Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)

The Lebanese Civil War was a complex and multi-sided conflict that erupted in 1975 and officially ended in 1990, lasting fifteen years. It is estimated that between 150,000 and 230,000 people lost their lives, approximately 300,000 were injured, and more than a million were forced to flee the country.

This civil war is generally referred to as “Arab world’s civil war” or “proxy war,” fueled not only by internal dynamics but also by interventions from regional and international powers.

A visual of Beirut after the civil war (AA)

Lebanon’s Internal Structure

The roots of the conflict lie in the sectarian confessional political system established upon Lebanon’s independence in 1943. This system was formalized by the National Pact, which allocated constitutional positions among the country’s leading religious communities according to demographic ratios. Accordingly, the presidency was assigned to Maronite Christians, the prime ministership to Sunnis, and the speakership of parliament to Shiites.

However, over time this system created two fundamental structural vulnerabilities:

Demographic Imbalance

After the last official census in 1932, the Muslim population, particularly Shiites, grew rapidly. The static nature of the National Pact failed to adapt to these demographic changes, intensifying perceptions among Muslim communities of unequal political representation and power sharing.

Political and Economic Inequality

The privileged position granted to Maronite Christians within the political system — particularly the strong powers of the president — deepened the socio-economic marginalization of other sectarian groups, especially the rural and urban poor Shiite population. This situation created the social discontent that transformed into political divisions.

Primary Causes and Dynamics of the Civil War

Internal Causes of the Conflict

The outbreak of the war reflected accumulated tensions within Lebanese domestic politics:

Institutionalization of Sectarianism

Lebanon’s political structure defined citizenship not in modern civic terms but through sectarian identity. This led different religious communities to establish their own political and military structures (militias), preventing the consolidation of a centralized state and a unified national identity.

Weak Central Government

The weak central government, built on sectarian alliances and compromises, failed to effectively manage rising social grievances and the growing power of militias. The army itself was divided along sectarian loyalties and lacked the capacity to confront the militias.

External and Triggering Causes

Although internal structural weaknesses existed, external factors were critical in making the Lebanese Civil War inevitable and escalating its violence: The presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) disrupted Lebanon’s delicate balance after hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon following the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. PLO militants began using Lebanese territory as a base for attacks against Israel. Palestinian groups, particularly through an alliance with the Lebanese National Movement, formed a powerful counterweight to the Maronite Christian-dominated political structure.

Additionally, Clash of Regional Interests turned Lebanon into a direct battleground for regional powers — especially Israel and Syria — due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These internal upheavals created the conditions for proxy wars involving the United States and Britain indirectly. The Ayn al-Rummaneh Incident (1975), widely regarded as the war’s starting point, occurred when Maronite Phalangist militias targeted a bus, unleashing accumulated tensions and rapidly plunging the country into full-scale militia warfare.

Main Actors and Phases of the Conflict

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) became more than a struggle among internal groups; it evolved into a laboratory for regional and international powers’ proxy wars. The conflict progressed through multiple phases, dominated by militias organized along sectarian lines.

Key Combatant Groups and Alliances

The war began primarily between two ideological and sectarian camps, but militias frequently switched sides:

• Right Wing and Lebanese Front (Predominantly Christian): The main actors were the Lebanese Forces (LF) militias, dominated by Maronite Christians and emerging from the military wing of Pierre Gemayel’s Phalange Party (Kataeb). This front opposed Palestinian attacks on Israel launched from Lebanese territory and pursued a policy of separating Lebanon’s identity from Arab nationalism.
• Left Wing and Lebanese National Movement (LNM): This alliance, led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, comprised Sunni, Druze, and leftist parties alongside PLO factions. The LNM aimed to reform the political system, achieve greater socio-economic equality, and support the Palestinian cause in line with Pan-Arab ideology.

Some buildings in Beirut bearing scars from bullet holes and bomb blasts (AA)

Role of Regional Actors:

The complexity of the war intensified due to direct military interventions by regional powers:

• Syrian Intervention (1976): Initially supporting Christian Phalangists to advance its own interests, Syria intervened in 1976 with a large military force. Its primary goal was to maintain Lebanon within its sphere of influence and control the influence of Palestinian groups. Syria maintained its military presence in Lebanon until the 1989 Taif Agreement.
• Israeli Intervention (1978 and 1982): In response to PLO attacks from Lebanon, Israel conducted a brief occupation in 1978 and then launched a large-scale invasion in 1982. The main objectives were to expel the PLO entirely from Lebanon and establish a pro-Israeli Maronite government in Beirut.
• 1982 Invasion and Expulsion of the PLO: Israel’s 1982 invasion succeeded; PLO fighters were largely evacuated from Lebanon under the supervision of an international peace force and relocated to Tunisia. This event ended the PLO’s military role in Lebanese politics.
• Emergence of Hezbollah: After the 1982 Israeli invasion, Hezbollah was established in southern Lebanon under the leadership of Shiite clerics to resist Israeli occupation. With support from Iran, Hezbollah evolved from a militia into a major political and social welfare network with a lasting role in Lebanese politics.
• Militia Republics and Economic Collapse: As the war dragged on, militias transformed into mafia-like organizations, financing themselves through smuggling, drug trafficking, and extortion. The collapse of the Lebanese pound in 1987 plunged the country into a deep economic crisis and hyperinflation in the war’s final years.
• Sabra and Shatila Massacres (September 1982): During the Israeli occupation, Christian militias (Phalangists) massacred thousands of unarmed Palestinian and Shiite civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. This event became one of the darkest moments of the war, exposing to the international community the humanitarian horror and cycle of sectarian revenge it had unleashed.

End of the Civil War and Its Consequences

The end of the Lebanese Civil War was not the result of a military victory but a political compromise imposed by regional and international pressure. Although the war brought partial stability to Lebanon, it failed to eliminate the sectarian structures that caused the conflict; instead, it reinforced them with new dynamics.

Taif Agreement (1989)

After fifteen years of devastating internal conflict, the official end of the Lebanese Civil War was achieved through the Taif National Reconciliation Accord, signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989. This agreement aimed to fundamentally reform Lebanon’s political, constitutional, and security structures, but it also created new areas of tension.

Constitutional Reforms and the Reinstitutionalization of Sectarianism

The Taif Agreement reformed the constitutional system based on the 1943 National Pact, adjusting the power balance previously tilted in favor of Christians. However, rather than abolishing sectarianism, it constitutionally re-institutionalized it. Parliamentary seats were redistributed from the previous 6:5 Christian-to-Muslim ratio to an equal 1:1 ratio between Christians and Muslims. This change responded to the growing demographic weight of the Muslim population. The agreement’s most significant reform transferred executive power from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the Cabinet, substantially limiting the president’s authority. Requirements for consensus or qualified majority in most decision-making processes indirectly reinforced the veto power of sectarian groups within the political system.

Syria’s Hegemony in Lebanon

The most controversial provision of the Taif Agreement from a regional perspective was its legal legitimization of Syria’s military presence in Lebanon. The agreement granted Syria authority to remain in Lebanon under the mission of “restoring peace,” providing a legal basis for Syria’s direct interference in Lebanese domestic politics and security decisions. The agreement anticipated that Syrian forces would redeploy to the Bekaa Valley and other strategic areas within two years after the reorganization of the Lebanese Army — by 1991 at the latest. However, Syria failed to fully comply with this condition and maintained its military presence and political hegemony until 2005.

Disarmament of Militias and the Hezbollah Exception

The Taif Agreement mandated the disarmament of all militias involved in the civil war and the surrender of their weapons to the official Lebanese Armed Forces. Most sectarian militias complied, and former militiamen received limited political amnesty and opportunities for integration into the Lebanese Army. However, certain groups, notably Hezbollah (the Shiite faction), were exempted from this obligation. Hezbollah refused to surrender its arms, arguing that they were necessary for an ongoing “resistance movement” against Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. The agreement lacked a clear provision against such resistance groups, enabling Hezbollah to emerge as Lebanon’s most powerful armed actor after the civil war.

Impact of the Lebanese Civil War on Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy

Although Lebanon is not a neighbor of Turkey, the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) indirectly influenced Turkish foreign policy through its implications for regional stability, counterterrorism, and the balance of power in the Middle East. During the war, despite Turkey’s traditionally pro-Western foreign policy, it could not escape the war’s repercussions.

The impact of the conflict on Turkey became particularly evident in the reassessment of security and regional policies: Security Pressure from Syria intensified as Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon became entrenched. This situation, combined with Syria’s support for the PKK, created serious security pressure on Ankara, and instability in Lebanon expanded the operational space for regional terrorist organizations.

In response to these complex and sectarian developments, Turkey strengthened its traditional policy of balance and distance during the Cold War and continued its conventional stance of non-intervention in Middle Eastern internal affairs. As the conflict deepened as a reflection of the Arab-Israeli struggle, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts increasingly focused on playing a more active role regarding the Palestinian issue and regional instability.

Later impacts (post-2000s) were shaped by the lingering effects of Syrian tensions in the 1990s. From 2002 onward, Turkey began pursuing a multidimensional and active policy toward Lebanon, demonstrated notably by its deployment of troops to the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and its diplomatic contributions during the Doha Agreement process (2008), reflecting Turkey’s growing commitment to Lebanese stability.

Model for Regional Instability

The Lebanese Civil War remains a symbol of regional instability. Its combination of sectarian tensions, foreign intervention, and the collapse of the central state has served as a reference model for subsequent conflicts in the Middle East. This phenomenon is termed “Lebanonization.” Turkey closely experienced this “Lebanonization” risk, particularly during the Syrian Civil War after 2011. One of the key motivations shaping Turkey’s foreign policy toward Lebanon has been the potential for Lebanon’s internal fragmentation to threaten broader regional stability. Turkey has frequently emphasized its efforts to promote an inclusive, non-sectarian actor in Lebanon and assist in the country’s reconstruction, drawing on these regional experiences.