Just War Theory and Legitimate Defense

The use of advanced weapons with increasing lethality in today’s military operations is further heightening the sensitivity of comments and assessments regarding the legitimacy of such actions. technology day Although the theory of just war is not a new concept, it has been revisited frequently and repeatedly pronunciation. Its renewed formulations attempt to define criteria that serve as a veneer for military interventions carried out under the banners of democracy and human rights. Just war theory does not anticipate aggression. The simple distinction between offense and defense is embedded within the concept of legitimate defense. In contemporary practice, legitimate defense is no longer used solely in its established definition (preventative legitimate defense) as a tool for punishment by powerful actors; it also appears as pre-emptive legitimate defense. Indeed, labeling wars as just or unjust is not particularly logical. Theorizing the actions of the powerful while using international law to frame those actions within a legal boundary undoubtedly requires immense power.

Just War

Within less than half a century after the Second World War, conflicts such as Vietnam, Arab-Israel, Gulf, and Afghanistan Wars brought about significant changes in the levels of warfare, forms of engagement, and the doctrines and principles employed. During this period, conflicts of varying scales and dimensions emerged, ranging from low- and medium-intensity clashes to combined operation and air operations across the globe. Modern Changes in the structure and scale of war have added new dimensions to the concepts of war and operations. Future planners of warfare and policymakers will be compelled to consider both the capabilities technology will bring to weapons and military tools on one hand, and the constantly evolving nature of the battlefield within the broader context of international politics situation. Parallel to these developments, new concepts regarding war have emerged. Examples include Network-Centric Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Parallel Warfare, Hybrid War, and Unrestricted Warfare. Cold War These concepts, particularly those that arose in the post-Cold War era, have played a role in the development of certain theories.

Although these types of warfare appear as novel concepts, they are not in fact new forms of war or conflict. In fact, nearly all of them are as old as war itself. For hundreds, even thousands of years, the weaker side has sought various road and methods to neutralize the technological and numerical superiority of a stronger adversary.

2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu said, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” and introduced the philosophy of “applying the most natural maneuver with the least expenditure of force to suit every possible scenario.” Although this thought is philosophical, it is also economic. Today It is not only poor country or organizations lacking technological and numerical superiority that prioritize economics in their struggles against rivals; even powerful and wealthy nations and organizations adopt as a fundamental principle achieving maximum benefit with minimum expenditure and effort yield.

The ancient Chinese military strategist Zhuge LIANG, in the 3rd century BCE, said: “…The wise win the war before it begins, whereas the foolish fight to win… Therefore, high walls and deep moats do not guarantee security; strong armor and effective weapons do not guarantee strength. If the enemy prefers to remain united, attack where they are unprepared; if the enemy is forming a battle line, appear where they least expect you.” This explains why the world’s superpower, USA, stood helplessly during the 11 September attacks. The emergence of asymmetric methods has directed those possessing power and technology toward seeking more lethal weapons and technologies. This, in turn, has led to an increase in civilian casualties and consequently to the proliferation of theories about whether wars are just or unjust. The growing public sensitivity to human losses in military operations continues to heighten the sensitivity of this issue. It is certainly accurate to say that the legal foundation of the use of force has also gained legitimacy.

Components of the Law of War

The Law of War has three components. The first is ‘jus ad bellum’, which encompasses the rules governing the declaration of war, namely the conditions and justifications for going to war. The second component, ‘jus in bello’, concerns conduct during war. ‘Jus in bello’ is today expressed as humanitarian law. The third component, ‘jus post bellum’, relates to the end of war and the activities required afterward. Here, views concerning the conditions and justifications for declaring war are most commonly associated with the concept of just war.

Just War Theory

Explaining the two distinct dimensions of just war theory—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—is essential for establishing the conceptual framework of the subject.

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Jus ad bellum

The principle of jus ad bellum establishes specific criteria to determine whether a war is justifiable under certain conditions. These criteria generally include: a just cause, a legitimate authority, a just intention or good faith, the proportionality of force—meaning force must not cause harm beyond the objective—last resort, the aim of achieving peace, and finally, a reasonable chance of success.

Just cause is the first and most important condition of jus ad bellum. Almost all just war theorists agree that wars initiated for aggression cannot be considered just. Thus, it is argued that the only legitimate cause for a just war is defense. However, this proposition can be stretched when the question arises as to what constitutes an unjust aggression. While it may be true that defense is the sole just cause, just war theorists have at times included offensive wars within the scope of defense. The sole condition advanced here is that even if the nature of the war is offensive, its purpose must be to respond to a prior wrong.

Legitimate authority is a highly contested condition. Generally, just war theorists equate legitimate authority with the sovereign power of the state. According to this view, if this sovereign power is legitimate, it will not act arbitrarily, and therefore the right to declare war may be granted to such legitimate governance. In just war theory, the right to declare war belongs exclusively to legitimate authority; otherwise, the possibility of a war being just vanishes.

Just intention or good faith is generally accepted to mean that the war must be waged for the common good and not for personal or imperialist, unjust interests. In just war theory, the use of national interests as a pretext for aggression is not accepted, and such a war would be deemed unjust. However Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that there may be cases where the only way to realize a good intention is through an attack, such as forcibly facility peace. In just war theory, as with just cause and good faith, the reasonable chance of success is also important. This condition aims to prevent the waste of human and economic resources on a war with no prospect of success.

Proportionality, although technically a criterion of jus in bello, is considered under jus ad bellum as the requirement that the use of force must not cause harm beyond the intended objective. A just war must have a just cause and, accordingly, a legitimate objective that must be consistent with other principles.

Jus in bello

The principle of jus in bello, which justifies the use of force during war, has two key conditions: the immunity of civilians and proportionality. Civilian immunity is a standard for identifying legitimate targets in war. According to just war theory, failing to distinguish between targets undermines the justice of the war. As long as no distinction is made, non-combatants and innocents may become targets. Combatants have consciously chosen to join armed forces and therefore may legitimately be targeted. Non-combatants, civilians or innocents, have not made such a choice, and thus their killing is unjust.

Although just war theory prohibits the killing of civilians, it does acknowledge that in some circumstances civilian deaths may be unavoidable. Just war theory explains this through the concept of “double effect.” Double effect justifies civilian deaths in cases where they are not intended but occur accidentally, thereby in a sense legitimizing such outcomes. Classical The distinction between civilian and combatant, even for just war theory, has become a serious problem in the modern era, as mass warfare has made this distinction increasingly difficult.

In a just war, proportionality is the criterion that determines the moral appropriateness of the level and manner of violence used. According to the principle of proportionality, the violence employed in a just war must be commensurate with the objective sought. This differs from proportionality under jus ad bellum. The proportionality criterion under jus in bello aims to reduce the intensity and destructiveness of warfare.

History of Just War

Generally, the conceptual framework of just war can be outlined based on the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and the criteria they encompass. However, the content of the just war concept, which has a very long historical historical, has been shaped by diverse period and intellectual traditions. Examining the historical and intellectual contributions to just war theory within a historical process context will enable a more accurate contemporary evaluation of its content and theory.

Claude stated that the justice of war can be examined according to three different views;

First view, pacifism, holds that all wars are unjust from the perspective of all parties involved. Pacifists are particularly represented by early Christians. Although present from the beginning, this opinion has never become the dominant view on the justice of war.

Second view, the just war doctrine, argues that at least one side in a conflict has a just cause for war. Some wars are unjust, others are just. Each war requires a justification, and each war demands such a justification.

Third view, holds that the justice of war does not need to be established. There is no need to justify the use of force.

In the Western world, the Christian together view, which differs from other perspectives, focuses on the conditions under which the declaration of war can be considered legitimate. The emergence of states and the recognition of their equal sovereignty led to the notion that, in the absence of a superior or comprehensive power—or even philosophy—the sovereign state holds the right to declare war. The just war doctrine, absent from 19th-century international law literature and, when mentioned, treated only historically and without much attention, gained new momentum with Article 231 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which declared Germany and its allies as the sole aggressors responsible for the war. The new just war doctrine, until the 1960s, emphasized peace and held that war could be justified only as legitimate defense. From the 1960s onward, it in a sense reverted to the medieval period, with “good wars” being openly discussed. Concepts such as “war against terrorism” and “preventive war,” which gained considerable popularity in international law, are continuations of this same thinking.

Since the publication of Michael Walzer’s book “Just and Unjust Wars” in 1977, the concept of just and unjust wars has become the source of numerous discussion and countless publications. Like John Rawls’ Justice Theory, Walzer helped initiate a classic debate in political theory. While Rawls developed a universal political theory emphasizing historical obligations through the method of analytic philosophy, Walzer emphasizes historical experience to confront the successes of traditional philosophy and current events. Walzer attempts to justify just war theory by linking historical events to political evaluations.

Walzer evaluates the Vietnam War as a just war, emphasizing authors such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Grotius. Leaving aside the concepts, events in the world evoke Thucydides’ famous prediction: “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” He thus asserted that the weak are always subject to the strong. This situation, while unjust, also constitutes a threat to the continuity of the human species in our current era.

Walzer, praised for the debates he generated on just war, Kosovo also evaluated the invasion of Afghanistan as a “just war,” describing the occupation as a “victory of just war theory.” However, in both cases, his arguments rely on assumptions, and obvious facts are ignored. “Just war” allows the powerful, in the context of counter-terrorism or other logic, to exempt themselves from the fundamental principles of the world order they helped create and normalize.

Legitimate Defense

Recently, particularly the United States, has invoked the concept of just war by promoting positive values such as freedom and human rights. The simple distinction between offense and defense is embedded in the concept of legitimate defense. Today, legitimate defense is not only used in its established definition (preventative legitimate defense) as a tool for punishment by powerful actors; it also appears as pre-emptive legitimate defense. Thus, the adaptation of just war theory to the present day involves establishing criteria to prove the legitimacy of the powerful, thereby justifying their actions.

The new international legal order established after the end of the Second World War regulates the rules of the law of war in the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The use of force without the approval of the Security Council or outside the scope of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, until the Security Council takes necessary measures, is prohibited.

Powers to Use Force

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter limits states’ powers to use force as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The United Nations Charter introduces exceptions to this prohibition on the use of force through another article. Article 51 states: “No provision of this Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Agreement The Charter outlines two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force: the right of legitimate defense by a state subjected to an armed attack, and the measures to be taken by the United Nations Security Council to preserve international peace.

Some just war theorists consider the occupations of Kosovo and Afghanistan as “just wars.” These assessments are generally based on assumptions. Unfortunately, such theories fail to go beyond providing a veneer for the conduct of powerful states on the international stage and lack scientific data and analysis.

The U.S. National Security Strategy issued on 18 September 2002 placed under its authority the right to carry out what it called “pre-emptive war.” But this was far more dangerous than preventative war, as it anticipated action based on suspicion.

At a 2004 UN panel on Article 51 of the UN Charter and unilateral preventative intervention, the following conclusion was reached: “There is no need to expand or narrow the well-established scope of Article 51… In a world filled with hidden threats, accepting the legality of unilateral preventative action at the expense of the global order and the non-intervention principle it still relies upon would be a great loss. Granting permission to one is granting permission to all.”

On 11 September 2001, some of the most tragic and terrifying terrorist attacks in human history occurred. As a result of these event, approximately 3,000 innocent people lost their lives, and the American public perhaps for the first time in history fear, death, and enemy felt these concepts so acutely. After the attacks on the World Trade Trade Center, the Pentagon, and White House, the American public experienced profound security concerns, and all these events negatively affected the U.S. economy. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are of immense significance not only because of their horror but also because of the changes they brought to the international system. Many Western states, motivated by the need to ensure their national security, launched campaigns against domestic and foreign opponents.

Following the terrorist attacks, with few exceptions, world states set aside their post-Cold War rivalry with the United States and joined the U.S. in the “Global War on Terror.” International organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU supported the United States. Under U.S. leadership, many regional powers and states joined a campaign to build a new world free of “terrorism” and “states supporting terrorism,” with only a few exceptions. The first phase of this campaign began in Afghanistan, a country historically filled with wars from the past to the present. The Afghanistan intervention is considered a pivotal event due to its significance in shaping the new era and its outcomes. Before and after the Afghanistan intervention, the UN regressed from a decision-making body to one that merely ratified decisions, suffering a loss of prestige, and international legal rules and agreements were disregarded. Prior to 11 September, Americans paid little attention to freedom and security problems elsewhere in the world, believing themselves free and secure within their own territory. For them, America was a land of freedom; they assumed that problems of freedom and security would never reach America. One of the most important figures in American strategy, Admiral MAHAN, in his 1904 recommendation to Roosevelt, included as one of his principles for America: “Keep War Far from the American Continent.” This principle was not realized, and for the first time since the American Civil War, Americans carried such profound security concerns. The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in the suffering and death of many Afghan civilians.

Criteria of Just War (Before War)

Criteria to be considered before resorting to this approach:

• Legitimate authority,
• Just cause,
• Good faith,
• Proportionality,
• Reasonable chance of success, and
• Last resort.

Criteria of Just War (During War)

Criteria to be observed during war:

• Good faith,
• Proportionality,
• Distinction.

Evaluation of the Afghanistan War in Terms of Just War Criteria

To what extent did the United States adhere to these criteria before and during the Afghanistan War?

First, the United States declared war on terrorism and explicitly set as its goal combating terrorism wherever it may occur.

Second, the criterion of “just cause.” Under this criterion, a state resorts to war to “protect the innocent” and “ensure humane living and the protection of natural rights.” Was this the U.S. objective? The evidence is troubling. Some states allied with the U.S. in this war had previously directly or indirectly supported terrorism. For example, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had ideological and financial ties with Laden. Additionally, during the Afghan-Soviet war, the U.S. provided $40 million in humanitarian aid to the Taliban.

Third, the legitimacy of “good faith” in this war is questionable. Political leaders likely believed it necessary to retaliate immediately against this style enemy to satisfy public opinion. Could the possibility of killing innocent civilians be a valid reason for the U.S. to satisfy its domestic public opinion?

Fourth, the U.S. bombed Afghanistan in a manner that likely caused the deaths of many non-combatant civilians. Although Donald Rumsfeld stated in daily press briefings that “our target is not civilians,” targeting civilian settlements inherently meant civilians could die, and many did.

Fifth, U.S. actions displaced hundreds of thousands of people and disrupted humanitarian aid already poorly managed in the country. Directly or indirectly, civilian losses due to U.S. actions are estimated in the hundreds of thousands, violating the principle of proportionality.

Sixth, the question is whether this war was winnable. In a war against terrorism, achieving a definitive outcome is never possible.

Finally, was this war a last resort? The U.S. military operation against Afghanistan was declared and launched immediately after 11 September, almost unilaterally. The possibility of civilian casualties was undoubtedly known at the outset. Therefore, despite numerous alternatives available to the powerful, a military operation was launched against a country.

To what extent must each criterion of just war be met to render a war just? In other words, if even one criterion is missing, is the war still just? Indeed, judging wars as just or unjust is not particularly logical. Theorizing the actions of the powerful while using international law to frame those actions within a legal boundary undoubtedly requires immense power.

Setting aside the above criteria, legitimacy is not applicable except for legitimate defense against aggression. Therefore, the concept of legitimate defense must be conceptualized as preventative and pre-emptive. This can also be described as creating concepts and ensuring others understand them.

In conclusion, the lethality of advanced weapon systems has increased. Their use in today’s military operations further heightens the sensitivity of comments and assessments regarding just war. Although just war theory is not a new concept, its content and criteria are being redefined. The criteria used are deliberately shaped to serve as a veneer for military interventions carried out under the banners of democracy and human rights. Just war permits only proportional use of force within the framework of legitimate defense. Therefore, the definition of legitimate defense is of critical importance, yet distortions are being made regarding how this concept can be applied in ambiguous situations. Beyond its established definition (preventative legitimate defense), pre-emptive legitimate defense is also being presented as legitimate defense by powerful actors.

It is questionable whether labeling wars as just or unjust will lead us to sound and logical analyses. Theorizing the actions of the powerful while using international law to frame those actions within a legal boundary undoubtedly requires immense power.