2. Karabakh War

2. Karabakh War was a 44-day high-intensity conventional conflict between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas from 27 September to 10 November 2020. The fundamental cause was the de facto occupation of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories by Armenia following the 1990 ceasefire, the stagnation of the Minsk Process, and the escalation of border tensions in the summer of 2020, which rendered the status quo unsustainable.

The war ended with the entry into force of the trilateral statement dated 9–10 November 2020, brokered by Russia, based on Azerbaijan’s battlefield gains. The agreement included the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces and arrangements for corridors. This war marked a transformation of regional power balances and security architecture, institutionalized Turkey–Azerbaijan defense cooperation, and enabled the return of displaced Azerbaijani citizens to their lands, initiating a process of reconstruction and political normalization in the region.

Historical Background of the War

Geographical and Administrative Framework

Karabakh is a region located at the intersection of east-west transit corridors in the South Caucasus, naturally divided by a threshold between its mountainous section (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the continental steppe belt. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, the administrative boundaries of the Caucasus changed several times. In 1923, the Soviet Union established the “Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO)” within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The NKAO had a legally subordinate status to Azerbaijan SSR but was granted cultural autonomy. Throughout the Soviet era, authority over external borders remained with Moscow. The mutual dependency between the region’s economic centers (Shusha, Khankendi/Stepanakert) and surrounding districts (Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Kubatli, Agdam, Lachin, Kelbajar) determined the logistical and strategic character of the conflict in subsequent years.

Late Soviet Period and the Onset of the Crisis (1987–1991)

In the late 1980s, the breakdown of central planning and the relative expansion of freedom of expression and organization accelerated ethnic and regional demands. Between 1987 and 1988, petitions calling for a change in status were submitted by the NKAO Council and institutions of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In February 1988, protests began in Khankendi; social violence incidents (e.g., Sumgait, Kirovabad) deepened the crisis. In 1989, a movement centered around the “Karabakh Committee” in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic became politicized, culminating in a declarative announcement by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on 1 December 1989 that the NKAO would be “annexed” to Armenia. Moscow did not recognize this declaration. From early 1990, armed clashes between local militias and irregular units became widespread, and interventions by Soviet Interior Ministry forces failed to restore stability in the region.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Escalation of the War (1991–1994)

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independence in 1991. Unilateral “referendums” and “declarations of independence” in the NKAO were declared invalid by Baku.

From late 1991, the conflict expanded with more systematic use of conventional elements (artillery, armored vehicles, air assets). By 1993, most of the seven surrounding districts of Nagorno-Karabakh had come under Armenian control. Disruption of communication lines (via Lachin and Kelbajar linking to Armenia), sieges, and artillery superiority shaped the battlefield. Civilian populations were displaced, humanitarian aid corridors became necessary, infrastructure was damaged, and prisoner exchanges occurred.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the Status Quo

In 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, calling for respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, withdrawal from occupied territories, and cessation of hostilities. The resolutions emphasized the obligation to halt the use of force and outlined a framework for returning to negotiations. However, implementation failed to permanently alter the de facto situation on the ground.

In spring 1994, a ceasefire brokered by Russia (under the Bishkek Protocol process) silenced the weapons, but fundamental issues—such as the final status, the sequence of return of occupied districts, and the safe return of displaced persons—remained unresolved. Thus, the conflict entered the category of a “frozen conflict.” While deviations from internationally recognized borders persisted, no formal peace agreement was produced.

Minsk Process (1994–2019)

The main negotiation platform after the ceasefire became the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chairs: Russia, the United States, France). Between 1997 and 2001, “package” and “phased” solution drafts were discussed. The 2007 Madrid Principles and 2009–2011 updates defined the framework parameters for a solution as follows:

• Gradual withdrawal from occupied territories and security arrangements,
• Granting Nagorno-Karabakh a temporary status and establishing a future mechanism for a popular vote or expression of will to determine its final status,
• Establishing a secure corridor through Lachin and guaranteeing the return of displaced persons as part of peace.

The parties interpreted these parameters differently. For Baku, territorial integrity and early withdrawal were primary priorities; for Yerevan, final status and guarantees of self-rule were decisive. The military balance on the ground was reinforced by deepened positions along the line of contact, artillery and rocket systems, sniper activity, and mining practices. Between 1994 and 2020, thousands of ceasefire violations, dozens of deaths, periodic escalations, and diplomatic cycles focused on “managing tensions” occurred.

After the First Karabakh War, hundreds of thousands of people in Azerbaijan (officially estimated at around 600,000) lived for years under “temporary” housing conditions. Social policy instruments (housing projects, employment, education) were deployed to mitigate the social cost of the conflict. In Armenia and along the Karabakh line, the war’s economic toll, the perception of siege, unsustainable military expenditures, and migration dynamics produced significant impacts. In the context of international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, losses and fate of prisoners, mine contamination, and preservation of cultural heritage became regular agenda items for international monitoring mechanisms (OSCE field missions and reports, etc.).

Unsustainability of the Status Quo

Throughout the 2000s, oil revenues and defense modernization enhanced Azerbaijan’s military capacity. On the Armenian side, the defense doctrine became anchored in fixed positions, firepower, and deterrence. The April 2016 “Four-Day War” triggered a limited but noticeable shift in the front-line balance and deepened skepticism about the effectiveness of the Minsk Process.

Although the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia briefly revived the tone of negotiations, no flexibility emerged between the positions of the two sides in 2019–2020. In July 2020, clashes along the Tovuz/Tavush segment of the Armenia–Azerbaijan state border revealed risks extending beyond the front line (proximity to energy and transport routes). This scenario confirmed that the conflict, labeled as “frozen,” contained inherent vulnerabilities capable of erupting into open hostilities at any moment.

The factors preparing the ground for the second war were:

• Territory and status: The tension between the principle of territorial integrity under international law and the demands for Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status or self-rule.

• Security architecture: Intense firepower deployed along the contact line, high levels of mine contamination, and limited verification and monitoring capacity.

• Refugee/IDP issue: Uncertainty regarding when and under what guarantees return, property restitution, and rehabilitation would occur.

• Erosion of the diplomatic framework: Stalemate in the Minsk parameters regarding sequencing, trade-offs, and guarantees.

• Geopolitical variables: Russia’s role in regional security, Turkey–Azerbaijan rapprochement and defense cooperation, Iran’s security sensitivities, and the limited but symbolic influence of the EU and the US.

The First Karabakh War, ending with the 1994 ceasefire, produced a balance in which “weapons fell silent but the conflict remained unfrozen.” This balance proved unsustainable due to the contradiction between the internationally recognized framework and the de facto situation on the ground, the unresolved humanitarian and demographic consequences, and the implementation crises of diplomatic formulas. Periodic escalations, military modernization, and hardened rhetoric throughout the 2010s gradually prepared the ground for the second war, which erupted in the autumn of 2020.

Pre-2020 Triggers: Tovuz Clashes, Political Rhetoric, and Border Violations

The OSCE Minsk Group, the main framework since the 1994 ceasefire, developed proposals over the years—including “package,” “phased,” and “common state” models—but none translated into a binding agreement. There was a ceasefire, but no solution.

While political change occurred in Armenia after 2018, rhetoric along the Baku–Yerevan line did not soften. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement, “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.” referring to the entity established in Karabakh, strained peace talks.^【1】 This rhetoric was recorded as a threshold that heightened mutual distrust and made the fragile balance on the ground more precarious.

On 12 July 2020, heavy fighting erupted along the Tovuz/Tavush segment of the Armenia–Azerbaijan state border, outside the Karabakh front line, involving heavy weapons. Azerbaijani sources described the incident as “an Armenian attack including heavy artillery,” while Armenian sources claimed “an attempt by an Azerbaijani vehicle to cross the border.”

Tovuz’s significance lay in its role as a node for energy and transport routes. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Supsa oil pipelines, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP natural gas pipelines, and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway all passed through this corridor. Thus, escalation along the border served not only as a warning to the front-line balance but also to regional energy security.

Throughout the 2010s, ceasefire violations, sniper fire, and artillery shelling resulted in casualties. The escalation of summer 2020 was one of the peaks of this “attrition cycle.”

The “Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreement” signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2010 included provisions for urgent consultations and joint defense commitments in the event of any threat. From the 2010s onward, defense, training, and joint exercises institutionalized the relationship. This framework became a frequently referenced point in assessments of increased security coordination between the two countries in the summer of 2020. That same summer, official statements were made public regarding Azerbaijan’s efforts to procure Bayraktar TB2 from Turkey.

Beginning and 44-Day Course of the War

The war became visible on 27 September 2020, during daylight hours, with clashes along the line of contact. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense announced that Armenian units in Karabakh had targeted civilian settlements. In response, Azerbaijan launched a “counter-offensive” along the entire front. In the first weeks, a battle scenario emerged involving intense artillery and missile fire, armored units, special forces, and intensive use of air assets—particularly UAVs/UCAVs.

The decisive axis of the war was the southern front, where Azerbaijan broke the front line. Pressure built along the Fuzuli–Jabrayil–Zangilan–Kubatli direction, forcing supply lines and positions into retreat. Control over cities, towns, and villages was gradually announced.

By 29 October, official reports indicated that “four cities, four towns, and approximately 180 villages” had been recaptured. In the northern and central sectors, the balance remained largely one of positional defense and attrition.

Ceasefire Initiatives

An initial “humanitarian ceasefire” was declared following a meeting in Moscow on 10 October, but it was quickly violated and failed to take hold on the ground; hostilities continued. During this period, both sides accused each other of violations. In the days following the ceasefire, renewed artillery and missile fire were reported, and intense fighting persisted along the line of contact.

Combat Methods: UAVs/UCAVs, Firepower, and Information Superiority

Azerbaijan’s most conspicuous advantage during the 44 days was its use of UAVs/UCAVs, which combined reconnaissance, surveillance, and precision strike missions. First, air defense and command-and-control targets were suppressed. Then, waves of attacks targeting armored units and forces in open areas generated “informational and psychological superiority” on the battlefield. Numerous analyses have noted that the shock effect and morale-degrading imagery produced by UCAVs played a significant role in shaping the course of the war.

Civilian Impact and International Humanitarian Law Debates

The targeting of settlements behind the front lines produced severe consequences. International human rights organizations documented attacks on Barda and Ganja in separate reports. These strikes fueled international debates on humanitarian law, particularly regarding allegations of cluster munitions and indiscriminate attacks. Academic studies on the law of armed conflict emphasized the importance of documenting and adjudicating violations committed during the 44-day war.

Recapture of Shusha by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces: The Turning Point of the War

In the first week of November, the focus of combat shifted to Shusha. After a phase defined by rugged terrain and urban close-quarters fighting, the capture of Shusha by Azerbaijan on 8 November became the war’s decisive turning point, due to both its strategic location and symbolic value.

The fall of Shusha led to increased pressure on Khankendi (Stepanakert) and threatened Armenian troop withdrawal and supply lines, which were cited as key factors compelling Yerevan to accept the ceasefire.

9–10 November: Ceasefire Declaration and End of Hostilities

Following a video conference on the night of 9 November, the ceasefire declaration was signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Hostilities ceased at 00:00 Moscow time on 10 November. The ceasefire text mandated the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces, established connectivity via the Lachin corridor, and set out a timetable for redeployment and withdrawal in specific areas; Russian forces subsequently moved into the region.

Main Arrangements Introduced by the Ceasefire Text

Recognition of the new situation on the ground: Azerbaijan’s control over territories captured during the war was confirmed; specific districts (Agdam, Kelbajar, Lachin) were scheduled for handover on designated dates.

Peacekeeping force and monitoring: The deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces was formalized. Subsequently, the Turkey–Russia Joint Monitoring Center was established in Agdam, tasked with monitoring ceasefire violations.

Transport corridors: Connectivity between Armenia and Karabakh via the Lachin corridor was preserved; new transport links between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan (the Zangezur corridor perspective) entered the agenda.

Outcomes of the Second Karabakh War

Military Outcomes

• At the end of 44 days, Azerbaijan regained a significant portion of its territories that had been under de facto occupation for nearly 30 years. Five regions, four towns, and 286 villages were liberated from Armenian occupation. The recapture of Shusha became the most important symbol of Azerbaijan’s victory.

• The battlefield design and doctrine were reflected in the outcome. The combined use of unmanned aerial systems (TB2 and other platforms), artillery/rockets, and ground forces in a reconnaissance-strike cycle broke Armenian defenses, particularly along the southern front (Fuzuli–Jabrayil–Zangilan–Kubatli). This superiority was carried to the negotiating table and reflected in the ceasefire terms.

• The capture of Shusha intensified pressure on Khankendi and narrowed Armenia’s maneuver space. This development was regarded as a critical threshold that accelerated the ceasefire decision.

• A Russian peacekeeping force of 1,960 personnel, 90 armored vehicles, and 380 other vehicles was deployed along the Lachin corridor and the line of contact. The force’s mandate lasts five years, with automatic extension unless objections are raised six months before expiration.

• The Turkey–Russia Joint Monitoring Center was established in Agdam. Tasked with documenting violations and evaluating complaints from both sides, it provided a 24/7 monitoring layer for the ceasefire.

Political–Diplomatic Outcomes

• New status quo: The ceasefire institutionalized Russia’s permanent presence as an actor in the region and its de facto control over the line of contact.

• Turkey–Azerbaijan dimension: Relations were framed at the level of “alliance” after the war; bilateral cooperation deepened across a broad spectrum from defense and security to the economy.

Economic Outcomes

• Corridors and connectivity: Article 9 of the ceasefire called for the removal of all obstacles to transport and communication routes in the region and the establishment of a new connection between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. This was regarded as a major gain for Azerbaijan, particularly through the planned Zangezur corridor outside the conflict zone.

• Regional impact of Zangezur: Studies highlight the Zangezur corridor’s potential to strengthen logistical and commercial networks between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, as well as its geopolitical significance.

• Reconstruction activities: Infrastructure and urban reconstruction in liberated areas, alongside transport projects, emerged as key priorities on the post-war agenda.

Social Outcomes

• Return of displaced persons: Based on Article 7 of the ceasefire, the return of displaced Azerbaijanis and refugees within the country was foreseen. It was specified that returns would be managed according to security, mine clearance, and infrastructure conditions, with reference to the BMMYK framework.

• Prisoner and remains exchanges: The agreement regulated the mutual repatriation of prisoners of war and remains; implementation was conducted under the supervision of the peacekeeping and monitoring mechanisms.

• Law and accountability: Issues such as attacks on civilians and allegations of indiscriminate or cluster munition use were debated after the war around mechanisms for evidence collection and judicial processes (national courts, universal jurisdiction, ICC’s individual jurisdiction).

• The liberation of Shusha was commemorated in Azerbaijan’s cultural memory as a turning point and became a central focus of cultural revitalization initiatives.

International Attitudes

Turkey

Turkey adopted a stance during the Second Karabakh War that affirmed its “strategic partnership and mutual assistance” alignment with Azerbaijan. In its diplomatic rhetoric, Turkey emphasized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and legitimate right to self-defense. On the ground, it provided military and technical support without directly deploying combat units. This support included the provision of Bayraktar TB2 and other UCAV/UAV systems, training and technical adaptations for their effective use in target detection, designation, and damage assessment cycles, integration of joint concepts for artillery/rocket fire, and sharing of combat intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (C4ISR).

The rhetoric during the war was consistent with the natural continuation of the bilateral security framework established in 2010. After the war’s conclusion, Turkey participated with Russia in establishing the Joint Monitoring Center in Agdam, becoming part of the 24/7 monitoring capacity for the ceasefire’s implementation. In the post-war period, relations reached an institutional threshold with the 15 June 2021 “Shusha Declaration on Alliance Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan.” The declaration consolidated under one umbrella the shared understanding of defense and security, defense industry cooperation, continuity of joint exercises, and integration of transport and energy routes (particularly the Nakhchivan connection and Zangezur axis), explicitly formalizing the “alliance” status between the two countries. Thus, Turkey’s military and technical role during the war was transformed into a lasting security, economic, and transport architecture in the post-war era.

Russia

Russia emerged as the primary actor shaping the ceasefire. It subsequently deployed a 1,960-person peacekeeping force along the Lachin Corridor and the line of contact, placing the new regional order under its oversight. The peacekeeping force not only monitored the ceasefire but also assumed roles in mine clearance, organizing returns, and facilitating access to religious sites—a move interpreted as Russia’s effort to position itself as a “permanent presence” in the region.

After completing its mandate, the Russian Peacekeeping Force stationed temporarily in the Karabakh region withdrew from the area.

Iran

Iran interpreted the Second Karabakh War primarily through the lens of border security and internal stability. Azerbaijan’s rapid military advance, its defense cooperation with Turkey, and the perceived increase in military-technical capacity linked to Israel heightened Tehran’s security concerns. Sensitivities among Iran’s own Azerbaijani Turk population further amplified these concerns. Consequently, while emphasizing the principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders in its official rhetoric, Iran prioritized preventing the conflict from spilling over into its own borders and disrupting its demographic balance.

During the fighting, Iranian authorities made claims that third-country elements were present in Azerbaijani territory and that fighters had been transported from Syria. Allegations of “Israeli presence” were frequently raised. Simultaneously with this security narrative, Iran built up military concentrations along its border, maintained its air defense and border units on high alert, and issued diplomatic notes to both sides when artillery shells occasionally landed on Iranian territory, calling for restraint.

Iran’s stance during the Karabakh War did not align with Azerbaijan’s expectations and was associated with various political and practical support claims toward Armenia. In this context, Iran’s conduct of a military exercise named “Hayber Fatihleri” near its border, its closure of airspace to military cargo flights targeting Nakhchivan, and its post-war criticism of Baku attracted attention.

France

France, as co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, attempted to maintain a neutral mediator image throughout the process. However, public statements and media practices during and after the war created the impression of a pro-Yerevan bias. It was observed that French official news agencies and mainstream media promoted a narrative favoring Armenia, which was inconsistent with the impartiality expected of a co-chair.

In French media, the war was frequently framed under headlines such as “Christian–Muslim,” “war driven by Turkish encouragement,” or “Ankara’s Ottomanist/competitive expansion.” The claim that Turkey supported Azerbaijan not out of “brotherhood” but for its own interests was repeatedly echoed. Central motifs in this narrative included allegations that Turkey brought “jihadist/mercenary fighters” from Syria and that this posed a threat to regional security. Thus, France not only sought to evoke sympathy for Armenia but also aimed to generate a hostile public opinion atmosphere toward Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In content directed at the French public, Turkey and President Erdoğan were predominantly portrayed as a “revisionist/Ottomanist foreign policy actor seeking influence in the region and escalating the conflict.” Erdoğan’s “challenge” to France was emphasized, with the view that this posture strengthened his domestic nationalist coalition and was interpreted alongside other points of friction between Turkey and France (Libya, Syria, Eastern Mediterranean). This narrative embedded the Karabakh context within a broader Paris–Ankara tension axis, reinforcing anti-Turkey sentiment in French public opinion.

United States and European Union

The United States and the European Union generally positioned themselves on a “balancing/mediating” line during the Second Karabakh War, aiming to halt hostilities and bring the parties back to negotiations. In this framework, a humanitarian ceasefire initiative was announced on 26 October 2020 under US mediation, but it failed to have a lasting impact on the ground. This approach was reflected in public opinion. Mainstream US media adopted a reporting tone that shared responsibility between the parties, emphasized the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, and sought balance.

In the institutional-political aftermath of the war, Russia’s decisive role on the ground and at the negotiating table was highlighted, while the OSCE Minsk Group umbrella and the West’s (US/EU) regional influence receded relatively. The emerging new security architecture, centered around the Russian peacekeeping force and the Turkey–Russia Joint Monitoring Center, limited the effectiveness of Western actors.

Contribution of the Second Karabakh War to Turkish Nationalism

The nationalist sentiments observed during the Second Karabakh War were not confined to ethnic nationalism mobilized against an “external threat/enemy”; they transcended the geography of Karabakh and Azerbaijan to trigger a regional form of Turkish nationalism. This mobilization was built upon the central place of Karabakh in Azerbaijan’s historical memory (as an inseparable part of identity) and the collective wave of euphoria and loyalty generated by the victory.

Turkey, from the first hours of the war, provided open and decisive diplomatic support, breaking the perception of isolation in Azerbaijani public opinion and transforming the slogan “One Nation, Two States” into a concrete practice of solidarity. Emphasis on the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in official statements and operational planning nurtured the spirit of struggle and conveyed to broad audiences the message that Azerbaijan was fighting alongside a powerful ally. As a result, support even on the opposing front led to the perception of the war as a “joint operation,” thereby expanding the legitimacy and self-confidence of the nationalist discourse.

The war generated a ripple effect in Iran’s domestic politics through the real-time monitoring of developments by Iranian Azerbaijanis (particularly via media and social media). This visibility and sensitivity weakened Iran’s influential position during the First Karabakh War; Tehran’s overt pro-Armenian stance became politically difficult due to internal backlash, ultimately leading to a rise in nationalist sentiments among Iranian Turks. Thus, the wave of nationalism in Azerbaijan transformed into a transnational identity politics that affected the regional balance.