Nicolás Maduro Moros (born 23 November 1962, Caracas) is a Venezuelan politician and trade union leader who served as President of Venezuela from 2013 until his removal from office in January 2026 following a military intervention. Prior to his presidency, he held the positions of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the Republic.

Early Life and Family Origins

Nicolás Maduro Moros was born on 23 November 1962 in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, into a working-class family. His father, Nicolás Maduro García, was a prominent trade union leader; his mother was Teresa de Jesús Moros. While official government records list his place of birth as the Los Chaguaramos neighborhood of Caracas, political opponents and certain media outlets have claimed he was born in Colombia, a claim Maduro has consistently denied.^【1】

During his youth, he attended José Ávalos High School in Caracas, where he began his political activism as president of the student union. Although he did not complete his secondary education, he became known for his effective public speaking. Raised as a Roman Catholic, Maduro was an avid rock music fan and baseball player in his youth; it is reported that he declined a professional contract offer from a Major League Baseball scout.^【2】

Professional Career and Union Activities

Maduro’s professional career is regarded as a defining starting point on his path to the presidency. He worked as a bus driver and later as a conductor for the Caracas Metro.^【3】 This experience in the transportation sector transformed him into a direct actor in trade union organization.

Within union activities, he rose beyond mere membership. He played an active role in organizing efforts among metro and transportation workers, eventually becoming union president. He subsequently advanced to the level of the institution’s board of directors. His early adult union work made him a more visible public figure and established him as a “regulator” and “organizer.”

During this period, he also established direct contact with political circles. At the age of 21, he served as a bodyguard for the left-leaning national politician José Vicente Rangel.^【4】 Rangel’s later appointment as Foreign Minister is cited as an early example of Maduro’s integration into political circles.

Relationship with Hugo Chávez and Political Trajectory

Maduro’s political trajectory was largely shaped by the institutionalization of the “Bolivarian” movement centered around Hugo Chávez. Chávez’s imprisonment following his failed 1992 coup attempt marked a decisive turning point in Maduro’s politicization. During this period, Maduro played an active role in campaigns demanding Chávez’s release.

Maduro’s first direct contact with Chávez occurred in 1994.^【5】 By this time, Maduro had developed a political stance closely aligned with Chávez’s socialist and populist approach. After Chávez’s 1998 presidential victory, Maduro assumed more visible roles within the movement’s institutional structures.

Maduro was part of Chávez’s original Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200 (MBR-200) and participated in the party-building processes of subsequent political organizations supporting Chávez.^【6】 This framework demonstrates Maduro’s positioning within the continuity of the “Chavista” political line and his rise through its institutional framework.

Institutional Roles and Rise to Power

Maduro’s ascent within state institutions paralleled the constitutional and political reorganization processes after 1999. In 1999, he joined the Constituent National Assembly, convened to draft a new constitution, and served on various committees.^【7】 This period marked his direct entry into the state machinery.

In 2000, he was elected to Venezuela’s legislative body, the National Assembly. He gradually assumed a more central position within legislative activities and served as President of the National Assembly from 2005 to 2006.^【8】 This role solidified his status as a trusted figure within the ruling bloc.

From 2006 to 2013, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs.^【9】 During this period, foreign policy was pursued through the establishment of regional and global networks supported by oil revenues; Maduro became one of the most visible faces of Venezuela’s international engagements.

On 12 October 2012, Chávez appointed him Vice President of the Republic.^【10】 On 9 December 2012, Chávez, during his cancer treatment, publicly designated Maduro as his political successor. These developments established the institutional framework for Maduro’s succession.

Presidency

Following Chávez’s death on 5 March 2013, Maduro took the oath of office as interim president on 8 March 2013.^【11】 He then won the presidential election held on 14 April 2013 by a margin of less than two percentage points.^【12】 After the election, the opposition called for a recount; on 17 April 2013, a judicial ruling declared a manual recount unconstitutional.^【13】 Maduro was officially sworn in on 19 April 2013.^【14】

After 2013, the Maduro administration continued to operate under the claim of preserving the “Bolivarian” political framework established under Chávez. Domestic politics were marked by tensions with the opposition, street protests, and institutional disputes over authority. In 2014, nationwide protests erupted; the government framed these as organized internal and external attempts to destabilize the state.^【15】 Criticisms regarding human rights and security practices also became prominent during this period.

In 2016, the government declared an economic state of emergency, followed by an constitutional state of emergency.^【16】 That same year, after a two-year hiatus, talks with the political opposition were attempted. In 2017, the government initiated the process of creating a new Constituent Assembly, which redefined executive powers and reshaped the balance of legislative authority; this deepened the institutional divide between government and opposition.

Maduro declared victory in the 2018 elections and was sworn in on 10 January 2019.^【17】 Following this inauguration, several member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) refused to recognize the legitimacy of Maduro’s government. On 23 January 2019, the President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself interim president, intensifying the “dual legitimacy” crisis.^【18】

After the 2024 election, Maduro again declared victory; the scope of the official results, the election records, institutional stances, and responses to protests became central to debates over his third term.^【19】 This process strengthened the political discourse leading into his third term, which began in January 2025.

The 2024 Election and Debates Over a Third Term

Maduro’s 2024 electoral process evolved into a broader political crisis extending beyond voting and candidate nomination to include post-election records, institutional statements, protests, and arrest procedures.^【20】 Maduro declared victory; in response, the opposition contested the results and published its own vote tally data. Disputes over the details of the official results and election records recentered the debate on legitimacy.

The suppression of post-election protests and the arrest and detention processes strengthened the security dimension of the third-term debate. This phase entered a new stage when Maduro was sworn in for his third term in January 2025.^【21】 Thus, the period of rule that began in 2013 was redefined in terms of “institutional legitimacy” and “international recognition.”

Economic Crisis and Social Impact

One of the most defining features of Maduro’s tenure has been the prolonged economic contraction and its social consequences. The crisis became evident through weaknesses in production diversity, increased state control, shrinking private sector activity, disruptions in foreign exchange and price stability, and persistent shortages of basic goods and services.

During this period, the country experienced hyperinflation, chronic shortages, and supply disruptions. Access to food, medicine, and public services became a recurring national priority. The scale of the economic collapse was also discussed in light of Venezuela’s transformation from one of the region’s largest economies to a significantly smaller one.

The most extensive social impact has been mass migration. Migration accelerated throughout the 2010s and reached millions by the 2020s; approximately 8 million people left the country.^【22】 This movement affected labor markets, public services, and family structures within Venezuela, as well as social integration, undocumented populations, and humanitarian capacity in neighboring countries.

Security, Assassination Attempts, and Internal Tensions

During Maduro’s tenure, internal tensions became more visible through security-related incidents, particularly during periods of intensified protests. In 2014 and 2017, large-scale street demonstrations occurred, accompanied by casualties and widespread arrests and detentions.^【23】 The government interpreted these waves as revolutionary attempts or externally supported destabilization campaigns.

One of the most prominent security events was the drone attacks during a military parade on 4 August 2018.^【24】 The incident was labeled an “assassination attempt”; it was confirmed that Maduro was unharmed.^【25】 The following day, arrests and investigations linked to the attack dominated public discourse.

In 2019, discussions emerged around an opposition-led uprising and attempt to overthrow the government; the Maduro administration maintained de facto control through state institutions and security forces.^【26】 This period brought greater attention to the role of the military, police, intelligence agencies, and paramilitary groups in political crises.

Relations with Türkiye

Maduro’s relations with Türkiye have been shaped by both diplomatic protocol visits and political positioning during international crises. During the 2019 government crisis, while some countries recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president, Türkiye, alongside Russia and China, recognized Maduro as Venezuela’s elected president.

Maduro’s visits to Türkiye and participation in ceremonial events stand out. In July 2018, he attended the inauguration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.^【27】 He visited Türkiye on 8 June 2022 and again in June 2023 for Erdoğan’s swearing-in ceremony following his re-election.^【28】 These engagements reflect a diplomatic thread in which Türkiye assumed a distinctive role within Venezuela’s foreign policy orientation.

Relations with the United States, Sanctions, and Accusations

Relations between Maduro and the United States progressed through diplomatic crises, sanctions, and criminal investigations. In 2013, Maduro expelled three U.S. diplomats in a televised statement, an early sign of rising tensions in diplomatic relations.^【29】

Shortly after the 2017 Constituent Assembly elections, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Maduro, prohibiting U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transactions with him.^【30】 In 2018, the sanctions list expanded to include Maduro’s wife and close associates.^【31】

A judicial turning point in the U.S. occurred in March 2020, when the Southern District of New York filed charges against Maduro for alleged involvement in a conspiracy related to narcoterrorism and cocaine trafficking, as well as conspiracy to possess automatic weapons and “destructive devices.”^【32】 In this framework, Maduro was linked to leadership of the “Cartel de los Soles” (Sun Cartel); allegations included ties to FARC, drug shipments, and arms procurement.^【33】

The U.S. State Department’s Narcotics Rewards Program established a reward mechanism for information leading to Maduro’s capture or conviction. The reward began at $15 million in 2020; it increased to $25 million on 10 January 2025, and reached a maximum of $50 million on 7 August 2025.^【34】 In the same period, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the “Cartel de los Soles” as a “Global Terrorist” entity on 25 July 2025.^【35】

In December 2025, a telephone conversation between Trump and Maduro made headlines.^【36】 In January 2026, following a special forces operation coinciding with attacks on Caracas, Maduro and Cilia Flores were detained and transferred to the United States, becoming subjects of a judicial process in New York. Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice appointed Delcy Rodríguez as interim president at this stage.^【37】

2026: Military Intervention, Detention, and Removal from Office

General Framework and Timeline

In January 2026, Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were detained and transferred to the United States following a special forces operation conducted simultaneously with aerial attacks on Venezuela’s capital, Caracas.^【38】 The operation culminated in a nighttime raid on Maduro’s residence; during this period, Caracas experienced a power outage, and aerial attacks were described as serving to “mask” the extraction team.^【39】

Execution of the Operation: Raid Time, Power Outage, and Arrest

The operation began at 02:01 local time, during which Caracas lost power; the method used to cause the outage remains unclear.^【40】 Accounts state that Maduro attempted to enter a steel-reinforced safe room but was apprehended before he could close the door, marking a critical moment in the operation.^【41】

Elements and Logistics: Delta Force, Air Assets, and Transport Route

The operation involved the U.S. Delta Force unit; Maduro’s location was tracked via an intelligence source within Venezuela’s state apparatus; over 150 aircraft were reportedly used to transport the extraction team into the capital.^【42】 Maduro and Flores were first taken to the USS Iwo Jima, then flown to Stewart Air National Guard Base in New York State, and subsequently transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn.^【43】

Aerial Attacks Around Caracas and Targeted Locations

Aerial attacks conducted in parallel with the raid and extraction were described as providing “cover.” The five targeted locations included: La Carlota Air Base, also known as Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base; Fuerte Tiuna, a major military installation in Caracas; La Guaira Port, Caracas’s primary access to the Caribbean Sea; Higuerote Airport in eastern Caracas; and the “Antenas El Volcan” telecommunications towers.^【44】

U.S. Administration’s Political Framework: Temporary Control, Possibility of a Second Attack, and Oil Infrastructure

Following the operation, U.S. President Donald Trump stated his intent to govern Venezuela until a “safe, appropriate, and cautious transition” occurred, emphasizing a “group” that would lead the interim administration.^【45】 He also kept open the option of a new military strike and indicated that U.S. oil companies would be deployed to “repair” and “economically operate” infrastructure.^【46】

Judicial Process in the United States: Indictment and Charges

The U.S. justice system filed an indictment against Maduro and Flores in the Southern District of New York, charging them with conspiracy related to narcoterrorism and cocaine trafficking, as well as conspiracy to possess automatic weapons and “destructive devices.”^【47】 These charges marked the transition of Maduro’s previously alleged involvement in drug trafficking and armed group ties into an active judicial phase in 2026.

Drug Trafficking Allegations and “Terrorist Organization” Designation Debates

The U.S. designated the Tren de Aragua and Cartel de los Soles as “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs), asserting that Maduro led the Cartel de los Soles.^【48】 In response, Maduro denied the cartel leadership claim and argued that the “fight against drugs” narrative was used to remove him from power and justify access to Venezuela’s oil resources. It was also reported that in recent months, over two dozen naval attacks were carried out against vessels suspected of drug trafficking in international waters, resulting in over 100 deaths; this reinforced the security rationale for the intervention.^【49】

Venezuelan Domestic Law and Administrative Arrangements: The Interim Presidency Issue

Immediately after the operation, Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice appointed Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president.^【50】 Rodríguez subsequently appeared on state television, calling for Maduro’s release and referring to him as the “sole president.”^【51】 In the U.S., Marco Rubio met with Rodríguez; Trump reportedly assessed that Rodríguez would comply with U.S. demands.^【52】 This situation created a power vacuum and authority dispute, as “de facto force” and “temporary legal authorization” operated simultaneously in early 2026.

Opposition Front and Election Connection: The González and Machado Axis

Opposition leader María Corina Machado called for Edmundo González to assume the presidency, noting her support for González in the 2024 elections; opposition-published vote tally data suggested González had won by a clear margin.^【53】 Trump, however, stated he had not met with Machado and assessed that she lacked sufficient social support and legitimacy to lead Venezuela.^【54】 These contrasting positions highlighted a multi-layered debate within the opposition over who should be recognized as the legitimate authority after the 2026 intervention.

Oil Dimension: Reserve Characteristics, Refinery Suitability, and Infrastructure Narrative

Venezuela’s proven oil reserves were emphasized, alongside the fact that its oil is “heavy and high-sulfur,” making refining more difficult, though suitable for diesel and asphalt production; in contrast, the U.S. primarily produces “light and low-sulfur” oil.^【55】 This technical context explained why post-intervention discourse on oil infrastructure—repair, operation, and revenue generation—became a strategic priority.

International Reactions and Geopolitics: Allies, Regional Countries, and Multilateral Institutions

After the intervention, Russia labeled the U.S. action as “armed aggression”; China strongly condemned the use of force against a sovereign state; Iran denounced it as an “open violation of national sovereignty.”^【56】 In Latin America, countries including Colombia and Brazil condemned the action; Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel called it a “criminal attack”; Colombian President Gustavo Petro emphasized it as an “attack on sovereignty.”^【57】 Argentine President Javier Milei shared messages of support centered on “freedom.”^【58】 United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern, warning of a “dangerous precedent”; UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated he would not mourn the end of Maduro’s rule and would coordinate with the U.S. on the developments; EU foreign policy representative Kaja Kallas continued to criticize Maduro’s legitimacy while insisting on the protection of international law principles.^【59】

Timing and External Contacts: China’s Representative Visit and Communication Channels

The intervention occurred hours after the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Special Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean, Chiu Shiao-chi, to Caracas; during this visit, Maduro had discussed bilateral cooperation with Venezuelan officials. It was reported that Maduro’s visibility on certain social media platforms declined before the intervention, and his last Telegram post featured images from Chiu’s visit.^【60】 These details established that the 2026 military intervention occurred within a timing framework shaped not only by Venezuela’s internal politics but also by great power competition and external diplomatic schedules.

Visual and Symbolic Elements: The USS Iwo Jima Photograph

After the operation, Trump shared on social media a photograph of Maduro aboard the USS Iwo Jima; the image showed Maduro with his eyes covered and holding a bottle of water.^【61】 This posting was recorded as evidence that the 2026 intervention carried not only a judicial dimension but also a deliberate political messaging component aimed at the public.