--- title: #17 Gray Area slug: 17-gray-area-0dc50 url: /detay/17-gray-area-0dc50 type: blog language: English entity: primary: #17 Gray Area type: blog categories: - name: Politics And International Relations slug: siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler url: /kategori/siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler tags: - strategyandsecurity - GlobalOrder - IntellectualProperty - HumanitarianCrisis - StrategicAnalysis - EconomicSanctions - InternationalLaw - DataSecurity - Digitalsecurity - EuropeanUnion - Geopolitics author: KÜME Vakfı created_at: 2026-07-23T15:30:34.211042+03:00 updated_at: 2026-07-23T15:30:34.211055+03:00 image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/VLVt6bUWMD7cdhcFCmKprWGZyP0FFfam.jpeg --- # #17 Gray Area ## Article Content ### **Frozen Russian Assets and the Frozen European Consensus** Despite intense negotiations the European Union has failed to reach a common position on the use of 21 billion euros in frozen Russian assets since the invasion of [Ukraine](/en/detay/ukraine-e6348/llms.txt). [Germany](/en/detay/almanya-4/llms.txt) led member states advocating for the use of these assets to meet Ukraine’s urgent financing needs but the decision was not approved due to a veto by [Belgium](https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-shoots-down-eu-commission-offer-unblock-russia-assets-plan-ukraine/) the host country of Euroclear where the assets are held. In parallel EU leaders approved a 9 billion euro credit package to cover Ukraine’s financing needs for the 2026–2027 period. Yet the process triggered deep political divisions due to opposition from Hungary Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Thus the debate over frozen Russian assets has become a fault line simultaneously challenging the European Union’s legal boundaries and its geopolitical capacity. [Russia](/en/detay/rusya-federasyonu/llms.txt)’s frozen assets have moved beyond being a technical financial instrument and have become a property rights issue. Modern Europe built on the foundation of private property rights faces legal uncertainty regarding the handling of assets legally owned by Russia. This uncertainty highlights the tension between Europe’s commitment to support Ukraine and its reflex to uphold its institutional principles. Countries arguing that Russian assets should be used to finance the war assert that Ukraine’s urgent financing needs constitute a moral and strategic priority and that frozen assets represent a legitimate source for this purpose. In contrast Belgium emphasizes the inviolability of property rights the rule of law and the risk that using these assets would permanently undermine Europe’s role as a secure financial haven in the global financial system. The global dimension of this debate is at least as significant as the internal European dynamics. Although the majority of the 289.5 billion euros in Russian assets frozen since 2022 are held in Belgium Japan the United Kingdom [France](/en/detay/fransa-2/llms.txt) and Canada also hold substantial frozen Russian assets. Within the EU in addition to Russia at least 31 other countries including Iran Iraq Lebanon Yemen Libya and Mali have assets frozen amounting to tens of billions of dollars. The deadlock over frozen assets has pushed the EU to move forward with its 9 billion euro credit plan for Ukraine. Ukraine’s total financing requirement for 2026–2027 is approximately 13.7 billion euros with the bulk of this gap expected to be filled by the EU budget. Repayment of the loan would be possible only if Russia pays compensation to Ukraine. In other words the risk effectively rests on Europe’s shoulders. The objections of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the heads of government of Slovakia and the Czech Republic to the EU credit package for Ukraine carry the character of a broader challenge to the EU’s general stance. According to Orban although the package is presented as a loan Russia will never pay compensation and therefore the funds will never be repaid causing European resources to be exhausted in a prolonged war. Therefore Hungary together with the Czech Republic and Slovakia agreed to provide only political support for the package without financial backing. In addition French President [Emmanuel Macron’s](https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/macron-ukrayna-konusunda-putin-ile-gorusmenin-yeniden-gerekli-hale-gelecegini-belirtti/3775498) remarks suggesting the possibility of renewed relations with Russia demonstrate that there is no full consensus within Europe even on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. Greater financial support for Ukraine deepens internal European fragilities while the debate over using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine has placed Europe at the crossroads between legal norms such as private property and geopolitical interests. Strong support for the use of frozen assets risks dragging Europe toward an irreversible threshold in terms of international legal norms and financial credibility over the long term. The opening of debate on frozen Russian assets will prompt China Gulf states and other global actors to more seriously consider withdrawing their reserves from Europe. After all this issue is a clear test of whether the European Union will continue to position itself as a legal order that rigorously upholds its rules or whether it will transform into a power that bends its rules in response to geopolitical necessities. Time will tell. ### **National Security in France’s Advertising Market** A recent [investigation](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2025/12/13/how-french-spies-police-and-military-personnel-are-betrayed-by-advertising-data_6748453_13.html) revealed that using publicly accessible advertising data it is possible to identify the names addresses and daily routines of dozens of individuals working in France’s most sensitive institutions. These include intelligence officers senior police commanders special operations personnel soldiers stationed at nuclear weapons bases and workers at nuclear power plants. In the digital age debates over data security typically focus on state surveillance of citizens. Examples include the identification of protesters in Iran through their Instagram posts the tracking of Hong Kong demonstrators via location data or authoritarian regimes using social media platforms as intelligence tools. In this dominant framework the balance of power is clear: the state surveils and the citizen is watched. The visible side is the individual while the opaque side is the state. Within this framework surveillance is viewed solely as a tool of political power. Yet the situation in France reveals the inadequacy of this perspective because the same technological infrastructure is making state capacity itself vulnerable. Moreover the actors acquiring this data do not necessarily have to be foreign intelligence agencies or hostile hacker networks. A journalist an academic or any individual with basic technical knowledge can reach the same conclusions using simple techniques. At this point the nature of the data is also critical. The data in question are location-based advertising data typically consented to by users under the assumption that they have read and approved them as part of mobile applications. These data can reveal with high positional precision when and where individuals in sensitive positions are located which routes they take and their routines between work and home. When just a few data points are combined anonymity disappears entirely and the user’s identity emerges from the data. Furthermore the collected data can change hands multiple times and be sold to different actors. The security implications of this situation are particularly striking. For example using this data it is legally possible to monitor critical security information such as shift changes at nuclear power plants daily patrol routes of military personnel at bases and even the number of senior security personnel present at a given location. The potential for these data fragments to be combined and cause major security breaches is substantial. The core problem here is what is called the “*data broker loophole*”. States cannot directly collect certain types of data from their citizens or personnel under their own laws but can indirectly access them through private companies. The danger arises because foreign intelligence agencies and organizations can also exploit these loopholes. The European Union’s data protection strategy prioritizes individual privacy but this framework does not adequately account for the national security implications of such data. Previously it has already been revealed that advertising data enabled the tracking of [EU officials’](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-officials-location-data-up-for-sale-belgium-investigation/) movements. These investigations also expose how limited personal data protection rules in Europe are in practice. This development demonstrates that security debates in the digital age cannot be confined to the frameworks of privacy or individual rights. Data generated and circulated by the advertising market has the potential to expose even the most protected state domains. This once again confirms that control over data has become one of the fundamental determinants of national security. ### **The New World Disorder** The International Rescue Committee (*IRC*) has published its [Emergency Watchlist 2026](https://www.rescue.org/watchlist2026) report. The report not only ranks 20 countries at risk of worsening humanitarian conditions in the coming year but also reveals that humanitarian crises have now become structural. The IRC uses the term “[New World Disorder](/en/detay/yeni-soguk-savas-ad969/llms.txt)” (*New World Disorder*) to describe this phenomenon. This term refers to the unraveling of the post–World War II order based on rules international law and collective security. In its place a disorder has emerged in which multilateralism is paralyzed and civilians have become “legitimate” targets. In this new environment humanitarian aid funding collapses conflicts spread and crises no longer appear as temporary fluctuations but as permanent realities. At the top of this “new disorder” is Sudan which as in the past three years remains the epicenter of the largest humanitarian crisis ever recorded. Of Sudan’s 50.4 million population 33.7 million or about 67 percent currently require humanitarian assistance. In this respect Sudan most clearly illustrates what the New World Disorder means. Following Sudan are Palestine South Sudan Ethiopia Haiti Myanmar the Democratic Republic of the Congo Mali Burkina Faso and Lebanon. Although these countries are located in different geographic regions and historical contexts their commonality is that they host the harshest humanitarian consequences of global disorder. Fifteen of the 20 countries identified in the report are in [Africa](/en/detay/afrika-2/llms.txt) and the Middle East highlighting the geographic concentration of humanitarian crises. These 20 countries which are home to 12 percent of the world’s population host 89 percent of all people in need of humanitarian assistance. Moreover if current trends continue by 2029 more than half of the world’s extremely poor population will still reside in these countries. This reveals the extreme geographic concentration of humanitarian crises. One of the most alarming new practices of the New World Disorder is the direct targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure. A nearly 50 percent increase in attacks on schools this year is one of the most concrete indicators. The systematic Israeli bombardment of hospitals living areas and basic infrastructure in Gaza demonstrates how the most fundamental norms protecting civilians are eroding. Under these conditions forced displacement and migration have become permanent features of the global system. Today 71 percent of displaced persons are struggling to survive in low and middle income countries. Although migration remains a heated topic in Europe and North America the proportion of displaced people who reach these countries is extremely limited. In other words the global refugee crisis is a phenomenon in which the burden falls disproportionately on the countries with the fewest resources. Despite this entire picture the global humanitarian aid system is experiencing one of its most severe crises. According to the IRC humanitarian aid funding has shrunk by 50 percent. Yet today 40 million people worldwide face extreme hunger that directly threatens their lives. As needs grow funding is being withdrawn at an alarming rate deepening the system’s unsustainability. The main cause of this decline in global humanitarian aid is the cutting of funding to the [United States](/en/detay/united-states-of-america-76234/llms.txt) Agency for International Development (USAID) following the return of [Trump](/en/detay/donald-trumpin-kuresel-tarife-politikasi-ve-etk-13/llms.txt) to power. As of March 2025 83 percent of USAID programs have been terminated. The end of USAID programs has led to a surge in deaths in African countries due to hunger and epidemics. Although the termination of USAID funding and programs is often attributed to Donald Trump’s return to office similar cuts have been made by the United Kingdom Germany and France. This indicates that the issue goes beyond Trump’s personal preferences or ideological positioning and reflects a broader retreat of global solidarity as nations increasingly turn inward and focus on their own domestic concerns. The potential consequences of this trend point to a grim outlook. If the cuts to foreign aid budgets in the United States and European countries continue the world could see up to 22 million deaths by 2030. The majority of these deaths are expected to occur in areas directly linked to the humanitarian aid infrastructure such as inadequate access to healthcare malnutrition and epidemics. According to the report the political dimension of the crisis is clearly visible in the rising number of vetoes in the United Nations Security Council. Between 2016 and 2025 there were 49 vetoes compared to only 19 in the previous decade. With the United States vetoing resolutions on Gaza and Russia doing the same on Ukraine the Security Council has increasingly become an actor that freezes or deepens crises rather than resolving them. The New World Disorder shows that conflicts displacement and humanitarian suffering have become the norm rather than the exception. Genocides and humanitarian crises are now normalized while the international system has proven unable to prevent them and no longer seems to care. The question remains: how indifferent will societies and politicians become to suffering around the world and how long will this new world disorder endure?