Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy

The concept of “autonomy” derives its origin from the Ancient Greek words autos (self) and nomos (law, rule), and literally means “self-legislation.” This core meaning evokes both the capacity of an individual to make decisions for themselves and the ability to act independently of external authorities. The term was first used in a political context, particularly to denote the independence of ancient Greek city-states (poleis). During this period, autonomy was associated with a community’s power to determine and enforce its own laws.

In modern philosophy, the concept of autonomy acquired a subject-centered dimension, especially through Enlightenment thought. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the idea that individuals as rational beings could determine their own actions under the guidance of reason laid the theoretical foundations for both moral and political autonomy. In this context, autonomy was conceptualized not merely as freedom from external pressures but also as the capacity to determine one’s own values and act in accordance with them.

Especially in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the concept deepened and acquired a normative dimension through the understanding that the source of moral law lies in the individual’s own reason. According to Kant, an individual can be truly free and moral only when following laws that they themselves have determined through reason and that can be universalized. This interpretation led to the intertwining of modern conceptions of autonomy with the ideas of individual rationality, moral responsibility, and free will.

In the 20th century, autonomy began to be addressed through broader approaches that emphasized not only individuals’ internal capacities but also their social, cultural, and relational contexts. Nevertheless, in its foundational meaning and early usage, autonomy continues to rest on the idea of the “law-giving subject” and remains a significant normative ideal at both individual and collective levels.

Moral Autonomy: Definition and Core Debates

Moral autonomy refers to the capacity of an individual to make moral decisions independently of external authorities, based solely on their own rational evaluations. According to this view, an individual is morally autonomous only when acting in accordance with principles derived from their own reason, rather than from tradition, authority, or habit. Moral autonomy encompasses not only the individual’s ability to determine their own moral laws but also their capacity to live consistently in accordance with them.

This concept was most systematically developed in modern moral philosophy by Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, moral laws originate solely from reason and their universality grounds them not in external authority but in the rational structure of the individual. In the Kantian view, an individual is truly free only when following moral laws that they themselves have determined and that are capable of universalization. Thus, moral autonomy is defined as the individual’s self-legislation through reason and their subsequent action in accordance with that legislation.

The concept of moral autonomy is not limited merely to acting on internally generated moral reasons; it also presupposes that decisions must be informed, voluntary, and free from coercion. In this sense, moral autonomy entails not only a substantive but also a formal competence. The conditions for autonomy include the individual’s capacity to make decisions through free will and to ground those decisions in moral reasoning.

However, critical debates regarding moral autonomy also exist. For instance, Joseph Raz argues that individuals’ decisions cannot always be based purely on rationality and that meaningful autonomy requires the availability of certain valuable options. Similarly, feminist thinkers such as Susan Sherwin and Jennifer Nedelsky contend that individuals’ decision-making processes cannot be independent of social relations and power asymmetries, asserting that autonomy cannot be reduced solely to individual rationality. According to these perspectives, cultural, psychological, and relational factors shape individuals’ decisions and may limit the scope of the autonomy ideal. Furthermore, criticism has been leveled at the concept of autonomy for establishing an individualistic norm that inadequately considers social context. These approaches argue that moral autonomy must be understood not only in terms of an individual’s capacity for reasoning but also in relation to their social and cultural environment.

Political Autonomy: Individual, Society, and Authority

Political autonomy is linked to the individual’s right to participate in political arrangements that shape their own life and to exert influence over those arrangements. The concept aims to ensure that individuals can express their own will not only in private choices but also within public political and legal structures. In this context, political autonomy entails recognizing the individual as a citizen capable of self-governance and securing this capacity institutionally.

In modern political thought, the concept of autonomy holds a central place, particularly within the liberal tradition. According to this view, individuals as bearers of rights and freedoms must be protected from interference by the state and other authorities and should be free to pursue their own life plans. Political autonomy is supported by principles such as legal equality, the right to free choice, freedom of expression, and participation in governance. The individual is not merely obligated to comply with laws enacted by lawmakers but also has the right to participate directly or indirectly in the formation of those laws.

Autonomy does not merely mean securing individual rights and freedoms; it also signifies the individual’s capacity to act as an active agent in political life. Therefore, political autonomy is not limited to a negative conception of freedom (non-interference) but also carries importance in its positive dimension (participation and empowerment). It is argued that an individual who cannot participate in political decision-making processes that affect their own life cannot be considered a fully autonomous political subject.

The concept of political autonomy encompasses not only the relationship between the individual and the state but also the individual’s interactions with communities, civil society organizations, and other collective structures. From this perspective, political autonomy is not merely an individual trait but an institutional condition that emerges only within a specific social order. Democratic forms of governance are highlighted as structures that enable the institutionalization of political autonomy.

Theories of Autonomy: Internalist and Relational Approaches

Theories of autonomy offer various perspectives on how individuals acquire the capacity to direct their own lives and under what conditions this capacity should be considered valid. These theories can generally be divided into two main categories: internalist approaches and relational approaches.

Internalist approaches ground autonomy in the individual’s mental and cognitive processes. These theories focus on whether an individual’s decisions arise from their own reflective evaluations. According to this view, autonomy is possible when individuals make decisions that reflect their own desires, beliefs, and values. An individual is considered autonomous when acting free from external pressures and manipulation, using their rational capacities independently. This approach emphasizes the necessity of internal coherence, reasoning ability, and free will in the individual. When evaluating autonomy, internalist theories prioritize the uniqueness of internal cognitive processes over external conditions.

In contrast, relational approaches evaluate autonomy within social, cultural, and relational contexts. According to this view, individuals’ preferences and value systems cannot be understood as independent of social relations, power structures, and historical contexts. Relational theories, particularly developed within feminist philosophy, argue that the individualistic conception of autonomy neglects the reality of social dependency. According to this perspective, an individual can be truly autonomous not only through their internal constitution but also through social interactions, care relationships, power asymmetries, and historical experiences.

The relational approach argues that autonomy is not merely an individual capacity but a socially constructed and sustained process. An individual can make autonomous decisions only when certain supportive conditions are met—for example, access to education, information, respect, and social recognition. Therefore, relational theories treat autonomy not only as an individual ability but also as a concept intrinsically linked to social justice.

The fundamental difference between these two approaches lies in whether the source of autonomy is located within the individual or within the network of social relations. Internalist approaches emphasize individual reason and rational evaluation, while relational approaches highlight the determining role of environmental and structural factors in shaping that evaluative process. Contemporary theories of autonomy generally attempt to reconcile these two perspectives by developing integrated models that consider both individual freedom and social context together.

Critiques and Contested Areas

Although the concept of autonomy has gained broad acceptance as an ideal in modern philosophy, it has been critically examined and reevaluated from various angles. These critiques target both its normative content and its practical applicability. Debates have focused particularly on its individualistic foundations, its detachment from cultural context, and its tendency to overlook inequalities.

One of the most fundamental criticisms is that autonomy is frequently equated with liberal individualism. In this framework, autonomy is attributed to a self-sufficient, rational, independent subject whose choices are free from external influences. However, it is argued that this model fails to adequately reflect the complex experiences of real individuals, who are shaped by social relations, cultural norms, and power structures. Feminist and postcolonial theories particularly emphasize that this individualistic definition of autonomy excludes care relationships, dependency states, and cultural identities.

Another contested area is the relationship between autonomy and manipulation. Individuals’ decision-making processes can be shaped not only by overt coercion but also by subtle and invisible forms of guidance. In such cases, the assumption that individuals make their own decisions loses validity. Decisions made under the influence of advertising, propaganda, social norms, or authority figures raise questions about whether individuals are truly autonomous. In this context, it is argued that autonomy must be sensitive not only to external coercion but also to internalized forms of pressure.

Competence issues constitute another area of debate that challenges the boundaries of the concept of autonomy. For instance, can young children, individuals with mental illness, or those with severe cognitive impairments be considered fully autonomous? These questions raise ethical debates concerning whether autonomy can be a universal norm for all individuals and under what conditions an individual’s decisions deserve respect.

Moreover, the tension between cultural relativism and universality is also among the criticisms directed at autonomy. In some cultural and social structures, the right of individuals to make autonomous decisions may be limited by community norms or religious authorities. This raises the question of whether the universal conception of autonomy disregards cultural diversity. Within this framework, some theorists argue that the norms embedded in autonomy are Western-centric and fail to adequately represent alternative ways of life.