Circassian Exile

Circassian Exile, is the forced displacement of large numbers of Circassians from their ancestral homeland in Northwestern Caucasus as a result of the military expansion of Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century. The refugees were resettled primarily in the Ottoman Empire and other regions; some settled permanently in temporary安置 areas, while others were compelled to relocate a second time due to wars and political developments. May 21, 1864, marked the symbolic date of the exile, coinciding with the Russian victory in the Caucasian Wars and the formal annexation of the Caucasus. This process was not merely a relocation; it was a multifaceted historical rupture encompassing war, forced migration, mass death, resettlement, social adaptation, and collective memory.

The Caucasus is a vast transitional region stretching between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, encompassing the northern and southern basins of the Caucasus Mountains. Bordered by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the west, the Caspian Sea to the east, the Manych Depression to the north, and the passes leading into Anatolia, Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to the south, this area has historically served as a crossroads for north-south and east-west movements. The region’s geography is not merely defined by mountainous terrain and passes; the Black Sea coast, the Kuban basin, the Terek line, the eastern regions opening toward the Caspian, and the natural barriers formed by the Caucasus Mountains have rendered the Caucasus a decisive zone for settlement, defense, and military advancement. In contemporary geographic and political divisions, the Caucasus is generally split into two main regions: North Caucasus and South Caucasus. South Caucasus refers to Transcaucasia, comprising Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, while North Caucasus denotes the mountainous northern belt extending from the Black Sea–Azov line to the Caspian Sea, home to numerous ethnic communities.

The area directly associated with the Circassian Exile is particularly the Northwestern Caucasus. Northwestern Caucasus, historically known as Circassia, is bounded by the Black Sea coast to the west, the Kuban River and its basin to the north, mountainous regions bordering Georgia to the south, and the upper course of the Terek River and the route toward Chechnya to the east. This region posed a long-term military challenge to Russian expansion not only due to its physical boundaries but also because of its coastal strip, mountain passes, forested areas, and the dispersed yet resilient settlement patterns of its local communities. Some Circassian groups lived along the coast, while others inhabited the mountainous and semi-mountainous interior; this settlement pattern provided defensive advantages while simultaneously hindering the establishment of a centralized political authority. Consequently, from the Russian perspective, Northwestern Caucasus was not merely a frontier territory to be conquered but a demographic and military space requiring reorganization.

^{Circassian Exile and Genocide} (TRT News)

The ethnic composition of the Caucasus is extremely fragmented. Over successive periods, Turkic, Iranian, Caucasian, and Indo-European communities have coexisted in the region. Among Turkic groups are the Azerbaijanis, Kumyks, Karachays, Balkars, Nogais, and Turkmens; among Caucasian groups are the Circassians, Abazas, Abkhazians, Ubykhs, Chechens, Ingush, Laks, Lezgins, and Georgians; among Indo-European groups are the Ossetians, Armenians, Persians, Russians, and other communities. Small communities with unique languages and cultural distinctiveness, particularly in the isolated mountainous interior, also persisted. This highly fragmented structure makes it difficult to define the Caucasus through a single ethnic or political identity; its historical fabric is composed of interwoven languages, lineages, tribal affiliations, religious influences, and local traditions.

Within this complex structure of North Caucasus, the Circassians held a prominent position among the indigenous communities of Northwestern Caucasus. In the narrow sense, the term “Circassian” refers to the Adyghe communities. Within this framework, tribes such as the Shapsugs, Abzakh, Bzhedug, Hatuqway, Besleney, Kabardians, Chemguy, and others are considered fundamental components of the Circassian/Adyghe social structure. The Adyghe-Abkhaz-Ubykh group occupied a significant portion of Northwestern Caucasus’s historical demography, inhabiting areas stretching from the mouth of the Kuban River southeastward, along the Black Sea coast, and in the mountainous regions. Their neighbors included the Karachays, Balkars, Ossetians, Chechens, Ingush, Dagestani groups, and Abazas. Understanding these tribal and neighborly relationships is crucial for comprehending Circassia before the exile, as the rupture of 1864 represented not merely the displacement of one people but the substantial disruption of this local ethnic map.

The usage of the term “Circassian” is also a matter requiring careful attention. While in the narrow sense it refers to the Adyge, this term acquired a broader scope in Ottoman geography and especially after the exile. Circassian migrants arriving in the Ottoman lands were often collectively labeled “Circassians” regardless of their specific ethnic distinctions. Several factors contributed to this broad usage: the migrants’ common origin from the same region, similar clothing and lifestyles, their Muslim identity, the Ottoman administration’s tendency to categorize migrants into administrative groups, and the local population’s lack of familiarity with the detailed ethnic names of groups from North Caucasus. Nevertheless, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term “Circassian” did not always encompass all North Caucasians; Abazas, Karachay-Balkars, and Nogais were sometimes distinguished from Circassians in certain texts.

The presence of the Adyge in Northwestern Caucasus is linked to the region’s ancient settlement history. It is widely accepted that human settlements in Northwestern Caucasus date back to prehistoric times, with Paleolithic and Neolithic artifacts revealing traces of early life. Ancient texts mention communities such as the Maeotians, Sindians, and Cercetae along the northeastern Black Sea coast; the relationship between these ancient groups and the Circassians has been the subject of various historical interpretations. Etymological explanations for the term “Circassian” include Greek-Latin, Iranian, and Turkic-Tatar theories. One such theory suggests that the Greek term “Cercetae,” used for indigenous groups along the northwestern Black Sea coast, gradually evolved into “Circassian.” However, the etymological question has not been definitively resolved.

The religious structure of the Caucasus is as diverse as its ethnic composition. Throughout history, the region has been influenced by indigenous belief systems, Christianity, and Islam. Christianity reached certain parts of the Caucasus primarily through Byzantine, Georgian, and missionary influences; Islam spread earlier in Dagestan, Chechnya, and the Nogai territories. The mass adoption of Islam in Northwestern Caucasus occurred later, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although some Circassian tribes had earlier contact with Islam through Crimean Tatars and Ottoman influence, religious conversion did not occur uniformly across the region. The mountainous terrain, local social traditions, and tribal organization hindered the equal penetration of both Christianity and Islam. Consequently, the religious identity of Circassian communities in the nineteenth century must be understood not only as a change of faith but also in terms of the continuity of local traditions and older cultural elements.

In terms of social structure, the Circassians operated under a system dominated by strong tribal and clan affiliations and localized leadership. While many regions of the Caucasus exhibited hierarchical divisions such as nobles, free peasants, and dependent classes, this structure was not uniform across all North Caucasus communities. In Dagestan, for example, classes such as beys, free men, and slaves were prominent; among the Chechens, a more egalitarian tribal organization prevailed. Circassian society also featured distinctions between aristocratic families, warrior classes, free community members, and dependent groups, which shaped social relations. However, this hierarchy did not produce a centralized and enduring state apparatus; rather, it fostered local political fragmentation and inter-tribal autonomy. The prolonged resistance of the Circassians against Russian expansion was linked to this form of local organization; yet the same structure also made it difficult for all Circassian communities to unite into a single, centrally commanded military force.

The political position of the Caucasus was directly tied to the competition between the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia. The Ottoman Empire established military, commercial, and religious ties with the Caucasus through its control of the Black Sea and the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Khanate’s position within the Ottoman system was one of the key elements supporting Ottoman influence along the northern Black Sea. Russia’s southward expansion from the eighteenth century onward initiated a new phase, targeting first Crimea and the Kuban line, then the interior regions of the Caucasus. The loss of Crimea weakened the Ottoman defensive line along the northern Black Sea and granted Russia a more favorable military and diplomatic position for advancing into the Caucasus. These developments transformed Circassia from a merely mountainous region inhabited by local communities into one of the central arenas of imperial rivalry.

Therefore, the foundational context leading to the Circassian Exile lies in the Caucasus being a geographic transit zone, ethnically highly fragmented, and politically vulnerable to external power competition. Circassian communities, thanks to their mountainous terrain, local autonomy, warrior traditions, and Black Sea connections, managed to resist Russian advances for a long time. Yet the same geography constituted a strategic obstacle for Russia’s ambitions to dominate the Black Sea, Ottoman borders, and routes to the south. In the nineteenth century, removing this obstacle was seen as possible not only through military victory but also through altering the region’s demographic structure. The subsequent phases of the exile—village evacuations, coastal concentrations, forced transfers to Ottoman lands, and the expansion of Cossack and Russian settlements—were direct consequences of this geographic and political context.

The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus was shaped through Black Sea dominance and the Crimean Khanate. From the second half of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans exerted influence along the northern and eastern coasts of the Black Sea; with Crimea’s incorporation into the Ottoman sphere, the Ottomans became neighbors of the Caucasus. The coastline from the Taman Peninsula to Sochi remained under Ottoman influence for a long time, and centers such as Sohumkale, Anapa, and Soğucak played military and diplomatic roles in Ottoman-Caucasian relations. This relationship was based not on direct central administration but on alliances with local beys, coastal fortresses, trade, religious contacts, and the perception of the region as a defensive line against Russian expansion.

Russia’s southward expansion accelerated in the eighteenth century through Crimea and the Kuban line. The establishment of the Mozdok Fortress in 1763 and the subsequent extension of Russian forts and Cossack settlements into North Caucasus marked one of the initial phases of pressure on Circassia. Resistance by the Kabardians against Russian advances became prominent during this period. Russia sought to establish permanence in the Caucasus not only through military campaigns but also through fortification lines and settlement policies. The fortified system stretching from Mozdok-Stavropol to the Sea of Azov demonstrated Russia’s aim to establish a permanent frontier and military administration rather than temporary raids. During the reign of Catherine II, expansion toward the Caucasus became a continuous state policy for Russia.

The 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca constituted a decisive turning point in Ottoman-Russian rivalry concerning Crimea and the Caucasus. Under this treaty, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to recognize Crimea’s independence; Crimea remained only religiously subordinate to the Caliphate. This weakened the Ottoman balance system along the northern Black Sea and granted Russia more direct influence over Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783 meant the loss of one of the Ottoman Empire’s most important bases along the northern Black Sea. The loss of Crimea was not merely a territorial loss; it rendered the Caucasus more vulnerable to Russian invasion, weakened Ottoman security in the Black Sea, and increased pressure on the Straits.

The transfer of Crimea to Russian control facilitated Russia’s focus on the Caucasus. Russian administration advanced toward the Taman and Kuban regions via Crimea, creating a more direct contact and conflict line between Russia and Circassia. After the loss of Crimea, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to pay greater attention to the Caucasus. Circassian and Abaza beys, under Russian pressure, sought assistance from the Ottoman Empire; delegations were sent to Istanbul, and military-administrative initiatives centered on Soğucak emerged. During the governorship of Ferah Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Empire sought to strengthen its relations with Circassian beys in Western Caucasus, support the Muslim identity of the region, and establish a local resistance line against Russian expansion.

The Ottoman Empire’s influence in the Caucasus never transformed into full centralized control due to the autonomous structures of local communities. While Circassian tribes formed alliances with the Ottomans and shared religious affinity, they preserved their internal organization, local leaders, and tribal systems. For the Ottoman state, the region’s importance was summarized in several points: securing the Black Sea coast, preventing Russian southward advance, creating a resistance belt against Iran, providing military manpower when needed, and functioning as a buffer zone for Ottoman territories. In contrast, Russia viewed the same region as a strategic corridor opening toward the south and the Black Sea; Russia regarded the conquest of the Caucasus not merely as a local security issue but as part of a broader expansionist policy toward the Black Sea, Anatolia, Iran, and Central Asia.

The Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829 further weakened the Ottoman military position in the Caucasus. During the war, Russian forces besieged the important coastal fortress of Anapa. The Ottoman Empire requested assistance from Circassians in the region; however, Anapa fell to the Russians. Circassian representatives seeking to negotiate with the Russians encountered demands for complete obedience, preventing any agreement. Subsequently, Russian forces under General Emanuel crossed the Kuban River and attacked Circassia, destroying numerous villages. The 1829 Treaty of Edirne, which ended the war, ceded Anapa, Poti, and Ahıska to Russia. The loss of key defensive points such as Anapa and Poti strengthened Russia’s connection with the western Black Sea and Caucasus coasts.

The Treaty of Edirne strengthened Russia’s diplomatic claims over Circassia. The Ottoman Empire’s loss of its coastal bases in the Caucasus left Circassian communities more isolated against Russia. Russia intensified its military pressure in the Caucasus after the treaty, while the Ottoman Empire largely lost its capacity for direct intervention in the region. From this point onward, the struggle in Circassia transformed from an Ottoman-supported frontier defense into a war between local resistance and Russian military power. During the first half of the nineteenth century, while the Ottoman Empire struggled with internal revolts, nationalist movements in the Balkans, reform efforts, and successive wars, Russia advanced its military line in the Caucasus more systematically.

The Crimean War brought the Caucasus issue back onto the international political agenda. Between 1853 and 1856, the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and France fought Russia on the same front, leading to Circassians being viewed as potential allies against Russia. The Black Sea and Caucasus corridor was vital for Russia in terms of communication, supply, and security; the continued presence of Circassians along this corridor hindered Russia’s ability to maintain uninterrupted control over the region. At the 1856 Paris Peace Conference, the Caucasus and Circassian issue was raised; British and Ottoman representatives proposed revisiting the Treaty of Edirne and establishing a Circassian state under British and Ottoman protection. France’s refusal to support this initiative and Russia’s rejection of the proposals resulted in no concrete political outcome.

After the Paris Treaty, Russia adopted a harsher policy in the Caucasus. The possibility of Circassian support from external powers during the Crimean War convinced Russian authorities that the region required not only military defeat but also permanent control. Russia viewed the indigenous population of the Caucasus as a threat to its dominance over the Black Sea coast, the Kuban basin, and the mountain passes. Consequently, from the late 1850s, military operations in the Caucasus combined village destruction, population displacement, expansion of Russian and Cossack settlements, and the depopulation of coastal areas. After the capture of Sheikh Shamil in 1859, resistance in the east was largely broken; Russian military focus shifted to Northwestern Caucasus.

Russia’s advance in the Caucasus altered not only the Ottoman Empire’s eastern borders but also the balance of power in the Black Sea. Until the end of the eighteenth century, for the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus was an extension of Black Sea security; by the mid-nineteenth century, it had become an area under intense Russian military pressure, increasingly difficult to defend. For Russia, the same region connected the eastern Black Sea coast, the Georgian and Transcaucasian links, the Kuban-Terek line, and strategic routes to the south. The path to the Circassian Exile emerged from this prolonged rivalry between the two empires, the weakening of Ottoman influence in the Caucasus, and Russia’s policy of establishing military-demographic dominance.

Russia’s advance in the Caucasus faced local resistance movements from the late eighteenth century. One of the first organized examples of this resistance emerged under the leadership of the Dagestani Sheikh Mansur. Sheikh Mansur developed a form of struggle that emphasized not only military resistance against Russian expansion but also religious and social solidarity. This movement became one of the early phases of the broader resistance later known as Muridism. Wars with Russian forces lasted until 1790; Sheikh Mansur was captured in 1791 and taken to Petersburg, where he was executed. This period marked the transition of local and tribal reactions in North Caucasus against Russia toward a more organized political-religious struggle.

The Muridism movement gained strength in the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in Dagestan and Chechnya. Under the leadership of imams, this structure sought to unite various mountain communities around a common cause of resistance against Russian expansion. The movement’s foundation lay in the religious discipline of the Naqshbandi order, efforts to mobilize local communities against Russian military pressure, and the desire to preserve regional independence. Due to tribal organization and local autonomy, it was difficult for Caucasian communities to unite around a central authority; Muridism functioned as an attempt to unify this fragmented structure within a religious and political framework. This movement, influential in Northeastern Caucasus, had limited contact with Kabardians, Karachays, Ossetia, and Western Circassia but failed to achieve similar institutionalization in Northwestern Caucasus.

Sheikh Shamil, the most effective leader of the Muridism movement, waged a prolonged resistance against Russia from the 1830s until 1859. Born in the village of Gimri in Dagestan, Shamil became one of the principal leaders of the Caucasian resistance after joining the movement initiated by Ghazi Muhammad. Shamil’s struggle was not merely military; it also involved reducing fragmentation among tribes, maintaining local communities under a common discipline, and establishing a political-military structure to halt Russian advances. Although Russia possessed superior military strength, the mountainous terrain, the local population’s resistance capacity, and Shamil’s movement prevented Russian occupation for many years. Shamil brought together tribes that were not always in harmony, using Islamic values to unite them under a common cause.

Russia’s military methods in the Caucasus hardened significantly during the first half of the nineteenth century. General Aleksey Yermolov’s activities in the Caucasus were among the earliest and most prominent examples of this hardening. The burning of villages, targeting civilians, depopulation of fertile lands, and forcing populations into mountainous areas demonstrated that Russian military strategy targeted not only armed opponents but also the local population’s sources of livelihood. In 1839, declining agricultural production and Russian measures restricting trade left the Caucasus population under pressure of famine and hunger. Thus, military assault, economic pressure, and destruction of settlement areas became mutually reinforcing methods.

Circassian communities in Northwestern Caucasus also attempted to organize resistance against Russian advances during this period. The Shapsugs and Natukhais convened councils in the 1830s to create a broader resistance framework. The idea of a common flag became one of the symbolic steps strengthening solidarity among tribes. Circassian representatives also engaged in negotiations and peace initiatives with Russian generals. The response received by the delegation sent to General Velyaminov revealed that the Russian side demanded obedience rather than compromise; threats that villages would be burned, populations forcibly subjugated, and enslaved if they refused to submit to Russia rendered diplomatic efforts largely ineffective.

After the Crimean War, Russian pressure on the Caucasus intensified. General Baryatinsky, appointed Governor of the Caucasus in 1856, applied Yermolov’s methods more systematically. Russian forces encircled the Caucasus, gradually tightening the noose. This strategy yielded results within a few years; Shamil’s forces were dispersed, and Shamil surrendered to the Russians on September 6, 1859. After Shamil’s capture, Muhammad Emin, sent to support Circassian resistance in Western Caucasus, also surrendered to Russia along with his followers. Thus, approximately twenty-five years of Gazavat wars ended, and the Russians largely achieved their military objectives in Northeastern Caucasus, including Dagestan.

Shamil’s capture opened the way for Russia to shift its military focus to Northwestern Caucasus. With resistance in the east broken, Russian forces turned toward the regions inhabited by the Adyge, Abkhaz, Ubykh, and communities beyond the Kuban. At this stage, Circassians faced a difficult choice: continue resistance or surrender. The Abzakh, Ubykh, Shapsug, and some Kuban communities decided to continue resistance. However, the feudal and tribal organization of Circassian communities made it difficult for them to form a large, disciplined army under unified command. Local resistance persisted for a long time; yet, against the numerical and technological superiority of the Russian army, siege tactics, village destructions, and the disruption of supply lines, losses mounted steadily.

In 1861, leaders of the Abzakh, Ubykh, and Shapsug tribes met in Sochi to establish a structure known as the High Council of Freedom or the Great Free Council. This council aimed to organize resistance politically, appoint officials for specific regions, and seek external support. Envoys were sent to Britain and the Ottoman Empire, requesting recognition of the new political structure and assistance against Russia. This initiative demonstrated that Circassian resistance was not merely a collection of scattered tribal wars but also involved diplomatic and institutional efforts in its final phase. However, the Ottoman Empire’s capacity for direct intervention was weak; the expected support from Britain did not materialize into concrete military aid.

During this period, Russia did not merely apply military pressure on Circassian communities; it also developed plans to alter the region’s population and settlement structure. In October 1860, the Caucasus High Command convened in Vladikavkaz and rejected peaceful methods, adopting a new military plan targeting mountain dwellers beyond the Kuban. The plan relied on Russia’s superior numbers and weaponry to force mountain dwellers into the lowlands and plains, then compel them to abandon their lands. The goal was to establish Russian and Cossack settlements in the emptied areas. Between 1860 and 1861, the forced migration of 10,343 Kabardians to Ottoman lands was one of the early applications of this policy.

Meetings between Tsar Alexander II and Circassian delegations in 1861 indicated a weakening of diplomatic prospects for the Circassians. Circassian delegations attempted to resolve the issue through negotiations; however, the Russian side demanded that Circassians either settle in the Kuban basin or migrate to Ottoman lands. These options contradicted the Circassians’ desire to remain in their ancestral homeland. The decree later issued by Grand Duke Michael stated that if the population did not leave the Caucasus within a specified period, they would be deported as war captives to various regions of Russia. Thus, the final phase of resistance became a stage where military defeat was intertwined with forced displacement policy.

By 1863, the majority of Circassian communities had exhausted their final options and were forced to retreat under Russian military pressure. In March 1864, one of the last major resistances, the Ubykh resistance, was crushed; nearly all Ubykhs migrated to Ottoman lands. Fighting continued sporadically until 1865; the fall of Ahçipsu near the town of Bogra marked the dispersal of the last Circassian forces. Russia completed its military objective of conquering the Caucasus, which it had pursued step by step since the end of the eighteenth century, in May 1864. The diplomatic environment established after the Treaty of Edirne, combined with Shamil’s capture in 1859 and the crushing of the final resistances in Northwestern Caucasus, largely eliminated the possibility for Circassian communities to remain in their homeland.

Behind the Circassian Exile lay not only Russia’s aim to militarily conquer Northwestern Caucasus but also its policy of reshaping the region’s population and settlement structure to suit its own dominance. The main problem faced by the Russian army during prolonged wars was that even after Circassian communities suffered defeats, they could reorganize in mountainous and forested areas, maintain connections between coastal and inland regions, and draw support from local village networks. Therefore, for Russia, lasting dominance could not be achieved merely by breaking armed resistance; it required the elimination of the villages, agricultural lands, mountain passes, coastal settlements, and local social organization that sustained resistance. This approach evolved into a clear policy of population engineering from the late 1850s onward.

Russian commanders viewed Circassia not as a frontier region to be governed alongside its indigenous population but as an area that needed to be emptied for Russian expansion. General D. A. Milyutin, in a report prepared in 1857, advocated the removal of Circassians from their ancestral lands and their resettlement in areas deemed suitable by Russia, such as the Don basin. General Baryatinsky persuaded Tsar Alexander II to accept this plan in 1860. The core logic of the plan was to sever mountain communities from their historical settlements, strengthen Russian population in the northern slopes of the Caucasus, and make living conditions increasingly unbearable to force the local population to leave. This thinking later guided applications along the Kuban line and the Black Sea coast.

Within Russian military and administrative circles, the presence of the Circassian population was viewed as a direct security threat. The approach attributed to General Yermolov—“The lands beyond the Kuban were needed by Russia, but the indigenous population there was not”—reflects Russia’s tendency to reclaim territory by removing its indigenous population rather than controlling it together with them. General Yevdokimov also assessed the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of families from the Kuban line to Ottoman lands as a safer option for Russia. Thus, the exile became not an incidental outcome of war but a method shaped within Russian command’s military security and colonization calculations.

The practical implementation of this policy presented Circassians with two options: settle in areas designated by Russia, particularly around the Kuban, or migrate to the Ottoman Empire. However, Russia’s proposed internal settlement did not mean Circassians could remain autonomously in their own lands. Coastal areas, mountain passes, and strategic settlement lines were being emptied; the population was either forced into lowlands under Russian control or compelled to leave the empire. Even some communities that accepted Russian rule could not remain in their ancestral villages. The rejection of Ubykh demands to live peacefully in their lands without displacement revealed that Russia’s goal was not merely obedience but the depopulation of specific regions.

The Kuban line became one of the central areas of this policy. Russia sought to reduce the indigenous population beyond the Kuban and strengthen the region with Cossack and Russian settlements. The settlement of Cossacks served not only agricultural colonization but also military frontier security. Cossack villages functioned for Russian administration as both sources of settled population and military outposts. By replacing Circassians who were expelled or forced to leave with Russian peasants and Cossacks, Russia attempted to bring the coastal strip open to the Black Sea and Western Caucasus trade under control. Thus, the demographic structure of Circassia was transformed to fit a new settlement order designed to ensure permanent Russian dominance.

The burning of villages, destruction of farmland, and elimination of crops were complementary elements of this policy. Russian forces did not merely attack military targets; they also destroyed the production infrastructure that sustained resistance fighters and enabled the civilian population to remain in place. The burning of crops, slaughter or seizure of livestock, and irreversible destruction of villages rendered Circassian living areas unsustainable. Some Russian military accounts describe practices such as advancing by burning villages, destroying settlements between the mountains and the sea within days, and then re-burning crops as they regrew. This method aimed not only to remove the population from the battlefield but also to eliminate any possibility of return to their homeland.

Russia’s pressure tools were not limited to military violence. Religious, psychological, and administrative pressures were also used to force communities into migration. Rumors that those remaining under Russian rule would be Christianized, conscripted into long-term military service, and forced to fight against the Ottoman Caliphate created serious anxiety among Muslim Circassians. The possibility of conscription into the Russian army was perceived not merely as compulsory service but as a threat to their own people and religious-political identity. The beginning of recruitment from some Circassians beyond the Kuban who did not consider migration to Ottoman lands demonstrated that these fears were not merely rumors.

The Russian administration also utilized negotiations with the Ottoman Empire regarding migration to suit its own policy. In 1859, the Ottoman Empire was requested to grant permission for some Muslim groups to migrate from the Caucasus. In 1860, Russian envoy Melikof informed the Ottomans that approximately 40,000 Muslims affected by war and displacement wished to migrate to Ottoman lands, establishing a basis for an agreement. While the Ottoman side viewed this migration as limited, phased, and controllable, Russia transformed this framework into a diplomatic basis for broader exiles. Thus, subsequent mass displacements were framed as “migration permits” and “refugee acceptance,” yet on the ground, the options presented to the population did not constitute genuine freedom of movement.

Ottoman documents from 1863 clearly demonstrate the direct coercive nature of Russian pressure. In a letter dated December 3, 1863, from the Trabzon Governorate to the Sublime Porte, it was reported that Russians, after seizing territories, offered local populations the choice of relocating inland or being forced to leave for Ottoman lands, burned their homes to accelerate departure, and compelled people to gather at piers. In a memorandum dated December 12, 1863, it was stated that Russia had seized Circassian territories and advanced as far as the Abzakh regions, offered settlement in the Kuban lowlands, some accepted, and approximately fifty thousand decided to migrate to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Embassy informed the Sublime Porte that if the Ottoman Empire refused to accept them, these people would be forcibly resettled in Kuban areas, potentially leading to bloodshed.

During this period, a clear distinction existed between Russia’s use of the term “migration” and the reality of coercion on the ground. The Russian administration often portrayed Circassians’ migration to Ottoman lands as their own choice; however, the burning of villages, forced concentration at the coasts, time-limited valley evacuations, threats of forced relocation to areas designated by Russia, and military conscription revealed that this movement was not voluntary. Many Circassians attempted alternatives such as remaining in their villages, maintaining limited loyalty to Russian rule, or avoiding war. The rejection of these options demonstrated that Russia’s primary goal was not to create a compliant Circassian population but to depopulate strategic regions of their indigenous inhabitants.

Another element behind the exile decision was control of the Black Sea coast. The Circassian coastline was vital for Ottoman contact, external support, trade, and arms procurement. Russia viewed the presence of the indigenous population along the coast as a permanent threat to its dominance. Therefore, depopulating the coastal strip aimed to sever Circassian ties with the Ottomans and establish Russian settlement and military control along the eastern Black Sea coast. When the connection between the mountainous interior and the coast of Northwestern Caucasus was severed, resistance’s link to the outside world also weakened. Thus, the exile was not a simple evacuation following military victory but the culmination of a coastal control policy developed during the war.

After 1859, Russia concentrated its military strength in Northwestern Caucasus to implement this policy. With the capture of Sheikh Shamil, resistance in Northeastern Caucasus was largely broken; the main Russian military focus shifted to Circassia. Between 1859 and 1864, operations involved the systematic capture of villages, the forced concentration of indigenous populations toward the coast or the Kuban, and the redirection of non-submissive communities toward Ottoman lands. Although individual and limited migrations occurred after the Crimean War, between 1863 and 1865, this movement reached the scale of mass exile.

This background renders the Circassian Exile insufficiently explained as merely a migration following military defeat. Russia’s goal extended beyond merely conquering Northwestern Caucasus militarily; it encompassed altering the region’s population, agricultural structure, coastal connections, and settlement patterns. The Circassians’ departure from their homeland, the burning of villages, the destruction of crops, the forced settlement offers to the Kuban, the transfer to Ottoman lands, the fear of conscription and Christianization, and the establishment of Cossack and Russian settlements collectively constituted this process. Thus, the exile became the demographic pillar of Russia’s strategy to establish lasting dominance in the Caucasus.

As Russian military pressure intensified in Northwestern Caucasus, Circassian communities were first driven from inland areas toward the coast. Families expelled from mountain settlements, whose villages were burned, or forced to relocate to areas designated by Russia gathered in waiting areas along the Black Sea coast. This concentration did not occur within a systematic evacuation framework. People often arrived at the coast with only limited possessions, animals, and food; winter conditions, lack of shelter, epidemics, and food shortages caused massive losses even before sea travel began. Mobility accelerated from late 1863; by spring 1864, as Russian advances reached their final phase, the concentration of refugees along the coast intensified further.

The main direction of the exile route was from the eastern Black Sea coast toward Ottoman ports. Centers such as Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop, Varna, Kostroma, and Istanbul served as primary ports of arrival at different times. Trabzon, due to its geographic proximity, became one of the first major arrival points; Samsun functioned as a transit gateway for refugees destined for inland Anatolia. Under normal circumstances, refugees arriving at ports were intended to be sent to permanent settlement areas; however, the massive influx, insufficient ships and transport, seasonal conditions, and administrative capacity limitations often disrupted this plan. Some refugees brought to Samsun Pier were temporarily settled in Samsun and Canik areas because they could not be immediately dispatched to their assigned destinations; some of these temporary settlements later became permanent.

The Black Sea crossing was one of the most devastating phases of the exile. The number of refugees waiting along the coast far exceeded ship capacity. Consequently, people were often crammed onto overcrowded boats and merchant vessels. During the journey, access to clean water, food, medical care, and adequate shelter was insufficient. Epidemics spread rapidly on ships, and weak children, elderly, and sick passengers often could not complete the voyage. Storms, poor weather, and unsuitable vessels made sea travel even more perilous. Shipwrecks, passengers drowning at sea, and captains who, for high fees, transported people without ensuring safe passage became commonplace.

The exile was not limited to the transition from the Caucasus to Ottoman shores; a new period of uncertainty began for refugees who reached Ottoman ports. As concentrations increased in centers like Trabzon and Samsun, issues of food, shelter, health, and transportation worsened. The Ottoman administration established temporary shelters, distributed food, and attempted to direct refugees to inland areas. However, the population accumulating at the ports quickly exceeded existing capacities. The spread of epidemics, rising mortality, and local authorities simultaneously grappling with burial, medical care, food, and security issues created a severe humanitarian crisis at the exile’s destination points.

Between 1863 and 1865, the arrival of refugees, their humanitarian needs, resettlement, and transportation issues became visible in the Ottoman press. Newspapers such as Takvim-i Vekayi, Tasvir-i Efkâr, Tercüman-ı Ahval, and Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis covered developments in Circassia, Russian military pressure, refugee masses heading toward Ottoman lands, and appeals for aid. Press reports revealed that the exile was perceived not merely as a diplomatic or military issue but as a broad refugee crisis confronting Ottoman public opinion. News highlighted the resettlement, transportation, food supply, and fundraising efforts for refugees.

After reaching Ottoman ports, refugee destinations varied by region. Some groups were directed to the interior of Anatolia, others to the Balkans, and others to Syria and Jordan. During transportation, families were often separated, caravans encountered disease and poverty along the way, deaths continued in temporary shelters, and those arriving at settlement areas remained dependent on aid until they could begin production. In cases like Canik, some refugees brought to the port for transfer to other locations were left in place due to congestion and climatic conditions. Thus, the administrative map of the exile was shaped more by on-the-ground necessities than by initial plans.

Losses during concentration at the coasts and sea travel intensified the demographic impact of the Circassian Exile. Many people died before reaching Ottoman lands—along the Black Sea coast, on ships, or at arrival ports. Survivors often arrived at new settlement areas suffering from hunger, disease, loss of property, and family separation. This process demonstrated that the exile was not merely a “migration from the Caucasus to Ottoman lands” but a series of successive coercive phases: expulsion from inland areas, forced concentration at the coast, waiting, boarding ships, sea crossing, concentration at ports, temporary shelter, and relocation to new settlement areas.

Population and loss figures related to the Circassian Exile remain one of the most contentious areas. Several factors make precise calculation of the population displaced from the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century difficult. The exile did not occur on a single date or along a single route; it was a process that accelerated from the late 1850s, peaked between 1863 and 1865, and continued in smaller waves over subsequent decades. Some refugees reached Ottoman lands overland, a significant portion by sea; some died along the coast, on ships, or at arrival ports; others were relocated from temporary settlements to other regions. This mobility led to some individuals being counted multiple times across different registration stages or some who died during transit never appearing in official settlement records.

Another reason for discrepancies in numbers is that sources use different population categories. Some figures cover only the major exile wave of 1863–1865, others include migrations beginning in 1858, others encompass the broader Caucasian migration from 1859 to 1879, and still others include migrations continuing until 1881–1914. The term “Circassian” in some texts refers narrowly to the Adyge, while in others it includes Abazas, Ubykhs, Chechens, Dagestanis, and other North Caucasian Muslim refugees. Consequently, when evaluating exile numbers, the historical period, the communities included, and the type of records used are decisive.

By the summer of 1863, approximately 80,000 refugees had reached Ottoman lands since the migration wave began in 1858; by spring 1864, this number had risen to 400,000. These two figures are significant in demonstrating how rapidly the exile expanded. The 80,000 refugees in summer 1863 represented the initial stage of large-scale concentration, while the 400,000 estimate in spring 1864 showed the rapid increase in refugee numbers as Russian military operations reached their final phase. This increase revealed that 1864 was not merely a symbolic date but a period of intense mass forced displacement.

Estimates for the total number of refugees from the Caucasus range from 700,000 to 1 million, with some figures reaching 1.2 million. This range stems not only from calculation difficulties but also from differing definitions of the event’s scope. Narrower estimates consider only specific refugee groups who reached Ottoman lands, while broader estimates include all populations expelled or forcibly displaced from the Caucasus. Some studies state that 1.5 million people were deported from North Caucasus, which had a population of approximately 5 million in 1840. Another estimate claims that 552,000 people migrated solely from Eastern Circassia.

Broader estimates for 1859–1879 suggest that approximately 2 million people from the Caucasus, mostly Circassians, were displaced, with about 500,000 dying during transit due to hunger, disease, maritime accidents, and poor transportation conditions. Within this framework, a significant gap exists between the population that reached Ottoman lands and the total population expelled from the Caucasus. A large portion of those who died during transit never entered formal registration systems, making it impossible to calculate the full demographic loss solely from Ottoman settlement records.

Some estimates suggest that approximately 1.5 million Circassians arrived in Anatolia between 1859 and 1879, and an additional 500,000 arrived from the Caucasus between 1881 and 1914. This calculation demonstrates that the Circassian Exile did not end completely in 1864; it continued in subsequent decades due to Ottoman-Russian wars, security concerns, Russian settlement pressure, and regional politics. The 500,000 estimate for 1881–1914 is significant for understanding the long-term demographic impact of the exile, as this period represents a phase in which remaining communities continued to leave the Caucasus under various pressures and political conditions.

New migration waves after the 1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War further complicated the numbers. After this war, it is reported that 694,067 people migrated, with these refugees primarily resettled in provinces such as Thessaloniki, Istanbul, and Kosovo, and approximately 15,000 settled in Samsun. Again, after the war, 60,000 Abaza refugees were resettled, with 50,000 placed in Çarşamba and Bafra and the remainder in the Trabzon region. These figures demonstrate that the post-1864 Caucasian migration was revived by new wars and security developments. Some of those who migrated after the 93 War were communities previously resettled in Ottoman lands but forced to relocate again due to the war.

The most difficult issue in loss estimates is determining where and at which stage deaths should be counted. Those who died during village destruction in the Caucasus, those who died while waiting on the coast, those who perished from disease or hunger on ships, those who drowned in maritime accidents, and those who died after reaching Ottoman ports due to epidemics and poverty are not always recorded separately in the same total. Some estimates consider only sea transit and passage losses, while others include all losses from war, exile, and resettlement. Therefore, the figure of 500,000 deaths is not a precise demographic statistic derived from a specific calculation method but rather a broad estimate reflecting the massive human toll of the exile.

Ottoman records, based on registers of refugees arriving at ports, food distribution lists, transportation documents, and settlement records, become more visible. However, these records do not fully reflect the entire process. Those who died without being registered, those who remained temporarily at ports, those relocated to other regions, those who fled, those separated from families, and members of the same household recorded in different locations all affect the reliability of counts. Particularly in ports such as Samsun, Trabzon, and Sinop, the intensity of the situation made systematic registration and transportation difficult. Some refugees remained in temporary settlement areas because they were not sent to their planned destinations; this situation complicated both local population records and the total refugee count.

Discrepancies exist between Russian, Ottoman, and Western observers’ figures. Russian authorities sometimes used lower numbers to portray the exile as a limited relocation, while the Ottoman side systematically recorded the population arriving at ports and creating relief burdens. Western diplomats, journalists, and observers often made estimates based on observations of specific ports, regions, or transit points. Consequently, different sources provide numbers that describe the same historical event but often do not measure the same population phase. One number may refer to those waiting on the coast, another to those who reached Ottoman lands, another to those resettled, and another to the total displaced including war and transit losses.

Despite these discrepancies, the common picture is clear: the Circassian Exile was one of the largest mass migrations toward Ottoman territories in the nineteenth century. The movement, initially expressed in tens of thousands in 1858, reached hundreds of thousands by 1864; when broader historical periods are considered, the population displaced from the Caucasus or directed toward Ottoman lands is estimated in millions. Although precise figures are impossible, estimates ranging from 700,000 to 1.2 million refugees, 1.5 million deportation assessments, the 2 million total migration calculation for 1859–1879, and the 500,000 death estimate demonstrate that this was not merely a regional relocation but a fundamental demographic rupture that radically altered the demographic structure of North Caucasus.

The Ottoman Empire’s acceptance of Circassian refugees became one of the largest population and resettlement challenges it faced in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite a weakened treasury, rising foreign debt, and numerous structural problems in provincial administration following the Crimean War, the Ottoman government refused to leave Muslim refugees from the Caucasus outside its borders. The policy of acceptance was influenced by religious affinity, the Caliphate’s responsibility toward Muslim communities, the protection of populations fleeing Russian pressure, and the strengthening of the Muslim demographic balance within Ottoman lands. The arrival of refugees was not viewed merely as a humanitarian issue but as a resettlement problem linked to the empire’s demographic, military, agricultural, and security needs.

Although the acceptance of Circassian refugees was initially conceived as a limited and manageable movement, the rapid increase in numbers between 1863 and 1865 strained administrative capacity. A significant portion of refugees arriving at Ottoman ports were exhausted, hungry, ill, and had lost most of their property. The state could not merely disembark these people; it simultaneously faced responsibilities to house, feed, treat, transport, find land, manage relations with local populations, and establish new villages. Consequently, the refugee issue transformed into a multifaceted administrative effort involving the central government, provincial governors, district administrations, local councils, military authorities, health personnel, and public participation.

The most important institutional step in this process was the establishment of the Refugee Commission, tasked with organizing the transportation and resettlement of refugees. The commission’s duties included determining the number of arrivals, planning their destinations, meeting temporary shelter and food needs, organizing transportation costs, and intervening in disputes arising during resettlement. The commission’s establishment demonstrated that refugee placement was not haphazardly managed. Simultaneously, efforts to investigate the causes of migration and conditions on the ground revealed that the resettlement process was not viewed merely as distributing arrivals.

The refugees’ first needs were food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare. Most who arrived at the ports after days-long journeys faced starvation, cold, epidemics, and poverty. Government officials and local populations provided both in-kind and cash assistance. Ottoman press reported news of clothing aid such as trousers, cloaks, and American cloth; the names and amounts of donors were published. The Sultan and state officials also participated in aid efforts. These aids demonstrated that refugees arriving at the coasts and ports were in a state where they could not sustain their lives with their own means.

Healthcare was one of the most challenging aspects of the aid policy. The overcrowded ships transporting refugees from the Caucasus, their concentration at ports, and poor shelter conditions facilitated the spread of epidemics such as cholera. Reports from Trabzon indicated that people fled the city due to cholera outbreaks, worsened by hot weather. Doctors and surgeons were assigned to refugee camps; health personnel such as Doctor Rıfat Efendi and Surgeon Hacı Ahmet Efendi served among the refugees. Their work was reported in the press, and some were awarded honors for their services. Epidemics affected not only refugees but also local populations, officials, and healthcare workers.

The selection of resettlement areas was a strategic decision for the Ottoman administration. The main areas where the state intended to settle refugees included Western Anatolia, Eastern Thrace, Southeastern Anatolia, the Syria-Iraq corridor, and North Africa. Rumelia was one of the priority regions in the initial phase because the Ottoman government sought to increase the Muslim population in areas with dense Christian populations and active separatist movements. Settling Circassian refugees in Rumelia aimed to alter the demographic balance and ensure security through a community with military experience and loyalty to the state. Resettlement in Anatolia and Syria followed the same logic applied to different geographies. In southern and southeastern Anatolia, objectives included controlling Arab tribes, integrating nomadic groups into settled life, and strengthening public order.

Istanbul was not a preferred location for refugee resettlement. The capital was already crowded, expensive, and sensitive in terms of food supply. Therefore, efforts were made to prevent refugees from concentrating in Istanbul; housing and rental assistance for Istanbul was evaluated separately from other regions. The state directed refugees toward areas where they could contribute to production, where uncultivated land was available, or that were strategically important for security. Thus, resettlement policy pursued three objectives: short-term sheltering of refugees, medium-term transformation into productive populations, and long-term strengthening of demographic, security, and tax structures.

The transportation and resettlement of refugees incurred significant costs. In the Canik example, 321 barges were rented to transport 317 Nogai refugees destined for Kırşehir, with expenses paid from the Canik Sanjak Treasury. Transportation costs for 522 people assigned to Dikbıyık were covered; another group of 182 was sent to Havza. Expenses for bread, transportation, daily allowances, official salaries, and other costs were paid for Circassian and Crimean refugees sent to İslimye, Kayseri Uzunyayla, Bolu, and Canik. Payments were also made for Circassian refugees transported by boats to Terme, Fatsa, Ünye, and Sinop. These details demonstrate that resettlement involved more than land allocation; it encompassed transportation, food, official salaries, and temporary care expenses.

Land allocation was central to resettlement policy. The Ottoman administration distributed unused or uncultivated land to refugees to secure their livelihood and increase agricultural production. The cultivation of vacant and uncultivated land by Circassian refugees was seen as a development that could increase the treasury’s agricultural revenues. This policy also meant reinforcing the productive Muslim population in regions depopulated by wars and migrations. However, land allocation was not always problem-free. In Canik, assigning newly arrived refugee families to some farms caused disputes with local Turkmen, previous refugees, landowners, and new Circassian settlers. Some lands were private property, others were state land, and some were waqf land, further complicating the solution.

The amount of land per person, existing population usage rights, and the sharing of arable land frequently required intervention by central and local authorities. One farm was allocated 1,478 dönüm to 409 refugees, amounting to approximately three and a half dönüm per person; it was also noted that 40 households of 64 Turkmen tribe members lived in the same area. The use of marshlands as pasture, the determination of who controlled arable land, and private landowners’ rights became subjects of commission reports and local investigations. Such examples demonstrate that resettlement did not function merely as “placing refugees on vacant land”; it required complex arrangements among existing residents, new arrivals, waqf lands, private property, and state lands.

The Ottoman Empire did not view refugees as passive aid recipients but as new population elements contributing to the empire’s security and production order. In Rumelia, the goal was to strengthen the Muslim population against separatist movements; in Anatolia, to open vacant land for agriculture; in Syria and Iraq, to limit nomadic tribal territories; and in strategic transit zones, to establish loyal settled communities. The Circassians’ military experience and warrior identity influenced their preferential settlement in regions experiencing public order issues. Thus, resettlement policy served both protective and state-building functions regarding population and security.

The example of Syria and Kuneytra clearly demonstrates the regional transformational impact of Ottoman resettlement policy. Kuneytra, long considered insecure and used primarily as pastureland by nomadic groups, began to undergo administrative, social, and economic transformation after the strategic resettlement of Circassian refugees. The first generation of refugees turned to agriculture and trade; with state support, they became integrated into local administration and education. The Ottoman government’s goal of sedentarizing nomads intersected with the establishment of refugee villages in this region. Circassian refugees played an active role in ensuring security against groups in conflict with the state and promoting settled life.

One challenging aspect of resettlement was maintaining public order. The exile had rapidly transported large populations who had lost their property and social order into new environments. In some areas, land disputes, conflicts with local populations, looting, theft, complaints, and security issues emerged. In areas such as Canik, Manyas, Terme, and Samsun, tensions occurred between Circassian and Georgian refugees and local Muslim or non-Muslim populations; measures such as relocating individuals to distant regions, seizing documents, or purchasing land to resolve problems were introduced. These incidents demonstrate that resettlement was not merely a humanitarian aid effort but also required maintaining provincial order and resolving local legal conflicts.

The Ottoman Empire’s financial resources proved inadequate against the scale of incoming population. The debt burden from the Crimean War, financial difficulties, and rising administrative expenses in the provinces intensified the burden of refugee relief and resettlement. Nevertheless, the acceptance, settlement, and basic needs of refugees continued. The state’s approach cannot be explained solely by religious solidarity or pragmatic population policy. Circassian refugees were simultaneously protected as Muslim communities fleeing Russian pressure and integrated into the Ottoman Empire’s agricultural, security, military manpower, and demographic balance policies.

Ultimately, the Ottoman acceptance and resettlement policy aimed to ensure the survival of refugees concentrated at ports in the short term, transform them into productive and settled populations in the medium term, and reestablish the empire’s demographic and security balances in the long term. In this process, relief campaigns, healthcare services, transportation costs, land allocations, village foundations, resolution of local disputes, and strategic settlement choices functioned as interconnected components of the same policy. Despite limited resources and the large scale of incoming population, serious disruptions occurred; yet the settlement of Circassian refugees in Ottoman territories left lasting impacts on the empire’s late-period population, agriculture, military structure, and provincial security.

The settlement of Circassian refugees across Ottoman territories was not concentrated in a single region but spread widely from Rumelia through Anatolia’s interior to the Black Sea coast and into Syria and Jordan. The Ottoman administration did not merely disperse refugees to vacant areas; it evaluated potential settlement regions based on demographic balance, security, agricultural production, transportation routes, and existing local issues. Consequently, Circassian villages were often established near major roads, mountain passes, border regions, areas experiencing public order problems, or uncultivated land targeted for agricultural development. The scattered settlement pattern stretching from Dobruja to Kosovo and from Nablus to Kuneytra resulted from both the mass scale of the exile and the strategic preferences of Ottoman resettlement policy.

Rumelia became one of the first major resettlement areas. The Ottoman Empire sought to increase the Muslim population, support agricultural production, and establish new loyal settlement units in this region, which had a dense Christian population and rising nationalist movements. The Circassian refugees’ military experience was particularly significant for security considerations in Rumelia. The pressure created by Bulgarian, Serbian, and other Balkan movements transformed Circassian resettlement from a mere humanitarian act into a component of demographic and security policy. Nevertheless, a significant portion of settlements in Rumelia did not endure long; after the 1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War, Circassians in the region faced another wave of displacement, and many groups were relocated to Anatolia or Syria.

Anatolia became the primary and most enduring settlement area for Circassian refugees. Tokat, Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Samsun, Kayseri, Sivas, and Bursa emerged as major centers of Circassian resettlement. These cities were notable not only for population density but also for aligning with Ottoman resettlement objectives. The Tokat-Sivas-Kayseri corridor formed a broad inland settlement belt connecting Inner Anatolia with the Black Sea. Balıkesir, Bursa, and Eskişehir were seen as suitable areas in Western Anatolia for transportation, agricultural production, and resettling refugees moving from Rumelia to Anatolia. The state pursued goals such as reclaiming marshlands, opening vacant land for agriculture, increasing tax revenues, and strengthening settled life in these regions.

Samsun and the Canik region held a special position during the exile process as both transit and settlement areas. Samsun Pier was one of the key arrival points for refugees destined for Anatolia’s interior. However, as the number of arrivals increased, particularly during winter months, refugees were temporarily housed in Samsun and its surroundings. Of the 727 Circassian refugees brought to Samsun for resettlement in Sivas, some were sent to Yozgat, while those arriving later were temporarily settled in Amasya and Samsun due to winter conditions. In 1861, of the 2,432 refugees brought from Trabzon to Samsun Pier, 2,344 were sent to Sivas; the remainder were temporarily settled in Samsun. It was decided that the 26 households with 123 individuals who arrived in Samsun and stayed as guests in Merzifon would be resettled in vacant lands in Samsun, Amasya, and Sivas, and those in need would receive half a kıyye of bread daily.

In 1864, approximately 70,000 refugees gathered in Trabzon were temporarily settled in Samsun. This number demonstrates that Samsun was not merely a transit point but a major refugee concentration center. Temporary shelters in the form of tents were established in Canik kazas and surrounding areas such as Kılıçdede, Kurupelit, Dereköy, Kürt Irmağı, Derbent, and Kumcağız. Samsun Pier’s small size, combined with the continuously increasing number of refugees, forced the administration to implement rapid transportation measures. Vehicles and pack animals were requested for the elderly, women, children, and those unable to walk. Thus, resettlement in Samsun and Canik was shaped more by on-the-ground congestion, transportation capabilities, and seasonal conditions than by pre-planned settlement.

Temporary settlements in the Canik region gradually transformed into permanent ones. Some refugees brought to Samsun for transfer to other locations remained in place when transportation procedures were delayed. The desire of some families from the Shapsug tribe to settle in Dereköy created problems due to the land’s waqf status. This example demonstrates that Circassian settlements were not merely about population distribution; they generated legal-administrative conflicts between waqf land, state land, private property, local population usage rights, and refugee settlement demands. Settlements in the Canik region also provide a concrete example of how refugees established new villages in Ottoman provincial life, how temporary shelters became permanent settlements, and how resettlement intertwined with local land arrangements.

Circassian settlements in Anatolia were not concentrated solely along the Black Sea and Inner Anatolia corridor. In Western Anatolia, regions such as Balıkesir, Bursa, Bilecik, Eskişehir, Sakarya, Düzce, Yalova, and Çanakkale; in Central Anatolia, Tokat, Amasya, Çorum, Yozgat, Sivas, and Kayseri; and in the south, Kahramanmaraş and Adana regions were significant Circassian settlement areas. The general distribution of Circassian settlements in Turkey forms a broad belt extending from the Black Sea through Inner Anatolia and from the Marmara to the Mediterranean. Hundreds of Circassian settlements emerged in many regions outside Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and Thrace. This distribution resulted from both the 1860s exile and the second wave of movement after 1877–1878.

The second wave of migration from Rumelia to Anatolia and Syria reshaped the settlement map. After the 1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War, Circassians, like the broader Muslim population in Rumelia, faced severe pressure. Previously resettled Circassian communities were relocated again due to war and diplomatic arrangements. These groups, concentrated at ports such as Varna, Thessaloniki, and Istanbul, were sent to Anatolia or Arab provinces. In resettling refugees from Rumelia, not only Ottoman administrative preferences but also external pressures were influential. Greek authorities opposed the settlement of refugees near border areas; Russia did not want Circassians located near its own borders. These conditions pushed the Ottoman Empire toward more southern provinces such as Syria.

The Syrian province became one of the major settlement areas for Circassian refugees, particularly after 1877–1878. Beirut, Acre, Tripoli, and Latakia ports served as initial arrival centers for refugees relocated from Rumelia. In February 1878, a total of 4,500 Circassians arrived at these ports and were directed inland. In March 1878, it became clear that over a thousand Circassians were brought to Beirut for resettlement near Damascus but were forced to wait due to poor weather and insufficient transportation. This situation demonstrated that similar transportation problems experienced during the Black Sea crossing also occurred at Eastern Mediterranean ports.

One of the central settlement areas in Syria was the Kuneytra and Havran region. Kuneytra had long been considered insecure and used primarily as pastureland by nomadic groups, with limited Ottoman central authority. The strategic resettlement of Circassian refugees in this region was directly linked to the Ottoman government’s goals of sedentarizing nomads and strengthening provincial security. The first generation of refugees turned to agriculture and trade; over time, they became integrated into local administration and education. Circassian villages in Kuneytra became not merely places of residence for resettled populations but active agents in the region’s administrative and economic transformation.

The state’s efforts to control mobility were evident in the migration flow toward Syria. Refugees previously settled and granted land were prohibited from relocating without authorization. In the correspondence of Syrian Governor Mehmed Nazif, it was noted that refugee arrivals from Anatolia to Syria had increased, worsening the refugees’ destitution and creating various difficulties for the government. It was requested that those arriving without transit permits be returned to their places of origin, unauthorized relocations of previously settled refugees be prevented, and officials be held accountable. This demonstrates that resettlement required long-term administrative control even after completion.

Russian pressure on settlement areas also influenced the resettlement map. While Russia was satisfied with Circassians migrating to Ottoman lands, it did not want them resettled along the Black Sea coast or in Eastern Anatolia. Russia feared that Circassians might become a future military threat and preferred their relocation further south, preferably to Syria. Ottoman plans to settle some refugees near Kars became problematic due to this external pressure. This situation demonstrates that Circassian resettlement was not solely determined by Ottoman internal administration but also by Russian security concerns and regional diplomatic calculations.

Ultimately, the settlement of Circassian refugees in Anatolia, Rumelia, and Syria was not a random population distribution following the exile. Goals included strengthening the Muslim population and ensuring security in Rumelia, opening vacant land for agriculture and increasing settled populations in Anatolia’s interior to support the agricultural economy, and controlling nomadic groups and ensuring public order in Syria’s border and transit zones. In places like Samsun and Canik, temporary shelters became permanent settlements; in regions like Kuneytra and Havran, Circassian villages played a role in reconstructing provincial order. This scattered settlement map laid the foundation for the widespread dispersion of the Circassian diaspora across Ottoman territories and the emergence of distinct regional identities in subsequent generations.

The Circassian Exile was covered in the Ottoman press through both the military-political developments in the Caucasus and the humanitarian and resettlement challenges faced by refugees arriving in Ottoman lands. The period between 1863 and 1865 was one in which the Ottoman press was still limited to a small number of newspapers, yet its ability to shape public opinion was growing through reading rooms and collective reading practices. Although newspaper circulation was low by today’s standards, a single newspaper being read by multiple individuals and news spreading orally expanded its influence. In this environment, the war in Circassia, the arrival of exiles at Ottoman ports, their resettlement, and aid campaigns were regularly reported.

Takvim-i Vekayi, Ceride-i Havadis, Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis, Tercüman-ı Ahval, and Tasvir-i Efkâr were the leading publications in making the Circassian Exile visible to Ottoman public opinion. Each of these newspapers approached the event differently. Takvim-i Vekayi, the official state publication, focused primarily on the arrival of refugees, their transportation to temporary settlements, the villages and towns designated for permanent resettlement, their needs, and the aid provided. Ceride-i Havadis and Takvim-i Vekayi emphasized that refugees were in dire need, that the state was doing its best, but that regular resettlement would be difficult without public support. Tasvir-i Efkâr and Tercüman-ı Ahval focused more prominently on the Russian occupation of Circassia, Circassian resistance, and Russia’s policy in the region.

The language of Takvim-i Vekayi carried an official character. In reports on refugees, the Sultan’s generosity, the efforts of state officials, and the assistance of local elites and the public were highlighted. Aid was often published with the names of donors, the amounts given, and the type of aid. These reports not only informed but also encouraged aid efforts. News appeared in the paper that Sultan Abdülaziz had donated 10,000 kuruş to Circassian refugees. Alongside the Sultan, members of the dynasty, state officials, bureaucrats, local elites, and private citizens’ contributions were publicly announced.

In Takvim-i Vekayi, refugees were portrayed as impoverished communities requiring protection and support. Reports frequently emphasized the Sultan’s compassion, the diligence of officials, and the generosity of the public. This editorial tone demonstrated that the state presented the refugee issue as both an administrative and moral responsibility. Due to its official identity, the newspaper placed emphasis on the state’s regulatory role, the Sultan’s protection, and the central administration’s determination to resettle refugees properly. The continuous publication of aid announcements revealed that charity networks in the provinces and center were publicly encouraged.

Ceride-i Havadis and Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis played a significant role in bringing the refugee issue to a broader public. These newspapers covered refugee resettlement, food and clothing needs, transportation procedures, diseases, congestion at ports, and activities of local administrations. Ceride-i Havadis, which also published official state announcements, followed a line close to Takvim-i Vekayi in emphasizing the necessity of aiding refugees. In Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis, practical details such as food aid and bread allowances became part of the communication network. Calculations indicated that expenditures for bread aid alone for refugees between 1856 and 1876 exceeded 60 million kuruş, demonstrating the financial scale of these aid efforts.

Tasvir-i Efkâr’s reports on Circassia differed from official aid and resettlement news by strongly emphasizing the political and humanitarian dimensions of the event. Under the main heading “Foreign News,” the “Asia” section of the newspaper reported on Circassia. These reports did not merely present Circassian resistance as dry war news; they conveyed the Circassians’ struggle to protect their homeland, their military resistance, and their dire circumstances to readers. It was reported that the Circassians were fighting with physical and spiritual strength but that conditions were no longer favorable for further resistance. This approach by Tasvir-i Efkâr demonstrated that the private press framed the Circassian issue as an unjust occupation and resistance beyond the state’s framework of aid and resettlement.

Tercüman-ı Ahval also directed public attention to the idea that Circassia had been unjustly occupied and to Circassian resistance against Russia. In this newspaper, the event was not treated merely as the matter of housing refugees arriving in Ottoman lands but as a consequence of Russian expansionism in the Caucasus. The distinguishing feature of Tercüman-ı Ahval and Tasvir-i Efkâr from state-supported publications was their more independent stance, both materially and politically. Thus, they addressed the Circassian issue beyond official decisions and aid announcements, framing it around occupation, resistance, loss of homeland, and public conscience.

The visibility of the Circassian Exile in the Ottoman press directly influenced the spread of aid campaigns. Publishing the names and amounts of donations encouraged donors and motivated others to contribute. Aid was not limited to money; clothing, food, shelter materials, transportation means, and various in-kind contributions were also reported. The announcement of clothing aid such as trousers, cloaks, and American cloth demonstrated the urgent basic needs of the population arriving through exile. The press functioned as a platform mediating between the state and society in calling for aid.

Newspaper reports also revealed how refugees were perceived in Ottoman public opinion. On one hand, refugees were presented as Muslim and victimized communities fleeing Russian pressure; on the other hand, they were viewed as elements who would contribute to production, provide manpower for the army, and strengthen the Muslim demographic balance in regions affected by Christian uprisings. This dual perception aligned with the Ottoman refugee policy as reflected in the press: Circassians were both the oppressed who needed protection and new population groups to be integrated into the empire’s social, military, and agricultural order.

Another aspect of press reports was making Russia’s practices in the Caucasus visible to Ottoman readers. Reports described how Russians expelled Circassians from their lands, settled Russian populations in emptied areas, and implemented the exile as a military and demographic policy. These reports enabled Ottoman public opinion to evaluate the Circassian issue not merely through the daily needs of arriving refugees but in connection with the long war and occupation process in the Caucasus. Particularly private newspapers used a more explicit language to criticize Russian expansion in the region.

The Ottoman press also left an archival record of the exile process. News published between 1863 and 1865 show which ports refugees arrived at, where they were transported, what aid was provided, how the state and public responded, and how military developments in Circassia were interpreted in the Ottoman world. The language of newspapers sometimes carried an official, sometimes an emotional, sometimes a political character; yet this variety revealed that the event was not perceived monolithically in Ottoman society. State newspapers made visible the aid and resettlement framework, while private newspapers emphasized the themes of occupation and resistance.

Therefore, the Ottoman press narrative of the Circassian Exile developed along two main axes. The first axis concerned the arrival of refugees in Ottoman lands, their sustenance, clothing and shelter needs, health problems, transportation, and resettlement. The second axis concerned the Russian occupation of Circassia, Circassian resistance, Russia’s oppressive policy, and the loss of the Caucasus. Takvim-i Vekayi and Ceride-i Havadis emphasized the first axis more strongly, while Tasvir-i Efkâr and Tercüman-ı Ahval made the second axis more visible. When these journalistic lines are considered together, it becomes clear that the Circassian Exile was perceived in Ottoman public opinion as both a humanitarian aid issue and a political issue linked to Russian expansionism.

The naming of the Circassian Exile is one of the most contentious areas in its historiography. In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman administration and press largely categorized the communities arriving from the Caucasus under the term “muhacir,” which in Ottoman administrative language referred to displaced, sheltered, and resettled Muslim populations. However, the experience of the Circassians was not merely a migration. The burning of villages, destruction of agricultural lands, forced relocation to areas designated by Russia or migration to Ottoman lands, concentration at the coasts, transportation by ships, mass deaths during transit and at ports, rendered the event closer to the concepts of forced migration and exile. Consequently, modern literature uses not only “Circassian migration” but also “Circassian Exile,” “Great Circassian Exile,” “tehcir,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “genocide.”

The term “migration” refers to people relocating permanently or temporarily from one place to another; however, the Circassians’ experience in the mid-nineteenth century involved extremely limited voluntary agency. The Russian military advance led to the evacuation of villages, the forced redirection of populations toward the coasts or the Kuban line, and the absence of viable alternatives beyond migration to Ottoman lands, placing the process firmly within the category of “forced migration.” Abdullah Saydam’s classification of migration categorizes the Crimean and Caucasian migrations as international, mass, forced, and permanent. This framework demonstrates that the Circassian Exile was not merely a population movement toward Ottoman lands but a permanent displacement shaped by war and state pressure.

The term “exile” carries a stronger historical correspondence in explaining the Circassian experience because at its core lies not merely relocation but forced separation from the homeland. The village structure, agricultural lands, family ties, tribal relationships, cemeteries, coastal settlements, and mountain passes of Circassia were all shattered as a whole. The Circassians’ arrival in Ottoman lands was not the result of refugees choosing a new country but the consequence of Russian military-political order expelling them from their ancestral homeland. The symbolic status of May 21, 1864, in modern Circassian memory stems not merely from the end of the war but from the experience of homeland loss and forced dispersal.

“Muhacir” is useful for describing the Ottoman administration’s burden of sheltering, feeding, and resettling refugees; however, it alone cannot capture the impact of the exile on Circassian society. Ottoman records emphasize issues such as which ports refugees arrived at, where they were transported, how much aid they received, and which lands they were settled on. In contrast, Circassian memory recalls the event as the loss of homeland, family separation, death during the journey, cultural continuity broken, and the struggle for survival in the diaspora. This difference reveals that the same event was experienced differently by state administration and social memory.

The term “genocide” is one of the most controversial in Circassian exile literature. Researchers such as Cahit Aslan and Gökhan Bolat evaluate Russia’s practices in the Caucasus within the framework of ethnic cleansing and genocide. This approach considers the mass killing, expulsion, or forced separation of the Circassians and the remaining population left as small, scattered groups under Russian control as decisive. This interpretation argues that the event cannot be viewed merely as forced migration following war but must be understood as the depopulation of Circassia and its opening to Russian-Cossack settlement.

In international legal assessments, the term “genocide” is linked to the criteria of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Dimaze Özden’s study analyzes the Circassian Exile within this legal framework, debating whether acts aimed at the partial or total destruction of an ethnic group occurred. This approach considers together elements such as killing, physical and psychological harm, destruction of living conditions, and forced displacement. However, since the event occurred in the nineteenth century while the term “genocide” was defined in international law only in the mid-twentieth century, the retroactive application of the term remains controversial.

Some studies prefer terms such as “massacre,” “exile,” “forced migration,” “catastrophe,” “tragedy,” or “exodus” instead of “genocide.” In Emre Başok’s analysis of Fabio L. Grassi’s work, it is noted that Grassi treats the Circassians’ mass catastrophe as an overlooked tragedy but deliberately avoids using the term “genocide.” This approach acknowledges the event’s severe violence, forced displacement, and mass deaths but does not consider the term “genocide” conceptually or legally mandatory. Thus, the fundamental disagreement in literature focuses not on the scale of the violence but on what term should be used to name it.

In the Circassian diaspora, May 21, 1864, is a foundational memory date beyond conceptual debates. This date symbolizes the end of the Caucasian-Russian wars, Russia’s victory declaration, the coastal concentration, the forced expulsion to Ottoman lands, and the loss of the homeland. Memorial sites such as Kefken stand out as places where Circassian memory gained public visibility in Turkey. Commemoration ceremonies serve not only to remember the past but also to reconstruct Circassian identity in the diaspora, transmit it to younger generations, and emphasize cultural continuity against assimilation.

Exile memory holds a central place in the intergenerational transmission of Circassian identity. In Zeynep Aksoy’s study on exile narratives, it is observed that stories passed down from the first generation are structured within frameworks of cultural trauma and diasporic identity. Four main themes emerge in the examined narratives: defeat and helplessness, human and nature, Circassian traditions, and the Circassian language. These themes keep the exile alive not merely as a historical event but as a memory field shaping the community’s self-definition. In these stories, war, journey, death, natural conditions, family relations, honor, tradition, language, and the struggle for survival are interwoven.

Habze, after the exile, functioned not merely as a collection of traditions but as a cultural framework preserving social order in the diaspora. Elements such as respect, hierarchy, hospitality, behavioral codes, marriage practices, reverence for elders, community solidarity, and social control helped Circassians severed from their homeland establish identity continuity in new geographies. In villages dispersed across Ottoman lands, language, weddings, music, dance, family narratives, and genealogical memory preserved a shared sense of origin. These cultural practices must be understood not merely as folkloric elements but as social mechanisms that reconnected communities fractured by exile.

Language became one of the most vulnerable aspects of diasporic identity. Circassian communities settled in Ottoman and later Turkish lands came into daily contact with Turkish, Arabic, or local languages; this made intergenerational transmission of Circassian languages difficult. Nevertheless, Adyghe, Kabardian, Abaza, and other North Caucasian languages were preserved within families, village life, associations, and cultural events as distinguishing markers of identity. The prominence of “Circassian language” as a central theme in Aksoy’s narratives demonstrates that the trauma of exile was remembered not only as land loss but also as the threat of language loss.

Diasporic identity was not constructed after the exile solely as attachment to the past; it evolved in conjunction with the political, social, and cultural conditions of the host countries. In the Ottoman Empire, Circassians assumed roles such as refugees, military manpower, peasant producers, and frontier and public order elements. In the Republican period, Circassian identity was reshaped within the framework of official citizenship, local affiliations, urbanization, association formation, language loss, cultural revival, and commemorative movements. Gülmelek Alev’s study at Galatasaray University reveals that Circassian identity in Turkey was reconstructed primarily through May 21 commemorations, collective memory, recognition demands, and public visibility.

In the modern era, the Circassian issue was not confined to the diaspora memory in Turkey. The collapse of the Soviet Union increased contact between the Caucasus and the diaspora; events such as the Sochi Winter Olympics brought exile and genocide debates into greater international visibility. Sochi’s place in Circassian memory, linked to the final war and victory declaration of 1864, brought its historical significance back to the forefront during the Olympics. Hamed Kazemzadeh’s study also shows that the modern Circassian issue has developed around language, culture, diaspora, return to the homeland, political recognition, and genocide claims.

The memory of the Circassian Exile took different forms in the regions where Circassians settled. Circassian villages in Anatolia became carriers of cultural continuity; communities in Syria, Jordan, and other former Ottoman territories experienced different diasporic experiences according to local conditions. In the Kuneytra example, Circassian refugees did not remain merely as victims of exile; they became active agents who integrated into the region’s agriculture, trade, security, education, and local administration, transforming their new environment. This demonstrates that diaspora history must be read not only through loss and trauma but also through adaptation, reorganization, and regional contributions.

Ultimately, the Circassian Exile is an event explained through multiple concepts in historiography and has become one of the foundational pillars of collective memory and identity in the diaspora. The term “migration” describes the Ottoman administration’s refugee acceptance and resettlement process; “exile” captures forced separation from the homeland; “genocide” opens debate on the destructive consequences of Russia’s practices in the Caucasus for an ethnic group. These conceptual differences reveal different dimensions of the event. In the Circassian diaspora, the exile is not merely a catastrophe experienced in the nineteenth century; it is a foundational historical memory continuously reproduced around language, Habze, May 21 commemorations, family narratives, and the idea of the homeland.