#5 Unmanned

Unmanned systems are advancing as a force transforming modern warfare doctrines. Türkiye is one of the countries that have adapted early to this transformation and are generating countermeasures on the battlefield.

The Presidency of Defence Industries has issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the “ALFA-2026 Artificial Intelligence, Quantum and Autonomous Systems Exercise”. This document serves as a call to identify the capabilities of companies operating in specific domains.

The ALFA-2026 exercise aims to observe the capabilities of companies active in unmanned systems under real battlefield conditions, assess the interoperability of systems developed by different firms and across different domains, and provide companies with opportunities to test their systems under realistic operational environments. Different scenarios will be conducted in parallel with NATO’s Innovation Continuum 2026 SHINE initiative to evaluate capabilities under real battlefield conditions. The details of the six initially identified scenarios will be determined based on the capabilities and resources of the responding companies, institutions or organizations.

The scenarios primarily focus on interoperability, swarm capabilities, urban and enclosed area operations, protection of critical underwater infrastructure, and communication of drone swarms using quantum key distribution.

The RFI underscores the importance of unmanned systems being able to operate together in diverse configurations within today’s operational environment. It highlights that the ability to manage air, land and sea platforms as well as unmanned systems from different manufacturers through a single common control station, track them and evaluate the data collected will significantly enhance operational efficiency.

In particular, during the activities focused on “Interoperability” and “Protection of Critical Underwater Infrastructure”, the goal is to transmit the common operational picture (COP) generated in real time to NATO headquarters using STANAG-4817 compliant interfaces. This is of great importance as it demonstrates that domestic and national systems can integrate not only internally but also according to NATO standards.

The scenario titled “Communication of Drone Swarms Using Quantum Key Distribution” to ensure secure communication in drone swarms will also be included in the exercise. The aim is to establish a security architecture that goes beyond classical encryption methods. Using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology, which leverages the principles of uncertainty and superposition in quantum mechanics, encryption keys are securely shared between two parties, minimizing vulnerabilities in communication. In this scenario, drone swarms equipped with specialized hardware such as photon sources and quantum state preparers will establish laser links (Free Space Optical – FSO) that are impossible to detect. The goal is to implement in an operational environment a dynamic, unbreakable and secure network structure through key distribution over these links.

The information gathered will be used to shape the scenarios to be executed during ALFA-2026 and to determine which systems will demonstrate their capabilities on the battlefield. The RFI published for ALFA-2026 was prepared to enable synchronized planning of activities with NATO across various domains.

The debate over the “Drone Wall” in Europe signifies not a single border project but a new security architecture emerging in response to the threat posed by UAS, which extends from critical infrastructure to national borders. The European Commission’s “UAS and Counter-UAS Security Action Plan”, published on 11 February 2026, proposes a unified approach to prevent incidents by enhancing detection, enabling coordinated responses, and strengthening Europe’s defence preparedness, addressing the threat both in terms of civil internal security and defence readiness.

The Commission’s answer to the question of why this plan is being introduced now lies in the events of 2025, which exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities. The framework emphasizes the serious risk of disruption caused by malicious unmanned aerial vehicles in areas such as airports, ports, transportation hubs, public spaces, energy security and maritime safety. Incidents such as airport disruptions in Copenhagen, Munich and Brussels in 2025 and Russian UAS violations of Polish airspace demonstrate that the threat is not confined to the Russia-Ukraine front line but has become tangible within Europe’s critical interior regions.

At this point, the issue of countering UAS is no longer merely about shooting them down or jamming their signals. In its action plan, the Commission proposes introducing a “Drone Security Package” in the third quarter of 2026 to strengthen identification and registration processes for civilian UAS.

Another critical pillar of the plan is supply chain security. The Commission anticipates conducting joint risk assessments to reduce dependency on “high-risk suppliers” in UAS and counter-UAS systems, leading to the development of a UAS and Counter-UAS Security Toolbox. This approach aims to ensure that countries operate under similar security criteria and experience fewer supply surprises. Additionally, the idea of an “EU Trusted Drone Label” is under consideration to help distinguish secure equipment on the market. In short, Brussels is placing equal emphasis on performance and the origin of the technology and the security standards applied.

The security architecture proposed by Europe under the term “Drone Wall” is, in practice, a network project. The logic is that different sensors—radar, RF detection, cameras, etc.—placed at borders or around critical facilities will detect UAS early. The system will then attempt to determine whether the detected object is an authorized UAS or a suspicious target. If suspicion arises, relevant authorities will view the same data on a shared screen to make rapid decisions and activate the most appropriate counter-UAS measure—monitoring, exclusion, jamming or neutralization. The Commission therefore defines the issue as data integration and joint operations.

The industrial and financial dimension is the key factor that makes this plan macro-scale. The Commission aims to expand Europe’s production capacity in UAS and counter-UAS systems, emphasizing that good ideas must not remain at the prototype stage but must transition to serial production. To this end, an Industrial Forum (D-TECT Forum) will be established to bring together civilian and military actors. The forum’s purpose is to unite companies, public institutions and technology providers to accelerate investment, joint procurement and standardization. The Commission is sending a clear message that success in counter-UAS does not lie solely in developing a good device but in establishing a system capable of testing, certifying, procuring and deploying such devices at scale.

The plan also outlines concrete steps on governance. It aims to strengthen coordination points within member states and establish a more systematic alignment at the EU level. The Commission’s approach is based on the finding that delays often stem from unclear inter-institutional responsibilities. Therefore, it emphasizes the need to integrate individual solutions into a unified framework through joint operations, coordinated exercises and mechanisms capable of providing rapid on-site support.

The action plan addresses the UAS threat in conjunction with critical infrastructure security, border security and defence preparedness. This approach implies that concepts such as the “Drone Wall” only gain meaning when supported by measurable detection capabilities, joint operations and a scalable supply chain. The Commission’s direction focuses not merely on developing a good system but on establishing a European framework capable of testing, certifying and widely deploying such systems.

The United States now views small-class UAS not as auxiliary tools acquired in limited numbers but as a fundamental capability integrated across the entire force. The Department of Defense’s document dated 6 February 2026 explicitly defines its goal: to field approximately 300,000 UAS to the force by 2027, rapidly and at low cost.

The underlying idea is simple. The battlefield in Ukraine has demonstrated that superiority in UAS warfare does not come from a single superior platform but from the continuous supply of large numbers of systems. The United States has therefore shifted the technological debate from “which model is better” to “how can we acquire and deploy them quickly”. The Department of Defense document explicitly labels this approach “drone dominance”.

The most critical component of this approach is the procurement system. The document promotes a “filter and scale” logic to reduce costs and increase volumes. In early February, 25 suppliers were selected and integrated into a roadmap designed to meet the force’s needs more rapidly. In other words, rather than testing individual small manufacturers one by one, the United States seeks to create an early pool and scale up those capable of meeting demand.

The second critical pillar is secure supply. The US Blue UAS list answers the question of which UAS are acceptable from a security standpoint. Originally managed by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Blue UAS (approved/secure UAS) list was transferred to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) as of 1 January 2026. The aim is to move secure UAS procurement out of the prototype phase and into a more regular and scalable acquisition process. Without expanding the pool of secure manufacturers, large-scale acquisitions cannot effectively manage cyber risks or supply dependencies.

The third pillar is the force’s on-site production and adaptation capacity. The Marine Corps aims to deploy a unit-level production and rapid adaptation approach using the HANX, a 3D-printed UAS developed internally and designed to comply with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The official Marine Corps announcement emphasizes that HANX is NDAA-compliant and designed to be more resilient against backdoor security risks. Defense News corroborates this example through verification by NAVAIR and NDAA compliance. This demonstrates that the United States is investing not only in procurement but also in the force’s ability to rapidly produce and maintain equipment using its own resources when needed.

The fourth pillar is swarm management. The United States seeks to solve the problem of operating large numbers of systems simultaneously through software. The DIU’s “orchestrator” competition aims to enable any soldier to control multiple unmanned systems using simple voice or text commands without complex training. This approach focuses not on the swarm itself but on the command-and-control layer that enables meaningful use of the swarm.

All these elements converge on a single conclusion. The United States treats UAS superiority not as a competition over a single platform but as a production and supply system. When rapid acquisition, a secure supplier pool, on-site production and maintenance, and swarm management work together, scalability becomes possible. The central message of the Department of Defense document reinforces this framework: in UAS warfare, decisive advantage comes not from inventing a new weapon but from rapidly scaling low-cost systems through a secure supply chain and integrating them into the daily operations of units.