---
title: Cemal Pasha
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---

# Cemal Pasha

> Ahmed Cemal Pasha (1872–1922) was a Turkish staff officer and statesman who held various military and administrative roles during the Balkan Wars and World War I, and was one of the leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress.

<!-- CONTEXT: KURE Information Cards for "Cemal Pasha" -->

## KURE Information Cards

![](https://cdn.t3pedia.org/media/uploads/2026/07/20/0bfBeTJFmOiPKEhUmUDIIVkBwNNtVZpb.jpg)
*Cemal Paşa*

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Full Name | Ahmed Cemal |
| Date of Birth | 6 May 1872 |
| Place of Birth | Midilli |
| Date of Death | 21 July 1922 |
| Place of Death | Tiflis |
| Cause of Death | Armed assassination |
| Burial Place | Erzurum,Kars Gate Martyrdom,Beside the grave of Hafız Hakkı Pasha |
| Rank/Profession | First ferik,Staff officer,Army commander,Governor,Minister,One of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress |
| Education | Kuleli Military High School,Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şahane,Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi |
| Main Military Positions | Officer of the Second Army Fortification Construction Section,Chief of Staff of the Selânik Reserve Regiment,Inspector of Railway Lines,Inspector for Accelerating Military Road Construction,Officer of the Edirne General Staff,Commander of the Adana Composite Forces,Deputy Commander of the Konya Reserve Division,En Route Inspector and Army Administration Chief of the Balkan Wars,Guard of Istanbul,Deputy Commander of the First Army,Commander of the Fourth Army,Commander of the Hejaz Expeditionary Forces,Commander of the Syria and Western Arabia Army Groups,Commander-in-Chief of Syria and Western Arabia |
| Main Administrative Positions | Governor of Üsküdar,Governor of Adana,Governor of Baghdad,Guard of Istanbul,Minister of Public Works,Minister of the Navy,Deputy Minister of War,Deputy Minister of the Interior |
| Main Orders and Medals | Second Class Mecidiye Order,Ottoman Orders of Various Classes,Murassa Ottoman Order,Golden War Merit Medal,War Superiority Medal,Pour le Mérite Order,Iron Cross First Class,Léopold Order with Swords First Class,Red Eagle Order First Class,Croix de Fer Order First Class,Civil Merit Order First Class,Military Merit Order with Swords |

<!-- CONTEXT: Article Content for "Cemal Pasha" -->

## Article Content

**Ahmed Cemal Pasha (6 May 1872, Midilli–21 July 1922, Tbilisi),** an Ottoman military officer and statesman who held various military, administrative, and political roles during the final period of the Ottoman State and was among the leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress. After completing his military education, he served in various posts in Rumelia; following the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, he was appointed mutasarrıf of Üsküdar and later governor of Adana and Baghdad. His appointment as commander of Istanbul’s guard after the Bab-ı Ali Raid solidified his influence in central politics; subsequently, as minister of public works and minister of navy, he became one of the principal figures of the Committee of Union and Progress administration alongside Enver and Talat Pashas.[^1] 

[Cemal Pasha’s](/en/detay/cemal-pasa-fd68c/llms.txt) political ascent was based on the convergence of his military identity and his experience in provincial administration; from 1913 onward, he played a direct role in decision-making concerning internal security, foreign policy, the army, and government management.[^2] The defining period of [Cemal](/en/detay/cemal-pasa-2/llms.txt) Pasha’s historical identity was his tenure as commander of the Fourth Army during World War I, during which he exercised military and administrative authority over a vast region encompassing [Syria](/en/detay/suriye-2/llms.txt), Palestine, and the Hejaz. In addition to managing operations targeting the Suez Canal, he implemented various measures to strengthen state authority in the region, limit foreign influence, and establish a new administrative order suited to wartime conditions.[^3]

This period has been subject to diverse historical assessments due to the divan-ı harp trials and executions, settlement policies, community and tribal policies, efforts to combat famine and epidemics, the reorganization of educational institutions, and public works activities.[^4] After the Ottoman State’s defeat in the war, Cemal Pasha left the country; while active in Germany, Russia, and Afghanistan, he maintained contact with the National Movement and was assassinated on 21 July 1922 in Tbilisi alongside his aides Nusret and Süreyya Bey. His body was later brought to Erzurum and buried at Karskapı Şehitliği.[^5]

### Family, Education, and Early Military Service

Ahmed Cemal Bey was born on Monday, 6 May 1872, in Midilli. His father, Mehmed Nesib Efendi, a military pharmacist whose name is recorded in sources as Mehmed Nesib or Mehmet Necip; his mother was his father’s second wife, Binnaz Hanım.[^6] Information passed down within the family identifies Midilli as his birthplace, while the naval archives’ künye register and the *Bahriye Salnâmesi* list Çengelköy; the official translation published in 1922 and *Nevsâl-i Osmânî* record Istanbul as his birthplace.[^7] 

His father registered him in Istanbul’s population records rather than Midilli’s, listing their residence as house number 10 on Hasırcıbaşı Street in the Zühtü Paşa neighborhood of Üsküdar sanjak. Mehmed Nesib Efendi’s children from his first marriage were Şadiye; from his marriage to Binnaz Hanım, Cemal and Saffet; and from his third marriage, Fehime, Naciye, and Kemal.[^8]

From childhood, Cemal Bey showed an interest in a military career; it is reported that during games with friends, he formed military units and assumed command roles. Although his father initially wished him to become a physician, Cemal Bey chose a military career during the later stages of his education and was sent from Midilli to Istanbul to continue his studies.[^9]

After graduating from Kuleli Military High School in 1890, at the age of eighteen, he enrolled in the War School’s artillery class on 13 June 1890. There he studied military sciences alongside subjects such as railway construction, science, Russian, German, cavalry training, high construction, and oil painting; after three years of study, he graduated in 1893 as second in his class with the rank of second lieutenant.[^10] He then completed a two-year staff officer training program at the War Academy. The date of his promotion to staff captain is recorded in some documents as 28 December 1895 and in the official translation as 28 January 1896.[^11]

After completing his staff training, he began his first assignment in the First Section of the General Staff Office. After working there for approximately three months, he requested to be assigned to the Kırklareli Fortification Construction Section and was transferred to the Second Army on 18 March 1896.[^12] While stationed in Kırklareli, Cemal Bey married the daughter of Bekir Pasha on 19 February 1897, whose name could not be identified. However, his wife died shortly afterward during childbirth along with their child.[^13]

Following this loss, Cemal Bey’s health deteriorated; he requested a transfer from Kırklareli to Thessaloniki and was promoted to major on 3 March 1898. During this period, he became engaged to Seniha Hanım, daughter of Binbaşı Hasan Bey and Ayşe Hanım, nephew of the commander of the Serez Brigade; after arriving in Thessaloniki, he married her on 2 June 1898. From this marriage, he had four sons—Ahmed Rüşdi, Hasan Necdet, Mehmed, and Hasan Behçet—and one daughter, Kamran.[^14]

On 27 March 1899, Cemal Bey was appointed chief of staff of the Thessaloniki Reserve Brigade under the Third Army. In this role, he was involved not only in staff duties but also in the army’s supply and transportation activities. He organized the shipment of clothing, shoes, weapons, and ammunition from Thessaloniki’s warehouses and arsenals to Istanbul by steamship; in March 1905, he assumed responsibility for meeting the needs and arranging the travel of tribal members arriving from Yemen to Istanbul.[^15]

On 1 August 1905, Cemal Bey was promoted to lieutenant colonel and served for a time with the 5th Rifle Battalion under the Third Army. At the end of the same year, as armed bandit activity intensified in Macedonia, he was appointed commander of military detachments operating around Ustrumca, Alasonya, Koçana, and Doyran by an order dated 27 December 1905. After participating in patrols and skirmishes with cavalry units, he returned to Thessaloniki in early 1906.[^16]

In the first months of 1906, Cemal Bey was appointed inspector of the Thessaloniki line of the Ottoman Railway Company and additionally assigned as inspector responsible for accelerating military road construction. Although his exact start date cannot be determined, correspondence dated 8 April and 27 May 1906 confirms that he was serving in this capacity at those dates.[^17] His inspections focused particularly on the Drama–Nevrekop and Serez–Nevrekop routes. He inspected the quality of materials used in road and bridge construction, verified whether contractors fulfilled their obligations, counted workers and vehicles, and reported deficiencies along the routes to the Rumelia Inspectorate. Thus, he found an opportunity to apply his fortification and construction experience from Kırklareli on a broader administrative scale.[^18]

Shortly after its founding on 5 September 1906 in Thessaloniki, Cemal Bey joined the Ottoman Liberty Society; his membership date is recorded as September or October 1906, and he was registered as member number 150, becoming the society’s forty-ninth member.[^19] His position as railway inspector granted him broad mobility across Rumelia, facilitating his participation in the society’s organizational efforts. He played a role in establishing neighborhood-based units in Thessaloniki; on 26 December 1906, he traveled to Monastir to inspect a newly arrived rifle battalion and established contact with society members there.[^20]

At the initiative of Second Army Commander Nasır Pasha, Cemal Bey was temporarily transferred to the Second Section of the Second Army General Staff Office in Edirne in March 1907. At the same time, Kolağası Fethi Bey was assigned to the First Section. After a brief period in Edirne, Cemal Bey was recalled to Thessaloniki at the request of the Third Army Inspectorate and reassigned to a central position in the Thessaloniki General Staff.[^21]

In August 1907, he was sent to the five provinces of Eastern Anatolia to monitor security issues and track armed groups; after completing his mission, he returned to Thessaloniki. In late 1907, he worked alongside Fethi Bey and [Mustafa Kemal Bey](/en/detay/mustafa-kemal-ataturk-722184/llms.txt) in the same staff circle in Thessaloniki.[^22] Thus, before the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, he had served in diverse fields including staff duties, fortification, supply, transportation, road inspection, security, and organization.

### The Second Constitutional Monarchy and Administrative Appointments

By 1908, the process leading to the restoration of the constitutional monarchy was not solely the result of the Committee of Union and Progress’s activities. Sultan Abdülhamid II’s dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 1878 and the de facto suspension of the Kanun-ı Esasi, combined with economic hardship and territorial losses, had intensified dissatisfaction within the Union and Progress ranks. This was further compounded by armed activities of Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, and Albanian organizations in Macedonia and interventions by major powers demanding reforms in the region. The deployment of foreign gendarmerie officers in the vilayets of Salonica, Kosovo, and Monastir strengthened Ottoman officers’ fears that the region might gradually slip from state control. Cemal Bey, who knew the region well due to his duties tracking bandits and inspecting railways, joined the military Unionist cadre who believed that constitutional rule would strengthen state authority and neutralize separatist movements.[^23]

The meeting between King Edward VII of England and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia in Reval on 9–10 June 1908 became one of the key developments that triggered these accumulated concerns. Decisions regarding the partition of the Ottoman State and proposed new arrangements in Macedonia were interpreted by Unionist circles as evidence of an agreement between Britain and Russia over Ottoman territories. Thus, the historical significance of Reval was perceived by Ottoman officers and opponents as an imminent threat to the dismemberment of the state. This perception transformed the restoration of the constitution from a distant political goal into an urgent state matter requiring immediate action.[^24]

In this context, Kolağası Resneli Niyazi Bey, on 3 July 1908, took to the mountains near Resne with an armed group composed of soldiers, civilians, and deserters, demanding the reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution. The assassination of Şemsi Pasha, the First Ferik appointed by the central government to suppress the movement, by Mülazım Atıf Bey in Manastır on 7 July rendered the central government’s first military intervention ineffective. This was followed by the participation of Ohrili Eyüp Sabri and Enver Bey in the armed uprising, the detention of Müşir Tatar Osman Paşa by Unionists, and the reluctance of troops sent from Anatolia to act against the rebels. The movement in Firzovik, initially assembled to resist Austrian intervention, also shifted its demands to the restoration of the Constitution, gaining widespread support.[^25]

As the central government proved unable to control events in Rumelia, Union and Progress leaders concluded that the constitution could no longer be delayed. At a meeting held at Cemal Bey’s house in Thessaloniki on the night of 21 July 1908, it was decided that the constitution would be proclaimed two days later regardless of whether the sultan accepted it. After informing the organizations in Serez and Manastır, a telegram demanding constitutional governance was sent from Serez to Istanbul on 23 July; in Manastır, twenty-one cannons were fired to announce the restoration of the constitution. Faced with telegrams from various centers in Rumelia and the threat that the Third Army might march on Istanbul, Sultan Abdülhamid II accepted the reinstatement of the Kanun-ı Esasi on the night of 23 July; the decision was publicly announced in Istanbul the next day.[^26]

The reinstatement of the constitutional monarchy required the Committee of Union and Progress to establish direct contact with state governance. At the initiative of General Inspector of Rumelia Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the Society sent a seven-member delegation to Istanbul composed of Cemal, Talat, Cavid, Rahmi, Hakkı, Necib, and Hüseyin Bey. Upon arriving in the capital on 31 July 1908, the delegation discussed the formation of the cabinet, appointments to the Ministry of War, and the preservation of constitutional governance with Grand Vizier Said Pasha. Although the Unionists had not yet assumed direct responsibility for government, they demonstrated their intention to oversee state administration from outside by securing the appointment of their close ally Recep Pasha to the Ministry of War.[^27] Cemal Bey’s rank was also elevated during this period to kaymakamlık, equivalent to staff colonel; the official translation prepared by the Ministry of National Defense records his promotion date as 10 August 1908.[^28]

After his contacts in Istanbul, Cemal Bey returned to Thessaloniki and was selected in early 1909 as a member of the proposed Heyet-i Islahiye, tasked with investigating land disputes between Turks, Kurds, and Armenians in the eastern provinces. The commission’s chairmanship was assigned to Ayan Meclisi member and judicial inspector Galib Bey; staff captain Zeki Bey and Cemal Bey were appointed as Turkish members. However, the appointment was delayed for months after eastern Anatolian deputies argued that such a commission would interfere with the constitutional authority of provincial governors. While Cemal Bey waited in Istanbul, the 31 March Incident erupted, and the commission’s dispatch was entirely abandoned; thus, contrary to some brief biographies, Cemal Bey did not travel to eastern Anatolia with this commission.[^29]

During the months the commission was delayed, the optimistic atmosphere following the restoration of the constitution rapidly gave way to political polarization. Although the Committee of Union and Progress was not officially in government, it sought to influence decisions through its influence over the army, parliament, and bureaucracy; this form of “indirect power” was criticized by both the government and the opposition. The Ottoman Freedom Party, founded by supporters of Prince Sabahaddin, and newspapers such as *İkdam*, *Sabah*, *Serbesti*, *Mizan*, and *Sada-yı Millet* mounted increasingly fierce opposition to the Society’s pressure on the government. [Kâmil Paşa](/en/detay/kibrisli-kamil-pasa/llms.txt)’s government and the Committee of Union and Progress experienced a particularly sharp struggle for influence over the army and foreign policy, which intensified after Kâmil Paşa was removed from office in February 1909.[^30]

The polarization of politics within the army created the military foundation for the 31 March Incident. The perception that academy-trained officers looked down on regimental officers, combined with purges in the military and oaths of loyalty to political societies, generated unrest among officers and soldiers. The weakening of discipline among the Avcı battalions brought from Thessaloniki to Istanbul to protect the constitutional order also made an armed uprising possible. During this time, the newspaper *Volkan*, published by Derviş Vahdeti, and the İttihad-ı Muhammedî Society, founded on 3 April 1909, developed a discourse uniting religious demands with opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress. The assassination of Hasan Fehmi, chief editor of *Serbesti*, on the night of 6 April on Galata Bridge, and the failure to apprehend the killer, widely reinforced the belief that the assassination was carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress, transforming tension into open conflict. Therefore, the 31 March Incident must be understood not merely as a movement driven by religious demands but as a multi-layered crisis combining a struggle for power, internal army conflicts, the weakening of government authority, and societal resistance to change.[^31]

On the night of 12 April 1909, soldiers belonging to the Avcı battalions in Istanbul incapacitated their officers and gathered in front of the Chamber of Deputies building in Ayasofya. In the Rumi calendar, this date corresponded to 31 March 1325, hence the uprising became known as the “31 March Incident”; the soldiers demanded guarantees that they would not be punished, the resignation of the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha government, the removal of the president of the Chamber of Deputies Ahmed Rıza, and the replacement of certain academy-trained officers. The government’s choice of advice and conciliation over military intervention failed to prevent the uprising’s spread; some academy-trained officers were killed, Lazkiye Deputy Emir Arslan Bey and Minister of Justice Nâzım Paşa were lynched by mistaken identity, and the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha government resigned.[^32]

At the time the uprising began, Cemal Bey was in the vicinity of Istanbul due to his planned assignment to the eastern Anatolian commission. During the crisis, he moved from Gebze to Ayastefanos and then to Ispartakule and Hadımköy, where the vanguard units of the Action Army assembled to suppress the rebellion.[^33] Upon hearing news that the constitutional order in Istanbul had collapsed, it was decided to form a force within the Third Army; the first units departed on 14–15 April under the command of Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha and according to a plan prepared by Chief of Staff Mustafa Kemal Bey. Third Army Commander Mahmud Şevket Pasha departed from Thessaloniki on 21 April and arrived in Ayastefanos the next day, assuming overall command of the army.[^34]

On 18 April, Cemal Bey, together with Hasan İzzet and Selahattin Bey, sent a telegram to the Committee of Union and Progress Central Committee requesting that deputies who had fled to Thessaloniki—Hüseyin Cahit, Cavid, Rahmi, and Karasu—come to Hadımköy. On the same day, he met with İzzet and Çürüksulu Mahmud Pashas, and later with Talat and Dr. Nâzım Bey, to evaluate the political framework of the intervention. As a result of these meetings, Cemal, Talat, and Dr. [Nâzım Bey](/en/detay/nazim-bey/llms.txt) drafted a report dated 19 April proposing: advancing the troops to the Ayastefanos–Kalfaköy line, ensuring the neutrality of the Hassa Army in Istanbul, issuing proclamations to the public and seminary students, forming a delegation to negotiate with the government and the Chamber of Deputies, declaring martial law, and establishing courts to try the rebels. Thus, Cemal Bey emerged as one of the coordinators who sought to align the Action Army’s military operations with the political objectives of the Committee of Union and Progress, rather than as one of the officers who prepared the military campaign plan.[^35]

After Mahmud Şevket Pasha assumed command, Cemal Bey joined the Action Army alongside Enver, Niyazi, Remzi, and Selahattin Bey. The troops entered Istanbul on the night of 23–24 April; the Ministry of War and other major official buildings were brought under control, and resistance encountered in some barracks, notably Taşkışla, was suppressed. Martial law was declared on 25 April; on 27 April, the Meclis-i Umumi, composed of the councils of Âyan and Mebusan, gathered in Ayastefanos and decided to depose Sultan Abdülhamid II and install [V. Mehmed Reşad](/en/detay/mehmed-v/llms.txt) as the new sultan.[^36]

After order was restored in Istanbul, Cemal Bey was appointed as a member of the Divan-ı Harb-i Örfî with the rank of staff colonel under the chairmanship of Ferik Hurşid Pasha. The court tried soldiers who participated in the uprising, members of the İttihad-ı Muhammedî Society, and individuals linked to the events; on 21 June 1909, the court members, including Cemal Bey, prepared a detailed report on the causes of the uprising and the actions of the accused.[^37] However, no evidence was found to support the claim that the uprising had been orchestrated by Abdülhamid II. The trust gained during the uprising and his role on the Divan-ı Harb-i Örfî accelerated Cemal Bey’s transition from military to civilian administration. Upon the recommendation of the Third Army and the Action Army, he was appointed mutasarrıf of Üsküdar; the official translation records his start date as 19 May 1909.[^38] 

While serving as mutasarrıf of Üsküdar, the administrative crisis caused by the Muslim–Armenian clashes that began on 14 April 1909 in Adana and its surroundings had not yet ended. The clashes resulted in the deaths of thousands, the burning of neighborhoods, and the orphaning of many children and the homelessness of families; the existing provincial administration proved inadequate in investigating the perpetrators, ensuring security, and conducting relief efforts. Following the summons of Adana Governor Mustafa Zihni Pasha to Istanbul, Cemal Bey was appointed interim governor of Adana by an irade dated 1 August 1909; his appointment was confirmed as permanent on 2 October after his work.[^39]

Upon arriving in Adana, Cemal Bey first summoned Muslim and Christian notables, ulema, and representatives of Armenian and Syriac churches to meetings, urging an end to mutual hostility. In his proclamations, he declared that relief and reconstruction efforts would be carried out without distinction between Muslims and Armenians. This approach aimed to rebuild trust between communities while reinforcing the idea of a shared Ottoman citizenship above religious and communal affiliations.[^40]

On 29 August 1909, the Adana Provincial Construction and Relief Commission, chaired by Cemal Bey, organized the reconstruction of burned homes, shops, schools, churches, and other buildings. In addition to government aid, Cemal Bey was granted a credit of 200,000 liras; half of this amount was allocated for the construction of destroyed Muslim and Armenian homes and businesses, while the other half was provided as ten-year loans to merchants, artisans, and farmers. Separate commissions were established to find employment for the unemployed, support destitute women, conduct health screenings, and shelter orphans; until permanent orphanages were completed, children were placed in rented houses in Adana, Haçin, Dörtyol, Mersin, and surrounding areas.[^41]

The reconstruction and relief efforts were completed with the reorganization of the security apparatus. Gendarmerie officers brought from Istanbul were assigned to battalions in Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, and Silifke; a gendarmerie school was planned to be opened in Adana to train local gendarmes. Although Cemal Bey’s administration sometimes employed harsh measures, it played a decisive role in restoring daily life in the city. The British consulate’s report dated 23 February 1910 noted that *“general security was good,”* trade had revived, destroyed homes had been rebuilt, and the governor was admired by various segments of society.[^42]

After order was largely restored in Adana, Cemal Bey was appointed governor of Baghdad by an irade dated 14 June 1911. This appointment was not merely a routine transfer: the restoration of Ottoman authority in Baghdad, the limitation of British influence, the regulation of relations between tribes and the central government, and the economic development of the region were all expected. With a mazbata prepared by the Council of Ministers on 18 July, Cemal Bey was granted authority to replace civil and judicial officials (except those appointed by religious law), coordinate reforms in Baghdad and Basra, reorganize the gendarmerie and police forces, draft plans for tribal settlement, and utilize the 40,000 liras allocated for roads and irrigation canals. These arrangements effectively positioned him as a regional governor with authority over Baghdad, Basra, and partially Mosul.[^43]

In Baghdad, Cemal Bey first addressed unfinished public works projects, seeking credit for roads, canals, municipal infrastructure, and transportation investments. He believed that poverty and administrative inadequacy weakened state authority and that lasting order could not be established through military measures alone. In contrast, his stance toward local power centers and foreign influence, which he viewed as rivals to central authority, was more forceful. A British consulate report recording his inaugural speech noted his statement that *“the hand extending from the south must be blocked,”* referring to the growing British influence in Basra.[^44]

This stance led to two major disputes with the British Consulate in Baghdad in 1912. First, he opposed the British consul’s appointment of official uniformed personnel to guide Indian Shiites traveling to Najaf, Kerbela, and Samarra, viewing it as an attempt to institutionalize British influence within the Ottoman administrative structure and prevented these officials from operating. He then opposed the consulate’s establishment of a court in Kâzımiye and its appointment of local muhtars; he declared he would resign if these practices were not revoked. After negotiations in May 1912, the court and muhtar appointments were abolished, and the official titles of the persons appointed by the consulate were revoked.[^45]

However, Cemal Bey’s governance in Baghdad was not limited to public works and resistance to foreign influence. Complaints were made that he used his position to support Committee of Union and Progress candidates in the 1912 elections, restricted the activities of the Freedom and Accord Party candidates, and closed the party’s Baghdad branch in the final days of his governorship.[^46]

The Albanian Revolt, pressure from the Halâskâr Zâbitân Group, and the strengthening of opposition in the Chamber of Deputies led to the fall of Said Pasha’s government in July 1912; on 22 July, the “Grand Cabinet” under the leadership of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was formed. As the new government began removing Unionist cadres from office, Cemal Bey resigned from his post as governor of Baghdad, stating he could not serve under a government whose political views he did not share. The exact date of his resignation is not clear in the documents; it is understood to have been issued between 22 July and 3 August, and Cemal Bey remained in the province until departing Baghdad on 13 August after handing over his duties. His return to Istanbul temporarily ended his civilian administrative career; the outbreak of the Balkan Wars redirected him back to direct military service.[^47]

### The Balkan Wars, the Bab-ı Ali Raid, and the Istanbul Guard

Returning to Istanbul from Baghdad in August 1912, Cemal Bey sought to re-enter military service as the Ottoman State was drawn into war with the Balkan League. After submitting an application to the Ministry of War on 1 October declaring he would not accept a civilian post, he was appointed commander of the Konya Reserve Brigade on 3 October 1912; the official translation records this appointment as dated 4 October. The brigade, composed of the Konya, Seydişehir, and Karaman reserve battalions, was attached to the Eastern Army under the command of [Abdullah Pasha](/en/detay/abdullah-pasa-kolemen/llms.txt). However, since three of the nine battalions were stationed in Yemen, the actual force under Cemal Bey’s command was limited to six reserve battalions and a small artillery component.[^48]

After sending orders to accelerate the preparation of his units in Konya, Cemal Bey met with Hakkı Pasha, commander of the Ninth Corps, in Çerkezköy. He observed that mobilization was incomplete and no viable operational plan had yet been prepared, revealing the organizational and logistical problems he would face at the outset of the war. The first units of the Konya Reserve Brigade reached the village of Büyük Manika near Saray on 16 October, and Cemal Bey assumed command of his forces; he was promoted to brigadier general on 19 October. Due to the inadequacies of the reserve units in training, officer cadres, weapons, provisions, and transportation, he needed to maintain constant contact with commanders at the front and especially organize rear services.[^49]

The defeats suffered by the Eastern Army, the main Ottoman force in Eastern Thrace, at the battles of Kırkkilise and Pınarhisar–Lüleburgaz completely changed the nature of Cemal Bey’s mission. Rather than managing organized offensives or defenses, he now struggled to regroup disintegrating units and control retreats. The Eastern Army Command assigned him on 24 October the task of organizing the withdrawal from the Kırkkilise–Vize line; on 3 November, he joined the Fourth Corps with the remaining forces of his brigade and reached Istranca on 6 November. He was then appointed commander of the Fourth Regular Brigade on 10 November, tasked with defending the Yassıviran–Uzunlu and Nakkaşköy–Mahmudpaşa lines. During this time, he worked to prepare defensive positions and reorganize soldiers weakened by hunger and fatigue.[^50]

Cemal Bey summarized his observations on the defeat in a six-point report submitted to the Third Corps Command on 6 November 1912. He cited the poor execution of mobilization, inadequate roads and medical services, officer shortages in reserve battalions, soldiers’ inability to use weapons, lack of communication between units, and the absence of pre-determined retreat directions as causes of the defeat. In describing the condition of the reserve soldiers, he used the phrase *“more than two-thirds of the men had never fired a weapon.”* As a solution, he recommended gathering the disintegrated units behind the Çatalca line, completing their provisions and equipment, repairing their weapons, and fortifying the defensive line with barbed wire, projectors, and lighting. Thus, the report was not merely a critique of the war’s management but a comprehensive set of measures for reorganizing the retreating army.[^51]

However, the organizational chaos in the army was compounded by epidemics. Cemal Bey, who contracted cholera, collapsed from his horse while inspecting positions on 14 November; the next day, his condition worsened and he was taken to Hadımköy. After initial treatment at his brother-in-law’s house, he was transported to Istanbul on a special train on 16 November. His illness removed him from the later stages of the Çatalca defense; however, he recovered quickly and resumed his duties.[^52]

Before fully recovering, Cemal Bey was arrested on 5 December 1912 as part of the Kâmil Paşa government’s investigation into members of the Committee of Union and Progress and brought before the Martial Law Court. After approximately eight hours in custody, he was released; he then returned to the Fourth Regular Brigade in Çatalca. Although he was reportedly appointed on 26 December as Istanbul’s Transit Inspector and Army Administration Chief, the official translation records the start of this assignment as 8 January 1913. The Transit Inspectorate held a strategic position overseeing transportation, provisions, and troop deployment for the capital and the Çatalca front, making it significant for the role Cemal Bey would assume in the upcoming government coup.[^53]

The process leading to the Bab-ı Ali Raid cannot be explained solely by battlefield defeats. The Committee of Union and Progress faced intense opposition due to allegations of pressure and irregularities in the 1912 elections; the Halâskâr Zâbitân Group, composed of pro-Freedom and Accord officers within the army, had forced the resignation of Said Pasha’s government. The Kâmil Paşa government, formed on 29 October 1912 after Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s “Grand Cabinet,” sought to remove Unionist cadres from central and provincial institutions. Thus, military defeats merged with a political purge, strengthening the Unionist leaders’ belief that, unless they returned to power, they could not influence either the party’s or the state’s future.[^54]

The military situation further intensified this political tension. After the Bulgarian army advanced to the Çatalca line, an armistice was signed on 3 December 1912 and peace negotiations began in London. During these talks, the status of Edirne became one of the main points of disagreement. On 17 January 1913, the Great Powers presented a joint note to Bab-ı Ali demanding acceptance of the Midye–Enez line, thus abandoning Edirne to Bulgaria and entrusting the fate of the Aegean islands to them. Edirne’s status as a former Ottoman capital and its strategic position in the defense of Istanbul gave the issue not only military significance but also strong historical and symbolic meaning.[^55]

On 22 January, a Meşveret Meclisi was convened at the palace to determine how the Kâmil Paşa government would respond to the Great Powers’ note. Sources debate whether this body explicitly accepted the abandonment of Edirne; the Şeyhülislam [Cemaleddin Efendi](/en/detay/cemaleddin-efendi-halidefendizade/llms.txt) later denied that the government had decided to cede Edirne to Bulgaria. However, in Union and Progress circles, the prevailing belief was that the government would abandon Edirne to achieve peace. Moreover, Edirne had not yet been legally or de facto ceded to Bulgaria on 23 January; the city was under siege, and the official decision to abandon it would emerge only from subsequent developments. Thus, the fear of losing Edirne, while grounded in a real military threat, also served as a powerful political mobilization tool to legitimize the Unionists’ return to power.[^56]

Union and Progress leaders discussed preparations for overthrowing the government in meetings held at the house of Beşezade Emin Bey in the Vefa quarter of Istanbul. Cemal Bey attended these meetings and supported the idea of a raid, arguing strongly that Edirne’s loss must be prevented. However, he did not join the armed group that entered Bab-ı Ali on 23 January 1913; he was assigned the task of organizing security measures in the capital and among military units and overseeing the implementation of the plan. This distinction shows that he did not directly participate in the raid with weapons but assumed part of the responsibility for the coup’s preparation and security phase.[^57]

In the afternoon of 23 January, the armed group led by Enver Bey entered Bab-ı Ali. During the ensuing clash, Minister of War and Acting Commander-in-Chief Nâzım Paşa was killed; Kâmil Paşa was forced to write a document stating he resigned at the request of “the people and the military.” As Enver Bey carried the resignation letter to Dolmabahçe Palace, Sultan V. Mehmed Reşad accepted Kâmil Paşa’s resignation and appointed Mahmud Şevket Pasha as Grand Vizier. Sources dispute whether Nâzım Paşa’s assassination was a premeditated act or the result of a clash during the raid; however, it is clear that the government was forced to resign through armed coercion and executive authority was forcibly changed.[^58]

After Nâzım Paşa’s assassination, Cemal Bey arrived at Bab-ı Ali to implement security measures to prevent possible retaliatory actions and welcomed the new Grand Vizier. Mahmud Şevket Pasha requested that Cemal Bey immediately secure the capital’s security and implement necessary measures without delay. Cemal Bey was appointed interim commander of the Istanbul Guard on 26 January and permanent commander on 27 January. The Istanbul Guard was not merely a garrison command; under martial law, it was a political security office with broad authority over military units, the police force, intelligence activities, and the operational base of the army at Çatalca.[^59]

In the early days of his tenure, Cemal Bey sought to prevent retaliatory actions triggered by the raid. He permitted the former Grand Vizier Kâmil Paşa and Şeyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi to return to their homes; however, he detained former Interior Minister Reşid Bey and Finance Minister Abdurrahman Bey for two days at the Guard headquarters for their personal safety. He rejected Yakub Cemil’s demand for the execution of the former ministers and organized a large funeral ceremony for Nâzım Paşa attended by state officials and foreign military representatives. In return for these conciliatory steps, the Guard Battalions were established in the capital, the intelligence network was expanded, and opposition circles’ activities were closely monitored. Thus, the new government’s initial security policy combined limited conciliation with intense military and police surveillance.[^60]

The Bab-ı Ali Raid did not end the opposition’s attempts to regain power. A group, allegedly under the spiritual patronage of Prince Sabahaddin and centered around Satvet Lütfi and Dr. Nihad Reşad, prepared a counter-coup aiming to overthrow the Mahmud Şevket Pasha government and establish a decentralized cabinet. Documents gathered by the Istanbul Police Directorate described this plan, called “Taklîb-i Hükûmet Teşebbüsü,” as relying on gathering crowds around Bab-ı Ali, forcing the Grand Vizier to resign, and sending government members to the Divan-ı Âli. However, whether Prince Sabahaddin had direct responsibility for planning the coup and the feasibility of the initiative remain debated.[^61]

On 28 January 1913, Cemal Bey issued a statement calling for the people and government to act together and declared that no leniency would be shown to those disturbing public order. He publicly announced the results of the “Taklîb-i Hükûmet” investigation on 2 March under the title “Beyanname-i Resmiyye”; the text was translated into foreign languages and sent to European newspapers, demonstrating that the matter was not viewed solely as an internal security issue. The arrest of Satvet Lütfi and [Ahmed Bedevi Kuran](/en/detay/kuran-ahmet-bedevi/llms.txt) and the flight of Dr. Nihad Reşad to Europe effectively dissolved the attempt.[^62]

The activities of the Istanbul Guard extended beyond high politics. Operations were organized against widespread illegal tobacco sales in Sirkeci, Sultanahmet, Beyazıt, and Mahmudpaşa areas; some apprehended individuals were imprisoned, while others were deported from Istanbul. It was announced that those engaging in verbal or physical harassment of women on the streets would be expelled from the city under martial law powers. These measures aimed to restore daily security and public order in the capital while simultaneously establishing an administrative system based on limited judicial oversight and extraordinary powers.[^63]

Despite the failure of the “Taklîb-i Hükûmet” attempt, armed opposition organizations did not disappear. Circles around Çerkes Kâzım Bey and some former officers prepared an assassination plot targeting first the Union and Progress leaders and then Grand Vizier Mahmud Şevket Pasha, the political and military center of the government. Although the organic connection between this organization and the “Taklîb-i Hükûmet” attempt and the Freedom and Accord Party is debated, both movements arose from the power struggle triggered by the Bab-ı Ali Raid. Cemal Bey later stated he received intelligence about the assassination attempt and personally warned Mahmud Şevket Pasha on the morning of 11 June 1913. Nevertheless, the failure to arrest the suspects beforehand was criticized as one of the Istanbul Guard’s main security failures; Cemal Bey defended himself by claiming he waited for sufficient legal evidence and to apprehend the perpetrators in the act.[^64]

On 11 June 1913, Mahmud Şevket Pasha was attacked at the Beyazıt–Divanyolu intersection while traveling from the Ministry of War to Bab-ı Ali. Severely wounded after being shot by assassins who exploited the slow movement of his car due to a funeral procession, Paşa died at the Ministry of War after being taken back; his aide, Navy Lieutenant Ibrahim Bey, was also killed in the attack. Upon receiving the news, Cemal Bey intensified martial law measures, ensured the immediate gathering of government members, and worked to prevent any military movement in the capital. A curfew was enforced during the funeral ceremony the next day; the government’s vacuum was quickly filled with the appointment of [Said Halim Paşa](/en/detay/said-halim-pasa-2/llms.txt) as Grand Vizier.[^65]

Following the assassination, the Istanbul Guard and Police Directorate launched a large-scale arrest operation; approximately five hundred people were detained, and many opponents with no direct connection to the assassination were exiled to Sinop. After trials before the Divan-ı Harp, Damat Salih Pasha, Çerkes Kâzım, Topal Tevfik, and nine other defendants were executed, and death sentences were handed down in absentia for some fugitives. Cemal Bey played a central role in conducting the investigation, arrests, and security measures; however, the court that issued the verdicts was the Divan-ı Harp, and the sultan approved the death sentences. The limited conciliation policy pursued immediately after the raid thus gave way to open political struggle involving mass arrests, exile, and executions.[^66]

### Edirne, Western Thrace, and Government Appointments

The London Treaty of 30 May 1913, which ceded Edirne to Bulgaria and fixed the Ottoman-Bulgarian border along the Midye–Enez line, left the Union and Progress administration, which had promised to rescue Edirne during the Bab-ı Ali Raid, in a politically difficult position. Although the Said Halim Paşa government, formed after Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s murder on 11 June, reopened the issue, the potential for intervention by the Great Powers initially led to cautious behavior against military action. The outbreak of the Second Balkan War on 29 June 1913, when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, forced the Bulgarian army to fight on multiple fronts and reduced its forces in Eastern Thrace. Thus, the Ottoman government found itself in a favorable military and diplomatic environment to recover part of the territory lost in the London Treaty.[^67]

Cemal Bey, Talat Bey, and Enver Bey were among the leading Unionists advocating a campaign to recapture Edirne. In contrast, a significant portion of the cabinet feared that the operation might provoke intervention by Britain, France, and Russia and draw the Ottoman State into another war. To secure financial resources for the military operation, Cemal and Talat Bey met with Mösyö Weyl, Director General of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, on 6 July 1913 and agreed to borrow 1.5 million gold liras in exchange for extending the Reji concession by fifteen years. While Cemal Bey worked with Mithat Şükrü Bey to convince cabinet members to accept intervention, he also sought the incorporation of Dedeağaç, Dimetoka, Gümülcine, İskeçe, and Sofulu into Ottoman sovereignty. He viewed the recovery of Edirne as essential not only for border security but also for the Union and Progress’s ability to remain in power after the Bab-ı Ali Raid.[^68]

Following these discussions, the Council of Ministers decided on 13 July 1913 to launch an offensive toward Edirne. Despite warnings from Britain and France, advancing Ottoman forces took advantage of the Bulgarian army’s weakness in the region and recaptured Kırklareli on 20 July and Edirne on 21 July without serious resistance. The Said Halim Paşa government declared in a proclamation on 26 July that the London Treaty had been rendered null and void by the new war among the Balkan states and that Ottoman forces entered Edirne to ensure state security. The Great Powers issued a joint protest note on 7 August; the Ottoman government rejected this protest on 11 August. The inability of Britain, France, and Russia to convert diplomatic pressure into military intervention facilitated the permanent establishment of Ottoman authority in Edirne.[^69]

The recovery of Edirne generated widespread public satisfaction in the Ottoman Empire following the heavy defeats of the first phase of the Balkan Wars and partially restored the Union and Progress’s damaged reputation. This development also fulfilled one of the central justifications of the Bab-ı Ali Raid: the “rescue of Edirne.” Indeed, in the narrative later constructed in the memoirs, it was explicitly stated that the Union and Progress would have lost its right to remain in power had Edirne not been recovered.[^70] In an interview published in *Tasvir-i Efkâr* on 7 August 1913, Cemal Bey expressed his determination with the words: *“We would rather see Turkey perish catastrophically than evacuate Edirne.”* 

After the recovery of Edirne, the issue focused on where the Ottoman advance should stop. Bab-ı Ali had pledged in its note to Bulgaria that its forces would not cross the west bank of the Maritsa River. However, on 15 August 1913, volunteer units entered [Western Thrace](/en/detay/western-thrace-republic-4d275/llms.txt); under the leadership of Kuşçubaşı Eşref, Selim Sami, Süleyman Askerî, Reşid, Fehmi, and Cihangiroğlu İbrahim Bey, the Provisional Islamic Government of Western Thrace was established with its center in Gümülcine. Thus, the Ottoman government found itself caught between Unionist circles supporting the initiatives of the Muslim population in Western Thrace and its pledge not to cross the Maritsa River and the pressure from the Great Powers. Since sources date the establishment of the provisional government differently and its institutional relationship with the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa is unclear, it is safer to view its establishment as the outcome of the military advance on 15 August.[^72]

The de facto situation in Western Thrace also cast uncertainty over Edirne’s future, prompting peace negotiations between Ottoman and Bulgarian delegations in Istanbul on 5 September 1913. The Ottoman delegation included Interior Minister Talat Bey, Navy Minister Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, and President of the Council of State Halil Bey. Istanbul Guard Cemal Bey and War Academy Captain İsmet Bey were appointed as military advisors to the delegation; Cemal Bey’s appointment is recorded in the official translation as dated 8 September. Thus, following his role as one of the leading advocates for Edirne’s recovery, Cemal Bey also participated in the delegation that would resolve the border issue arising from the operation through a diplomatic treaty.[^73]

The approximately three-week negotiations concluded with the Istanbul Treaty of 29 September 1913. Under the treaty, Edirne, Kırklareli, and Dimetoka remained under Ottoman control, while Western Thrace was ceded to Bulgaria; certain guarantees were secured for the religious and civil rights of Muslims in Bulgaria. Cemal Bey participated in negotiations with Bulgarian General Savov on Büyükada to determine the border and military issues. For his services during the negotiations, he was awarded the Order of the Mecidiye, Second Class, in November 1913. While the treaty legally legitimized Edirne’s recovery, it also placed the Ottoman government under the obligation to dissolve its provisional administration in Western Thrace.[^74]

Although Cemal Bey initially desired Ottoman advances to include Western Thrace, he accepted the dissolution of the provisional government to prevent Edirne from falling back into danger and to implement the treaty signed with Bulgaria. Due to his longstanding relationship with Kuşçubaşı Eşref, he took on the task of convincing government members and, together with Ömer Naci Bey, traveled to Dedeağaç, Gümülcine, and İskeçe. Although the exact start date of this journey cannot be determined, Cemal Bey’s telegrams dated 20 and 28 October and 1 November 1913 indicate that the negotiations lasted from mid-October to early November. At the end of the negotiations, Eşref Bey and his associates accepted the dissolution of the provisional government and returned to Istanbul.[^75]

Cemal Bey’s role in dissolving the Western Thrace government became one of the most debated decisions of his life. Kuşçubaşı Eşref and later Cemal Kutay strongly criticized him for arguing that the de facto authority in the region could have been preserved. However, the possibility that the armed formations in Western Thrace, acting independently of Bab-ı Ali, might initiate a new war with Bulgaria or provide a pretext for intervention by the Great Powers was also a real risk. Cemal Bey’s choice thus meant abandoning the gains in Western Thrace but was based on a risk calculation that prioritized retaining Edirne and preserving Ottoman-Bulgarian peace.[^76]

During the days when the Western Thrace issue was being resolved, Cemal Bey’s military position in Istanbul also changed. Minister of War and Acting Commander-in-Chief Ahmed İzzet Pasha, who believed the army should be distanced from politics, was uncomfortable with the Istanbul Guard’s status as a special force closely linked to the Committee of Union and Progress. At Ahmed İzzet Pasha’s proposal dated 29 October, the Istanbul Guard was abolished by an irade-i seniyye dated 30 October 1913; Cemal Bey was appointed on the same day as deputy commander of the First Army and assumed the presidency of the martial law administration. Thus, while the Istanbul Guard was abolished, Cemal Bey was not entirely removed; his powers were integrated into the regular army’s command chain and reassigned to a new position.[^77]

As deputy commander of the First Army, Cemal Bey was involved not only in security and martial law matters but also in the army’s technical and educational needs. On 21 November 1913, he visited the military aviation center in Ayastefanos with Talat Bey and listened to the problems faced by pilots and technical personnel. This visit, conducted at a time when Ottoman military aviation was still in its early stages, was part of the effort to address the technical deficiencies revealed by the Balkan Wars and integrate aviation into the regular army.[^78]

On 4 December 1913, Cemal Bey issued a nine-point circular to the units of the First Army. The circular called for strengthening religious and spiritual bonds, ensuring that personnel of all ranks could perform their duties, monitoring the outcomes of issued orders, reducing unnecessary correspondence and paper consumption, and timely implementation of orders. Cemal Bey advocated replacing peacetime drills with wartime conditions in training; he emphasized marksmanship, terrain utilization, bayonet combat, marching discipline, officers’ professional development, and realistic field exercises. This circular reflected one of the demands for reorganizing discipline, training, and command methods within the Ottoman army following the Balkan War defeat, at the corps level.[^79]

Cemal Bey’s tenure in the First Army was brief. The military reform commission, composed of forty-one German officers under the leadership of Liman von Sanders, arrived in Istanbul in early December 1913 as decided during Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s tenure. The First Army was designated as the center of the German commission’s training and reorganization efforts, and Liman von Sanders was appointed commander of the corps on 5 December; Cemal Bey was thus relieved of his duties as deputy commander and president of the martial law administration. The chronology of duties in the memoirs does not fully align with official appointment records; the chronology based on official records indicates that the corps assignment ended on 5 December and the new assignment at the Ministry of Public Works began on 16–17 December.[^80]

The desire of the Committee of Union and Progress to make its military and administrative cadres more effective within the cabinet facilitated Cemal Bey’s transition to a civilian government post. The planned loan from France and infrastructure negotiations with French companies also influenced his selection, as he spoke French and had connections with French circles. His experience gained during his inspectorship of the Rumelia Railways regarding roads, bridges, and transportation further supported this appointment. On 16–17 December 1913, Cemal Bey was appointed interim minister of public works, replacing Osman Nizami Pasha, entering the cabinet for the first time.[^81]

At the time Cemal Bey entered the cabinet, a change in the Ministry of War was also being prepared. The disagreement between Ahmed İzzet Pasha, who sought to distance the army from politics, and the Union and Progress leaders became more pronounced during the abolition of the Istanbul Guard, and Ahmed İzzet Pasha resigned on 1 January 1914. Although both Enver Bey and Cemal Bey’s names were mentioned among Unionist circles for the Ministry of War, Enver Pasha was appointed on 2 January. At the suggestion of Said Halim Paşa, Cemal Bey’s service during the Balkan Wars and the Istanbul Guard was cited as grounds for adding three years to his military seniority; he was promoted to the rank of mirliva by an irade-i seniyye dated 3 January 1914. From this date onward, sources began using the title “Cemal Pasha” instead of “Cemal Bey.”[^82]

Cemal Pasha was appointed permanent minister of public works on 25–26 February 1914 after serving as interim minister for approximately seventy days. The appointment date is recorded as 25 February in the archival document and 26 February in the official translation. Despite the brevity of his tenure, he prepared an extensive public works program covering railways, highways, irrigation, and port construction. This program aimed not only at economic development but also at addressing the transportation and supply deficiencies clearly exposed during the Balkan Wars and strengthening administrative and military connections between Anatolia and the Arab provinces.[^83]

In the railway program, 83 million francs of the loan from France were allocated to the Samsun–Sivas line, with the Sivas–Erzincan railway to be completed with French capital afterward. The Ankara–Sivas line was planned to be connected to Ulukışla via Kayseri, with the concession granted to the Germans. Strategic railways connecting Istanbul to Baghdad, Erzurum, and İzmir were envisioned as broad-gauge and state-guaranteed; local lines such as Çanakkale–İzmir, Aydın–Muğla, and Marmaris were to be built with narrower gauge, lower cost, and without state guarantees. To meet the necessary reliance on foreign capital, it was stipulated that railway ledgers and operational procedures be maintained in Turkish, attempting to establish linguistic and administrative unity in transportation management.[^84]

In the highway sector, the contract previously granted to a French company was continued. Although the company was expected to complete 900,000 liras worth of work within a year, due to lack of financial resources, activities remained at approximately 300,000 liras, and the company was paid 140,000 liras. Additionally, complaints came from local populations and Ottoman engineers that the company unnecessarily extended routes and built excessive bridges, increasing costs. Cemal Pasha argued that the fundamental problem was the state’s financial inadequacy; he worked to resolve disputes between the Ministry of Public Works’ engineering board and the Turuk-ı Umumiye company to ensure the continuation of road and bridge projects.[^85]

The center of the irrigation program was the Konya Plain. The project, projected to last five years and cost 19.5 million francs, aimed to irrigate 550,000 dunams annually, totaling 2.75 million dunams. Irrigation of the Adana, Menderes, and Mihalıççık plains; draining of marshes around the Maritsa River; regulation of the Amik Plain and the Asi River; and preparation of irrigation projects for the Tigris basin and the Mesopotamian Plain were other components of the program. In port investments, priority was given to Tripoli, Jaffa, Tekirdağ, Samsun, and Trabzon; discussions with French companies were planned for Syrian ports and with the Turkish National Bank for Black Sea ports.[^86]

However, a significant portion of these initiatives consisted of projects planned for implementation if financial resources became available. Cemal Pasha’s total tenure at the Ministry of Public Works was limited to approximately eighty-five days, and the outbreak of World War I a few months later prevented the program’s completion. The conclusion of Said Halim Paşa, Enver Pasha, and Talat Bey that a fundamental change was needed in the Ministry of Navy led to a cabinet reshuffle on 9–10 March 1914; Cemal Pasha was appointed Minister of Navy, and Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa was appointed Minister of Public Works. Thus, Cemal Pasha’s brief public works tenure ended as he began his Ministry of Navy tenure, which he would hold throughout the war years.[^87]

### Ministry of Navy and Entry into World War I

Cemal Pasha’s appointment as Minister of Navy on 9–10 March 1914 was the result of efforts to address the military deficiencies exposed by the Balkan Wars and extend the reorganization initiated in the army to the navy. A significant portion of the Ottoman fleet required maintenance and repair; delays occurred in the delivery of the dreadnoughts *Reşadiye*, built in Britain, and *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel*, purchased from Brazil; Greece’s strengthening of its navy created serious security concerns in Istanbul over the Aegean islands issue. Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa, Minister of War Enver Pasha, and Interior Minister Talat Bey decided on a change in the Ministry of Navy under these conditions; Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa was transferred to the Ministry of Public Works, and Cemal Pasha became Minister of Navy.[^88]

Upon assuming office, Cemal Pasha met with British Reform Commission head Admiral Arthur Limpus and reviewed reports prepared by Limpus and his predecessor, Admiral Douglas Gamble. After his examination, he concluded that the ministry’s decision-making process was slowed by numerous committees, offices, and correspondence. The new organizational structure proposed the abolition of the Navy Council and the minister’s deputyship, reorganizing the ministry into four directorates, one Health Inspectorate, and one Accounting Directorate. Greater decision-making authority was granted to directors of the directorates to reduce bureaucracy and accelerate the implementation of orders.[^89]

The organizational change continued with the reorganization of ports and coastal security. To prevent smuggling by sea and bring under control ports insufficiently monitored from the center, port directorates were established in Samsun, Istanbul, İzmir, and Beirut; Red Sea ports were attached to the Red Sea Commodore. Gambots acquired from France were deployed along the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Syrian, and Red Sea coasts, and navy officers were classified to serve in the war fleet, port organizations, and coastal surveillance units. The renovation of the Haliç Shipyard and the construction of a modern shipyard and floating dock in İzmit Bay were also pursued. However, since the shipyard projects had previously been granted to the British Armstrong-Vickers company, Cemal Pasha’s initial reforms aimed not to eliminate the British advisory and capital system but to enhance Ottoman administrative control over it.[^90]

In personnel policy, discipline, duty competence, and generational change came to the fore. Some port commanders and officers deemed too old or incapable of fulfilling their duties were retired and replaced with younger personnel. In a proclamation dated 24 March 1914, Cemal Pasha requested the protection of military documents, the prevention of leaks of ministry information to the press, and the meticulous fulfillment of assigned duties by all officers. He conducted one of his first comprehensive inspections on 4 April aboard the corvette *Muin-i Zafer*. These measures were not as extensive as Enver Pasha’s purges in the army; they were primarily directed at specific officials in port administration, fleet command, and the ministry’s bureaucracy.[^91]

One of the most visible examples of the new discipline was on 10 June 1914. Cemal Pasha had previously announced that the navy’s officers and sailors would celebrate the holiday together on the shipyard square; when he arrived at the designated time, he found no one present except for the Fleet Commander Tahir Bey and a few officers. Upon Tahir Bey’s explanation that he had delayed the gathering due to rain, Cemal Pasha dismissed him and sentenced him to three days of arrest. In the order he issued, he emphasized that a force failing to carry out an order due to rain during peacetime could not succeed in wartime.[^92]

Regulations were also introduced regarding the uniforms and rank insignia of navy personnel. An additional draft prepared on 16 April 1914 required rank insignia to be placed on the capes worn by officers in their official uniforms. Some ranks shared with the army—such as mushir, miralay, kaymakam, and binbaşı—were attempted to be rendered in naval terminology as “mushir admiral,” “kalyon kaptanı,” “fırkateyn kaptanı,” and “korvet kaptanı.” Although some of these regulations were completed during the war years, the initial aim was to create a coherent naval identity by making the class and rank of navy personnel visibly distinct.[^93]

Alongside administrative reforms, a broad procurement program was prepared to increase the navy’s ship inventory. Cemal Pasha was elected to the Ottoman Navy Society Central Committee on 27 March 1914; he supported fundraising campaigns for the navy and contributed financially himself. In a contract signed with the British Armstrong company on 2 May, it was stipulated that one first-class armored ship, two battleships, four torpedo boats, and two submarines be delivered within no more than three years. To maintain balance in relations with France, it was planned to order six destroyers, two submarines, and twelve seaplanes from French companies.[^94]

These orders were primarily based on the naval arms race with Greece. Athens’ acquisition of ships from Britain and the United States made it difficult for the Ottoman navy to establish dominance in the Aegean. In a letter to Enver Pasha on 27 June 1914, Cemal Pasha drew attention to the connection between the strengthening of the Greek navy and the islands issue. He believed that the acquisition of the *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel* and *Reşadiye*, then nearing completion in Britain, would balance the Greek navy. He therefore urged Rauf and Vasıf Bey, who were responsible for the delivery of the ships, to accelerate their initiatives with British authorities.[^95]

The relations established with British and French companies for the navy’s renewal were consistent with Cemal Pasha’s foreign policy inclinations. The French ambassador to Istanbul, Maurice Bompard, invited Cemal Pasha on 28 June 1914, the day of the Sarajevo Assassination, to observe French naval maneuvers scheduled for July. With permission granted by Bab-ı Ali on 30 June, Cemal Pasha departed Istanbul on 2 July and arrived in Paris the next day. His official instructions were to gain France’s support on the islands issue and influence French public opinion in favor of the Ottoman State. Some contemporary testimonies suggest he was also authorized to explore the possibility of an alliance; thus, the trip had broader diplomatic objectives than merely observing military maneuvers.[^96]

Cemal Pasha visited military facilities, shipyards, and arms factories in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Toulon, and Havre. In Toulon, he was received by Admiral Boué de Lapeyre and observed three days of French naval maneuvers; he inspected submarines and destroyers being built for the Ottoman State at the Creusot and Normand factories. He attended meetings and dinners hosted by the France-Turkey Friendship Society, the Ottoman Bank, and French military authorities. These contacts demonstrated the outwardly friendly nature of Ottoman-French relations, but they did not change the French government’s political stance toward Ottoman demands.[^97]

In meetings with French officials Viviani and Margerie, Cemal Pasha raised the possibility of French support on the islands issue and closer political ties between the two states. France, like its support for Greece on the Aegean islands, linked any independent alliance with the Ottoman State to Russian approval. For Ottoman officials, who feared Russian ambitions over Istanbul and the Straits, this response provided no guarantee. When Cemal Pasha returned to the country on 18 July, he had gathered comprehensive observations on military facilities and the French navy but had failed to secure any of his fundamental political demands. This outcome became one of the factors strengthening the pro-German tendency within the Union and Progress leadership.[^98]

A few days after Cemal Pasha’s return, Enver Pasha offered an alliance to the German ambassador Hans von Wangenheim, and Said Halim Paşa offered one to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Johann von Pallavicini. Secret negotiations, initiated by German Emperor Wilhelm II’s desire to include the Ottoman State in the alliance, culminated in the signing of the Ottoman-German Alliance Treaty on 2 August 1914. The treaty stipulated that Germany and the Ottoman State would act jointly if Russia intervened in the Austro-Serbian war. However, negotiations were conducted among Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa, Enver Pasha, Talat Bey, and President of the Chamber of Deputies Halil Bey; Cemal Pasha was excluded from both the negotiations and the treaty.[^99]

Several days after the treaty’s signing, Said Halim Paşa summoned Cemal Pasha to his Yeniköy villa to inform him of the developments. Cemal Pasha expressed his displeasure at being kept in the dark and briefly considered resigning; however, he concluded that an alliance preventing the Ottoman State from being left alone against Russia was necessary and accepted the treaty. Nevertheless, this acceptance did not mean he advocated immediate entry into the war. Indeed, from 20–22 August, he continued exploring the possibility of security and alliance with Britain through British ambassador Sir Louis Mallet. Throughout September, he advocated preserving Ottoman neutrality and preventing the navy from being used in a way that might provoke conflict with Russia.[^100]

On the very day the Ottoman-German alliance was signed, Britain seized the dreadnoughts *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel* and *Reşadiye*, whose construction had been largely funded by donations collected from the Ottoman public. Although the delivery team had reached Britain, the refusal to allow the ships to fly the Ottoman flag provoked a strong reaction against Britain in Istanbul. A few days after the British decision, the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau*, pursued by the British Mediterranean fleet, headed toward the Dardanelles under the command of Admiral Souchon. German naval attaché Colonel Hans Humann requested on 8 August that Cemal Pasha provide five to six thousand tons of coal to the ships; after consulting with Said Halim, Enver, and Talat Pashas, Cemal Pasha accepted the request. The ships entered the Dardanelles on 10 August.[^101]

Under international law of neutrality, the Ottoman government was required to either remove the ships from its territorial waters within twenty-four hours or disarm them and keep them in a port until the end of the war. To avoid direct conflict with the Entente powers, it was announced that the ships had been purchased from Germany and joined the Ottoman navy, replacing the two dreadnoughts seized by Britain. The legal validity of the 80 million mark sale was disputed; the German crew remained on board, and German authorities continued to treat the ships as part of their own forces throughout the war. Nevertheless, the *Goeben* was renamed **Yavuz**, the *Breslau* was renamed **Midilli**, Ottoman flags were raised, and the crew was issued fezzes. The choice of the name *Midilli* carried a political message regarding the lost Aegean island and recalled Cemal Pasha’s birthplace.[^102]

The acceptance of the ships led to the replacement of British influence in the Ottoman navy with German influence. British Reform Commission head Admiral Limpus resigned, and Admiral Souchon was appointed commander of the Ottoman Navy on 9 September 1914. Souchon’s dual identity as a German officer and commander of the Ottoman navy created authority conflicts between the Minister of Navy and the Acting Commander-in-Chief. Cemal Pasha argued that administratively the navy was subordinate to his ministry, while Souchon based his authority on the Acting Commander-in-Chief, headed by Enver Pasha, regarding military operations.[^103]

This authority conflict first became openly apparent in September. When Souchon wished to take the navy into the Black Sea for extended training, Cemal Pasha stated this was a foreign policy decision that could provoke war with Russia. In his 14 September reply, he declared: *“The navy’s movement into the Black Sea constitutes a political initiative of the Ottoman Government and can only be decided by the Cabinet.”* He made clear that the German admiral could not act alone.[^104] When Souchon, relying on an oral order from Enver Pasha on 21 September, took the navy into the Black Sea, Said Halim Paşa and Cemal Pasha acted; Cemal Pasha ordered the navy to return immediately and compelled the initially resistant Souchon to return to the Straits. This intervention demonstrated that Cemal Pasha had been striving to maintain de facto neutrality until the end of September.[^105]

Cemal Pasha’s stance changed in the second week of October. The announcement on 11 October that Germany had accepted the Ottoman government’s requested loan tied the state’s financial needs to Germany. Simultaneously, the Entente powers’ refusal to guarantee Russia’s actions, the anxiety over Russia’s ambitions over Istanbul and the Straits, and the belief that the unilateral abolition of capitulations on 9 September could be permanently ended by a war won by Germany strengthened the idea of entering the war. From this date onward, Cemal Pasha began arguing that neutrality could not be sustained and that the Ottoman State was compelled to fulfill the obligations of its alliance with Germany.[^106]

On 22 October, Enver Pasha gave Souchon an oral order to seek out the Russian navy and attack without declaring war; on 24 October, after consulting with Talat Bey and Cemal Pasha, he formalized the order in writing. On the same day, Cemal Pasha informed the commanders of Ottoman ships that they must unhesitatingly follow Souchon’s orders while in the Black Sea. Souchon set sail on 27 October with a fleet composed of the **Yavuz**, **Midilli**, **Hamidiye**, **Berk**, **Gayret**, and **Numune**; on 29 October, he launched attacks against Sivastopol, Odesa, and Kefe. This operation initiated actual hostilities with Russia before the Ottoman State had declared war.[^107]

Cemal Pasha’s level of awareness regarding the details of the operation was long debated. Early editions of his memoirs contained no statements indicating prior knowledge of the bombing decision, but later published draft fragments show he learned of the attack five to six hours before Enver Pasha. Additionally, his written order of 24 October demanding compliance with Souchon’s orders was not limited to the Black Sea operation. However, existing documents do not definitively establish how much advance notice he received about the targets and attack times. Therefore, it is impossible to consider Cemal Pasha the sole planner of the attack, yet it is also inconsistent with the sources to portray him as an entirely unaware and powerless minister.[^108]

Following the Black Sea attack, Russia declared war on 3 November, and Britain and France on 5 November. Ministers opposed to the war—Cavid Bey, Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, Süleyman Elbistanî, and Oskan Efendi—resigned, while Cemal Pasha remained in office. The Ottoman State declared war on 11 November; jihad was proclaimed on 14 November, and proclamations were issued to the army and navy by the sultan and commander-in-chief on 15 November. Cemal Pasha also addressed the navy on 17 November, arguing that the war was necessary to preserve independence, and concluded his speech with the words: *“Either glorious and heroic death, or victory and independence!”* Thus, Cemal Pasha, who had advocated closeness to France and Britain in early 1914 and neutrality when the war began, became one of the leaders directly responsible for the Ottoman State’s entry into the war alongside Germany from late October onward.

### Command of the Fourth Army and Canal Operations

After the Ottoman State entered World War I, Cemal Pasha was appointed commander of the Fourth Army on 18 November 1914, retaining his position as Minister of Navy.[^110] His duties were not limited to defending Syria and Palestine; he was expected to prepare and execute military operations against Egypt, ensure security in Syria, and implement civil decisions in coordination with military needs. Therefore, the command granted Cemal Pasha extraordinary authority over a vast region encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Western Arabia.[^111] 

In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha records his response to Enver Pasha’s offer as: *“I accept with gratitude and eagerness the Fourth Army Command you have offered and will depart for my administrative seat within a few days.”* On 21 November, Paşa departed from Haydarpaşa; traveling via Konya, Pozantı, Tarsus, Adana, İskenderun, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Baalbek, he arrived in Damascus on 8 December and established the Fourth Army headquarters there.[^113]

Preparations for the Canal operation had already begun before Cemal Pasha’s arrival in Syria. Germany calculated that threatening the Suez Canal could sever Britain’s links with India and the Far East, prevent British forces in Egypt from being sent to European fronts, and mobilize Muslim communities under British rule through the Ottoman caliph’s call to jihad. Ottoman leaders added to these objectives the expectation of reestablishing control over Egypt, strengthening the state’s prestige in the Islamic world, and reinforcing central authority in the Arab provinces.[^114]

From August 1914, preparations under the command of Halepli Zeki Pasha, the Fourth Army commander, were joined by the VIII Corps under Mersinli Cemal Bey and a German officer delegation led by Kress von Kressenstein, who arrived in Syria on 20 September. However, Zeki Pasha argued for prioritizing the defense of Syria over an offensive against Egypt, citing the water shortages in the Sinai Desert, the lack of training and equipment among the units, logistical difficulties, and the strength of British defenses at the Canal.[^115] Enver Pasha’s assignment of the Fourth Army to Cemal Pasha aimed to unify under a single command both the defense of Syria and preparations for an offensive against Egypt. Von Frankenberg was appointed chief of staff, [Ali Fuad Bey](/en/detay/cebesoy-ali-fuat/llms.txt) was appointed head of the Operations Section, and Kress von Kressenstein was assigned to plan the Canal operation and oversee preparations in Sinai.[^116]

During and after the war, differing explanations were given regarding the objective of the Canal operation. In the German strategic vision, threatening the Canal and keeping British forces tied down in Egypt took precedence; in the Ottoman public discourse, the liberation of Egypt and the end of British rule were emphasized.[^117] Cemal Pasha’s farewell speech in Haydarpaşa, his pre-operation reports, and his contacts with nationalist circles in Egypt indicate that the expectation that Egyptians would revolt and Ottoman forces could advance through the country had a genuine place in the operation’s planning.[^118]

In contrast, in his memoirs written after the war, Cemal Pasha described the First Canal Operation as a *“reconnaissance with offensive character”* and argued that its primary aim was to test the Canal’s defenses and keep British forces occupied in Egypt.[^119] Thus, defining the operation solely as a reconnaissance or as a fully planned large-scale invasion of Egypt is insufficient: the plan envisioned opening a passage through the Canal with limited military means, triggering a revolt in Egypt as a result of this success, and then undertaking a broader advance depending on the emerging conditions.

Upon arriving in Damascus, Cemal Pasha continued efforts to utilize not only regular units but also members of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, Arab volunteers, and Bedouins. Rather than recruiting volunteer fighters from tribes, he relied on them for the necessary camels, horses, and mules for desert transportation; however, Bedouin units retained limited capability for conventional warfare.[^120] According to the operation plan, the central column would advance from Birüssebi–İbin to Ismailiye, the right column from the north to Kantara, and the left column from the south to Suez; auxiliary columns would attempt to disperse British forces while the main crossing would occur in the Tussum–Serapeum sector between Lake Timsah and the Salt Lake. Total forces allocated for the operation are estimated in sources at approximately 20–25 thousand, with the main assault column numbering around 12 thousand.[^121]

The approximately 300-kilometer arid terrain between Birüssebi and the Canal forced units to march at night and rest during the day to reduce water consumption. Camels, limited numbers of pontoons, food, and water depots were largely transported by human and animal power, and transporting heavy artillery across the desert was impossible.[^122] The expeditionary force began its advance from Jerusalem on the night of 14–15 January 1915; Cemal Pasha’s headquarters departed from Birüssebi on 15 January, and the units reached the Canal area approximately sixteen days later.[^123]

The offensive began at approximately 03:30 on the night of 2–3 February 1915. Attacks were launched against British forces in the directions of Kantara, el-Ferdan, Ismailiye, Şallûf, and Suez, while the main force attempted to cross the Canal in the sector between Tussum and Serapeum.[^124] Some of the pontoons carried by Ottoman soldiers across the desert were lowered into the water, and approximately 600 soldiers reached the western bank. However, the proximity of British fortifications to the crossing point, the detection of pontoons by projectors, the fire from Indian units, and the heavy artillery of British warships in the Canal prevented the expansion of the crossing. A significant portion of the soldiers who reached the opposite bank were killed or captured; the remaining units remained on the eastern bank of the Canal.[^125]

After approximately thirty hours of fighting, Cemal Pasha, together with Mersinli Cemal Pasha, von Frankenberg, and Kress von Kressenstein, concluded in their evaluation that the British defenses could not be breached with the available forces and issued a retreat order on the evening of 3 February.[^126]

The casualty figures for the First Canal Operation differ significantly between the parties. In Cemal Pasha’s detailed report dated 27 April 1915, the table indicates 124 officers and soldiers killed, 417 wounded, 819 missing, and a total loss of 1,360; in his memoirs, the total loss is recorded as 1,296. British authorities, however, reported Ottoman casualties at approximately 3,000.[^127] The operation’s primary military objectives—establishing a permanent crossing through the Canal, cutting off transportation, and initiating a general revolt against British rule in Egypt—did not materialize; thus, the attempt ended in tactical and operational failure.[^128]

However, the Ottoman forces’ ability to cross the vast expanse of the Sinai Desert with a large force demonstrated to the British command that the Canal could be threatened from the east, influencing the decision to extend Egypt’s defenses into the Sinai. Thus, although the operation failed to capture the Canal, it compelled Britain to maintain a significant military force in Egypt and strengthen desert transportation.[^129]

After the retreat, Ottoman forces gathered in Birüssebi on 15 February and around Gaza on 20 February. In a report sent to Enver Pasha on 5 February, Cemal Pasha indicated that the first attempt had revealed the necessary tools to cross the Canal and announced that a stronger force would prepare for a second operation.[^130] The first operation demonstrated that even the temporary capture of a Canal bridgehead required heavy artillery, more crossing equipment, and an uninterrupted supply system. In Cemal Pasha’s subsequent calculations, a comprehensive offensive against Egypt required 100–150 thousand troops; maintaining such a force near the Canal necessitated extending railways, highways, water wells, and supply depots deep into the desert.[^131]

Under the management of German engineer Heinrich August Meissner, the “Egypt Branch” accelerated railway construction for this purpose. The line, beginning at Ramin, reached Birüssebi on 30 October 1915 after 158 kilometers of construction; due to material shortages, the railway could not be extended toward the Canal, and transportation continued to rely on highways and camel caravans further south.[^132]

However, other fronts developing throughout 1915 reduced the Fourth Army’s resources. Significant portions of the units that participated in the First Canal Operation or were stationed in Syria were sent to the Dardanelles, Iraq, and Caucasus fronts; some rapid-fire artillery and machine gun units were also withdrawn from the Fourth Army. After Enver Pasha informed Cemal Pasha on 11 August 1915 that the larger second Egyptian campaign had been postponed, Cemal Pasha stated that postponing the operation until the next year effectively meant abandoning it.[^133] Thus, the comprehensive second campaign planned for 1915 was not carried out; preparations continued, but the objective gradually narrowed from capturing Egypt to maintaining the threat against the Canal and halting British advances in the Sinai.

The British withdrawal from the Dardanelles in December 1915 shifted the military balance in the region against the Ottomans. A significant portion of the troops evacuated from the Dardanelles were transferred to Egypt; the total number of British and imperial forces in the country reached approximately 300,000. The British shifted their defense from limiting it to the western bank of the Canal to advancing into the Sinai, constructing the Kantara–Romani railway, a parallel water line, and an advanced supply center at Katya.[^134]

To halt this advance, Kress von Kressenstein’s forces launched a raid on Katya between 20–25 April 1916. In the clash, one British colonel, 23 officers, and approximately 230 soldiers were captured; numerous horses were seized, and British forward units withdrew from Katya.[^135] However, this local success did not alter the strategic balance. With the outbreak of the Sharif Hussein Revolt in early June, new forces were diverted to defend the Hejaz Railway, further limiting the Sinai front’s manpower and supplies. Under these conditions, the second operation transformed from a large-scale campaign to cross the Canal into a narrower offensive aimed at delaying British advances eastward.[^136]

In early July 1916, Cemal Pasha assigned Kress von Kressenstein to prepare the operation. Cemal Pasha’s memoirs state the attacking force numbered approximately 10,000 infantrymen, while another calculation based on Kress’s account gives a total force of 16,000; the British forces between Kantara and Romani were estimated at approximately 32,000.[^137] Although called the “Second Canal Operation,” this force never reached the Canal.

Under Kress’s actual command, the forces attacked the fortified British positions at Mehemidiye and Romani, approximately 40 kilometers east of the Canal, on 4 August. Although Ottoman units advanced to the barbed wire and British trenches in some sectors, they were forced to retreat due to artillery superiority, the strength of fortifications, and counterattacks by British–ANZAC cavalry units. A large portion of the 39th Regiment, along with its officers, was surrounded and captured; a mountain artillery unit and machine gun elements were also lost.[^138]

British cavalry units pursued the retreating Ottoman forces, recapturing Katya on 8 August, Bir el-Abd on 9 August, and Salmana on 10 August. The main Ottoman forces withdrew to Birüssebi and the coastal areas of el-Ariş, Refah, Han Yunus, and Gaza. The British capture of el-Ariş on 21 December transferred the military initiative entirely to the British command.[^139]

In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha states that Kress proposed the Romani offensive and that he permitted it on the condition that it would not endanger the defense of Palestine. However, the telegram Cemal Pasha sent to Enver Pasha on 15 July 1916 shows that he prioritized the Canal operation even as the Sharif Hussein Revolt continued and requested ammunition and reinforcements for its continuation.[^140] After the defeat, Kress von Kressenstein criticized Cemal Pasha for allocating resources to the Hejaz and for planning the operation during summer heat rather than spring; Cemal Pasha, in turn, cited the unexpectedly strong British fortifications, artillery superiority, and the division of forces due to the Hejaz Revolt as the main reasons for failure.[^141]

Both explanations demonstrate that the problem cannot be reduced to the tactical decision of a single commander: while Ottoman forces attacked far from their railway and water lines, British units possessed an uninterrupted supply line, numerical superiority, heavy artillery, and mobile cavalry units; when combined with the Ottoman forces’ dispersion between Hejaz, Iraq, and the Caucasus, the gap between the operation’s objectives and available means widened further.[^142]

The First Canal Operation demonstrated that the Canal could not be forcibly crossed; the defeat at Romani showed that even maintaining the threat against the Canal was no longer feasible with available forces. After August 1916, the Fourth Army lost its offensive initiative, and Cemal Pasha’s strategy toward Egypt gave way to the necessity of defending Palestine along the Gaza–Birüssebi line.[^143]

### Governance and Centralization Policies in Syria

The administrative system established by Cemal Pasha in Syria was a wartime administration that exceeded the ordinary military authority of the Fourth Army headquarters but did not legally abolish the existing civil institutions.[^144] In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha records Enver Pasha’s assignment to him as: *“to prepare and execute the Canal Expedition and also ensure internal security and order in Syria.”* His acceptance of the assignment, with conditions to preserve the legal freedom of movement granted to military commanders, retain his position as Minister of Navy, and require his approval for essential ministry procedures, demonstrates that he did not go to Damascus merely as a front commander.[^146]

However, the frequent use of the terms “Governor of Syria” or “General Governor of Syria” in literature is misleading in terms of official titles. The civil governorship of the Syria Vilayet was held first by Hulusi Bey and then by Azmi and Tahsin Bey; Cemal Pasha represented the military and political authority that overshadowed these governors as Minister of Navy and Commander of the Fourth Army.[^147]

This extraordinary authority extended over a vast geography encompassing present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and part of Western Arabia. Officials, mutasarrıfs, and other civil servants were expected to coordinate their actions with the Fourth Army headquarters on matters of security, defense, and war policy.[^148] Immediately after his appointment, Cemal Pasha sent a telegram to Enver Pasha requesting that no interference occur in Syria’s military and political affairs without his consent; thus, he sought to ensure that decisions in the command region originated from a single center.[^149]

However, the appointment of governors and mutasarrıfs, allocation of budgets, and fundamental administrative regulations were still carried out by the ministries and the Council of Ministers in Istanbul. Thus, the resulting structure was not an independent administration detached from the center but a powerful regional command that maintained continuous consultation with the central government and sometimes altered its decisions.[^150]

The emergence of this governance style was not solely due to the military needs of the Canal operation. Before the war, rising reform and decentralization demands in the Arab provinces, relations between local notables and foreign consulates, foreign states’ protection claims, and some communities’ autonomous institutions were viewed by Unionist leaders as rival centers of influence between the state and the people.[^151]

The loss of most of the Ottoman territories in Europe following the Balkan Wars and the fear of the Ottoman state being partitioned again led the Union and Progress administration to view local opposition movements not merely as political dissent but as a security threat to the territorial integrity of the state.[^152] The goal Cemal Pasha expressed with the terms “order” and “internal security” was therefore not merely to combat crime and disorder. The aim was to extend state authority to the lowest administrative units, establish an administration independent of foreign or local intermediaries, and direct the population’s primary political allegiance toward the Ottoman State.[^153]

Within this framework, the centralization policy pursued simultaneously served as a reorganization to enhance state capacity during wartime and subordinated civil administration to the military commander’s will. Therefore, evaluating Cemal Pasha’s practices solely as an authoritarian initiative overlooks the Ottoman State’s aim of freeing the region from foreign influence and integrating it into its own administrative structure; however, portraying these practices merely as modernization efforts also ignores their primary purpose.[^154] Cemal Pasha’s administration arose from the convergence of the will to strengthen Ottoman sovereignty by bringing local political movements, community institutions, and foreign protection ties under control.

One of the first areas of centralization was bureaucracy. Cemal Pasha sought to replace officials previously serving in Syria who spoke Arabic and had close ties with local notables with a cadre loyal to him, capable of swiftly implementing orders and representing central authority.[^155] In a telegram to Talat Bey dated 1 February 1916, he complained about Salt kazas having remained without a kaymakam for nearly a year and stated that he was attempting to *“securely establish the authority of the government in Syria”* and requested the appointment of a *“capable official.”* 

The qualities he sought in the appointee to Jerusalem were even more detailed: the candidate needed to be Turkish, honest, experienced, possessing a sense of law, courageous, loyal to state laws, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, possessing a certain cultural level, and fluent in French.[^157] The most important qualities in these criteria were political reliability and administrative competence to establish government authority.[^158]

During these bureaucratic changes, some Arab kaymakams and mutasarrıfs suspected of supporting the idea of an independent Arab state were transferred from their regions to Anatolia, replaced by Unionist officers.[^159] However, this practice was not an assimilation program aimed at eliminating the Arabic language and culture but a limited administrative change. In response to accusations of Turkification, Cemal Pasha replied in his memoirs: *“We did not practice Turkish policy but the policy of the Ottoman Community.”* He defended the preservation of central authority over the provinces as a condition of Ottoman unity.[^160]

Disagreements with senior officials became one of the main problems in the new system. The Governor of Syria, Hulusi Bey, was a capable administrator who spoke Arabic, had good relations with local notables, and understood regional conditions; however, Cemal Pasha believed he was not sufficiently forceful against Arab nationalist circles seeking separation from the Ottoman state. Hulusi Bey, in turn, disapproved of Pasha’s overly harsh policies and resigned in 1915.[^161]

Cemal Pasha requested on 13 October 1915 that Erzurum Governor Tahsin Bey be appointed governor of Syria. The central government initially refused this request and appointed Azmi Bey; however, Cemal Pasha found Azmi Bey inexperienced and inadequate, forcing him to resign in April 1916. After a brief governorship by Ahmet Faik Bey, close to Talat Pasha, Tahsin Bey was appointed governor of Syria in July 1916.[^162]

Similar changes occurred in Beirut, Aleppo, and Jerusalem. Beirut Governor Bekir Sami Bey was removed from office on charges of corruption and gambling with bank managers; Bekir Sami Bey denied the accusations. Aleppo Governor Celal Bey resigned due to his close relations with local notables and his disagreement with Cemal Pasha’s governance style. Kudüs Mutasarrıf Macid Bey resigned following a disagreement with Hasan Bey, the commander of Jaffa under Cemal Pasha’s protection.[^163] Thus, within approximately a year after Cemal Pasha’s arrival in the region, a significant portion of the senior administrative cadres in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Cebel-i Lübnan were replaced. These purges and appointments resulted in the civil administration, while legally intact, becoming de facto dependent on the Fourth Army headquarters.[^164]

One of the most prominent applications of centralization policy was in Cebel-i Lübnan. The mutasarrıflık, established after the 1860 events and protected by international arrangements involving foreign powers, had a sectarian representation-based administration, military exemption, and extensive local privileges. During mobilization, the refuge of deserters in Lebanon and the attempt to seize animals for the army within the mutasarrıflık boundaries transformed this autonomous structure into a security issue in the eyes of military authorities.[^165] Cemal Pasha, in a proclamation dated 12 December 1914, declared that customary administration extended to Cebel-i Lübnan; he stationed a military unit in the region and placed the Lebanese gendarmerie under the command of this unit. However, the proclamation also stated that some privileges granted to the Lebanese population would continue under the protection of the Ottoman government.[^166]

In spring 1915, Catholic Mutasarrıf Ohannes Kuyumcuyan was removed from office; the existing Administrative Council was dissolved, members believed to have close ties with foreign consulates were purged, and the selection of new members was placed under military and civil authority control. On 4 August 1915, the appointment of Ali Münif Bey, a prominent Unionist and Deputy Minister of Interior, as mutasarrıf constituted a clear departure from the previous condition that the mutasarrıf be a Catholic Ottoman citizen.[^167] Nevertheless, all privileges in Lebanon were not immediately abolished. Military exemption, the selection of the local gendarmerie from the local population, and the preservation of the existing tax system were maintained, while the foreign powers’ right to intervene in the appointment of the mutasarrıf and local administration was eliminated.[^168] Thus, Cebel-i Lübnan policy aimed not to remove all privileges of the local population but to transfer the source of these privileges from foreign powers to the central Ottoman government and integrate autonomous administration into the state hierarchy.

Cemal Pasha also used his public visibility as a tool to strengthen government authority. In Damascus, Jerusalem, and other major cities, prominent buildings were designated as headquarters; Pasha attended Friday prayers with a large procession and listened to public petitions and complaints after prayers. Displaying signed photographs of him in homes and official offices became one of the visible signs of loyalty.[^169] This style of governance led some contemporaries to describe him as a “viceroy of the sultan” and a “king without a crown.”[^170] These descriptions did not refer to an official office but to the authority Cemal Pasha had achieved in Syria and the transformation of the military headquarters into a center of power. The ceremonies organized to visibly demonstrate Ottoman power in a region perceived as weakening thus led to the merging of state authority with Cemal Pasha’s personal authority.[^171]

These extensive powers, combined with his disagreements with the Unionist leadership in Istanbul and the strong public image he created in Syria, generated rumors from 1915 onward that Cemal Pasha intended to rebel against the central government and establish a “Syrian Kingdom.” These allegations circulated particularly in British and Russian diplomatic correspondence; Cemal Pasha’s disagreements with German officers and Enver Pasha were used as factors enhancing the credibility of these claims.[^172]

However, existing correspondence, memoirs, and other contemporary testimonies do not confirm that Cemal Pasha personally initiated such an attempt or accepted a proposal offered to him. The “Syrian Kingdom” proposal appears to have been primarily the product of Entente powers’ efforts to exploit disagreements within the Ottoman ruling cadre and create distrust between Istanbul and Damascus.[^173] Therefore, Cemal Pasha’s freedom of action in Syria must not be equated with political independence: he was a powerful commander who could influence and sometimes alter central government decisions; however, there is no reliable evidence that he established a new and independent center of sovereignty.[^174]

Cemal Pasha’s centralization policy facilitated the concentration of military and civil decisions in a single center during the early years of the war; it enabled the renewal of bureaucratic cadres, the control of autonomous structures like Cebel-i Lübnan, and the establishment of a more forceful administration against foreign influence.[^175] The cost, however, was the narrowing of governors’ areas of action, the weakening of local mediation channels, and the increasing dependence of governance on Cemal Pasha’s decisions.[^176] 

### Divan-ı Harps and Executions

The most controversial aspect of Cemal Pasha’s governance in Syria was the operation of divan-ı harps and executions carried out under their rulings to ensure state security during wartime. The background of the Arab political movement was not a single program: alongside reformers who sought to strengthen the public status of Arabic, grant broader powers to local administrations, and ensure stronger representation of Arab provinces in the center, there were separatist circles that maintained contact with foreign powers and demanded full independence based on the conditions the war would create.[^177]

When Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria, correspondence intercepted at the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut was handed over to him. These documents contained records of contacts between Abdülhamid ez-Zöhravi, Şefik el-Müeyyed, Şükrü el-Aseli, Abdülvehhab el-İngilizi, and other Arab notables with French diplomats.[^178] In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha states that, to avoid undermining the image of Islamic unity during the war against the Entente powers, he initially kept the documents secret and did not immediately initiate prosecutions against the individuals named. During the same period, he attempted to attract representatives of Arab political and cultural circles such as Abdülkerim el-Halil, Abdurrahman Şehbender, Abdülgani el-Arisi, and Muhammed Kürd Ali, provided some of them with financial assistance, and secured their loyalty to the Ottoman State.[^179]

This conciliatory policy began to change in early 1915. Due to the Dardanelles Campaign, some units of the Fourth Army were transferred from Syria to other fronts, increasing fears that coastal areas might be vulnerable to amphibious landings or local revolts. At the same time, reports reached Cemal Pasha that some Arab politicians in Sur, Sidon, and Merc-i Uyûn were discussing organizing against the Ottoman State’s potential defeat and establishing contact with Britain.[^180] Cemal Pasha informed Talat Pasha in a telegram dated 16 May 1915 that he considered the suppression of the Arab political movement necessary to preserve order in Syria; in July, arrests began against leading separatist Arab nationalists.[^181]

The first trials were conducted by the Beyrut Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi. Eleven individuals sentenced to death by this court were executed in Beyrut on 21 August 1915.[^182] These initial executions aimed not only to punish the condemned but also to send a deterrent message to opposition circles in coastal cities and Damascus that separatist political organization would not be tolerated under wartime conditions.

After the August 1915 executions, the scope of investigations expanded. In addition to active members of Arab political societies, former deputies, mayors, and some local notables suspected of association with them were also subjected to surveillance. Although Abdülgani el-Arisi, Tevfik el-Bisat, and Arif eş-Şihabi attempted to escape to the desert to avoid arrest, they were captured by Bedouins and handed over to Ottoman authorities.[^183] Following correspondence between Cemal Pasha and the Istanbul Police Directorate, in November 1915, Cemaleddin el-Hatib, Şefik el-Müeyyed, Azimzade Osman, and Ömer Bey were arrested. Şefik el-Müeyyed and Abdülvehhab el-İngilizi were sent to Syria on 17 January 1916; Ayan Meclisi member Abdülhamid ez-Zöhravi was arrested on 25 March and sent to Aliye.[^184]

The trials initiated in Aliye in late 1915 were completed in April 1916.[^185] The defendants were accused of attempting to establish an independent Arab state or Arab caliphate under the protection of France and Britain, cooperating with hostile societies such as el-Lâmerkeziye in Egypt, and preparing a revolt against Ottoman sovereignty during the war.

One of the most important legal issues in the trials was that some of the consulate documents concerned activities before the general amnesty declared in 1913. Cemal Pasha argued that the accused had continued their old activities after the amnesty; however, critics among the opposition argued that the Aliye Divan-ı Harb could not prove, in each case, that the defendants had continuously maintained their connections with Egyptian societies after the amnesty.[^186] Thus, the trials became the subject of claims that they failed to clearly distinguish between individuals who had direct cooperation with foreign states and those who had previously joined reformist or decentralization societies. This claim was later addressed by Paşa in his work “Kırmızı Kitap.” After the completion of the trials, death sentences were carried out simultaneously on 6 May 1916. Fourteen of the condemned were executed in Beyrut, and seven in Damascus.[^187]

The greatest legal controversy surrounding the executions was that they were carried out before the sultan’s approval. The executions were carried out on 6 May 1916, while Sultan Mehmed Reşad’s approval of the verdicts was dated 14 June 1916.[^188] However, it is also stated that the special regulations enacted at the beginning of the war granted military commanders the authority to implement divan-ı harp rulings before obtaining the sultan’s approval and then seek ratification afterward.[^189] In response to criticism directed at him, Cemal Pasha stated in his memoirs: *“I had legal authority for this.”* He claimed he had previously agreed with Enver and Talat Pashas and that the verdict documents were sent to Istanbul after the executions to be approved by the Council of Ministers and the sultan.[^190] 

To demonstrate the legitimacy of the trials and executions, Cemal Pasha compiled the names of the accused, their verdicts, and documents found in French consulates in a work titled *Aliye Divan-ı Harb-i Örfisinde Tetkik Olunan Mesele-i Siyasiye Hakkında İzahat*. Published by Tanin Press in Istanbul and known as the “Red Book” due to its red cover, this work was not merely a document collection but the official defense of the Fourth Army administration regarding the trials.[^191]

It is not possible to establish a direct and unidirectional causal relationship between the executions and the Sharif Hussein Revolt that began in June 1916. Sharif Hussein’s contacts with British authorities and his negotiations regarding the future of the Hejaz and Arab provinces began well before the May 1916 executions; thus, the Aliye verdicts were neither the first nor the sole cause of the revolt. Nevertheless, the executions were used by Sharif Hussein’s circle as propaganda to justify the removal of Syrian officers and some nationalist intellectuals from the center.[^192]

### Communities, Tribes, and Population Policies

Cemal Pasha’s policy toward communities and tribes in Syria and Palestine was not a uniform program applying the same methods to all social groups; direct control tools were used against institutional structures that could compete with central authority, while conciliation through exemptions, material support, and local autonomy was pursued with armed, mobile, and geographically inaccessible communities.[^193] The common goal of this differentiated governance style was to ensure the security of the Fourth Army region under the intensified military and economic conditions of the war, limit foreign influence over local communities, and bind the region more tightly to Istanbul.[^194]

When Cemal Pasha arrived in the region in December 1914, the first steps of a policy based on conciliation with the Druze and Bedouins had already been taken by his predecessors; Zeki Pasha, Governor of Syria Hulusi Bey, and Mersinli Cemal Pasha, among other military and civil administrators, visited the sheikhs in Havran, Dera, and Maan in the autumn of 1914 to secure their loyalty to the Ottoman State.[^195] The Druze leader Yahya el-Atraş received a gold watch, sword, and robe bearing the sultan’s name; other sheikhs received medals, swords, and robes according to their rank, demonstrating the state’s attempt to secure loyalty through symbolic prestige and conciliation.[^196]

One of the first social issues Cemal Pasha encountered immediately after assuming office was the status of Jews who were subjects of the Entente powers; the general practice of expelling citizens of enemy states applied to Jewish subjects of Russia, Britain, and France in Palestine, and thus a measure based on the laws of war directly affected the Jewish population.[^197] Between December 1914 and January 1915, approximately 2,700 foreign Jews were sent to Egypt via Italian ships; by February 1915, approximately 3,000 had applied for Ottoman citizenship, of whom approximately 970 had been accepted by June; by September, an additional 500 individuals who had refused citizenship or whose applications were deemed unsuitable were expelled from Palestine.[^198]

This practice soon shifted from the issue of enemy state citizens to directly targeting Zionist organizations. In a six-point draft regulation prepared by Cemal Pasha on 15 March 1915, he proposed halting new Jewish immigration to Palestine, banning the establishment of new colonies exclusively for Jews, preventing foreign states and society representatives from interfering in colony affairs, dissolving Zionist immigration and settlement organizations, and expelling their foreign members.[^199] The central government, due to potential diplomatic reactions in Germany and the United States, did not fully implement the draft; however, Talat Pasha’s permission to use existing administrative capacities granted Cemal Pasha broad authority to control the armed guards, courts, and external connections of Zionist organizations.[^200]

In early 1915, twelve Zionist leaders, including David Yellin, were exiled to Jaffa, and plans were made to expel forty-nine more individuals; some of these decisions were delayed or softened due to German interventions, but the activities of figures such as Arthur Ruppin, Ben-Zion Mossinson, and Jacob Thon were closely monitored.[^201] The collection of weapons in colonies, the removal of community court powers, and the redefinition of colony administrators as muhtars within the Ottoman administrative hierarchy demonstrated that the aim was not to eliminate the Jewish religious identity but to bring the semi-autonomous institutional structure created by Zionist organizations under state control; at the same time, the distinction between foreign Jews and Zionist leaders became evident only over time.[^202]

Another institution linked to foreign influence was the Christian clergy; the unilateral abolition of capitulations in September 1914 legally invalidated France’s claims of protection over Maronites and Catholics and Russia’s over Orthodox Christians, providing Cemal Pasha with the opportunity to link church hierarchies to Ottoman authorities.[^203] The recognition of Maronite Patriarch İlyas Huveyk by a sultan’s decree in January 1915 and his invitation to visit Cemal Pasha’s headquarters in Sofar on 27 July 1915 aimed to publicly demonstrate that the highest religious authority of the Maronites was subordinate to the Ottoman government before foreign powers.[^204]

This policy was not solely composed of coercive measures; some bishops with close ties to consulates were transferred to other churches, and regular financial aid was provided to patriarchates and churches, indicating the intention to both politically neutralize and financially bring the clergy under state control.[^205] Indeed, after a letter was intercepted showing communication with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Patriarch Huveyk was exiled to Adana in 1916, demonstrating that Cemal Pasha pursued full conciliation with community leaders only on the condition of loyalty to the state and the abandonment of foreign connections.[^206]

A similar centralization policy was applied to the Cebel-i Lübnan Mutasarrıflık; the mutasarrıflık’s ability to provide refuge to deserters, protect agricultural products from military requisition, and maintain its ties with France was viewed as a military security issue under wartime conditions.[^207] The removal of Mutasarrıf Ohannes Kuyumcuyan in spring 1915 and the appointment on 4 August 1915 of Ali Münif Bey, a prominent Unionist and Muslim, as mutasarrıf signified the abandonment of the old custom that the mutasarrıf be a Catholic Ottoman citizen and the effective erosion of Cebel-i Lübnan’s privileged status.[^208]

The most controversial dimension of Cemal Pasha’s population policies in the region was the deportation of a portion of the Anatolian Armenians to Syria and Mesopotamia in 1915.[^209] In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha states he did not participate in the negotiations regarding the deportation decision, did not know the grounds on which the decision was made, and attempted to prevent the clashes that occurred during the deportations.[^210]

When the first Armenian convoys arrived in Aleppo and the Fourth Army region from June 1915 onward, they had suffered losses due to epidemics, looting, rape, and armed attacks during the long journeys; many of the survivors were left without shelter, food, or medical care. This situation was largely due to the insufficient number and equipment of the escort forces assigned to the Armenian convoys.[^211] In August 1915, Cemal Pasha ordered that adults in the Aleppo region receive five and children four meteliks per day, that convoys be settled around Maarratünnuman, Bâb, and Müslimiye, and that Armenians be distributed so as not to exceed ten percent of the local population; he requested 11,035,000 kuruş from the center to cover settlement expenses.[^212]

Cemal Pasha pursued a policy that combined the army’s production and transportation needs with the survival prospects of the relocated Armenians, employing Armenian artisans in army factories, railway construction, and the Taurus–Amanos tunnels.[^213] It is clear that Cemal Pasha could

<!-- CONTEXT: Academic Sources and References for "Cemal Pasha" -->

## Academic Sources and References

1. Altuncu, İlker. "Türk Basınında Cemal Paşa Suikastı ve Yansımaları." Master's thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2010. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://nek.istanbul.edu.tr/ekos/TEZ/46870.pdf
2. Artuç, Nevzat. Cemal Paşa Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı. 3. baskı. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023.
3. Cemal Paşa. Hatırât (1913-1922). Hazırlayan Ahmet Zeki İzgöer. İstanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2021.
4. Eliri, Yusuf Alper. "Cemal Paşa'nın Askeri Kişiliği ve Askeri Faaliyetleri." Master's thesis, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, 2008. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=wBmNpkQC9Nhi90NLW7E7-URGsOoN-z31RodXU4zCDCK8YT2MTsUSwAw18mj4GGOc
5. Erdoğan, Murat. "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası: Bâbıâli Baskını." Master's thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2025. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=5NNqZKwwGohPh6\_KCcfp-oDdcJP9hI4R8qORwtYlMSMeLkX4PUJFwYE\_T\_dnuuqM
6. Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. "Cemal Paşa." \*TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi\*, Volume 7, pp. 305-307. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/cemal-pasa
7. Kayalı, Hasan. "Cemal, Ahmed." \*1914-1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War\*. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/cemal-pasa-ahmed/?format=pdf.
8. Polat, Gülsüm. "‘İhanet’ mi Taktik mi?: Cemal Paşa’nın Suriye Krallığı Meselesi." \*Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi\* 38, no. 1 (2023): 207–30. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://doi.org/10.18513/egetid.1333282
9. SALT Araştırma. "Adana Valisi Cemal Paşa." Envelope Collection, Istanbul. Accessed July 20, 2026.
10. Uca, Alaattin. "Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi ve Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşivi’ndeki Bazı Belgeler." \*Journal of Turkish Research Institute\* 16, no. 41 (2010): 271–305. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ataunitaed/article/39725
11. Çiçek, M. Talha. Cemal Paşa Suriye'de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları. İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020.
12. Çiçek, Muhammed Talha. "Cemal Pasha's Governorate in Syria, 1914-1917." PhD thesis, Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2012. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=1zw6GvYMe-q3Hf6HR-3US6gY9E7AnMgSMr-2zvvotkc-wudHqgAufVllBKFENvAZ
13. Çolak, Mustafa. "Cemal Paşa Suikastı İle İlgili İddialar ve İki Yeni Belge." \*Tarihçi\* 1, no. 1 (January 2021): 112–135. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://makale.isam.org.tr/server/api/core/bitstreams/00a5d361-23a5-40d7-acf8-3ad7aa0b89ba/content
14. Özkeleş, Ali Rıza. "İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Üç Paşaların (Talat, Enver, Cemal) Düşünce Yapısı (1908-1918)." Master's thesis, Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi, 2025. Accessed July 18, 2026. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=CtwiQkYvArAb95Ufpfs\_vl1T3SZZW19u1SszL4RGs64OWuvOJjp4MO1bRRRoVrpD

<!-- CONTEXT: Citations for "Cemal Pasha" -->

## Citations

[^1]: Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı, 3. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), 15–18, 109–174; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, c. 7 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993), 305–307, Erişim tarihi: 18 Temmuz 2026, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/cemal-pasa.
[^2]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 24–57, 109–145.
[^3]: M. Talha Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, çev. Fatih Sel (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020), 17–22, 44–59.
[^4]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 91–104, 178–230, 318–330, 374–420; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 1914-1918-Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. Ute Daniel vd. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2015), 2–4, Erişim tarihi: 18 Temmuz 2026, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/cemal-pasa-ahmed/?format=pdf.
[^5]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 331–395; Alaattin Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi ve Millî Savunma Bakanlığı Arşivi’ndeki Bazı Belgeler,” Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi 16, no. 41 (2009): 272–275, Erişim tarihi: 18 Temmuz 2026, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ataunitaed/article/39725.
[^6]: Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı, 15; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 305.
[^7]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 15.
[^8]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 16.
[^9]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 17–18.
[^10]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 17–18; Yusuf Alper Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği ve Askeri Faaliyetleri” (Yüksek lisans tezi, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, 2008), 15, erişim tarihi 18 Temmuz 2026, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=wBmNpkQC9Nhi90NLW7E7-URGsOoN-z31RodXU4zCDCK8YT2MTsUSwAw18mj4GGOc.
[^11]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 18; Alaattin Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi,” 272.
[^12]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 18–19; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği,” 15.
[^13]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 16.
[^14]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 16–17; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği,” 14–15.
[^15]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 18–19; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği,” 15.
[^16]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 19–20; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi,” 272; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği,” 15–16.
[^17]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 20–21.
[^18]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 20–22.
[^19]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 28–30; Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 305.
[^20]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 29–30.
[^21]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 22–23.
[^22]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 23–24.
[^23]: Murat Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası: Bâbıâli Baskını” (yüksek lisans tezi, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2025), 7–10, erişim tarihi 18 Temmuz 2026, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=5NNqZKwwGohPh6\_KCcfp-oDdcJP9hI4R8qORwtYlMSMeLkX4PUJFwYE\_T\_dnuuqM; Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı, 3. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), 35–37.
[^24]: Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 10, 14; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 40.
[^25]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 38–40; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 14–15.
[^26]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 40–41; Yusuf Alper Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği ve Askeri Faaliyetleri,” 18.
[^27]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 42–44; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askeri Kişiliği,” 20–21.
[^28]: Alaattin Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi ve Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşivi’ndeki Bazı Belgeler,” 272; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 61. Resmî hâl tercümesinde 10 Ağustos 1908, bazı biyografik anlatılarda ise 28 Temmuz 1908 tarihi verilmektedir; metinde resmî sicil kaydı esas alınmıştır.
[^29]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 61–62; M. Talha Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, çev. Fatih Sel (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020), 23.
[^30]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 63; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 18–20.
[^31]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 63–64; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 19–21.
[^32]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 64–65; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 21–22.
[^33]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 67.
[^34]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 64, 67; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 22–23.
[^35]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 67–69.
[^36]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 65, 69–70; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 22–23.
[^37]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 69–70; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 23.
[^38]: Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmi Hal Tercümesi,” 272; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 70–71. Resmî hâl tercümesinde 19 Mayıs, Artuç’un çalışmasında 18 Mayıs 1909 tarihi verilmektedir; metinde resmî kayıt esas alınmıştır.
[^39]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 77–78; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 24; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2. Vekâleten atama için Artuç’un yayımladığı 1 Ağustos 1909 tarihli İrade-i Seniyye esas alınmıştır.
[^40]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 79–80; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 25.
[^41]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 80–83; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 25–26.
[^42]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 83–89; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 26. Alıntı, Çiçek’in aktardığı 23 Şubat 1910 tarihli İngiliz viskonsolosluk raporundandır (TNA, FO 371/998).
[^43]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 92–94; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 27–28.
[^44]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 95–97; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 28–30. Alıntı, Çiçek’in aktardığı 16 Ekim 1911 tarihli İngiliz konsolosluk raporundandır (TNA, FO 195/2369).
[^45]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 97–99; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 30–31.
[^46]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 100–102; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 31.
[^47]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 101–102; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 33. Cemal Bey’in istifasının kesin günü tespit edilemediğinden, Artuç’un arşiv belgelerine dayanarak belirlediği 22 Temmuz–3 Ağustos 1912 tarih aralığı esas alınmıştır.
[^48]: Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa: Askerî ve Siyasi Hayatı, 102–3; Alaattin Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 272; Yusuf Alper Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 34.
[^49]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 103–4; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 34–35; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 272.
[^50]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 104–5; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 35.
[^51]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 106–8.
[^52]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 105; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 35–36; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2.
[^53]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 105, 108; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 272; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 305–6.
[^54]: Murat Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 29–38.
[^55]: Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 41–43.
[^56]: Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 43, 48–49; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 108–9.
[^57]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 108–9.
[^58]: Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 54–72; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 109.
[^59]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 109–10; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 272; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2.
[^60]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 110–12; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 89–91.
[^61]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 112–15; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 90–91.
[^62]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 112–15; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 90–91.
[^63]: Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa: Askerî ve Siyasi Hayatı, 122–23; Ali Rıza Özkeleş, “İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Üç Paşaların (Talat, Enver, Cemal) Düşünce Yapısı (1908–1918)” (yüksek lisans tezi, Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi, 2025), 109–10, erişim tarihi 18 Temmuz 2026, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=CtwiQkYvArAb95Ufpfs\_vl1T3SZZW19u1SszL4RGs64OWuvOJjp4MO1bRRRoVrpD.
[^64]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 115–17, 121–22; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 92–94.
[^65]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 117–19; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 39–40; Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 93–95.
[^66]: Erdoğan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktidarın Yeniden İnşası,” 94–100; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 118–21; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2.
[^67]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât (1913–1922), haz. Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (İstanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2021), “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 124–125; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 41–42.
[^68]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 125–126; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 42–43.
[^69]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 126–127; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 43.
[^70]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 126–127.
[^72]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 129; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 44–45.
[^73]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 129–130; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 44; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 272.
[^74]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 130; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 44–45.
[^75]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 130–131; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 45.
[^76]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 131.
[^77]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 132–133; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 46; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 273.
[^78]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 133; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 46–47.
[^79]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 133–134; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 47–48.
[^80]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 134–136; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 48–49.
[^81]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 136; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 49; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 273.
[^82]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 140–144; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 273.
[^83]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 136–137; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 273.
[^84]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 137–138; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 49–50.
[^85]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 138; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 50–51.
[^86]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 139–140; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 51–52.
[^87]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 136, 140, 145–146; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 52–54.
[^88]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 145–147; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 53–54.
[^89]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 147–148; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 54–55.
[^90]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 147–149; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 54–56.
[^91]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 149–151; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 56–57.
[^92]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 151–153; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 57–59.
[^93]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 149, 155–156; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 55–56, 61.
[^94]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 161–164; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 64–66.
[^95]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 161–165; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 64–67.
[^96]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 169–171; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 70–71; Uca, “Cemal Paşa’nın Resmî Hâl Tercümesi,” 273.
[^97]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 171–173; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 70–72.
[^98]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 173–174; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 71–72; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2.
[^99]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 185–187; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 72–74.
[^100]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 186–188; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 73–75.
[^101]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 191–192; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 76–77.
[^102]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 192–194; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 76–77.
[^103]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 193–195; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 77–78.
[^104]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 195; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 77–78.
[^105]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 195–197; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 78.
[^106]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 188–190, 197; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 78–79.
[^107]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 197–199; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 79–80.
[^108]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İstanbul Muhafızlığı (23 Ocak 1913–Kasım 1917)” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 198–200; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 79–80.
[^110]: Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa Askerî ve Siyasi Hayatı, 3. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), 202–205; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât (1913–1922), haz. Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (İstanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2021), “Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı.”
[^111]: M. Talha Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, çev. Fatih Sel (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020), 19–20; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 2.
[^113]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 205–206; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı.”
[^114]: Muhammed Talha Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate in Syria, 1914–1917” (Doktora tezi, Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2012), 47–50, erişim tarihi 18 Temmuz 2026, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=1zw6GvYMe-q3Hf6HR-3US6gY9E7AnMgSMr-2zvvotkc-wudHqgAufVllBKFENvAZ; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 18–20.
[^115]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 50–54; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 206–208.
[^116]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 53–54; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 203–205; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı.”
[^117]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 18–20; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 47–48; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 306.
[^118]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 54–60.
[^119]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Birinci Kanal Seferi”; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 58–60.
[^120]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 50–53; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Birinci Kanal Seferi Hazırlıkları.”
[^121]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 216; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 57, 68.
[^122]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 216–218; Yusuf Alper Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği ve Askerî Faaliyetleri,” 87–88.
[^123]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 68; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Birinci Kanal Seferi Hazırlıkları.”
[^124]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 68–69; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 216–217.
[^125]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 217; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 68–69.
[^126]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 217–218; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Birinci Kanal Seferi.”
[^127]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 222–223; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Birinci Kanal Seferi”; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 69–70.
[^128]: Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3; Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 306; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 69–70.
[^129]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 63, 70; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3.
[^130]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 217–219; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 70–71.
[^131]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 71–72, 78–79; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 224–227.
[^132]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 72–76; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3.
[^133]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Çöl Kumandanlığı”; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 77–79; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 223–225.
[^134]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 370–372.
[^135]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 372; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 237; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi.”
[^136]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi”; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 372–373; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3.
[^137]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 373; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 238; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi.”
[^138]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 373–374; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 238–239.
[^139]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 374–375; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi.”
[^140]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi”; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 238.
[^141]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 238–239; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 374; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “İkinci Kanal Seferi.”
[^142]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 238–239; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 372–374.
[^143]: Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 306; Kayalı, “Cemal Paşa, Ahmed,” 3; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 374–375.
[^144]: M. Talha Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, çev. Fatih Sel (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020), 19–20; Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı, 3. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), 252, 259–260.
[^146]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı”; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 20.
[^147]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 252, 259–260; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi 7 (1993): 306.
[^148]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 19–20; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed (Cemal Paşa, Djemal, Jamal),” 2.
[^149]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 20; Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı.”
[^150]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 57–58; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 259–260.
[^151]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 44–50; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 252–253.
[^152]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 47–49.
[^153]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 19–20, 44–50; Muhammed Talha Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate in Syria, 1914–1917” (doktora tezi, Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2012), 24–25.
[^154]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 42–44; Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed,” 2–4.
[^155]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 49–50.
[^157]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 51.
[^158]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 51–52; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 24–25.
[^159]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 51–52; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 24–25.
[^160]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 54–55.
[^161]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 55–56.
[^162]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 57–58; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 259.
[^163]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 55–57.
[^164]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 55–58.
[^165]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 165–168.
[^166]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 167–168.
[^167]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 169–170; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 260–261.
[^168]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 169–173.
[^169]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 58–59; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 255–257.
[^170]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 20, 58–59; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 255.
[^171]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 58–59.
[^172]: Ü. Gülsüm Polat, “‘İhanet’ mi Taktik mi?: Cemal Paşa’nın Suriye Krallığı Meselesi,” Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi 38, no. 1 (2023): 207–225, erişim tarihi 18 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.18513/egetid.1333282.
[^173]: Polat, “‘İhanet’ mi Taktik mi?,” 219–225; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 257–259.
[^174]: Polat, “‘İhanet’ mi Taktik mi?,” 225; Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed,” 4.
[^175]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 55–59, 167–173; Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed,” 2–4.
[^176]: Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed,” 2–3; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 47–50.
[^177]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 80–82, 94–100.
[^178]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Arap İhtilâli” bölümü; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 307–308.
[^179]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Arap İhtilâli” bölümü; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 91–94.
[^180]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 94–95; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 307–308.
[^181]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 94–95.
[^182]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 95–96; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 308.
[^183]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 96–97.
[^184]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 313–314.
[^185]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 314; Eliri, “Cemal Paşa’nın Askerî Kişiliği,” 107–108.
[^186]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 99–100; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 316.
[^187]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 97; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 315.
[^188]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 97.
[^189]: Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 97–98.
[^190]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Arap İhtilâli” bölümü.
[^191]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 315–316; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 100.
[^192]: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 316–318; Polat, “‘İhanet’ mi Taktik mi?,” 220–221; Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed,” 2–3.
[^193]: M. Talha Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, 132–139, 333–345; Muhammed Talha Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate in Syria, 1914–1917,” 130–168, 301–312.
[^194]: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Cemal Paşa,” 306; Hasan Kayalı, “Cemal, Ahmed (Cemal Paşa, Djemal, Jamal),” 2–3.
[^195]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 334–337; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 302–305.
[^196]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 336–337.
[^197]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 139–144; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 138–144.
[^198]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 143–146.
[^199]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 136–140; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 134–140.
[^200]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 138–143.
[^201]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 146–150; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 144–150.
[^202]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 150–156.
[^203]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 157–159; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 151–153.
[^204]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 157–160.
[^205]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 160–162; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 153–157.
[^206]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 159–162.
[^207]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 163–168; Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa: Askerî ve Siyasi Hayatı, 252–280.
[^208]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 168–171; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 157–164.
[^209]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Ermeni Meselesi” bölümü; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 184–192; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 283–304.
[^210]: Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, “Ermeni Meselesi” bölümü; Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 184–192.
[^211]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 192–195; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 180–184.
[^212]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 195–196; Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 291–295.
[^213]: Çiçek, Cemal Paşa Suriye’de, 196–199, 205–206; Çiçek, “Cemal Pasha’s Governorate,” 184–189.