---
title: #19 Gray Area
slug: 19-gray-area-bb958
url: /detay/19-gray-area-bb958
type: blog
language: English
entity:
  primary: #19 Gray Area
  type: blog
  categories:
    - name: Politics And International Relations
      slug: siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler
      url: /kategori/siyaset-ve-uluslararasi-iliskiler
  tags:
    - strategicandsecurity
author: KÜME Vakfı
created_at: 2026-07-10T11:24:28.733216+03:00
updated_at: 2026-07-10T11:24:28.733227+03:00
image: https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/01/13/qRczNTp3JLk8c7uysjE6zkwGvRcL0TUX.jpeg
---

# #19 Gray Area

<!-- CONTEXT: Article Content for "#19 Gray Area" -->

## Article Content

#### **What Does American Society Think?**

As [Donald Trump](/en/detay/donald-trump-6142d/llms.txt) approaches the end of his first year in office, public trust in him has clearly declined. According to various polls conducted in December 2025, Trump’s approval rating ranges between %36 and %44. According to a joint survey by YouGov and The Economist, Trump’s net approval rating stands at -%17, below the -%14 net approval level recorded during his first year in his previous presidency.

Polls by Rasmussen Reports, known for its relative closeness to the Republican Party and Trump, also do not reverse the overall trend against him. According to Rasmussen Reports, on the last day of the year Trump’s approval rating was %44, while his net approval rating was measured at -%15. Given that the net approval rating was -%9 at the end of September, the noticeable decline in support for Trump in recent months is striking.

Trump’s response to these poll results is equally striking. In recent months, Trump responded to low public support by stating, “My ratings may have dropped in the polls, but they have risen significantly among smart people.” This statement reflects Trump’s view that legitimacy does not require broad public approval but can instead be anchored in a select elite.

The idea that Trump’s support depends more on specific groups than on the majority of the public creates tension with the logic of democratic representation. This dynamic becomes clearer when examining the social distribution of Trump’s support and opposition. For example, among [Black Americans](/en/detay/amerika-2/llms.txt), disapproval of Trump reaches an overwhelming %85. In contrast, %48 of white voters approve of his administration.

When it comes to gender and age, Trump’s public support is observed to be narrowly confined within specific demographic segments. The approval rate among men is %45, while it drops to %35 among women. Similarly, support for Trump among those aged 45 and above is %45, but it declines with younger age groups, falling to %29 among those aged 18 to 29.

The economy is one of Trump’s weakest areas in public perception. %51 of the American public believes the economy is worsening, which directly contradicts Trump’s narrative of economic success and growth. Regardless of the indicators Trump promotes, voters are not convinced by their everyday experience. It appears that the economic performance narrative fails to mask the cost-of-living pressures felt by households.

On budget issues, Americans believe the government should increase spending in areas such as Social Security (%67), Medicare for the elderly (%63), Medicaid for low-income populations (%54), education (%62), the environment (%51), and the SNAP food assistance program (%46). Regarding military spending, %35 of the public supports increased expenditures, while %31 favor maintaining current levels.

The area where the American public expects the government to cut spending is foreign aid. %47 of Americans believe foreign aid should be reduced, while %25 think it should remain at the same level. Only %19 support increasing foreign aid, and among Trump voters this figure is just %5. These figures reveal the public backing behind Trump’s decision to cut USAID assistance.

Poll results also yield striking symbolic implications. Support for renaming the world-famous performing arts center in Washington, the Kennedy Center, as the “Trump–Kennedy Center” stands at only %18. Despite public backlash, this decision signals an attempt to transform historical and cultural institutions into personal branding assets under Trump.

Similarly, the announcement that a new class of warships will be named after Trump indicates that even military power is being integrated into symbolic identity-building. This step, unprecedented in the historically institutional continuity of the [United States](/en/detay/amerika-birlesik-devletleri-c691a,text:/llms.txt), demonstrates that personal branding has become central to Trump’s political identity. The legitimacy gap created by low approval ratings is being compensated not through political performance but through high-visibility symbolic gestures and strong appeals to belonging.

In foreign policy, Americans show limited interest in the Israel–Palestine issue. Poll results reveal that %42 of Americans consider the Israel–Palestine issue “only somewhat important,” while %20 consider it unimportant. This indicates that the issue has not yet become central to the American public agenda and remains overshadowed by more urgent domestic policy concerns for most voters.

However, a strong perceptual asymmetry stands out. %51 of the American public views Palestine as “unfriendly” or “hostile,” while %57 continue to define Israel as an “ally” or “friend.” These figures show that foreign policy preferences in the American public are largely shaped by entrenched narratives, while the humanitarian dimension of the issue receives limited recognition among the broader population.

Amid all these issues, the only matter on which a large majority of the American public agrees is the release of documents related to the Epstein investigation. %81 of the public demands that all files related to the [Jeffrey Epstein investigation](/en/detay/jeffrey-epstein-davalari-ve-epstein-dosyalari-f54e/llms.txt) be made public. This rare point of consensus across party and ideological lines reinforces a deep sense of distrust toward institutions and especially elites in the [United States](/en/detay/united-states-of-america-fd355/llms.txt).

The emerging picture shows that Donald Trump’s public support is confined to a narrow segment. Dissatisfaction with his performance on the economy, social spending, and symbolic politics reveals that his policies fail to convince diverse segments of the population. [Trump’s supporters](/en/detay/donald-j-trump-a20c0fa4/llms.txt) are increasingly concentrated within a more homogeneous and limited demographic framework.

On the other hand, the Epstein investigation points to one of the rare areas of cross-party consensus in American society, while also revealing that current dissatisfaction is increasingly directed at broader political and institutional elites. Although public opinion appears fragmented across different issues, this widespread discontent is likely to remain a critical factor shaping the course of [American politics](/en/detay/amerika-birlesik-devletleri-c691a/llms.txt) in the coming period.

#### **Gray Areas in Baltic and Black Sea Security**

As the international security architecture undergoes transformation, developments in [Ukraine](/en/detay/ukrayna-021b1/llms.txt) demonstrate that this shift is no longer exceptional. The newly appointed head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence service, Blaise Metreweli, emphasized a few weeks ago that Vladimir Putin is determined to export chaos globally. This assertion finds concrete resonance in the series of events unfolding in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia is increasingly adopting a security approach that moves beyond conventional military force, focusing instead on uncertainty and systemic vulnerabilities. This approach blurs the line between war and peace, shifting attention toward [gray zones](/en/detay/6-gri-bolge-c6170/llms.txt) and challenging the boundaries of law and deterrence. Consequently, conflict is increasingly directed not just at frontlines but at critical infrastructure such as ports and undersea cables.

One of the most striking areas of this conflict is the Baltic Sea. In recent days, Finland seized the Russian cargo ship “Fitburg,” suspecting it of damaging undersea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea. The fact that Fitburg, traveling from Russia’s St. Petersburg port to Israel’s Haifa port, was carrying Russian steel subject to European Union sanctions has further complicated the matter.

The presence of eight NATO countries alongside Russia along the Baltic Sea coast turns the region into an extremely sensitive area of direct contact. Therefore, any disruption to undersea cables is interpreted as a strategic signal from Russia. This is not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of similar events in recent years.

The Finnish authorities’ intervention against the Russian-linked oil tanker “Eagle S” in December 2024 remains fresh in memory. The tanker dragged its anchor for approximately 90 kilometers along the seabed, causing a total of 60 million euros in damage to five undersea cables. However, the Finnish court terminated the legal proceedings, citing that the incident occurred outside Finnish territorial waters and that intent could not be proven.

The most critical feature of hybrid warfare techniques is their ability to generate strategic impact just below legal and military thresholds. Infrastructure elements such as undersea cables, nuclear facilities, energy pipelines, and logistics networks have now become direct targets of war. Moreover, when these targets are damaged, the identity and intent of the perpetrator often remain in the gray zone, severely limiting states’ ability to assign responsibility and respond.

Similar hybrid warfare methods frequently appear in the Black Sea. Russia recently launched drone attacks on Ukraine’s Pivdennyi and Chornomorsk ports. According to Ukrainian authorities, two civilian vessels approaching the ports to load wheat were also hit during these attacks. Such strikes increasingly blur the distinction between military targets and civilian commerce, turning food supply directly into a security issue.

Ukraine’s three major ports—Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chornomorsk—have become essential lifelines for the Ukrainian population under wartime conditions. Each attack on these ports, which form a cornerstone of Ukraine’s economy, significantly affects global food security, as Ukraine is among the world’s major [wheat](https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/production/commodity/0410000) producers.

Turkey is also increasingly affected by this equation. It is known that Russia recently damaged three vessels owned by Turkish companies in the Black Sea, at least one of which was carrying food. As the long-standing neutral trade area in the Black Sea effectively shrinks, actors in the region become indirect targets of the conflict even if they do not directly take sides.

There are similarities between the undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and the ports and grain ships in the Black Sea. All these targets are civilian in nature, yet most attacks occur in [legal gray zones](/en/detay/6-gray-area-b7a63/llms.txt). This signals a fundamental transformation in the concept of security. Security now encompasses not only frontlines and conventional weapons systems but also infrastructure, trade, and food security.

It is necessary to return to the new MI6 chief’s warning that rules are being rewritten. Today, ongoing tensions across different geographies cannot be clearly classified as either war or peace. The real risk lies not in isolated attacks or sabotage, but in the normalization of such actions under a perception of impunity. In this new era, the definition of security must be fundamentally rethought.

#### **New Protest Wave in Iran**

The recent [protests in Iran](/en/detay/iran-protests-20252026-447ee/llms.txt), which have claimed the lives of [19 people](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kl56z2l4o), have reignited debate over the regime’s political legitimacy, as economic problems have surpassed the public’s threshold of tolerance. The Iranian rial’s record collapse to 1.42 million rials per [1 US dollar](/en/detay/abd-baskanlik-secimlerinde-salincak-eyaletlerin-on/llms.txt) became the symbolic threshold of this process. The rial’s value has fallen by more than %56 over the past six months, making long-standing economic hardships more visible and undeniable to the public.

The prolonged depreciation of the rial is increasingly felt in daily life, especially through food prices. Annual food inflation has reached %72, directly affecting not only low-income groups but also urban middle classes. This pressure, felt on supermarket shelves, pay slips, and rental costs, has moved the economic crisis from an abstract macroeconomic issue to the center of everyday life.

When viewed alongside economic growth figures, this situation becomes even more striking and suggests that the current crisis extends beyond a temporary fluctuation. Iran’s economy grew by %5.3 in 2023, declined to %3.7 in 2024, and in the past year, growth was limited to just [%0.6](https://www.imf.org/en/countries/irn). This economic stagnation has made the structural causes of social discontent more visible.

All these economic difficulties are compounded by the fact that Iran still faces some of the world’s harshest sanctions. Sanctions not only restrict foreign trade but also severely narrow the government’s monetary policy room. As a result, the government is increasingly deprived of effective tools to manage the deepening currency crisis while simultaneously containing rising social unrest.

Protests triggered by economic collapse quickly spread from Tehran to other cities across the country. Demonstrations that began in markets, the economic heart of the country, with shopkeepers closing their doors, have now moved to university campuses. The slogans raised during this period have increasingly taken on a political character beyond economic demands. At times, even [monarchist](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601039337) calls have been incorporated into protest chants.

The state’s response prioritizes framing the protests as purely economic demands. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged protesters’ economic grievances as “legitimate” but emphasized the need to “make clear the limits” to those causing chaos. This underscores the regime’s determination not to allow these demands to evolve into a political challenge.

Similarly, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s statement that the government must listen to protesters’ “legitimate demands” simultaneously opens a controlled space of legitimacy for demonstrators and signals that if protests acquire an “illegitimate” political dimension, security forces will swiftly respond.

Meanwhile, security institutions adopt a much harsher tone. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps describe the protests as a psychological war waged by foreign powers, claiming these powers are sowing seeds of [sedition](https://tr.irna.ir/news/86039469/Devrim-Muhaf%C4%B1zlar%C4%B1-%C4%B0ran-%C4%B1n-fedak%C3%A2r-savunucular%C4%B1-her-t%C3%BCrl%C3%BC-fitne) within Iranian society. This framework transforms the economic crisis from a structural failure into a security threat. Thus, public anger is presented not as the result of internal failure but as the product of foreign interference.

International reactions have also become part of the process. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has publicly supported every protest in Iran since the summer, once again declared solidarity with the Iranian people’s struggle. U.S. President Donald Trump stated that if peaceful demonstrators face violence, the United States will “come to their aid.”

These statements, while offering short-term symbolic support to protesters, ultimately strengthen the Iranian regime. Such external interventions enable the regime to revive its long-standing narrative of foreign conspiracies and reframe the protests as threats to national security. Thus, the domestic economic crisis is detached from popular demands and recast as an extension of geopolitical competition.

[The ongoing protests in Iran](/en/detay/iran-protestolari-2025-2026-55d27/llms.txt) signal that worsening economic conditions have severely eroded the regime’s capacity to generate popular political consent. While the Iranian government attempts to appease public anger by acknowledging the legitimacy of economic demands, it simultaneously redraws political boundaries through security-oriented rhetoric.