This article was automatically translated from the original Turkish version.
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The Korean War is an armed conflict that occurred in the second half of the 20th century and affected not only the Korean Peninsula but also global politics. The war began on 25 June 1950 with an invasion by North Korean forces into South Korean territory. It quickly transcended being merely a struggle between the two Koreas; a multinational intervention force was formed at the call of the United Nations, and with the subsequent entry of the People’s Republic of China into the conflict, it evolved into a global proxy war. In this regard, the Korean War is regarded as the first hot conflict of the Cold War era and is viewed as a direct manifestation of the ideological and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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Over the course of more than three years of war, the Korean Peninsula changed hands multiple times, resulting in millions of deaths and displacements. Its military, political, and humanitarian consequences affected not only the Korean people but also the domestic and foreign policies of the states involved. The Republic of Türkiye was among the first countries to send troops to Korea at the call of the United Nations; it participated in the war with four different brigade-level units. This decision marked a turning point that accelerated Türkiye’s shift toward the Western Bloc in its foreign policy.
The new world order that emerged after the end of the Second World War in 1945 brought profound changes to global politics. With the surrender of Germany and Japan, the defeat of the Axis powers was finalized; Europe was largely devastated, while political vacuums emerged in regions previously occupied by Japan in Asia. Under these conditions, the victorious powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, emerged as the dominant actors of the postwar era, and their ideological, political, and military rivalry formed the fundamental dynamic of the Cold War.
The United States aimed to establish a world order based on capitalist free-market economics and liberal democracy; in this direction, it implemented economic aid packages such as the Marshall Plan for Western European countries. On the other hand, the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence by supporting communist regimes in Eastern European territories it had occupied during the war, resulting in a bipolar world order. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the establishment of NATO in 1949 demonstrated the institutionalization of competition between the blocs.
This military and diplomatic polarization did not remain confined to Europe but extended to Asia.【2】 The Communist Party’s seizure of power in China under Mao Zedong in 1949 strengthened the socialist bloc’s presence in Asia and reinforced U.S. influence over allied countries such as Japan and the Philippines. Thus, the Asia-Pacific region became a new front of the Cold War, and the Korean Peninsula became the site of its first hot conflict.
During this period, international relations were shaped by military alliances, ideological orientations, and spheres of influence. The temporary solidarity among the victorious powers after the Second World War gave way to a systematic atmosphere of mistrust; global politics was restructured according to the principle of “bipolarity.” In this context, the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula inevitably became part of a global struggle.
The Korean Peninsula had been annexed by Japan since 1910 and remained a direct colony of the Japanese Empire until the end of the Second World War. However, Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945 ended its authority over Korea, prompting the need for international arrangements regarding Korea’s future. The idea of temporarily dividing Korea into two separate occupation zones was accepted at the Yalta Conference; the area north of the 38th parallel was placed under Soviet control and the area south under U.S. control.
Although this division was initially intended to be temporary and it was anticipated that the Korean people would establish a unified state in accordance with their right to self-determination, the ideological and strategic interests of the two great powers rendered this process unworkable.【3】 While the Soviet Union established an administration in the north under its control, the United States supported efforts to establish an independent government in the south. The Soviet Union and the North Korean side refused to allow general elections planned under United Nations supervision in 1947; this led to Korea’s de facto division into two separate political structures.
On 15 August 1948, an anti-communist government under Syngman Rhee was established in the south as the “Republic of Korea”; in response, on 9 September 1948, a socialist regime under Kim Il Sung was proclaimed in the north as the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Both administrations claimed legitimacy over the entire Korean Peninsula, creating a foundation for not only de facto but also constitutional and ideological conflict.
These two newly established Korean states rapidly developed their own political, military, and economic structures and strengthened their international positions by aligning with different blocs.【4】 South Korea was supported by the United States and the Western Bloc; North Korea developed close relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. This division meant not only a territorial split for the Korean people but also a division of identity; sibling communities were placed on opposing sides of rival regimes.
This political fragmentation was reinforced over time by increasing clashes along the military boundary. Frequent border violations, mutual propaganda campaigns, and small-scale armed confrontations were among the key developments that prepared the ground for war. During this period, the Korean Peninsula became one of the focal points of the conflicting interests of global powers; by 1950, the region had reached the brink of military escalation.
The political polarization that developed on the Korean Peninsula between 1948 and 1950 quickly led to military tensions; small-scale clashes along the border escalated. Both Korean governments remained committed to the goal of a unified Korea and developed plans to eliminate the opposing side by military means. On 25 June 1950, this tension erupted into open war, and the Korean War officially began.
The war began with a comprehensive offensive launched by the North Korean People’s Army across the 38th parallel in the early morning.【5】 Equipped with Soviet-made heavy weapons and numerically superior, North Korean forces quickly reached Seoul and captured the capital. The South Korean army, lacking adequate training, equipment, and discipline, could not withstand the offensive and was forced to retreat to the Busan region in the south.
North Korea’s attack elicited a strong international response; the United Nations Security Council convened urgently on 26 June 1950.【6】 The Security Council determined that the attack constituted a threat to international peace and security and adopted Resolution 82, demanding that North Korea immediately cease its offensive and withdraw its forces behind the 38th parallel. As the attack continued, Resolution 83, issued on 27 June, called upon United Nations member states to assist South Korea.
In response to this call, the United States immediately mobilized and directed its naval and air forces in the Far East toward Korea. At the time these decisions were made, the Soviet representative Andrey Vyshinsky was boycotting Security Council meetings due to the issue of China’s representation rights. Consequently, decisions were adopted without a Soviet veto, facilitating the United Nations’ direct involvement in the conflict.
With the outbreak of war, Korea ceased to be merely an internal matter of two states and transformed into a multinational armed conflict. Alongside the United States, countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, France, the Netherlands, and Türkiye began participating in the conflict with land, air, and naval forces; the People’s Republic of China also joined the war in the following months, altering the balance of power. These developments turned the Korean War into the first hot conflict of the Cold War and heralded the era of proxy wars.
The Korean War is regarded not merely as a civil war between two separate governments on the Korean Peninsula but as the first open military manifestation of the ideological and geopolitical polarization of the Cold War era. It was the first large-scale proxy war conducted without direct armed conflict between the United States, the leader of the Western Bloc, and the Soviet Union, the dominant power of the Eastern Bloc. In this sense, the Korean War reshaped the political, diplomatic, and military positions of not only the Korean people but also all states involved in or indirectly affected by the war.
The deployment of a multinational military force under U.S. leadership within the United Nations framework demonstrated that the war was conducted on the basis of international legitimacy. At the same time, this represented the first effective use of the United Nations’ collective security mechanism. The Soviet Union’s boycott of the Security Council at the outset of the war enabled decisions to be adopted without veto, providing a significant diplomatic advantage to the Western Bloc. The intervention of the People’s Republic of China on the side of North Korea transformed the regional conflict into a global struggle and fundamentally altered strategic balances in Asia.
The Korean War also clarified the ideological fronts of the Cold War. The United States, by providing strong support to South Korea, aimed to contain the spread of communism in Asia; this was seen as one of the early examples of the “domino theory.” On the other hand, the Soviet Union, without direct involvement on the battlefield, provided weapons and logistical support to North Korea and intervened indirectly through China. This situation strengthened the proxy war nature of the conflict.
The Korean War also compelled countries like Türkiye, which had sought to remain neutral, to take sides; Türkiye’s decision to send troops to Korea was a turning point that solidified its political alignment with the Western Bloc. By sending troops to Korea as part of its goal to join NATO, Türkiye established itself as a reliable partner within the Western Alliance. Similarly, after the war, NATO expanded, military expenditures increased, and neutrality policies declined globally.
At the end of the war in 1953, the parties signed not a peace treaty but only an armistice agreement. Therefore, legally, the state of war continues to exist on the Korean Peninsula. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), established after the Panmunjom Armistice, remains the most sensitive border line between the two Koreas to this day. This situation demonstrates that the Korean War was not merely a conflict specific to the Cold War era but also lies at the foundation of today’s geopolitical issues.
On the morning of 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel and launched a sudden and comprehensive attack on South Korean territory. The attack was carried out during a period when the South Korean army was unprepared; front lines quickly collapsed, and North Korean forces rapidly advanced into southern territory. South Korea’s capital, Seoul, fell to North Korean forces just three days after the attack began, on 28 June 1950.
North Korea’s attack was not confined to Korea’s internal affairs; it was regarded as a direct violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council defined the attack on Korea as a threat to international peace and security and, through Resolution 82 adopted on 26 June, demanded that North Korea cease its offensive and withdraw its forces behind the 38th parallel. When this demand was ignored, Resolution 83, issued on 27 June, called upon United Nations members to provide military assistance to South Korea. The United States assumed leadership in response to this call and redirected its naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region toward Korea.
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war; due to deficiencies in military organization, inadequate equipment, and weak logistical infrastructure, they were forced to retreat.【7】 At the time of the attack, the Republic of Korea army consisted of approximately 95,000 soldiers; the majority of these units were organized as local security forces and lacked tanks, artillery, and air support. In contrast, North Korean forces were equipped with heavy armored units, tanks, and modern weapons with Soviet support. Moreover, during the initial phase of the war, strategic initiative was entirely in the hands of the North.
The fall of Seoul was not only a major setback for South Korea but also a significant blow to Western public opinion, particularly in the United States. This development threatened the legitimacy of the South Korean regime and raised fears that U.S. influence in East Asia could be undermined. In response, U.S. President Harry S. Truman assessed the Korean War as the first major step in communist expansion and integrated this intervention into a global containment strategy. Following the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and other allied countries pledged military support to South Korea.
At this stage, the South Korean army and American units had retreated to the Busan area and were confined to a narrow zone known as the Busan Perimeter in the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula. The defensive line established there would later serve as the foundation for the United Nations forces’ counteroffensive. However, the rapid developments in the first weeks of the war marked a period of absolute North Korean superiority.
North Korea’s invasion on 25 June 1950 created a deep crisis not only on the Korean Peninsula but also on a global scale. This attack was classified as an “open threat to peace” within the framework of the United Nations’ founding principles, prompting the Security Council to convene urgently to address the crisis. Resolution 82, adopted on 26 June, called for the cessation of North Korea’s attack and the withdrawal of its forces behind the 38th parallel; when this appeal proved ineffective, Resolution 83, issued on 27 June, called upon United Nations members to provide military assistance. Resolution 84, adopted on 7 July 1950, determined that the command of military intervention in South Korea would be assumed by the United States.
These developments demonstrated the first actual implementation of the United Nations’ collective security mechanism in response to an attack on a member state. An important detail was that the absence of the Soviet Union’s representative from Security Council meetings enabled decisions to be adopted without veto. The Soviet representative was boycotting the meetings in protest against the lack of representation for the People’s Republic of China. This diplomatic vacuum allowed Western states to gain an advantage in the decision-making process.
Under the United Nations intervention, 16 countries sent military forces—land, air, and naval—to Korea.【8】 These countries included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, Türkiye, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and the Philippines. Additionally, more than 40 countries provided indirect support through logistical, medical, and humanitarian aid. The operational command of this multinational force was conducted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the command of ground forces was entrusted to General Douglas MacArthur.
The formation of the United Nations force demonstrated that the Korean War was not merely an internal matter concerning the Korean people but a crisis related to international peace and security. Moreover, its multinational structure strengthened the legal and political legitimacy of the war and reinforced the Western Bloc’s capacity for collective action against communist expansion. This development also directly contributed to the institutionalization of new military alliances such as NATO.
Türkiye officially announced on 25 July 1950 that it would send a brigade-sized military unit to Korea; this decision became one of the complementary elements of the multinational structure participating in the Korean War. Thus, the Korean War became not only a battlefield for participating states but also the first laboratory for the international alliances that would shape the Cold War.
In the initial months of the Korean War, the rapid advance of North Korean forces was halted by the United Nations forces’ counteroffensive and South Korea’s successful defense in the Busan region. Under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Army fundamentally altered the course of the war with the Inchon Landing in September 1950. Through this amphibious operation, UN forces recaptured Seoul, pushed North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel, and rapidly advanced into northern Korea, reaching the Chinese border. These developments raised the prospect that the war would extend beyond merely defending South Korea and that the North Korean regime could be entirely eliminated.
The proximity of United Nations forces to the Yalu River, China’s border, was perceived by the People’s Republic of China as a direct security threat. The Chinese leadership argued that allowing a regime change in Korea would endanger its own border security and therefore decided to intervene. Approximately 300,000 military personnel, organized under the name Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), secretly entered Korea in the last days of October 1950.
China’s entry into the war constituted one of the most critical turning points in the Korean War. Particularly after the Chinese offensive began in late November, United Nations forces suffered heavy losses, and Seoul fell once again into the hands of North Korean and Chinese forces. During this period, harsh winter conditions and logistical difficulties forced UN forces to retreat, restoring the balance of the war.
China’s participation in the war eliminated the regional nature of the conflict and reinforced the image of a direct international proxy war. For the United States, this situation necessitated a reevaluation of the limits of its military commitment in Asia. General MacArthur’s proposal for direct attacks on Chinese territory was rejected by President Truman, leading to MacArthur’s dismissal. This crisis also created a significant turning point in U.S. civil-military relations.
China’s intervention in the war prevented the collapse of the North Korean regime and led to a more balanced front between the two sides. After this period, the war took on a more defensive and positional warfare character; large-scale front-line changes gave way to a static front.
These developments meant that China’s intervention not only saved the North Korean regime but also laid the groundwork for China’s emergence as a visible global power during the Cold War. From this war onward, China was identified as an independent pole in Asia opposing the Western Bloc and began developing a diplomatic line independent of the Soviet Union.
From the beginning of 1951, large-scale front-line movements in the Korean War gave way to a process characterized by static and positional warfare. The reconfigured front-line balance following the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers led both sides to entrench themselves and establish new defensive lines. Although the United Nations forces recaptured Seoul for the second time in February 1951, indicating a temporary shift in initiative to UN forces, neither the Chinese and North Korean forces nor the UN forces were in a position to achieve lasting superiority through large-scale offensives.
During this period, the military nature of the war changed; instead of aiming for deep advances, intense positional battles around specific hills and defensive points became prominent. From mid-1951 onward, the front line stabilized around the 38th parallel and showed minimal change throughout the remainder of the war. This period was defined by low-intensity but continuous combat characterized by artillery fire, limited infantry raids, mutual trench warfare, and reconnaissance activities.
The static war period also brought about a political stalemate. With no clear victory or defeat emerging from the conflict, a balance of power developed that prolonged the war. This situation became exhausting for both the soldiers on the front lines and the participating countries. Particularly the harsh weather conditions, high-altitude positions, logistical difficulties, and human losses intensified the social and psychological impacts of the war.
During this time, the South Korean side, with support from UN forces, improved its defensive capabilities, while North Korean and Chinese forces attempted to offset their loss of initiative by leveraging terrain advantages. However, the inability to achieve superiority and the continued engagement of both sides despite dwindling resources led inevitably to negotiations.
Ultimately, this static and exhausting war environment laid the groundwork for the initiation of peace talks in July 1951. The village of Panmunjom was designated as the neutral site for these negotiations; thus, the diplomatic process that would shape the final phase of the war began. However, the negotiations themselves were as long and arduous as the war; for over two years, talks remained inconclusive, during which static combat on the front lines continued without interruption.
With the Korean War transforming into a static front-line conflict in mid-1951, the warring parties acknowledged the impossibility of a military solution and turned to diplomatic avenues. In July 1951, peace talks began in the village of Panmunjom between representatives of North Korea and the People’s Republic of China and the United Nations forces. The location of the talks, situated on the front line but considered neutral, symbolically represented both the military and political dimensions of the war.
The Panmunjom Talks were a multilateral and extremely challenging diplomatic process involving all parties to the conflict. Although initially aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace treaty to end the war entirely, the goal gradually narrowed to an armistice, with the parties focusing solely on ending hostilities. The main reasons for the slow progress of the talks included the fate of prisoners of war, the determination of the new border, monitoring mechanisms, and political representation issues.
The most contentious issue was the fate of prisoners of war. The Chinese and North Korean side advocated for the forced repatriation of prisoners, while the United Nations side, shaped largely by diplomatic initiatives from India, proposed the voluntary release of prisoners based on their own wishes. This fundamental disagreement caused months of stalemate; the processes of prisoner exchange and the establishment of neutral monitoring commissions took considerable time.
Despite all these obstacles, the exhausting effects of the nearly three-year-long war on the parties ultimately compelled them to seek a diplomatic solution. On 27 July 1953, an “armistice agreement” was signed in Panmunjom, bringing an end to active combat in the Korean War. The agreement established a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) approximately 240 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide, based on the actual front line; this line remains the de facto border between North and South Korea today.
However, this armistice did not mean the official end of the war. No peace treaty was signed between the parties; therefore, the state of war on the Korean Peninsula has not legally ended. This situation has led to the persistence of tension and military preparedness in the region to this day.
The Panmunjom Armistice also represents the first major military intervention in United Nations history in which a lasting peace was not established. After the armistice, the U.S. military presence in South Korea became permanent, while North Korea deepened its military and political relations with China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Korean War entered history as one of the most critical ruptures that defined the Cold War equation, affecting not only the Korean Peninsula but also the global balance of power.
After the Second World War, Türkiye entered a significant process of change in its foreign policy, gradually abandoning its principle of neutrality and seeking closer relations with the Western Bloc. This transformation was primarily driven by increasing pressure from the Soviet Union in the postwar period, particularly renewed demands regarding the Straits and territorial claims over Kars and Ardahan. In response to this threat, Türkiye felt the need to secure its security within a collective security system and began taking concrete steps toward joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The outbreak of the Korean War was seen by Türkiye as a significant opportunity to achieve this goal. The newly elected Democratic Party government, which came to power in 1950, believed that integration with the Western alliance needed to be reinforced not only through political rhetoric but also through tangible contributions. Government officials, led by Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, interpreted the United Nations’ call not merely as a peaceful initiative but as a test of Türkiye’s position within the Western Bloc.
On 25 July 1950, the Council of Ministers decided that Türkiye would send a brigade-sized military unit to Korea.【9】 This decision was neither discussed in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye nor consulted with the opposition. Consequently, the decision to send troops to Korea became a major point of debate in domestic politics; opposition parties criticized the decision as being taken outside parliamentary oversight, violating constitutional norms and democratic procedures. However, the government justified its decision by linking it to national interests, emphasizing its necessity for Türkiye’s NATO membership and integration with the Western world.
At the time the decision was made, Türkiye had not yet been formally admitted to NATO. Türkiye’s application for membership, not among the founding members of NATO established in 1949, had previously been negatively received by some European countries, particularly due to reasons related to geographical location and political stability. The decision to send troops to Korea was interpreted as a demonstration of Türkiye’s strategic commitment to its membership process; it was hoped that through the war, Türkiye would demonstrate its military capacity and loyalty to the West.
In the realm of foreign policy, Türkiye’s participation in the Korean War was not limited to providing military support; it was also an initiative to redefine Türkiye’s place in the international system. This move constituted a critical turning point in Türkiye’s transition from the status of a “neutral country” to becoming part of the Western defense system. Indeed, shortly after this decision, Türkiye’s NATO membership accelerated; in February 1952, Türkiye was formally admitted into the Alliance alongside Greece.
Türkiye’s decision to send troops to the Korean War was announced on 25 July 1950 by a decision of the Council of Ministers; however, this decision was implemented without being debated or put to a vote in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. Taken during a period when the Democratic Party government had been in power for only three months, this decision sparked serious debates regarding the functioning of the political system, decision-making processes, and democratic norms. Opposition parties, particularly the Republican People’s Party, criticized the government for bypassing the Assembly on such a vital issue.
Opposition parties, led by the Republican People’s Party, accused the government of exceeding its constitutional authority and argued that unilaterally committing Türkiye to a high-risk process like war contradicted the principles of a rule-of-law state. Criticisms were not limited to the procedure of the decision but also extended to its substance. It was frequently argued that there was no direct connection between Türkiye and Korea, that the war did not threaten Türkiye’s national security, and that sending Turkish soldiers to fight in a completely foreign conflict lacked legitimate public support.
In contrast, the Democratic Party government defended its decision to join the Korean War on strategic grounds, asserting that this step would strengthen Türkiye’s international position. The government’s main argument was that security against the Soviet threat could only be guaranteed by joining collective security mechanisms and that sending troops to Korea would open the path to full integration with the West. Additionally, Democratic Party leaders emphasized in their public statements that the decision was taken out of a sense of international responsibility, contribution to peace, and loyalty to United Nations principles.
The Istanbul press devoted extensive coverage to these debates. While some newspapers viewed the government’s initiative as a positive development, others criticized the sidelining of the Assembly as a violation of constitutional balance. Commentaries in newspapers also discussed the social and economic costs of sending Turkish soldiers to war. Particularly the emotional scenes during troop deployments stirred both a sense of national unity and anxiety and sorrow among the public.
The decision to join the Korean War demonstrated the extent to which the Democratic Party prioritized its goal of integration with the Western Bloc in foreign policy; however, it also revealed certain institutional and legal shortcomings in legitimizing this goal domestically. This decision laid the groundwork for more systematic discussions in later years regarding the limits of democratic oversight in Türkiye, the effectiveness of parliamentary functioning, and the unilateral influence of the executive on foreign policy.
Türkiye’s decision to send troops to the Korean War generated widespread reactions not only in political circles but also among the public and the press. Examination of news reports, commentaries, and opinion columns in newspapers of the period reveals that different segments of society responded to this decision with various emotions and assessments. Particularly the Istanbul press interpreted the decision to send troops to Korea as both a foreign policy move and a national responsibility test; it provided detailed analysis of the reasons behind the decision, its potential consequences, and its reflections on public conscience.
Following the announcement of the decision, some newspapers described the government’s initiative as a positive step and argued that Türkiye was striving to gain a respected position in the Western world.【10】 These commentaries emphasized that joining the collective security system was a necessity to counter Soviet pressure on Türkiye and that the Korean War served as a strategic tool in this context. Simultaneously, the view that Türkiye’s positive response to the United Nations’ call would strengthen its image as a state fulfilling its international obligations gained prominence.
However, more critical articles were also published in the press, going beyond these views. Some newspapers found the government’s decision problematic from a democratic standpoint, criticizing its failure to consult the Grand National Assembly and adequately inform the public; they argued that the legal and moral legitimacy of sending Turkish soldiers thousands of kilometers away to fight in a war unrelated to Türkiye’s direct security needed to be questioned. The phrase “Where is Korea, where is Türkiye?” became a symbolic expression reflecting public skepticism and a questioning attitude toward the decision to send troops.
Public sentiment, however, presented a more complex picture. On one hand, there was a desire for Türkiye to gain a stronger position internationally; on the other, families with sons of conscription age expressed anxiety and sorrow as they bid farewell to their children. Ceremonies held during troop deployments, especially at railway stations, visibly revealed the public’s emotional reactions; these scenes were frequently photographed and published in newspapers of the period.
Additionally, the deployment of Turkish soldiers to the front and their battlefield successes were met with pride and national enthusiasm, especially in major cities like Istanbul.【11】 These successes were frequently highlighted in the press; newspaper headlines emphasized the courage, discipline, and heroism of Turkish soldiers. These positive portrayals served as a tool to garner domestic support for the foreign policy initiative, providing the government with short-term political advantages.
However, as the war progressed, casualties, prisoner reports, and hardships on the front led to a more cautious and critical public attitude. The initial enthusiasm gradually gave way to fatigue, questioning, and social trauma; particularly the accounts of returning soldiers exposed the public to the true face of the war.
Immediately after deciding to participate in the Korean War, Türkiye launched a military preparation process and rapidly organized a brigade suitable for combat conditions. This brigade, known as the “Turkish Brigade” (officially the Turkish Combat Brigade), was organized to be sent to Korea under United Nations command. The brigade’s formation, training, deployment, and equipment were carried out at a rapid pace despite the limited resources of the period.
The core of the Turkish Brigade consisted of professional officers and non-commissioned officers; enlisted soldiers were primarily selected from reserve officer candidates, active-duty soldiers, and volunteers. The brigade’s strength was set at approximately 5,000 soldiers; it included infantry battalions, artillery units, reconnaissance elements, medical, communications, and logistical support units. The brigade was initially assembled for training at the Artillery and Infantry Schools in Polatlı, Ankara; it completed its pre-deployment training in Kayseri and İskenderun.
The training program was structured to suit the combat environment in Korea; particular emphasis was placed on night combat, grenade usage, machine gun training, and close-quarters combat. The disciplined nature, resilience, and morale of Turkish soldiers ensured the successful completion of the training program in a short time. The brigade’s command cadre was composed of officers fluent in English to ensure compatibility with United Nations forces. General Tahsin Yazıcı was appointed as the brigade’s first commander, a choice valued for both experience and discipline.
As part of deployment preparations, soldiers’ equipment was reviewed; rifles, machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank weapons were provided under American assistance. However, some deficiencies and shortages had to be addressed using domestic resources. Soldiers’ uniforms and provisions were revised to suit the Korean climate. Additionally, the brigade was deployed with its own medical and supply units. This enabled the brigade to operate independently upon arrival in Korea.
The deployment of the Turkish Brigade to Korea began on 17 September 1950; soldiers departed from İskenderun Port aboard American transport ships and arrived in Korea on 17 October 1950 after a month-long sea journey. The arrival point was Busan Port in South Korea, from where they traveled by land to the front line. The brigade’s first garrison area was Taegu. After a brief adaptation training period, the units were directly directed to the front line.
The deployment of the Turkish Brigade to Korea marked the first overseas military deployment in the history of the Republic of Türkiye; this situation also created a significant logistical and institutional experience for the Turkish Armed Forces. The brigade attracted attention not only through its frontline duties but also through humanitarian activities and symbolic functions during the later stages of the war.
The Turkish Brigade’s first frontline mission began immediately after its arrival on the Korean Peninsula in October 1950. The First Turkish Brigade, under the command of General Tahsin Yazıcı, was stationed under the United States Eighth Army and experienced its first major battle in November 1950 in the Kunuri region. At this time, the Chinese People’s Volunteers significantly increased their presence in the war, dramatically altering the balance of forces. The Turkish Brigade’s participation in the war ensured a critical role for United Nations forces in their defensive and withdrawal maneuvers during this new phase.
The Battle of Kunuri was the Turkish Brigade’s first major test in the Korean War. During this battle, which took place between 25–27 November 1950, Turkish units were tasked with protecting the right flank of the American 2nd Division and resisting Chinese encirclement and annihilation attempts. Despite the enemy’s numerical and firepower superiority, the Turkish Brigade did not abandon its position; at great cost, it held the front line and facilitated the withdrawal of allied units. This battle served as a remarkable example of Turkish soldiers’ resistance, close-combat capability, and morale, earning widespread international acclaim.
After Kunuri, the Turkish Brigade demonstrated similar resilience in the Battle of Wawon.【12】 Beginning on 27 November, this confrontation involved Turkish units being encircled by a large-scale Chinese offensive. Despite intense pressure, the brigade successfully broke the encirclement and largely rescued its units.
Although casualties during this period were severe, the discipline and combat capability of Turkish units slowed the enemy’s advance and provided time for allied front lines to regroup.【13】 In this regard, the Battle of Wawon strengthened the symbolic importance of the Turkish Brigade in Korea.
In early 1951, the Turkish Brigade participated in the battle known as the Battle of Kumyangjang-Ni.【14】 This battle occurred on 25 January 1951, and Turkish units successfully carried out the mission of capturing enemy positions. Particularly, this operation, conducted in mountainous and rugged terrain, was significant in demonstrating the proficiency of Turkish soldiers in classical infantry combat. For its success in this battle, General Tahsin Yazıcı was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit, and the brigade received the Republic of Korea Meritorious Service Medal from the South Korean President.
These three battles formed the foundation of the Turkish Brigade’s reputation in the Korean War; the brigade gained prominence not only through its military function on the front but also through its discipline, courage, and self-sacrifice among allied units.【15】 Simultaneously, these successes generated widespread resonance in Turkish public opinion; the legitimacy of the decision to send troops to Korea was justified through these battle achievements. The brigade’s losses during this initial mission period were recorded as approximately 741 killed, wounded, and missing.
Following the combat performance of the First Turkish Brigade at the end of 1950 and beginning of 1951, the Turkish Armed Forces continued its commitment to the Korean War; a total of four separate brigades served in Korea in rotation. In this context, the Second and Third Turkish Brigades played active roles during the more static but strategically critical phases of the war, undertaking defense, forward outpost security, front-line fortification, and occasionally offensive missions.
The Second Turkish Brigade arrived in Korea in late 1951 and was stationed along the front line north of Seoul. This brigade operated during the period when the Panmunjom negotiations began; thus, it undertook responsibilities such as maintaining front-line security, preventing enemy infiltration, and sustaining regional control despite the reduction in hostilities. The brigade’s area of operation generally consisted of mountainous and rugged terrain; however, this situation, which limited mobility, was successfully managed due to the Turkish soldiers’ familiarity with mountain conditions.
The Second Brigade operated during a period characterized not by large-scale offensives but by guerrilla-style raids, minefield patrols, and trench warfare. Nevertheless, responses to various enemy infiltrations, particularly the sensitivity shown in night defense discipline, strengthened the reliability of Turkish soldiers among allied forces. The brigade also operated during a period when psychological warfare elements intensified in parallel with the Panmunjom negotiations, successfully maintaining its morale and operational order.
The Third Turkish Brigade began its service in 1952, coinciding with a period when the war was increasingly becoming static.【16】 However, this static nature did not mean that Turkish units experienced a combat-free period. The Third Brigade, stationed on the front line, carried out duties such as identifying enemy weak points, mine clearance, forward outpost fortification, and short-range contact battles. The brigade played a significant role in strengthening the defense lines around Hook Hill and its surroundings in northern Korea.
The Third Brigade’s service period also coincided with a phase where greater emphasis was placed on the social and humanitarian aspects of the war. During this period, the brigade also undertook non-military functions such as interacting with the local population, supporting orphanages, constructing schools, and providing humanitarian aid. Particularly, the construction of the Ankara School enabled Turkish soldiers to be seen not merely as a combat force but also as a symbol of friendship and assistance in Korea.
The missions of these two brigades coincided with a period of reduced combat intensity on the front, yet they represented the continuity of a high-morale, disciplined military presence that maintained strategic balance. The brigades ensured the security of maneuver areas for United Nations forces by controlling key hills and passes.
The Turkish Brigade operated within the United Nations (UN) forces throughout the Korean War and was primarily stationed under the command of the United States Eighth Army. Within this framework, the brigade was integrated into the general operational plans of the UN army and was subject to various evaluations regarding discipline, combat performance, and strategic contribution. These evaluations found extensive space not only in military documents but also in the memoirs of allied officers and postwar military analyses.
The most prominent feature of the Turkish Brigade was its close-combat capability, high morale, and discipline. Particularly, the resistance demonstrated in the battles of Kunuri and Wawon was assessed by American command as “beyond expectations”; the behavior of Turkish soldiers on the battlefield was rated as equivalent to that of trained professional units. General Walton Walker stated that without the intervention of the Turkish Brigade, the Eighth Army might have been encircled and destroyed. Such statements indicate that the Turkish Brigade was perceived as a decisive factor in the course of the war.
Compared with other allied units under UN command, the Turkish Brigade exhibited a smaller but highly disciplined and determined structure. Even when suffering heavy losses, the brigade maintained its positions, serving as a model in terms of front-line discipline; this feature was frequently emphasized in American and British military reports. The fact that the majority of the brigade’s officers and non-commissioned officers had been trained after the Second World War enabled decisions made in combat to be implemented with calmness and precision.
However, some allied reports noted communication problems due to the brigade’s lack of technical equipment and insufficient foreign language skills. Particularly, coordination of artillery and air support occasionally faced difficulties; this affected tactical decision-making processes on the front line. Nevertheless, despite these issues, Turkish units demonstrated high capability in decision-making and implementation by maintaining their internal hierarchy.
The symbolic value of the Turkish Brigade within the UN was also significant. During a period when Türkiye was seeking integration with the Western Bloc, battlefield successes transformed into diplomatic capital. The brigade was evaluated not only for its combat performance but also for the political will and loyalty it represented. The fact that Turkish Brigade was referred to as the “core discipline force” among foreign soldiers in Korea demonstrates the widespread acceptance of this perception on the battlefield.
Overall, the Turkish Brigade was characterized as a stable, highly resilient unit within the UN command that demonstrated adaptability to allied coordination. The reputation gained by the brigade in the Korean War provided psychological and diplomatic contributions to Türkiye’s NATO membership process and enhanced its visibility on international platforms.
With the signing of the Panmunjom Armistice on 27 July 1953, the active combat phase of the Korean War ended; however, the presence of United Nations forces continued to ensure security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.【17】 In this context, Türkiye continued its military commitment in Korea after the war, replacing the combat brigades with a lower-intensity but regular military presence focused on peacekeeping duties.
After the armistice, the Turkish Brigade’s combat mission ended, but its service continued until 1954.【18】 During this period, the unit undertook responsibilities such as maintaining defense positions, conducting border patrols, and ensuring security around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Turkish units, alongside other allied forces, monitored the implementation of the armistice and remained a deterrent presence against potential violations on the front line.
After the four brigades rotated between 1950 and 1953, Türkiye’s military presence in Korea became more institutionalized from 1954 onward.【19】 Türkiye continued its annual rotation of brigade-sized forces under the United Nations command as the “Turkish Peace Force” (Korean Turkish Force); this structure was maintained throughout the 1960s. During this period, Turkish soldiers not only ensured security but also maintained social and cultural interactions with the Korean people and participated in various humanitarian aid activities to improve civilian life.
Türkiye’s military presence in Korea continued uninterrupted until 1971. In that year, Türkiye decided to end its military mission in Korea in line with its own foreign policy considerations, economic needs, military resource planning, and efforts to restructure within NATO; Turkish units were fully withdrawn from Korea. This withdrawal did not lead to a rupture in Türkiye-Korea relations; on the contrary, civil and diplomatic relations were further strengthened on the basis of the historical friendship established during the war.
The nearly 20-year-long Turkish military presence in Korea after the war constituted an important external operation experience for the Turkish Armed Forces.【20】 Maintaining military discipline within an international command structure, demonstrating professional performance in non-combat missions, and contributing to the peace process significantly enhanced the institutional capacity of the Turkish military. This long-term presence also effectively strengthened the external perception of Türkiye’s role in international security mechanisms.
The Turkish Brigade operated in the most challenging sectors of the front line and suffered significant losses, particularly during the battles of Kunuri and Wawon at the end of 1950 and beginning of 1951. These battles were notable not only in terms of the number of casualties and wounded but also in terms of the number of soldiers taken prisoner. Particularly, the sudden and encirclement-oriented offensives by the Chinese People’s Volunteers isolated some Turkish units, leading to an increase in prisoner cases.
According to official records, 244 Turkish soldiers were captured by Chinese and North Korean forces during the Korean War.【21】 Although this number appears relatively low when compared to the approximately 21,000 Turkish soldiers who served on the front, the rate of capture among brigade-level units was significant in terms of operational losses. Captivity left deep psychological and social scars, both individually and collectively, beyond the physical consequences of the war.
The majority of captured soldiers were either missing or taken during the retreat from Kunuri, when units were cut off from withdrawal routes due to enemy breakthroughs. Due to the nature of the war, the presence of wounded soldiers captured in close-combat situations was also recorded. Turkish soldiers captured by Chinese and North Korean forces were sent to camps located in the interior regions of North Korea. It is known that these prisoners were held together with other UN soldiers and subjected to various forms of propaganda, interrogation, and harsh living conditions.
The cases of Turkish soldiers being taken prisoner were not disclosed to the public during the early stages of the war; however, information about the prisoners’ survival reached the public through reports from the Turkish Red Crescent, the Red Cross, and UN sources as the war progressed.【22】 During this time, families in Türkiye waited anxiously; particularly, the prisoner exchange processes after the war became central to both diplomatic efforts and public expectations.
The cases of Turkish soldiers being captured also had consequences for military strategy. The Turkish Brigade, particularly in its rotation after 1951, underwent revisions to better structure its units and prepare them more suitably for combat conditions. Additionally, the experience of captivity in Korea became a factor considered in postwar Turkish military education and personnel planning.
The camps where Turkish soldiers were held as prisoners during the Korean War were primarily established in remote areas of North Korea, away from the front lines, and operated under the control of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. These camps held not only Turkish soldiers but also American, British, Canadian, and other United Nations forces. The living conditions of prisoners were far below the norms prescribed by military agreements and international law, characterized by physically and psychologically exhausting conditions.
The most prominent problems in the camps where Turkish prisoners were held were inadequate nutrition, poor hygiene, and lack of medical care. Food rations were typically monotonous, low-calorie, and based on the daily consumption of the local population, insufficient for survival under wartime conditions. Due to protein and vitamin deficiencies, prisoners suffered severe weight loss, muscle wasting, and infections. Particularly during winter months, low temperatures and lack of adequate shelter created extremely harsh living conditions for prisoners.
Another hardship of camp life was the constant exposure of prisoners to ideological propaganda and “re-education” activities. Organized by Chinese and North Korean officials, these activities systematically promoted the superiority of socialist ideology, the collapse of capitalism, and the “unjust war” waged by United Nations forces. Marxist-Leninist doctrines were explained in educational sessions, and lengthy discussions based on Mao Zedong’s views were held. The primary aim of these activities was to break prisoners’ loyalty to their own systems, create ideological uncertainty, and even produce individuals who could be used as propaganda tools.
Interrogation processes were often conducted as a preliminary stage of this propaganda. The goal was to obtain information about the locations of the units, relations with allied countries, and the command structure. However, these interrogations, unlike Western public opinion’s expectations, were based not on systematic torture but on ideological pressure and psychological manipulation. Turkish soldiers generally exercised their right to remain silent or provided only basic information already known to the public.
As part of the propaganda process, some prisoners were forced to participate in photo sessions, letter writing, or radio broadcasts. The aim was to spread the perception that these soldiers had “voluntarily undergone ideological transformation” and to generate international anti-war sentiment. However, the majority of Turkish prisoners resisted such practices, maintained distance from propaganda sessions, and rendered these efforts ineffective through group solidarity. This resistance was even reflected in Chinese official reports, which noted that Turkish soldiers were among the groups with “high collective resistance and resistance to influence.”
However, some prisoners were compelled to participate minimally in propaganda sessions; the basis for this participation was often better living conditions, access to medicine, or additional food. These concessions did not imply a breach of military discipline but revealed how crucial the struggle for survival was in the individual dimensions of war.
The psychological warfare process in the camps demonstrated that captivity was not merely a physical confinement but also an ideological challenge to mental integrity. Turkish soldiers, under these conditions, preserved their collective identity and did not provide a fertile ground for either propaganda activities or interrogation processes. This situation laid the groundwork for the formation of the “soldier who did not bow” image in postwar Türkiye and for the respectful remembrance of former prisoners by society.
Throughout the Korean War, the camps holding captured soldiers were not merely places for detaining combatants; they were also seen as arenas for psychological warfare and propaganda activities by the authorities of the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. In this context, Turkish soldiers became one of the primary targets of the most intense ideological battles on the home front of the war.
The propaganda activities implemented in the camps were mostly carried out under the guise of “re-education”; during this process, prisoners were subjected to intense narratives promoting the superiority of socialist ideology, the collapse of imperialism, and the claim that the United Nations forces were waging an “unjust war.” Marxist-Leninist doctrines were explained in educational sessions, and lengthy debates based on Mao Zedong’s views were organized. The primary aim of these activities was to break the prisoners’ loyalty to their own systems, create ideological uncertainty, and even produce figures who could be used as propaganda tools over time.
Interrogation processes were often conducted as a preliminary stage of this propaganda. The goal was to obtain information about the locations of the units, relations with allied countries, and the command structure. However, these interrogations, unlike Western public opinion’s expectations, were based not on systematic torture but on ideological pressure and psychological manipulation. Turkish soldiers generally exercised their right to remain silent or provided only basic information already known to the public.
As part of the propaganda process, some prisoners were forced to participate in photo sessions, letter writing, or radio broadcasts. The aim was to spread the perception that these soldiers had “voluntarily undergone ideological transformation” and to generate international anti-war sentiment. However, the majority of Turkish prisoners resisted such practices, maintained distance from propaganda sessions, and rendered these efforts ineffective through group solidarity. This resistance was even reflected in Chinese official reports, which noted that Turkish soldiers were among the groups with “high collective resistance and resistance to influence.”
However, some prisoners were compelled to participate minimally in propaganda sessions; the basis for this participation was often better living conditions, access to medicine, or additional food. These concessions did not imply a breach of military discipline but revealed how crucial the struggle for survival was in the individual dimensions of war.
The psychological warfare process in the camps demonstrated that captivity was not merely a physical confinement but also an ideological challenge to mental integrity. Turkish soldiers, under these conditions, preserved their collective identity and did not provide a fertile ground for either propaganda activities or interrogation processes. This situation laid the groundwork for the formation of the “soldier who did not bow” image in postwar Türkiye and for the respectful remembrance of former prisoners by society.
The release and return to Türkiye of Turkish soldiers captured during the Korean War required a long and complex diplomatic process even after the war ended. This process was not merely a military or logistical issue; it was at the center of international law, human rights, and postwar political balances. With the signing of the Panmunjom Armistice on 27 July 1953, hostilities ceased; however, the issue of prisoner exchange remained one of the most controversial and delayed topics in the negotiations.
The agreement reached between the parties regarding prisoner exchange was implemented under the name “Operation Big Switch” and put into effect in September 1953. During this process, both sides exchanged their prisoners of war under the supervision of neutral countries. Turkish prisoners were extracted from Chinese and North Korean camps and transported to neutral zones, from where they were sent to Türkiye via Busan under U.S. control. The return of prisoners was carried out gradually over a period of approximately one month.
Turkish soldiers returning from captivity were welcomed in Türkiye with great interest and respect. Ceremonies held at airports and train stations made the soldiers the focus of intense media attention; reunions with their families received extensive coverage in national newspapers. In public opinion, returning prisoners were seen as “symbols of patience, loyalty, and resistance”; this perception left a lasting mark in both political discourse and collective memory. Military authorities evaluated the health conditions of returning prisoners and initiated medical and counseling programs for their physical and psychological rehabilitation.
However, the effects of captivity left long-term psychological, social, and mental scars on the soldiers’ lives. The traumas experienced in the camps, social adjustment problems, and suppressed emotions made it difficult for these soldiers to reintegrate into civilian life. Some former prisoners were reluctant to speak about their experiences; others documented their experiences in written memoirs. In Türkiye, the limited number of testimonies about captivity during this period was closely observed by both the public and academic circles; these testimonies gradually became important documents in Turkish military history.
The prisoner exchange process was also part of Türkiye’s new diplomatic sensitivity in its postwar international relations. Türkiye strictly adhered to the principles of neutrality during the exchange; this attitude ensured that Türkiye was seen as a responsible actor fulfilling its international obligations before the United Nations.
Türkiye’s participation in the Korean War marked a turning point in the concrete realization of its strategic orientation. This decision was regarded as the most critical step toward Türkiye’s full membership in the Western Bloc; particularly, sending troops to Korea became a powerful political argument in favor of Türkiye’s NATO membership. The decision to send troops in July 1950 received great admiration in the West and led to Türkiye being perceived as a loyal and actively contributing ally.
Before the Korean War, Türkiye’s application for NATO membership had been negatively received by some European countries, primarily due to reasons related to geographical location, economic capability, and political structure. However, being one of the few countries to directly send troops to Korea elevated Türkiye’s status; with strong support from the United States, the membership process accelerated rapidly. The performance of the Turkish Brigade on the battlefield served as a concrete example of Türkiye’s potential role within NATO; the discipline, resilience, and combat capacity of the Turkish Armed Forces began to be considered within NATO’s security structure.
Shortly after the end of the war, on 18 February 1952, Türkiye was formally admitted into NATO alongside Greece. This membership symbolized a fundamental shift in Türkiye’s foreign policy throughout the 20th century; it solidified the transition from the principle of neutrality to a collective security approach. Thus, the Korean War became not merely a military experience but also the most decisive milestone in Türkiye’s political, military, and institutional integration with the West.
With NATO membership, Türkiye became the easternmost forward post of Western Europe’s defense line; its strategic importance increased significantly against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. This membership strengthened the Atlanticist line in Türkiye’s foreign policy and encouraged various legal and administrative reforms toward alignment with Western norms domestically. In the military domain, NATO integration led to the restructuring of the Turkish Armed Forces in terms of doctrine, education, organization, and weapon systems.
Türkiye’s foreign policy momentum gained through the Korean War also opened new diplomatic channels that would enhance Türkiye’s position in future international crises. NATO membership was made possible by the strategic and political capital gained from the Korean War; this remains Türkiye’s most enduring outcome of the war in the realm of foreign policy.
The Korean War provided a crucial experience for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in reshaping its institutional structure after the Second World War. This war was the first large-scale conflict in which the TSK directly participated after the Second World War and served as a test of the Turkish military’s ability to operate under modern warfare conditions. The four brigade-level units that served on the front contributed to the army’s restructuring process by gaining tactical and logistical experience during different phases of the war.
The experiences gained on the Korean front created significant knowledge in areas such as how to organize modern infantry units, close-combat techniques, effective use of artillery support, and maintaining the balance between reconnaissance and movement in contact with the enemy. The Turkish military doctrine analyzed the conditions encountered in Korea and improved its unit structure, training models, and discipline concepts. The trench and night combat tactics, movement under harsh climate and terrain conditions, and mobile supply chain formation were adopted as modeling elements in the Turkish military’s internal training programs.
The Korean War also marked a historical milestone for the TSK in terms of its ability to operate within a multinational force structure. Turkish units served under the command of the U.S. Eighth Army; during this period, they directly adapted to NATO-style command and control systems, joint operational planning, radio-communication protocols, and logistical support organization. This experience laid the groundwork for the military integration process Turkey would undergo after its NATO membership.
Additionally, the Korean War enabled officers and non-commissioned officers to gain combat experience; these personnel later assumed key roles in the Turkish military’s command structure, transforming these experiences into institutional memory. Known as “Korean veterans,” these personnel played active roles in postwar tactical and strategic evaluation processes within the TSK, contributing to the transfer of wartime experience to decision-making levels.
Another significant impact revealed by the war was the acceleration of the modernization process of the TSK’s equipment and weapon systems. The military equipment provided to Türkiye under American assistance was tested in Korea, and adaptation plans were developed based on these experiences. Particularly in the areas of communication systems, light infantry weapons, field medical practices, and equipment standards, the Korean experience influenced the shaping of domestic production and foreign procurement policies.
The Korean War contributed significantly to the comprehensive transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces in the areas of doctrine, education, personnel, and technology. This war is regarded as one of the fundamental experience areas that defined the TSK’s position within NATO during the Cold War.
The Korean War left deep and lasting impressions on Türkiye’s collective memory. The emotional atmosphere in public opinion during the war created a multi-layered social reflection oscillating between national unity, anxiety, pride, and critical awareness. The debates that began from the moment the government announced its decision to send troops continued throughout the war, and the collective memory formed during this period became one of the fundamental dynamics determining the position of Korean veterans in society.
Türkish public opinion largely adopted a supportive stance toward the government’s foreign policy initiative in the early stages of the war; the perception of soldiers as “going not for the homeland but for honor” coexisted with narratives questioning the legitimacy of the war. National emotional narratives created in newspapers, radio broadcasts, and funeral ceremonies were the main tools guiding public opinion. During this period, the resistance of Turkish soldiers on the front, particularly after the battles of Kunuri and Wawon, was elevated around the “Heroic Mehmetçik” narrative; a framework was established in public conscience that linked sending troops to Korea with honor and duty.
In the postwar period, returning soldiers were recognized with the title “gazi” and were defined as heroic figures who had completed an honorable mission. However, over time, significant fractures emerged in the social response to this designation. Although Korean veterans were initially welcomed with ceremonies, their memories were heard, and they gained symbolic prestige in public opinion, in later years, particularly after the 1960s during social transformation processes, they faced neglect, economic weakness, and social isolation.
The most prominent problems faced by veterans included lack of social security, limited pensions and support mechanisms, and becoming invisible in public life. Especially veterans living in rural areas were described as “silent heroes” in society; however, they failed to receive adequate institutional attention in terms of state support. This situation demonstrates that the social impact of the Korean War was shaped more by long-term neglect and forgetfulness than by the initial enthusiasm following the war.
Nevertheless, Korean veterans hold a special place in Türkiye’s collective memory as witnesses to the country’s first experience of international military responsibility. Particularly through memoir books, oral history projects, and the renewed Türkiye-Korea relations in the 2000s, renewed attention has been paid to the veterans’ memories. The South Korean state has viewed this testimony as a diplomatic value, organizing special honors, visit programs, and support campaigns for Korean veterans in Türkiye; this has revived interest in Korean veterans in Turkish public opinion.
The presence of the Turkish Brigade in South Korea during the Korean War was not limited to military operations; it also played a decisive role in humanitarian aid and social solidarity. The destruction and mass displacement caused by the war left deep scars on children; many Korean orphans emerged who had lost their parents and were left unprotected in the war environment.
In addition to their frontline activities, the Turkish Brigade established the Ankara School and Orphanage to provide shelter, basic education, and psychosocial support to war victims.【23】 The humanitarian attitude demonstrated by Turkish soldiers during the war had a positive impact on the future of relations between the two countries.
In this context, the story of a Korean girl known in public opinion as “Ayla” became an emblematic example of the humanitarian dimension of Türkiye-Korea relations. Turkish non-commissioned officer Süleyman Dilbirliği, who found and took under his protection this small child who had lost her family during the war, contributed significantly to shielding her from the destructive effects of the war, both physically and emotionally.
Süleyman Dilbirliği’s care and compassion toward Ayla demonstrated that human rights and universal values could be preserved even in the midst of war, laying the foundation for a bridge of friendship between the two nations.【24】 Ayla’s story concretely showed that humanitarian values and mutual understanding could rise above the social devastation of war. Furthermore, this story was adapted into a film titled “Ayla” and screened in both South Korean and Turkish cinemas.
The Korean War established not only a military solidarity between Türkiye and the Republic of Korea on the battlefield but also the foundation for a lasting and multidimensional diplomatic relationship. Türkiye’s participation in the Korean War became the starting point that defined the historical legitimacy of relations between the two countries; after the war, this relationship was built on friendship, cultural interaction, and mutual political support.
In the postwar period, Türkiye became one of the first countries to recognize the Republic of Korea; the Turkish Embassy in Seoul was opened in 1957. This diplomatic initiative is notable as one of Türkiye’s first embassies in East Asia. Türkiye’s political support for Korea was reciprocated by Korea under the principle of reciprocity; relations between the two countries were steadily maintained throughout the 1950s and 1960s on the basis of “war friendship.”
Diplomatic gains were not limited to bilateral relations; Türkiye gained an active and reputable profile within the United Nations due to its participation in the Korean War. Its military contribution in Korea enhanced Türkiye’s effectiveness in UN decision-making mechanisms and established it as a reliable partner in peacekeeping operations. Similarly, through the Korean War, Türkiye became one of the few NATO countries to be physically present in the Asia-Pacific region and gained the ability to influence regional geopolitical balances.
Over time, Türkiye–Korea relations developed in economic, cultural, and educational fields. From the 1980s onward, Turkish entrepreneurs entered the Korean market, Korean firms began investing in Türkiye, and mutual student exchange programs were implemented, diversifying this friendship. The Korean people referred to Turks as “blood brothers” (혈맹 / hyeolmaeng); the solidarity shown during the war became a lasting value in cultural memory.
Especially the South Korean state has placed Korean veterans in Türkiye at the center of diplomatic relations; it has repeatedly reminded this historical bond through state-organized invitations, honors, and official visits. In Türkiye, a special sympathy for the Republic of Korea has developed; this friendship is frequently visible in popular culture, television series, and commemorative ceremonies.
The Korean War, as the first open and hot conflict of the bipolar world order that emerged after the Second World War, marked a turning point where the Cold War was directly transferred to the battlefield. The war solidified the ideological and strategic polarization on a global scale and entrenched the division between the Western Bloc led by the United States and the Eastern Bloc represented by the Soviet Union and China.
The war, which began in 1950, was regarded as the first concrete application of the “containment policy” against the spread of communism in Asia. The United States, through its support to South Korea, aimed not only to protect an ally but also to resist the spread of socialism throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the Korean War became one of the initial links in the tradition of U.S. military intervention following the Truman Doctrine. The war strengthened NATO’s effectiveness and also paved the way for the creation of regional security structures in Asia, such as SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization).
On the other hand, the intervention of the People’s Republic of China in the war enhanced this country’s influence in world politics and laid the groundwork for its rise as an independent power center in Asia. China’s direct participation in the war with its own military power and political decision, distinct from the Soviet Union, signaled the first signs of the rift that would emerge between the two countries in subsequent years. This development demonstrated that the Eastern Bloc was not a homogeneous structure and that China would later establish its own geopolitical strategy.
The war also carried historical significance for the United Nations organization. The UN, for the first time, effectively activated its collective security mechanism; a multinational force comprising 16 countries was formed. However, the Soviet Union’s boycott of the Security Council meetings during this process raised questions about representation justice. Nevertheless, the Korean War enhanced the institutional prestige of the UN by demonstrating its capacity for military intervention in international crises.
Additionally, the Korean War accelerated debates on the rearmament of Germany, initiated the integration of West Germany into NATO, and led to the restructuring of military power balances in Europe. In response, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact to institutionalize its opposing bloc. Thus, the Korean War contributed to the opening of new fronts in the Cold War geopolitics centered on Europe.
The Korean War constitutes a turning point in international law as the first conflict in which the principle of collective security under the United Nations was applied. The UN, established in 1945, carried the claim of maintaining international peace and security, but this claim had not been fully implemented in practice until the Korean War. The events in Korea marked the first instance where the UN effectively used its authority to employ military force against an aggressor state; this generated new debates regarding the legitimacy of the war and the international legal order.
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 was classified by the UN Security Council as an “open threat to peace” and an “act of aggression”; accordingly, Resolutions 82, 83, and 84 authorized the use of military force against North Korea. These resolutions were adopted under Article 42 of the UN Charter, calling upon member states to provide military contributions. The adoption of these resolutions was made possible because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council meetings at the time, thus avoiding a veto.
In this context, the Korean War became the first major military intervention where the international community acted collectively under the UN umbrella; it served as an example of multinational force operating within the framework of international law. However, the manner in which the resolutions were adopted—particularly the absence of the Soviet representative and the lack of representation for the People’s Republic of China—led some legal scholars to criticize the process for “deficiencies in representation” and “legitimacy weaknesses.”
The applicability of the laws of war was also widely debated during the conflict. Issues such as the protection of civilians, the status of prisoners of war, and the legal boundaries of propaganda activities were revisited under the framework of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Korean War was regarded as the first test of these conventions; however, the treatment of prisoners held in North Korean and Chinese camps and the civilian casualties caused by UN air bombings raised questions about the effectiveness of the laws of war.
Additionally, the legal status of neutral countries was debated during the war; countries such as India, which assumed humanitarian mediation roles in prisoner exchanges, contributed to the reflection of international law in civil diplomacy. The principles of neutral observer status and medical aid during prisoner exchanges forced a redefinition of the limits and implementation tools of international law in conflict situations.
The legal legacy of the Korean War formed the foundation for the United Nations’ subsequent peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations in the following decades and played a critical role in establishing criteria for the legitimacy of military interventions in the postwar international system. This situation was reflected in UN operations in the 1990s and beyond; for example, principles of multinational intervention were developed in crises such as the Gulf War by drawing on the Korean War model.
The Korean War did not merely cause physical destruction on the peninsula; it also left deep and lasting imprints on the region’s political, social, and humanitarian structure. The war led to the permanent division of the Korean Peninsula, establishing the foundation for a status quo that has persisted into the 21st century. The armistice agreement signed in 1953 did not establish peace; technically, the state of war continues to this day. This situation has turned Korea into one of the most militarized borders in the world.
After the war, South Korea entered a reconstruction process under American protection, while North Korea consolidated under a closed totalitarian regime supported by China and the Soviet Union.【25】 South Korea industrialized through an authoritarian modernization process from the 1960s onward and later underwent a transition to democracy in the 1980s. In contrast, North Korea preserved the rigid centralized structure established under Kim Il Sung and has continued its existence through a hereditary leadership system passed down to subsequent generations. This political fragmentation created a complete cultural, economic, and ideological rupture between the two societies.
On the social level, the effects of the war were even more traumatic and widespread. Millions of people were displaced, and hundreds of thousands were killed or went missing. Families were torn apart by the war; the issue of “separated families” remains one of the most emotional and unresolved problems between North and South Korea to this day. Thousands of South Koreans who cannot reach their relatives in the North continue to remind the world that the war is not merely a past event but an ongoing tragedy.
The physical destruction left by the war was also profound. Cities, including the capital Seoul, changed hands multiple times; infrastructure was largely destroyed. The postwar reconstruction process, particularly in South Korea, began rapidly under the influence of foreign aid and planned development policies; significant advances were made in education, transportation, and industry. This process laid the groundwork for the country’s “Korean Miracle” economic development period. In contrast, North Korea’s development model was shaped largely by the ideology of self-reliance (Juche); by the 1990s, it had led to severe economic crises and international isolation.
Moreover, the war led to the entrenchment of military culture and compulsory military service at the center of Korean society.【26】 Particularly in South Korea, the military became not merely a security apparatus but also one of the fundamental symbols of social discipline, masculinity, and civic duty. This situation contributed to the strong embedding of militarism in the collective memory after the war.
The political and social legacies of the Korean War are not confined to the past. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th parallel remains a de facto border and a potential conflict line. The fact that the state of war has not ended has ensured the continuity of a defense-oriented approach in the domestic and foreign policies of both Koreas, leaving peace still a fragile possibility.
The Korean War occupies different places in the collective memory of the countries directly or indirectly involved; the ways in which this war is remembered serve various functions in the construction of national identities, history education policies, and public commemorative rituals. In some countries, the war is glorified as an act of national heroism and international responsibility; in others, it is marginalized, traumatic, or viewed critically. This situation demonstrates that the war has transformed into a cultural legacy, not merely a military and diplomatic event.
In South Korea, the Korean War is remembered as one of the central symbols of national independence and survival.【27】 Known as the 6.25 War (Yuk-i-o Jeonjaeng), this conflict is a core subject in school curricula; commemorative ceremonies, documentaries, museums, and monuments ensure the continuous vitality of collective awareness. The Korean War Memorial and the War Memorial Museum in Seoul have become significant symbolic spaces that allow both local citizens and international visitors to visualize the war’s legacy.
In Türkiye, the place of the Korean War in collective memory is more complex and layered. Immediately after the war, public opinion showed great interest and a sense of national pride; particularly, the heroism of the Turkish Brigade received widespread admiration. However, over time, this narrative gave way to relative silence and historical forgetfulness. Korean veterans remained with limited visibility in public opinion; the marginalization of the war in educational curricula and public debates contributed to its fading from collective memory.
Nevertheless, since the 2000s, the development of Türkiye–Korea relations and South Korea’s honor programs for Korean veterans have revived the memory of the war. The “Korean Martyrs’ Cemetery” at Anıtkabir and the Korean War Memorial in Ankara have become symbolically significant spaces during this period. Additionally, South Korean visits to veterans, honor ceremonies, and documentary projects have been important for reviving historical testimony and renewing public awareness.
In the United States, the Korean War was long referred to as the “Forgotten War”; it remained overshadowed by the more prominent conflicts of the Second World War and the Vietnam War. However, with the opening of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, the war regained its place in collective remembrance. In other participating countries such as Britain, Canada, and Australia, the Korean War is generally remembered as a historical example of duty and loyalty, kept alive through commemorative days and special sections in military museums.
The commemorative practices of the Korean War have also become integrated with global peace narratives and international solidarity. In many countries, peace monuments have been erected alongside war memorials, demonstrating that the war is remembered not only as a past event but also as an ethical lesson for the future. In this context, the Korean War has become a symbolic legacy woven with themes of peace, responsibility, loss, and solidarity in the collective memory of nations.
[1]
Oylum Bülbül Beşler, La Guerre de Corée et la militarisation de l’opinion publique turque (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Université Galatasaray, Institut des Sciences Sociales, Département des Sciences Politiques, 2025), s. 189.
[2]
Oylum Bülbül Beşler. (a.g.e), s. 191.
[3]
Ulviye Ulviya Mammadova, Kore Kollektif Bellek İnşasında Kore Savaşı ve Savaşın Ulus Kimlik Oluşumundaki Yeri (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Avrasya Araştırmaları Anabilim Dalı, 2023), s. 111.
[4]
Seher Kömürcü, Ulus ve Zafer Gazetelerinde Kore Savaşı (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Yeditepe Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2024), s. 220.
[5]
Fatih Set, Sinema-Savaş İlişkisi ve Türk Sineması’nda Kore Savaşı (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Radyo Televizyon ve Sinema Anabilim Dalı, 2019), s. 37.
[6]
Shi Woon Choi, İzzet Keribar’ın Kore Savaşı Sonrası Belgesel Fotoğrafları (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Güzel Sanatlar Enstitüsü, Fotoğraf Anasanat Dalı, 2021), s. 20.
[7]
Şehlem Kaçar, Reading the Korean War through the Photographs of Semiha Es (Doktora Tezi, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İletişim Doktora Programı, 2022), s. 45.
[8]
Oylum Bülbül Beşler. (a.g.e), s. 190.
[9]
Muhammed Cihad Kubat, A Godly Progressive Nation: The Korean War and Turkey’s Cold War Reordering (Doktora Tezi, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi, Ekonomi ve Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, 2024), s. 181.
[10]
Şehlem Kaçar. (a.g.e), s. 100.
[11]
Burcu Yener, Türk Basınında Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Hatay Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, 2019), s. 48.
[12]
Muhammed Cihad Kubat. A Godly Progressive Nation, s. 83.
[13]
İrfan Tunç, Kore Savaşı’nda Kunuri Muharebelerinin Askerî Harekât Prensipleri Açısından Değerlendirilmesi (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Millî Savunma Üniversitesi, Alparslan Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Harp Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı, 2019), s. 87.
[14]
Muhammed Cihad Kubat. A Godly Progressive Nation, s. 81.
[15]
Alper İşçimen, Kore Savaşı’na Gönderilen İlk Birliklerin Türkiye’deki Lojistik Tertiplenmeleri (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Millî Savunma Üniversitesi, Alparslan Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Harp Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı, 2021), s. 40.
[16]
İrfan Tunç. (a.g.e), s. 52.
[17]
Savaşın bitiminden sonra resmi verilere göre toplam şehit sayısını ve isimlerini öğrenmek için bkz. (Mehmet Savcı, Kore Savaşına Katılan Türk Birlikleri (Doktora Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 2018), s. 222-252). Ayrıca bkz. (Burçin Erlevent, 1950-1953 Kore Savaşında Esir Kamplarındaki Türkler (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 2014), s. 211-215).
[18]
Şehlem Kaçar. (a.g.e), s. 154.
[19]
Meltem Demir, İstanbul’da Yaşayan Kore Savaşı Gazileri Üzerine Sözlü Tarih Çalışması (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi, Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Türk Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Cumhuriyet Tarihi Bilim Dalı, 2018), s. 245.
[20]
Şehlem Kaçar. (a.g.e), s. 148.
[21]
Burçin Erlevent, 1950-1953 Kore Savaşında Esir Kamplarındaki Türkler (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 2014), s.221.
[22]
Burçin Erlevent. (a.g.e), s. 222.
[23]
Nihat Erdem, Kore Savaşı’nda Türklerin Açtığı Bir Okul: Ankara Okulu ve Yetimhanesi (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, 2022), s. 123.
[24]
Nihat Erdem. (a.g.e), s. 124.
[25]
Şehlem Kaçar. (a.g.e), s. 210.
[26]
Ulviye Ulviya Mammadova. (a.g.e), s. 113.
[27]
Ulviye Ulviya Mammadova. (a.g.e), s. 114.
International Background of the Korean War
Global Power Balance After the Second World War
Division and Political Structure of the Korean Peninsula
The Outbreak of War: 25 June 1950
The Significance of the Korean War in the Context of the Cold War
Beginning and Development of the War (1950–1953)
North Korea’s Invasion of the South and the Fall of Seoul
The United Nations’ Intervention Decision
China’s Entry into the War and Turning Points
Front Line Before Panmunjom and the Static War Period
Panmunjom Talks and the Armistice Agreement (27 July 1953)
Türkiye’s Participation in the Korean War
Türkiye’s Decision-Making Process in the Context of Foreign Policy
The Government’s Decision and Domestic Political Implications
Reactions of the Turkish Public and Press
Formation, Training, and Deployment Preparations of the Turkish Brigade
Battles and Missions of the Turkish Brigade
First Turkish Brigade: Battles of Kunuri, Wawon, and Kumyangjang-Ni
Second and Third Brigades: Defense and Offensive Missions
Evaluation of the Turkish Brigade Under United Nations Command
Post-Battle Missions and Türkiye’s Final Military Presence (1953–1971)
Prisoners of War and Captivity in Camps
Living Conditions in Prisoner Camps
Psychological Warfare, Propaganda, and Interrogations
Prisoner Exchange and Return to Türkiye
Consequences and Effects of the Korean War for Türkiye
NATO Membership and Integration with the Western Bloc
Military Experience and Effects on the Turkish Armed Forces
Society, Public Opinion, and the Position of Korean Veterans
A Cultural Symbol of Friendship: Ayla
Diplomatic Gains and Türkiye–Korea Relations
Global Consequences and Legacy of the Korean War
Cold War Dynamics and the Sharpening of Military Blocs
The United Nations, International Law, and the Legal Dimension of the War
Political and Social Legacies of the Korean War on the Korean Peninsula
The Place of the Korean War in Collective Memory and Commemorative Practices
