures have increased for the tenth consecutive year, reaching a historic $2.7 trillion last year—a 9.4% rise compared to the previous year. The United States leads global defense spending at 37%. Moreover, the proposed $1 trillion defense budget for 2026 confirms that the U.S. will maintain its dominance in this domain. This budget is 30% higher than in 2021 and 13% higher than last year. A significant portion is allocated to the Golden Dome missile defense system announced by Trump—$25 billion—and $34 billion for space-based military technologies. The U.S. 2026 budget explains why defense technology has become attractive and relatively “safe” for investors. As arms races accelerate, states are turning defense industry startups into long-term markets. Investors are now directing capital away from numerous small ventures and toward fewer, larger, and more ambitious projects. The [Russia-Ukraine War](/en/detay/russia-ukraine-war-ec710/llms.txt) has served as a critical testing ground for new unicorn startups. German-based [Quantum-Systems](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-drone-quantum-systems-ukraine/)’ drones are actively used by Ukraine. Similarly, Portuguese company TEKEVER’s drones have been deployed in combat, with claims that they contributed to the destruction of over $4 billion worth of Russian military assets, including two S-400 systems, over the past three years. In space, Stoke Space—a startup founded by former engineers of Blue Origin and achieving unicorn status this year—is developing an ambitious model aiming for 100% reusable rockets. This approach holds significant potential to influence not only the commercial dimension of space competition but also military space technologies. [Govini](https://state-journal.com/2025/07/23/govini-selected-as-a-core-partner-for-u-s-armys-next-phase-of-next-generation-command-and-control-ngc2/) has drawn attention with its AI-enabled weapons systems platform for the [U.S. military](/en/detay/amerika-birlesik-devletleri-c691a/llms.txt). The transformation in military technology also carries an ideological dimension. A new community of entrepreneurs clustered in El Segundo, California, known as the “Gundo bros,” consciously distances itself from Silicon Valley culture. This group embraces a more nationalist, ideologically conservative, and militarily oriented vision of technology, reflecting the technological legacy of the Trump era. All of this illustrates how entrepreneurs and tech companies are becoming increasingly direct actors in the global security equation. The rapid scaling of defense technology into a venture-driven entrepreneurial field simultaneously enhances state military capacities and inevitably raises the question of how far security can be surrendered to market logic.