Sudan Civil War (2023–)

Sudan Civil War (2023–) is an armed conflict that began on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), resulting in widespread destruction across the country and a major humanitarian crisis. The conflict erupted with attacks by RSF units on military installations in the capital Khartoum and quickly spread to Darfur Kordofan the Nile Valley and Al-Jazirah states.

The warring parties are composed of armed groups led by Abdulfettah el-Burhan Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti Commander of the Rapid Support Forces. Disputes over power sharing military hierarchy and security reforms have escalated into a comprehensive civil war affecting the entire country.

The deepening of the war was shaped by the power vacuum that emerged during the transitional administration established after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019. Although the army under Burhan and the RSF under Dagalo operated within the same administration they drew support from different interest groups leading to a dual-headed military structure in Sudan. Burhan advocated for the integration of the RSF into the regular army while Dagalo insisted on preserving his force’s independence. These conflicting objectives rapidly plunged the country into a devastating civil war.

The Sudan Civil War is also described as a process that has brought to the surface the country’s historical ethnic and economic fractures. The conflict has reignited allegations of ethnic cleansing and mass executions particularly in western regions such as Darfur leading to the displacement of millions of civilians and forcing thousands to seek refuge in neighboring countries.

Origins and Course of the War

The immediate cause of the Sudan Civil War that erupted in 2023 was the escalation of a long-standing authority dispute between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into an armed crisis. This crisis is linked to the military-civilian balance debates initiated during the transitional administration formed after the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019. Abdulfettah el-Burhan President of the Sovereignty Council and Chief of Staff demanded the RSF’s integration into the regular army and its subordination to the military hierarchy while RSF Commander Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti insisted on maintaining his organization’s autonomous status.

This disagreement turned into open armed conflict on the morning of 15 April 2023 when RSF units attacked SAF military facilities in Khartoum. The incident triggered intense fighting in the capital and within days key sites including the airport presidential palace and radio and television buildings became battlegrounds. In the initial days the army targeted RSF positions with air power while the RSF responded in urban areas with tanks and heavy weapons. This dynamic rapidly transformed Khartoum into a humanitarian crisis zone.

In the first weeks following the outbreak of fighting the cities of Khartoum Omdurman and Bahri were subjected to intense bombardment and civilian infrastructure was largely destroyed. Electricity water and communication systems collapsed and thousands of buildings were rendered unusable. According to United Nations (UN) data by the end of 2023 over 13 000 people had lost their lives 6 million were displaced within the country and more than 2 million had fled to neighboring states.

After losing control of the capital the Sudanese army shifted the main focus of the war to Al-Jazirah State in central Sudan. The RSF on the other hand largely seized control of the Darfur region in the west. Throughout 2024 the RSF’s area of control expanded to encompass all of South West Central and East Darfur states as well as parts of Kordofan and Sennar regions. In contrast the Sudanese army managed to retain its presence only in the city of Fasher the administrative center of North Darfur.

By late 2024 Fasher intensified as a critical target for both the army and the RSF due to its strategic location. Fasher serves not only as the administrative hub of Darfur but also plays a vital role in humanitarian aid delivery through its airport and military bases. The RSF’s siege of Fasher beginning in May 2024 further worsened the humanitarian dimension of the war. During the siege food and medicine shortages emerged and clean water sources were destroyed. According to UN reports over 260 000 civilians including 130 000 children faced risks of starvation and disease within the city.

As of 2025 the war has extended beyond the capital and Darfur axis to include eastern and southern regions of the country. The capital of Al-Jazirah State Wad Medani was recaptured by the army in December 2024 an event regarded as a critical turning point in the conflict’s trajectory. However despite the Sudanese army’s advances the RSF’s continued dominance in western regions has prevented the war from ending.

Between 2023 and 2025 the civil war in Sudan has generated the largest wave of displacement and humanitarian destruction in the country’s history. Agricultural lands industrial facilities and public buildings have been destroyed and the country’s production capacity has nearly collapsed. Nearly ten million people have been forced to abandon their homes and millions of children have been deprived of education. The war has become not merely a struggle between military forces but a catastrophe that has deeply shattered Sudan’s social fabric.

Darfur and Fasher Crisis

The most severe destruction of the Sudan Civil War has occurred in the western region of Darfur. Historically marked by intense ethnic economic and environmental tensions Darfur has reverted into a large-scale violence zone since the war began in 2023. This has triggered a new humanitarian disaster on a scale reminiscent of the Darfur War between 2003 and 2020. The region is strategically significant for both the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as it controls land routes to Chad Libya and the Central African Republic.

RSF Advance in Darfur

From the second half of 2023 the RSF seized control of all four Darfur states – South Darfur West Darfur Central Darfur and East Darfur. The weakness of army units in the region facilitated the RSF’s rapid advance. By the end of 2024 the RSF had taken control of all major settlements in the region except Fasher the administrative center of North Darfur. Fasher’s survival has been viewed as the last stronghold of the Sudanese army in the region. The city also holds strategic and symbolic importance as the only remaining hub for humanitarian aid delivery.

Fasher was fully besieged by the RSF in May 2024. The siege has paralyzed living conditions in the region rendering access to food water and medicine nearly impossible. Most of the civilian population remaining in the city has resorted to feeding on animal feed and wild plants while hospitals and aid centers have become targets. The United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have reported that thousands of civilians have died in the city due to starvation dehydration and disease. In October 2025 WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus expressed shock over reports that over 460 patients and caregivers had been killed at the Saudi Hospital.

Massacre Allegations and International Reactions

Events during the siege of Fasher have triggered international allegations of “massacre” and “ethnic cleansing.” RSF members have killed numerous civilians and executed some through torture. Humanitarian organizations operating in the region have stated that targeting civilians constitutes war crimes.

The Humanitarian Research Laboratory (HRL) at Yale University’s School of Public Health in an October 2025 satellite analysis report revealed evidence indicating that the RSF carried out “mass executions” in Fasher. Satellite imagery showed bodies piled in streets in areas previously unoccupied. These findings demonstrate that the war in Darfur includes systematic violence against civilians.

Following these events the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye issued a statement on 28 October 2025 condemning the atrocities committed against civilians in Fasher “in the strongest terms.” The statement affirmed Türkiye’s continued support for Sudan’s unity territorial integrity and sovereignty and called for the immediate cessation of attacks on civilians and the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid. During the same period the European Union (EU) warned that the violence in Fasher could further worsen a dire humanitarian situation and urged all parties to comply with international humanitarian law.

Scale of the Humanitarian Catastrophe

The events in Fasher and its surroundings have become emblematic of Sudan’s broader humanitarian crisis. A 29 October 2025 statement by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) revealed that two out of every three Sudanese require humanitarian assistance approximately 12 million people have been displaced and over 4 million have fled to neighboring countries. The same report noted that women and children are facing horrific conditions including sexual violence and cholera outbreaks and that Fasher has entered its most desperate phase after 500 days of siege.

During this period UN officials reported that 26 000 people had fled Fasher in two days and that approximately 260 000 civilians remaining in the city were at risk of death. Aid organizations have called for the lifting of the siege and the opening of humanitarian corridors. However the RSF has denied access to food and aid shipments and the resulting starvation disease and dehydration have rapidly led to mass fatalities.

Prospect of a New Darfur Crisis

Developments in Fasher have raised fears of a “second cycle of genocide” in Darfur. Allegations of ethnic cleansing have resurfaced in areas of intensified fighting with particular targeting of the Fur Masalit and Zaghawa communities. If the Sudan conflict acquires an ethnic character the region may be dragged into a humanitarian tragedy similar to the 2003 Darfur crisis.

Deepening Humanitarian Situation

The most defining feature of the Sudan Civil War is the unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe it has created across the country. Since 2023 escalating violence has eliminated civilian safety dismantled essential services and placed Sudan among the worst humanitarian crises in modern history. The scale reached after more than two years of war is measured not only in lives lost but also in multidimensional societal collapse involving famine disease displacement and poverty.

Displacement and Refugee Crisis

According to United Nations (UN) data since the fighting began in April 2023 over 8 million people have been displaced within Sudan and more than 4 million have fled to neighboring countries. Approximately two-thirds of Sudan’s population has been directly or indirectly affected by the war. Neighboring countries Chad South Sudan Egypt the Central African Republic and Ethiopia have begun hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees. Camps near the Chad border have once again filled with hundreds of thousands of people resembling the situation during the 2003 Darfur War.

This wave of displacement has meant not only the loss of homes but also the collapse of agricultural production and livelihoods. The destruction of farmland and disruption of food supply chains have accelerated the spread of hunger in rural areas. Combined with drought desertification and climate change the war conditions have permanently entrenched food insecurity in Darfur Kordofan and the Nile Valley states.

Food Insecurity and Famine

A 29 October 2025 statement by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) described Sudan’s humanitarian situation as “catastrophic.” According to the report two out of every three Sudanese require humanitarian assistance. Since the outbreak of fighting 12 million people have left their homes and over 4 million have fled abroad. Nearly half the population faces food insecurity and millions of children are malnourished due to shortages.

In particular in Darfur and Al-Jazirah agricultural production has completely halted due to the war. Food prices have risen more than tenfold and the national economy has entered a hyperinflationary spiral. These conditions have transformed hunger and poverty from temporary hardships into structural crises.

Health Crisis and Epidemics

One of the war’s most severe impacts has been the collapse of the health system. Approximately 70 percent of hospitals nationwide have become non-functional and a large portion of medical personnel have fled conflict zones. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported 185 attacks on health facilities between 2023 and 2025 resulting in over 1 200 deaths among health workers and patients. The attack on the Saudi Hospital in Darfur which killed over 460 patients and caregivers exposed the war’s targeting of medical infrastructure.

The WHO also reported the spread of cholera across the country and a rapid increase in infectious diseases due to the destruction of clean water sources. This has led to high mortality rates especially among children and the elderly. The collapse of the health system has rendered not only the treatment of war injuries but also maternal care vaccinations and basic medical services impossible.

Impact on Women and Children

The civil war in Sudan has created a multidimensional trauma zone for women and children. According to IASC and UN reports women and girls have been widely subjected to sexual violence with cases of forced marriage and human trafficking increasing. With the collapse of the education system 6.5 million children have been forced to drop out of school over half of whom are girls.

Children have suffered severe physical and psychological trauma during the war with reports indicating that some have been forcibly recruited by armed groups. UNICEF has described the war’s impact on children as “a generational devastation.” Women are struggling to survive under conditions of inadequate shelter healthcare and security facing both domestic violence and harsh conditions in camps.

Economic Collapse and Social Fragmentation

The war has destroyed the entire economic system of the country. Agricultural production has halted while industrial facilities and infrastructure have been largely destroyed. The Sudanese pound has lost over 900 percent of its value and inflation has exceeded 130 percent as of 2025. During this period poverty rates have surpassed 80 percent and unemployment has risen above 45 percent.

The economic collapse has triggered the disintegration of social structures. Social trust has declined and ethnic and tribal divisions have become defining again. Particularly in Darfur and Kordofan armed clashes between ethnic groups have triggered new waves of local violence. This has led to the collapse of social cohesion mechanisms nationwide.

Role of Regional and International Actors

Since its inception the Sudan Civil War has become not merely a national crisis but a geopolitical battleground where regional and global powers’ competing interests intersect. Sudan’s strategic location on the Red Sea its natural resource wealth and its role as a bridge between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East have placed it at the center of international competition. Key regional and global actors directly influencing the war’s trajectory include the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Egypt Chad South Sudan Ethiopia the Central African Republic Saudi Arabia the United States Russia and Iran.

Egypt

Egypt views Sudan as a fundamental pillar of its national security. In the context of Nile River water management and the construction of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) instability in Sudan is considered a strategic risk by Cairo. The Egyptian government has supported the Sudanese army under Burhan fearing that the strengthening of the RSF could disrupt regional balances. Egypt has emphasized that stability in Sudan is vital for its own agricultural production and water supply and has therefore maintained diplomatic and military cooperation with the Khartoum administration.

Chad and the Central African Republic

Chad which shares a western border with Sudan has faced refugee influxes and border security challenges since the first days of the war. The RSF’s ethnic ties in Darfur pose a risk to Chad’s internal stability. The Sudanese army has accused the UAE of using Chad as a conduit for arms shipments to the RSF. At the same time it has been alleged that militia groups from Chad have crossed into western Sudan to join the fighting.

The Central African Republic has also been affected by cross-border movements and militia activity. The RSF’s use of this region as a transit point for weapons and mercenaries has increased the regional security risks of the conflict.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a country that has had border disputes with both South Sudan and Sudan. The ongoing dispute over the El-Fashaga region on Sudan’s eastern border has deepened tensions between the two countries. Additionally the civil war in Sudan poses a threat to Ethiopia in terms of refugee flows and regional instability. Nevertheless the Addis Ababa administration has advocated for a neutral resolution of the conflict and supported peace talks under the African Union framework.

South Sudan

South Sudan which gained independence from Sudan in 2011 relies on oil revenues transported through pipelines running through Khartoum. Therefore the civil war in Sudan directly threatens South Sudan’s economy. The halt in oil exports has triggered an economic collapse and fuel shortages in South Sudan. Additionally thousands of South Sudanese who were forced to return due to the conflict in Sudan have weakened the country’s internal stability.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

One of the most influential external actors affecting the course of the war is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE has drawn international attention over allegations of providing military and financial support to the RSF. In 2024 the Sudanese government formally accused the UAE of planning the war facilitating arms shipments to rebels via Chad and supporting the RSF. These allegations were brought before the UN Security Council.

Nevertheless as of 2025 the UAE has supported Türkiye’s peace efforts and endorsed Ankara’s mediation role in Sudan’s peace initiatives.

Saudi Arabia and the United States

Saudi Arabia and the United States convened the warring parties in Jeddah in mid-2023 for peace talks. However ceasefire efforts quickly failed. Saudi Arabia views regional stability as vital to Red Sea security while the United States has labeled the conflict in Sudan a “humanitarian catastrophe.” The Washington administration has imposed sanctions on both Burhan and Dagalo and called on all parties to comply with international law. Nevertheless the United States’ policy toward Sudan has remained limited within the context of its broader African geopolitical priorities.

Russia and Iran

Two significant actors providing direct support to the Sudanese army are Russia and Iran. Russia has pursued a plan since 2017 to establish a military base on the Red Sea coast at the Flamingo Naval Base and has strengthened its influence during the civil war. Russia is reported to have provided arms and security equipment to Sudan and established economic ties with the RSF through gold mining.

Iran has reentered the Sudanese arena after a long absence by supporting the army through the supply of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This move is viewed as part of Iran’s strategy to reestablish itself as an influential actor in the region.

International Institutions: UN AU and IGAD

The United Nations (UN) the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have launched various peace initiatives since 2023. UN-led ceasefire appeals have frequently been violated and the AU’s peace plan has remained unimplemented due to mistrust between the parties. No lasting solution has been achieved under IGAD-led negotiations.

In this context international institutions have proven insufficient in pressuring the warring parties and have faced serious obstacles in delivering humanitarian aid. According to UN statements as of 2025 only 37 percent of humanitarian funding for Sudan has been secured contributing to the deepening of the crisis.

Türkiye’s Role and Mediation Efforts in Sudan

Since 2024 Türkiye has actively pursued mediation and diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring peace and stability in Sudan. Türkiye’s approach in this process is grounded in historical ties and its growing diplomatic engagement in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Ankara’s success in mediating the Ethiopia-Somali dispute paved the way for a similar role in the Sudan crisis.

Türkiye’s Historical and Diplomatic Ties with Sudan

Relations between Türkiye and Sudan have continued since Sudan’s independence in 1956. Historical ties extending to the Ottoman era have created a strong foundation for cultural and economic relations. In the 2000s Türkiye’s Africa outreach policy rapidly expanded ties with Khartoum and Sudan became one of Türkiye’s top investment destinations in Africa. Ankara was among the first Muslim countries to open an embassy in Khartoum and built a positive public image through humanitarian aid activities.

This historical and social closeness has positioned Türkiye as a “trusted third party” in the eyes of Sudanese stakeholders.

Beginning of Türkiye’s Mediation Efforts

Türkiye’s mediation role in the Sudan Civil War gained concrete momentum in the final months of 2024. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 13 December 2024 informed Sudanese Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdulfettah el-Burhan in a phone call that Türkiye was ready to mediate in easing tensions between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Sudanese side welcomed this proposal and expressed willingness to initiate the process.

Following this conversation Türkiye accelerated its diplomatic efforts by sending Deputy Foreign Minister Burhanettin Duran to Port Sudan. This visit demonstrated Türkiye’s close monitoring of the crisis and its direct engagement on the ground. Duran’s meetings were conducted with both Burhan’s administration and UAE representatives aiming to encourage confidence-building measures.

Türkiye’s Mediation Strategy and Diplomacy

Türkiye’s approach to the peace process in Sudan has been shaped around humanitarian diplomacy neutral mediation and the preservation of regional stability. Türkiye is perceived in the Sudan crisis as possessing three key advantages:

1. Historical trust relationship: The Sudanese people and authorities perceive Türkiye as a non-colonial actor with religious and cultural proximity.
2. Normalized relations with the UAE: Türkiye’s diplomatic rapprochement with the UAE since 2021 has enabled it to act as a bridge between the conflicting parties.
3. Cooperation capacity with the African Union (AU) and IGAD: Türkiye’s multilateral diplomacy strategy positions it to contribute effectively to peace processes.

Türkiye’s diplomatic initiatives in Sudan have not only sought to convince the parties to agree to a ceasefire but have also focused on ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. Since the war began in April 2023 Türkiye has delivered food medicine and medical supplies to Sudan through the Turkish Red Crescent and AFAD. These aid deliveries have been distributed via Port Sudan and Kassala making Türkiye a significant actor in humanitarian diplomacy on the ground.

Change in the UAE’s Stance and Türkiye’s Influence

A significant outcome of Türkiye’s mediation efforts has been the softening of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) position. Accused of providing military support to the RSF during 2023–2024 the UAE in early 2025 announced its support for Türkiye’s peace process citing international pressure and the regional risks of prolonged conflict. This development has been regarded as a critical shift in regional balances.

Regional Significance of Türkiye’s Role

Türkiye’s initiatives in Sudan contribute not only to internal peace but also hold strategic importance for Red Sea security Eastern African stability and Horn of Africa balances. Türkiye is recognized as a trusted diplomatic actor on the continent and this status enables Ankara to play an active role in peace processes across the Ethiopia-Somalia-Sudan triangle.

Ending the civil war in Sudan aligns with Türkiye’s comprehensive goals for its Africa policy. Ankara’s approach in this process presents a multidimensional model encompassing economic humanitarian and diplomatic components. While contributing to peace in Sudan Türkiye continues to promote a long-term vision of stability development and solidarity-based diplomacy across the continent.

Social and Economic Impacts of the War

The Sudan Civil War that began in 2023 has created lasting social and economic destruction not only in military and political spheres but across all layers of society. More than two years of conflict have directly affected the majority of the population; urban life production activities public services and social cohesion mechanisms have largely collapsed. The war has triggered an unprecedented economic contraction and social disintegration in modern Sudanese history.

Economic Collapse and Loss of Production

Before the war Sudan’s economy relied heavily on agriculture livestock and oil revenues. However with the outbreak of fighting in 2023 all these sectors became non-functional. Agricultural lands in Khartoum Al-Jazirah Darfur and Kordofan states were rendered unusable due to the conflict and damage to water infrastructure disrupted irrigation systems. Production of staple food crops such as wheat sorghum and groundnuts declined by 80 percent.

According to reports by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as of 2025 Sudan’s annual food production has halved compared to pre-war levels. This has caused food prices to rise more than tenfold triggering hyperinflation nationwide. As of 2025 inflation has exceeded 130 percent and the Sudanese pound has lost over 900 percent of its value.

Industrial facilities energy infrastructure and transportation networks have also been severely damaged by the war. Industrial zones in Khartoum and Al-Jazirah have been largely destroyed and railway lines bridges and power plants have become unusable. This has halted domestic trade and disrupted the flow of essential goods. The banking system collapsed during the conflict public sector salaries went unpaid and economic activity became dependent on informal foreign exchange markets.

Disintegration of Social Structure

The war has triggered a severe social fragmentation process in Sudanese society. Long-standing fractures between ethnic tribal and regional identities have deepened under the impact of the conflict. Particularly in Darfur and Kordofan mutual distrust has increased among historically distinct communities such as the Fur Masalit Baggara Arabs and Zaghawa. This has led to the spread of localized armed clashes and the complete weakening of state authority.

Prior to the war Sudanese society sustained itself through strong family bonds and local solidarity networks. However over two years of conflict have dismantled these traditional social structures. The displacement of millions has fractured families and dispersed village and neighborhood communities.

Social Impact on Women and Children

The war in Sudan has caused multidimensional devastation for women and children. According to UN and IASC reports over half of the 12 million displaced persons are women and children. Women have become both direct victims of the war and the primary actors sustaining their families. However widespread sexual violence forced marriage and human trafficking have been reported in camps and conflict zones.

The education system is one of the sectors most affected by the war. According to UNICEF and UNESCO data as of 2024 approximately 6.5 million children have been deprived of education. More than 10 000 schools have closed and many educational institutions have been repurposed as shelters or military headquarters. This has led to assessments of a “lost generation” in Sudan. The collapse of the education system carries the potential to create a long-term human capital shortage for the country’s future reconstruction.

Urbanization Migration and Refugee Dynamics

The war in Sudan has fundamentally altered urbanization patterns. Large cities such as Khartoum Omdurman and Bahri became largely depopulated in the early months of the conflict as a significant portion of the population migrated to eastern cities such as Port Sudan Kassala and Gedaref. Outside the country Egypt Chad and South Sudan have been the primary host countries for refugees.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) approximately 12 million people have been displaced of whom more than 4 million have crossed borders with the remainder seeking temporary shelter in internal camps.

This migration wave has caused overcrowding and infrastructure deficits in urban areas. In cities like Port Sudan water housing and healthcare services have collapsed and epidemics have spread. Simultaneously the influx of population from rural areas into cities has generated new social tensions due to unemployment and housing shortages. This new social structure has deepened long-term social integration challenges in Sudan.

Social Trauma and Psychological Effects

The war has created not only physical but also psychological destruction. UNICEF WHO and international humanitarian organizations have reported that a large proportion of Sudanese children exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to war trauma loss anxiety and exposure to violence. Women have experienced widespread long-term insecurity loss and sexual violence trauma.

The collapse of the health system has eliminated psychosocial support mechanisms. Mental health services are only marginally available in major cities and have completely ceased in rural areas. This situation has created a lasting need for societal rehabilitation in Sudan after the war.

Peace Efforts

Since the Sudan Civil War began in 2023 over two years have passed during which various local regional and international actors have launched multiple peace initiatives and ceasefire appeals. However none of these efforts have produced lasting results due to the structural ethnic and political complexity of the conflict. Mutual distrust external interventions with conflicting agendas and the frequent shifting of battlefield power dynamics have weakened the peace process.

Jeddah Talks

The Jeddah Talks initiated in May 2023 under the mediation of Saudi Arabia and the United States were the first diplomatic initiative to bring the warring parties together. During the Jeddah Talks the parties reached agreement on humanitarian aid delivery and civilian protection but the ceasefire was violated within days. The failure of the talks was driven by the intensification rather than reduction of fighting on the ground and the parties’ mutual violations of international commitments.

Although the Jeddah process was regarded as an important diplomatic effort by the international community the parties’ prioritization of military gains and continued external support prevented the establishment of a lasting ceasefire. During this period the United States imposed sanctions on the parties but these steps did not significantly alter the course of the war.

Neighboring Countries Initiative

Following the failure of the Jeddah talks a new diplomatic platform called the Neighboring Countries Initiative was established in mid-2024. This initiative involved Egypt Ethiopia South Sudan Chad Eritrea and the Central African Republic. Its aim was to mitigate the conflict’s regional security impacts and coordinate cross-border humanitarian aid. However the initiative failed to achieve concrete progress due to the differing foreign policy priorities of participating countries.

The Neighboring Countries Initiative remained a process that raised regional awareness but failed to produce political outcomes. The Sudanese army supported Egypt’s mediation efforts while the RSF remained distant from the process influenced by actors such as Chad and the UAE.

African Union (AU) and IGAD Process

The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have played active roles in seeking multilateral solutions to the Sudan crisis. Since late 2023 the AU has prepared a “Comprehensive Peace Framework for Sudan” but this plan failed to gain acceptance from the parties on the ground. IGAD developed a “prolonged mechanism” throughout 2024 aimed at monitoring ceasefire violations.

Although both organizations received international support their initiatives have stalled due to the sharply divergent demands of the parties. The RSF demands greater political representation while the Sudanese army insists on reestablishing military hierarchy and integrating the RSF into the regular army. This has made security reform the most critical impasse in the peace process.

Türkiye’s Contribution and Ankara Process

From late 2024 Türkiye’s diplomatic efforts marked a new phase in the peace process. Ankara’s mediation initiatives aimed to build trust among the parties following the Jeddah and IGAD processes.

Türkiye’s contacts in Port Sudan and Deputy Foreign Minister Burhanettin Duran’s visit in December 2024 were the most important steps in making the process tangible. Türkiye expanded the scope for a multilateral solution by engaging in dialogue with both the Sudanese army and regional actors supporting the RSF.

The Ankara Process gained prominence on the international diplomatic agenda in early 2025. Türkiye’s neutral stance was accepted by both the Sudanese administration and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) making Türkiye a trusted third party in peace negotiations. Ankara’s proposed model has advanced along the axis of “temporary ceasefire humanitarian corridors confidence-building measures.”

Obstacles to Lasting Peace

The main obstacles to peace are mutual distrust continued external interventions and the depth of social polarization. The Sudanese army and the RSF each label the other as an “illegitimate actor” hindering progress at the negotiation table. Furthermore the ethnic dimension of the war complicates the reestablishment of social peace.

The deepening economic collapse and humanitarian crisis also make it harder for peace to gain public support. The insufficiency of international financial aid indicates that Sudan’s reconstruction will remain dependent on external support in the long term.