Nuri Killigil (Nuri Pasha), born in 1890 in Manastır, was an officer and industrialist who operated in military, political, and industrial fields during the late Ottoman period and the Republic era. In his military career, he participated in the Tripolitania War, the Balkan Wars, World War I, and commanded the Caucasian Islamic Army; during the National Struggle, he served on the Eastern Front; in the Republic period, he established factories in Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce to produce weapons, ammunition, and various military equipment. He lost his life on 2 March 1949 in a blast at his Sütlüce factory; as his body was never fully recovered, his death was officially attributed to the explosion.
Nuri Killigil Documentary (TVNET)
Nuri Killigil’s family is of Gagauz Turkish origin. The Gagauz are identified as a Turkic community belonging to the Oghuz group, historically predominantly adhering to Orthodox Christianity. The family’s roots trace back to a Yemeni member of this Gagauz community.
According to genealogical accounts, this Yemeni, who lived in Crimea and was Christian, was among those supplying materials to the Crimean Khanate. After marrying a woman from the palace circle, he converted to Islam. This individual is regarded as the first Muslim ancestor of the Killigil family, and all subsequent migrations are traced through this core family.
The information regarding Gagauz origins demonstrates that the Killigil family was initially connected to the Christian-Gagauz branch of the Turkish world before embracing Islam and integrating into Muslim Turkic communities.
The Killigil family’s migration began in Crimea. Their residence in Crimea was disrupted with the expansion of Russian dominance. Following Russia’s occupation of Crimea, the family was forced to leave the northern shores of the Black Sea and migrated to the town of Kilya at the mouth of the Danube River.
Kilya is a strategic port settlement located where the Danube River flows into the Black Sea. The family lived there for a period, earning their livelihood through trades such as Yemeni crafts and weaving.
Subsequently, due to Russia’s occupation of Romania and changing political-military conditions in the region, the family was compelled to migrate again. This second migration was directly to Abana, within the Sanjak of Kastamonu on the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea.
After settling in Abana, the family engaged in weaving, Yemeni crafts, and seafaring, thus moving along a route from Crimea to Kilya and then to Abana. The origin of the surname Killigil reflects this process; due to their time in Kilya, the family was given the nisba “Killi/Killioğlu,” which over time evolved into “Killigil.”
Nuri Killigil’s father was Hacı Ahmet Bey and his mother was Ayşe Hanım. In the previous generation, his grandfather was Hafız Kamil Bey and his grandmother was Hasene Hanım. The children of Hafız Kamil Bey and Hasene Hanım were:
Of these children, Hacı Ahmet Bey would later become the father of Nuri and his siblings.
The children of Hacı Ahmet Bey and his wife Ayşe Hanım were:
Thus, the Killigil family formed a dynamic structure both militarily and civilly, with one branch descending from Hafız Kamil Bey (Halil, Hacı Ahmet, and others) and the other from the Hacı Ahmet–Ayşe couple (Enver, Nuri, and siblings). Enver and Nuri brothers became known in military circles, while Halil (Kut) gained recognition in both military and political spheres.
The Killigil family genealogy along the line from Crimea to Anatolia includes the following names:
This lineage traces the known male line of the family from the Crimea and Kilya periods. The nisbas “Killi” and “Killioğlu” refer to their residence in the town of Kilya at the Danube mouth. The titles “Hacı” and “Hafız” denote religious devotion and social standing within the family lineage.
The generation following Hafız Kamil Bey dispersed into various roles during the late Ottoman period. Halil (Kut) Bey pursued a military career and served on multiple fronts; Hacı Ahmet Bey served in engineering and public works, particularly within the Nafıa organization. This position was decisive in the family’s relocation to Manastır.
This documented genealogy reveals a family line originating in Crimea, passing through Kilya and Abana across the Balkans, and ultimately returning to Istanbul.
Nuri Killigil’s official population records list his birthplace as Istanbul (Dersaadet) and his birth date as 5 May 1890. The fact that the population record was registered in Beşiktaş confirms it was filed in Istanbul.
However, examination of the family’s residence and assignment history reveals that his actual birthplace was Manastır. His father, Hacı Ahmet Bey, was assigned to Manastır in 1887 while serving in the Nafıa organization, and the family began living there from that date.
His elder brother, Enver Bey, received his education at the Manastır Military Rüştiye and İdadi; his sister, Mediha, was born in Manastır in 1894. It is clear that the family resided in Manastır during these years. The year 1890, accepted as Nuri’s birth year, coincides with the family’s residence in Manastır.
Therefore, although the population record lists Istanbul as the birthplace, considering family life and assignment records, it is evident that Nuri Killigil was in fact born in Manastır. The registration in Istanbul likely followed the administrative practice of the time, which recorded the birthplace according to the father’s official residence.
Nuri Killigil’s childhood years were spent in Manastır. The family’s residence in the city since 1887 shaped his early environment. At the time, Manastır was an important Ottoman center both militarily and administratively. The city housed military Rüştiye and İdadi educational institutions. Nuri Killigil received his primary and secondary military education in Manastır.
His elder brother Enver Bey also studied at the Manastır Military Rüştiye and İdadi, meaning both brothers began their military education in the same city. The family’s life in Manastır unfolded within a dense military-administrative atmosphere, encompassing both civilian and military school environments.
Nuri Killigil’s childhood revolved around the streets of Manastır, its schools, and his father’s professional circle; his years in Manastır concluded when he moved to Istanbul to attend Kuleli Military High School. These years formed the first phase of his life, encompassing both familial relationships and his initial encounter with military discipline and education.
Nuri Killigil’s formal education began in Manastır. He completed his primary schooling there and then continued with military secondary education. He received his elementary and military secondary education in Manastır, progressing through military-oriented Rüştiye and İdadi levels after primary school.
At the time, Manastır had both Rüştiye and İdadi military schools. Nuri completed these military education stages during his childhood and early youth, thereby qualifying for entry into higher military academies in Istanbul. His education in Manastır formed the foundational stage of his subsequent military studies at Kuleli Military High School and the War School.
After completing his primary and military secondary education in Manastır, Nuri Killigil entered Kuleli Military High School in 1903. From this date onward, he continued his education in Istanbul. According to the chronology, his time at Kuleli spanned 1903–1906.
Kuleli Military High School was a secondary-level institution designed to prepare students for the War School, offering a curriculum combining military and general cultural subjects. Nuri completed a three-year program and, upon graduation, met the requirements to advance to the War School.
During this period, Nuri received high school-level military education at Kuleli after his secondary schooling in Manastır, thereby completing the classical educational path prescribed for those pursuing a military career. Education at Kuleli was recorded as the essential step enabling direct entry into the War School.
After graduating from Kuleli Military High School, Nuri Killigil entered the War School (Mekteb-i Harbiye) in 1906. His studies at the War School lasted three years, and he graduated on 26 August 1909. His name on the graduation record was listed as “Mustafa Nuri Efendi bin Ahmet Deraliye.” His graduation rank was Infantry Second Lieutenant (Mülâzım-ı Sani).
When the entry and graduation dates are considered together, his education spanned 1906–1909. During these three years, Nuri followed the military and technical courses of the War School curriculum. His class ranking was recorded as fourth. The courses listed in his record included:
Grades for these courses were recorded collectively to reflect his overall academic performance at the War School.
The date of his graduation, 26 August 1909, marked the end of his student life and the beginning of his officer career. With his graduation rank and service record, Nuri Killigil was officially registered as an infantry second lieutenant in the Ottoman Army.
Nuri Killigil’s military assignment schedule began immediately after his graduation from the War School. His first assignment after graduation was to the 3rd Army Headquarters. With this assignment, he transitioned from academic training to active service.
The key dates recorded during this period are:
These dates indicate the initial phase of his official service, beginning with the conclusion of his War School education. His educational life, which began with his entry into Kuleli in 1903 and ended with his graduation from the War School in 1909, was an uninterrupted military training process; in the same year, 1909, he transitioned directly into active officer duties.
After graduating from the War School with the rank of infantry second lieutenant, Nuri Killigil was assigned to the 3rd Army. With this assignment, he was posted within the 3rd Army’s organization stationed in Rumelia and became part of its officer corps.
Following his assignment, he was posted to one of the units under the 3rd Army and began duty on 9 January 1910 at the 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Thus, he moved from headquarters duty to active service as a company officer within an infantry regiment. This role marked his first direct involvement in troop deployment, training, and internal service operations.
During this period, his duty station was within the 3rd Army’s operational area, and his service was conducted within the infantry branch. The assignment records clearly indicate his posting under the 3rd Army, 71st Regiment, 3rd Battalion, and 3rd Company in Rumelia.
The next stage in Nuri Killigil’s service record shows his return to Istanbul and transfer to a palace-centered unit. After his service in the 3rd Army, he was assigned to the Palace Infantry Battalion on 12 October 1910.
The Palace Infantry Battalion was a guard unit stationed around the Sultan’s palace. With this assignment, Nuri Killigil left the 3rd Army units in Rumelia and joined a military structure directly linked to the palace. His duties were carried out within the infantry officer cadre of this unit.
This assignment appears in the official service record as the second military step following his posting in the 3rd Army. The date and unit name are clearly specified in the assignment records.
Nuri Killigil’s military life during this period was directly connected to the positions of his family members. His father Hacı Ahmet Bey’s brother, <Halil (Kut) Bey, was an officer serving in high-ranking positions in the Ottoman Army during the same years. It is known that Halil Bey was involved in the organization and management of the Palace Infantry Battalion and held a command position within it. Nuri’s assignment to this unit resulted in his serving under his uncle’s command.
His elder brother, Enver Bey, was an ascending officer in the Ottoman Army during the same period, holding various assignments. Before the Tripolitania War, he served as a military attaché in Berlin and later moved to Tripolitania. Nuri Killigil maintained familial ties with Enver Bey both during his service in the 3rd Army and while serving in the Palace Battalion.
In this context, during his military service from 1909 to 1911, Nuri was connected through family ties to both the command circle where his uncle Halil (Kut) Bey served and the military cadre where his brother Enver Bey operated. The command structure of the units he served in became intertwined with his family genealogy during this period.
Nuri Pasha and His Nephew Ali Enver Bey (Atilla Oral Archive)
Following the 31 March Incident, Istanbul’s palace security was reorganized, and new guard units were established around the Sultan. As part of this reorganization, the Palace Infantry Battalion became one of the units formed to protect the Sultan and his surroundings.
Nuri Killigil’s assignment on 12 October 1910 coincided with the implementation of this reorganization. Thus, he began serving in the Palace Infantry Battalion, which was part of the palace guard structure established after the 31 March Incident.
In this context, Nuri Killigil’s duties involved performing guard and internal service tasks within the palace region, participating in ceremonial and official receptions as part of the Sultan’s retinue, and operating within the framework of security and protocol. His military service from 1909 to 1911 continued with this palace guard duty after his earlier field service in the 3rd Army.
Throughout the 19th century, the North African coast gradually separated from Ottoman sovereignty under the expansionist policies of European powers. France seized Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, reducing the Ottoman Empire’s territories in the region known as the “Western Janissaries.” After these developments, Tripolitania remained the Ottoman Empire’s last major province in North Africa.
Italy’s late completion of political unification, following other European powers’ acquisition of colonial territories, led it to seek a territorial foothold in the Mediterranean. Tripolitania and Benghazi became among the regions Italy targeted for its sphere of influence. Although the Ottoman Empire maintained administrative control over Tripolitania, its distance from the center and limited maritime access rendered it militarily weak.
In the early 20th century, Italy made various demands on the Ottoman Empire to secure concessions and establish economic and political influence in Tripolitania. When these demands were rejected, tensions between the two states escalated, and Italy accelerated preparations for the invasion of Tripolitania.
Following the concentration of the Italian navy in the Mediterranean, the war was declared on 29 September 1911, and soon after, landing operations began on the coasts of Tripoli and Benghazi. Coastal cities such as Tripoli, Derna, Benghazi, and Tobruk were bombarded by artillery, followed by troop landings.
Unable to maintain naval dominance over the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire could not send regular army units to Tripolitania by sea. Only small groups of volunteer officers and limited personnel could be transported overland or via third countries. Consequently, the military structure of the war was shaped primarily by local forces and volunteer officers rather than regular units.
At the outbreak of the Tripolitania War, Nuri Bey was serving as an officer in the Sultan’s retinue. While his elder brother Enver Bey was on leave in Berlin, news arrived of the bombardment of Tripoli and Preveze. Upon hearing this news, Enver Bey returned to Istanbul, and Halil Bey began preparations to travel to Tripolitania; Nuri Bey also decided to go to Tripolitania.
Nuri Bey requested permission from the Sultan to join the war zone. Upon receiving approval, he began preparations to travel to Tripolitania as a volunteer officer.
In his first attempt, Nuri Bey, along with Halil Bey and Ali (Çetinkaya), boarded the Orient Express in 15 November 1911 and traveled to Paris. The journey took them from Istanbul through the Balkans into Europe and then to Paris. After a brief stay in Paris, they proceeded to Marseille and then to Tunis.
This route was chosen because direct sea access to Tripolitania was impossible. The goal was to cross into Tripolitania via Tunis, but the first attempt failed, and they were unable to enter Tripolitania. After this failure, the group returned to Paris.
In his second attempt, Nuri Bey again used the Marseille–Tunis route. On 15 December 1911, he traveled alone, took a steamer from Marseille to Tunis, and successfully crossed into Tripolitania via the desert route, guided by local contacts and following migration paths across the borders.
After entering the Tripolitania region, Nuri Bey advanced into the desert and reached the points where Ottoman officers had gathered. He arrived in Aziziye on 10 January 1912, stayed there for a period, and joined the front organization. Aziziye was a center where volunteer officers and local forces assembled.
After Aziziye, he was sent on 15 January 1912 to the Margab Headquarters, attached to the Homs Front, and joined the units under Halil Bey’s command. Margab was the central headquarters of the Homs Front, serving as a strategic position for defense and offensive operations between the coast and inland areas.
During his service in Tripolitania, Nuri Bey was stationed at various fronts in the eastern and central regions of Tripolitania. These included:
He operated alongside local forces against Italian units. These activities included positional battles, raids, defensive arrangements, protection of supply routes, and efforts to halt enemy units advancing from the coast toward inland areas.
The Tripolitania War was largely conducted by volunteer officers and local forces due to the Ottoman regular army’s inability to reach the region by sea. Officers who departed from Istanbul and various garrisons on their own initiative reached Tripolitania via different routes and were placed in command of units formed from the local population.
Nuri Bey was part of this volunteer movement, and his entry into Tripolitania was achieved through his own initiative and the Sultan’s permission. Crossing the desert route via Tunis, Nuri Bey established contact with local tribes and clans and served at headquarters where these forces gathered.
In the region, local tribes and clans around Tripoli, Derna, Benghazi, Tobruk, Homs, and Misrata were organized as mujahid units during the war. Volunteer officers were responsible for commanding, organizing, and implementing defense and offensive plans for these units. Nuri Bey’s duties at the Margab Headquarters were part of this broader structure.
The Tripolitania War ended with the Ushi Treaty signed on 15 October 1912 between the Ottoman Empire and Italy. Under this treaty, the Ottoman Empire relinquished its actual administration over Tripolitania and Benghazi, while the caliphate’s religious authority was guaranteed to continue.
After the treaty was signed, orders were issued for volunteer officers and Ottoman personnel in Tripolitania to return home, and Nuri Bey departed from the war zone to return to Istanbul. Thus, his first front experience, spanning from late 1911 to the autumn of 1912, was completed; the subsequent period marked the transition to the Balkan Wars and military-diplomatic assignments.
After returning from Tripolitania to Istanbul, the Balkan Wars began, and the Ottoman Army entered war with the Balkan Alliance states. At this time, Nuri Bey was reassigned to a unit for continental service. During the Balkan War, particularly during the First and Second Battles of Çatalca, he served in units organized to defend Istanbul.
Nuri Bey was assigned to a unit stationed in Selimiye, Istanbul, and positioned with units defending the Çatalca line against Bulgarian forces. Relevant records indicate that he served in the 1st Corps, 6th Regiment, 1st Battalion, 3rd Company. The Çatalca line was a defensive line established to prevent Balkan forces from approaching Istanbul, and the units stationed along it were deployed for the direct defense of the capital.
During this period, Nuri Bey participated in tasks such as preparing defensive positions, organizing defense lines, coordinating movements between forward and rear lines, and deploying units into battle formations. During the Çatalca battles, the corps units were subjected to intense artillery and infantry fire from defensive positions, and Nuri Bey continued his duties throughout these battle phases.
After the initial Ottoman retreats in the Balkan Wars, the Çatalca line became the last major defensive line the Ottoman Army held, and Nuri Bey’s regiment and battalion were among those assigned to defend it. His service during this period constituted his second military phase, following his Tripolitania front experience, now participating in conventional warfare with the regular army in the Balkans.
After the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire entered a process of reorganizing its military and diplomatic relations with European states. As part of this, several officers were assigned to military attaché and deputy attaché positions at Ottoman embassies in European capitals. Nuri Bey was among those appointed to these roles.
His rank was first promoted, and then he was assigned abroad. On 6 November 1913, he was promoted to Major (Yüzbaşı) and simultaneously appointed to the Deputy Military Attaché in Rome. With this assignment, he became part of the military representation staff at the Ottoman Embassy in Rome, Italy’s capital. During his time in Rome, he monitored the structure, organization, and military developments of the Italian Army and participated in military contacts conducted within the framework of embassy activities.
After his posting in Rome, Nuri Bey’s second foreign assignment was in the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On 15 June 1914, he was appointed to the Deputy Military Attaché at the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna. With this appointment, he assumed the role of assistant to the military attaché at the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna, the capital of Austria-Hungary.
During his service in Vienna, a period of rising political and military tensions in Europe unfolded, accelerating toward World War I. While serving in the embassy’s military cadre, Nuri Bey closely monitored developments in European military movements and the balance of power among states. Thus, his military career, which began with field service during the Balkan Wars, continued with military-diplomatic representation roles in Rome and Vienna.
Nuri Bey’s foreign service period ended just before the outbreak of World War I. While continuing his duties in Vienna, he was recalled to the center as part of new reorganizations within the Ottoman military structure.
On 15 August 1914, he was appointed to the position of Aide-de-Camp at the Ministry of War. The Aide-de-Camp position at the Ministry of War was a role conducted within the central military administration under the direct supervision of the Minister of War. With this appointment, Nuri Bey returned to Istanbul and began working within the Ministry of War, the center of central decision-making and command mechanisms.
At this time, the Ottoman Empire was about to enter World War I, and military deployment and administration would be largely conducted through the Ministry of War. Nuri Bey’s assignment as Aide-de-Camp placed him directly in contact with the central organization and established a phase that prepared him for future front-line commands and special missions.
The period from 1912 to 1914 marked a phase in Nuri Bey’s military career, transitioning from his field duties in Tripolitania and the Balkans to military attaché deputy roles in European capitals and finally to the Ministry of War Aide-de-Camp position, bridging the front and the center, the battlefield and diplomacy.
At the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire planned an operation targeting the Suez Canal, assigning the 4th Army Command to Cemal Pasha. Cemal Pasha arrived in Damascus in early December 1914 and began preparations for the Canal Operation, aiming to surprise British forces near Ismailia and incite unrest in Egypt.
Minister of War Enver Pasha, seeking to divide British forces and reduce pressure on the Canal, requested the opening of a second front along the western border of Egypt. He planned for the Senussi leader Sheikh Ahmed to launch an attack on Egypt via Sollum. However, Sheikh Ahmed and his cousin Seyid Idris opposed this offensive idea.
To break this resistance and centralize command over regional forces, Enver Pasha appointed his brother, Major Nuri Bey, as commander of the forces in Africa. Nuri Bey’s mission was to persuade Sheikh Ahmed to launch operations toward Egypt and assume command over the forces in Tripolitania. At the time of this appointment, Nuri Bey was serving as Aide-de-Camp at the Ministry of War in Istanbul since 15 August 1914.
Upon his assignment to Africa, Nuri Bey boarded a Greek smuggling vessel and landed on the Defne coast between Tobruk and Sollum in February 1915. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Cafer el-Askerî and several other officers. Thus, he formally entered the field to command military operations in Tripolitania and the western border of Egypt, beginning his Libya-centered duties that would last throughout World War I.
With Nuri Bey’s arrival in Tripolitania and Benghazi, the existing command structure in the region was reorganized. The Governor of Tripolitania, Süleyman el-Baruni, had previously exercised authority over local mujahid forces and administrative structures, but under the new arrangement, he came under direct relations with Nuri Bey.
Shortly afterward, a new command structure was established under the name African Groups Command, and Nuri Pasha was appointed its commander. The Chief of Staff, Major Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman, who had previously served as an advisor to the governor, was now attached to Nuri Pasha’s headquarters under the title of Chief of Staff of the African Groups Command, and the governor came under the command of the African Groups Command.
Under this structure, the forces stationed in the region were organized into Sudan, Fizan, Benghazi, and Tripolitania Groups. These groups included regular units, mujahid detachments, and mixed (regular–mujahid) units. Under the supply branch, facilities for manufacturing gunpowder and explosives, arms repair workshops, and uniform and equipment production units were established. Civilian personnel such as Pertev Tevfik and Egyptian Abdurrahman Azam were included in the headquarters support staff.
As Commander of the African Groups, Nuri Pasha commanded Ottoman and local forces in Tripolitania, Benghazi, Sudan, and Fizan. With the governor’s subordination to this command, Nuri Pasha’s military authority was augmented by administrative responsibility. Thus, throughout World War I, the organization composed of Ottoman and local forces on the Tripolitania front came under a single centralized command under his authority.
The initial phase of operations on the Tripolitania front began with operations against the British along the western border of Egypt. Following Enver Pasha’s instructions, Nuri Pasha attempted to persuade Sheikh Ahmed to launch operations toward Egypt and prepared attacks against British forces in coordination with Senussi forces.
In this context, various movements were carried out along the Benghazi, Tobruk, Sollum, and Egypt border lines, particularly targeting British units in the Sollum direction. Nuri Pasha’s preparations in areas such as Inzali and Cidabiye aimed to keep British forces occupied in Egypt and limit their troop deployments to the Canal region.
However, insufficient supply capabilities and vast terrain conditions hampered operations along the Tripolitania–Egypt border. During this period, plans were made to send money and supplies to the region via German submarines, but due to sea conditions and other reasons, these shipments could not be sustained regularly, causing operations to slow at times.
Nuri Pasha’s offensives toward Egypt ultimately led to the British recapturing Sollum, shifting the situation to a new phase. The British pushed back Nuri Pasha’s and Senussi forces within Egyptian territory, after which Seyid Idris emerged as a prominent figure, engaging in negotiations with the British and Italians, and a new political balance emerged along the Tripolitania–Benghazi front.
After the operations on the Egypt–Sollum front, Nuri Pasha’s activities focused primarily on Italian-occupied areas. Italian forces were stationed in three groups in fortified positions around Homs, Tripoli, and Zuwarah along the Tripolitania coastline. In contrast, Tripolitanian mujahids were positioned opposite these positions, and due to ongoing conflicts with the Senussis in the Sirt region, they faced a two-front situation.
With Nuri Pasha’s arrival in the western region, land warfare against the Italians intensified in Tripolitania. A headquarters structure centered in Misrata conducted reconnaissance and offensive preparations against Italian positions around Homs. During reconnaissance of the Homs front, Italian positions were approached closely, and observation towers and defensive arrangements were observed on-site.
Between April 1917 and January 1918, under Nuri Pasha’s command, units in the Tripolitania Vilayet conducted various battles against Italian forces alongside local tribal units. During the same period, these forces also clashed with British units in Sudan and French units along the borders of Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger, in addition to battles on the Tripolitania and western Egypt fronts.
During this period, clashes between the Italian occupation line and inland areas in Tripolitania and Benghazi occurred as part of the activities of local mujahid forces and units under the African Groups Command against Italian fortifications around coastal centers.
Nuri Pasha was decorated with various orders and medals for his duties in Tripolitania and Benghazi during World War I.
On 29 July 1916, he was awarded the Iron Cross First Class by the German Emperor. On 22 November 1916 (9 Teşrinisani 1332), he was honored by the Ottoman Sultan with the Ottoman Gold Medal of Merit.
During this period, rank promotions also occurred; Nuri, whose original rank was Major, was promoted to Colonel (Binbaşı) on 24 December 1916 (11 Kânunuevvel 1332) and granted a one-year seniority on 28 February 1917 (15 Şubat 1332).
After his return to Istanbul, Nuri Pasha was further honored with the Third-Class Sworded Osmanî Order on 6 February 1334 (1918) in recognition of his activities in Tripolitania and Benghazi.
These promotions and decorations represent the official military recognition of his duties on the Tripolitania front during World War I.
Over time, various disagreements emerged within the African Groups Command headquarters. Differences in opinion arose between Nuri Pasha and the Chief of Staff, Major Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman, particularly regarding the management of relations with Senussi leaders and the handling of tribal balances in Tripolitania.
Seyid Idris’s distant attitude toward Ottoman administration, the conflict between him and Seyid Ahmed, and independence claims in Tripolitania and Benghazi created a complex situation. Nuri Pasha aimed to work with Seyid Ahmed, whom he believed could be effective in Tripolitania, to bring the governor under his command and establish a coordinated structure with Senussi forces. This approach generated tensions with Ramazan Bey and some tribal leaders.
After evaluations in the center, it was concluded that this situation could negatively affect the overall balance in the region, and the Supreme Command decided to make changes in the African Groups Command. Accordingly, Nuri Pasha’s removal from duty was decided, and Şehzade Osman Fuat, a grandson of Sultan Murad, was appointed as the new commander of the African Groups Command.
About five months after the departure of Chief of Staff Major Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman, Nuri Pasha left Tripolitania in early January 1918 via a German submarine and returned to Istanbul via the Mısrata–Pola route.
After his return to Istanbul, he was appointed to the Command of the Caucasian Islamic Army as part of the upcoming Caucasus campaign in the final phase of World War I. Thus, his duties in Tripolitania and Benghazi from 1914 to 1918 ended, and a new front and phase of his military career began.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, Russian army units began withdrawing from the fronts, and military and political authority in the Caucasus largely collapsed. With the withdrawal of Russian forces, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, composed of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani elements, and later the Transcaucasian Seym, attempted to fill the power vacuum, but internal disagreements quickly emerged within this structure.
The Treaty of Brest–Litovsk signed on 3 March 1918 enabled the Ottoman Empire to regain Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which it had lost in 1878, and provided the legal basis for Ottoman military advances into the Caucasus. Cities were gradually surrendered; the balance of power in the Caucasus was fundamentally altered.
During this period, the Baku Soviet, composed of Bolsheviks and Armenian Dashnak elements under the leadership of Stepan Shaumyan, was established in Baku, and in March 1918, the Baku Massacre (March Events) occurred against Azerbaijani Turks. Thousands of Azerbaijani Turks lost their lives, deepening the authority crisis in the region. These developments led the Azerbaijani government to request military assistance from the Ottoman Empire.
In response to the request for assistance from Azerbaijan, the Ottoman Empire decided to appoint a commander for the forces to be sent to the Caucasus. The assignment was given to Nuri Bey, who had previously commanded in Tripolitania and Benghazi.
The appointment was formalized by a decree issued by Sultan VI. Mehmed Vahdeddin, and Nuri Bey was granted the title of “Commander of the Caucasian Islamic Army.” This army was planned to consist of both Ottoman units and newly formed local Azerbaijani units. After the appointment, Nuri Bey was granted extensive military authority, and the organization of forces to be sent to the Caucasus was entrusted to him.
After his appointment as commander, Nuri Pasha first went to Mosul, where he prepared the units to accompany him. Units departing from Mosul first advanced into Iran via the Hakkâri–Van route, then followed the Hoy–Dilman–Jolfa route toward the Caucasus borders.
During this journey, geographical conditions became difficult; units undertook long marches through the mountainous regions of Iran. Subsequently, the Nakhchivan–Ordubad route was crossed, and Nuri Pasha and his units reached Ganja. Ganja, the capital of Azerbaijan at the time, was chosen as the first headquarters location for organizing Ottoman forces.
After arriving in Ganja, Nuri Pasha began organizing the Caucasian Islamic Army. The army consisted of two main components:
During this period, the army’s needs—weapons, ammunition, logistical supplies, and provisions—were provided by the Ottoman Empire, while the organization and training of local forces were conducted by Nuri Pasha and his staff.
The Caucasian Islamic Army began its military operation toward Baku eastward from Ganja.
The first clashes occurred along the Gökçay line. Due to the strong defensive positions of the Bolshevik–Armenian forces, the operation involved intense fighting.
In Salyan, it was necessary to cross the river and surrounding marshlands; progress in this region was sustained with the support of local elements.
After breaking resistance on the Aksu line, advances were made toward Kürdemir. Control over both the railway and road in the Kürdemir area provided a significant strategic advantage for the advance toward Baku.
Şamahı was one of the cities severely damaged during the March Events and was a region heavily occupied by Bolshevik–Dashnak forces. The Caucasian Islamic Army recognized Şamahı as a crucial center for controlling this line and captured the region.
Each of these operations constituted a stage in the army’s advance toward Baku, with each phase involving difficult battles due to geographical conditions, logistical problems, and enemy resistance.
The First Baku Offensive was the first major operation by the Caucasian Islamic Army to reach the gates of Baku. At this time, the city was still under the control of the Baku Soviet and Armenian Dashnak elements. Due to the strong defensive line, the city could not be captured, and the army withdrew to reorganize.
The Second Baku Offensive was carried out after the entry of British forces under General Dunsterville into Baku. This period marked the most intense battles fought by the Caucasian Islamic Army. Although British-supported Baku defenses hindered the army’s advance, the second offensive was systematically conducted, resulting in the complete encirclement of the city.
On 15 September 1918, the Caucasian Islamic Army entered Baku. The forces in the city were forced to retreat, and the administration of Baku was transferred to the Azerbaijani government.
The capture of Baku changed the balance of power in the Caucasus and opened the way for the Azerbaijani National Government to move its capital to Baku. After the capture of Baku, Nuri Pasha focused on military order and security in the city and ensured the deployment of Caucasian Islamic Army units within Baku.
After the capture of Baku, the Caucasian Islamic Army continued its activities in the Karabakh and Dagestan regions. During this period, part of the army was directed to western Azerbaijan to conduct operations to restore order and neutralize various armed elements in Karabakh.
Similarly, upon requests for assistance from local governments in Dagestan, Nuri Pasha sent units to the region, and Caucasian Islamic Army units were seen in various cities of Dagestan. These activities were carried out to achieve military and political stability in the region after the capture of Baku.
The activities of the Caucasian Islamic Army hold an important place in Azerbaijani history. With the capture of Baku, the army facilitated the transfer of the Azerbaijani National Government to the capital, establishing a period of military and administrative cooperation between Ottoman administration and the Azerbaijani government.
Through headquarters established in Ganja and Baku, the organization of the Azerbaijani army was supported, local security organizations were restructured, and military training and administrative organization were implemented.
The presence of the Caucasian Islamic Army in the Caucasus lasted until November 1918; after the Mudros Armistice, the Ottoman forces withdrew from the region, and the Caucasian Islamic Army officially completed its mission.
After the Mudros Armistice, Nuri Pasha left the Caucasus and moved to Batum on 12 December 1918. In a letter he wrote to General Yakup Şevki Pasha, Commander of the 9th Army, he informed him of his intention to travel to Istanbul. Upon the British occupation of Batum, fearing possible mistreatment, he traveled with his officers via Artvin–Ardahan to Kars, where he met Yakup Şevki Pasha.
He then traveled from Kars via Erzurum–Bayburt to Trabzon. Telegrams between the Ministry of War and the 9th Army Command indicate that Nuri Pasha was in Trabzon by the end of January 1919.
He traveled from Trabzon by sea to Istanbul; upon disembarking, he was arrested by police and taken to the Ministry of War. After being detained for one day at the Bekirağa Barracks, he was handed over to the British. He was then taken back to Batum, where he was imprisoned for five months at the Ardahan Barracks and one month at the Ivanovka camp. General Milne’s report dated 19 February 1919, stating that Nuri Pasha would be tried by a British military court in Batum, confirms this period of detention.
This phase involved a process of detention and deportation along the route from Ganja to Batum, Kars, Trabzon, and Istanbul.
Nuri Pasha was imprisoned for five months at the Ardahan Barracks and one month at Ivanovka camp during his detention in Batum.
Regarding his escape from the Ardahan Barracks, it is reported that a group assisting him entered the barracks area disguised as a shepherd, delivered a note with clues to Nuri Pasha, and that Nuri Pasha, having gained the guards’ trust, expanded his walking area. On one occasion, when he was taken outside with the guards, gunfire from the wooded area killed two British officers and three sergeants. In the ensuing chaos, he was aided by the group outside the barracks and retreated into the forest.
The date of the escape is confirmed in the telegram dated 12 August 1919 from the Commander of the 15th Corps, Kazım Karabekir Pasha. The telegram states that the Ardahan Barracks were attacked on the night of 8/9 August 1335 (1919), two British officers and four soldiers were killed, and Nuri Pasha escaped. The same telegram notes that despite searches by aircraft and torpedoes, no trace of him was found after the escape.
After the escape, Nuri Pasha reached Urucu in the Oltu region via Artvin and Ardananuç and sent a telegram to Kazım Karabekir Pasha on 9 September 1919 to report his situation.
After escaping from the Ardahan Barracks, Nuri Pasha established contact with Kazım Karabekir Pasha in Eastern Anatolia and then returned to the Caucasus. After discussions in Erzurum, it was decided that he should return to Baku to organize support for the National Struggle in Anatolia.
During his time in the Caucasus, he established connections with the political and military structures of North Caucasus and was appointed by the North Caucasus Committee as commander of Muslim forces in the region. In this context, he operated primarily in the Dagestan region.
During the same period, securing financial support for the National Struggle in Anatolia became a priority; Kazım Karabekir Pasha requested that Nuri Pasha initiate contacts to secure financial aid from Azerbaijan and establish a radio station in Ganja. These requests were addressed through contacts conducted via Nuri Pasha.
During Nuri Pasha’s activities in Dagestan, the forces of General Denikin (White Army) were dominant in the region. The Muslim forces under Nuri Pasha’s command fought alongside the Red Army against Denikin’s forces during this period.
After Denikin’s forces suffered defeat, the balance of power in the region shifted, and the Bolshevik forces began to establish dominance in Azerbaijan and Dagestan. In response, Nuri Pasha moved his forces into a defensive position and attempted to continue resistance in the region. He faced an increasingly difficult struggle as Bolshevik dominance expanded in the Caucasus.
In letters sent during this period, Kazım Karabekir Pasha emphasized that the Bolsheviks’ rapid advance toward the Turkish border was politically necessary; in contrast, Nuri Pasha continued resistance in Dagestan with the forces under his command.
One of Nuri Pasha’s final military movements in the Caucasus occurred in the Karabakh region. This movement emerged in connection with the power vacuum in the region, conflicts between Azerbaijani and Armenian armed elements, and the Bolshevik advance. British forces entered Shusha as part of administrative arrangements for Karabakh; subsequently, they recognized Karabakh as belonging to Azerbaijan and decided that the region would be governed under Azerbaijani laws, appointing Hüsrev Bey Sultanov as the full-power governor. These developments affected the military and political process in the region.
During this period, Nuri Pasha was actively involved in Karabakh, operating at the head of local forces; it is reported that his forces included the Şeki, Cevanşir, Ağdam cavalry units, the Baku Infantry Regiment, and two artillery units, totaling approximately 6,000 personnel. The movement was effective around Ağdam, Berde, and Terter, and military actions were conducted in Shusha and its surroundings.
Efforts to establish control over armed elements in the region rapidly intensified with the Bolshevik advance, the movement in Karabakh was suppressed, and Nuri Pasha was forced to leave the region. This period constituted his final military activities in the Caucasus.
After his activities in the Caucasus and Karabakh, Nuri Pasha arrived in Erzurum in late summer 1920 with the units he brought with him. During meetings in August 1920, it was recorded that he joined the command of the 15th Corps (Eastern Front Command) upon reaching Erzurum.
After arriving in Erzurum, he established contact with the Eastern Front Commander, Kazım Karabekir Pasha, and was integrated into the Eastern Front organization. At this time, it was reported that Armenian forces continued their attacks against Turkish units and villagers, and Erzurum and its surroundings were in a state of intense military preparation.
Nuri Pasha joined the Eastern Front cadre with the cavalry units he brought from Azerbaijan, which were placed under the 12th Division.
At the time of his arrival in Erzurum, Armenian forces were continuing their attacks on the Eastern Front. In response, the Government of the Grand National Assembly decided to resolve the issue by military means and issued a decision to attack on 20 September 1920, which was communicated to the Eastern Front Command on the same day.
After completing preparations, the Eastern Front Command launched an offensive on the night of 27/28 September 1920, initiating an advance toward Sarıkamış with the 9th Caucasian Division and the 12th Infantry Division. Within this offensive structure, the Azerbaijani Cavalry Regiment under Nuri Pasha’s command operated under the 12th Infantry Division.
From this point onward, Nuri Pasha actively participated in the National Struggle on the Eastern Front, operating with his cavalry regiment on the forward lines in accordance with the Eastern Front offensive plan.
The offensive toward Sarıkamış as part of the Eastern Front operation began on the night of 27/28 September 1920, and the 12th Infantry Division advanced as far as the Sürphaç Mountain–Handere Ridge line.
On the night of 28/29 September 1920, following the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Sarıkamış and the front line, the Azerbaijani Cavalry Regiment participating in the offensive entered Sarıkamış at 05:00 on 29 September 1920 and occupied Sarıkamış without resistance.
The spoils captured in Sarıkamış were identified by a commission established by the Azerbaijani Cavalry Regiment, and the regiment also participated in the defense of Sarıkamış.
In subsequent official correspondence, it was clearly stated that Nuri Pasha voluntarily participated with the unit he brought from Azerbaijan under the 12th Division in the operation to recapture Sarıkamış and served in this operation.
After participating in the Sarıkamış offensive, Nuri Pasha was assigned by the Eastern Front Command to tasks related to the establishment and operation of factories and workshops. Official records state that he was assigned to the Eastern Front Command for the establishment and operation of factories and workshops.
In this context, he worked in repair shops and military factories established in Kars and Erzurum, engaging in activities to make seized weapons and equipment usable. It is noted that weapons, ammunition, and machine parts captured in various battles on the Eastern Front were repaired and returned to service in these facilities, and Nuri Pasha was involved in this process.
In later activities, it is recorded that Nuri Pasha’s name appears in connection with the establishment of the military factory now located within the Erzurum Firdevsoğlu Barracks; he established a workshop using weapons, ammunition, and machine parts seized from Armenian and Russian units and conducted technical activities for repair and reuse.
These activities demonstrate that during the Eastern Front phase of the National Struggle, Nuri Pasha was not only active on the front lines but also played a role in establishing military technical infrastructure and reusing available materials.
After his service on the Eastern Front, an official evaluation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense regarding Nuri Pasha, and information was requested from the Eastern Front Commander, Kazım Karabekir Pasha. In the response, it was reported that Nuri Pasha had come with a cavalry regiment from Azerbaijan and participated in the recapture of Sarıkamış and later served in the front workshops.
Based on this response, Nuri Pasha’s service duration and rank status were reviewed; it was decided that he would be retired on 4 December 1928 with the rank of “Infantry Kaymakam (Major)”, effective from 9 November 1921. The retirement decree was signed by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, and Minister of National Defense Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda.
Based on this decision, it was deemed appropriate to award Nuri Pasha the Independence Medal, and Independence Medal No. 15260 was delivered to him on 29 February 1929 by the Ankara Central Command.
Thus, Nuri Pasha’s activities during the National Struggle years, his participation in the Sarıkamış operation on the Eastern Front, his work in the military factories in Erzurum and Kars, and the Independence Medal awarded to him for these services have been officially recorded.
After leaving the military, Nuri Killigil continued his activities in the civilian sector during the Republic period. His retirement process, effective from 9 November 1921, was finalized on 4 December 1928 with the rank of “infantry kaymakam (major).” After a period in Ankara, he moved to Istanbul and turned to industry and trade.
In this new period, ironware production, arms and ammunition manufacturing, and mining formed his primary areas of activity. He established factories in Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce in Istanbul and began operating a mercury mine in İzmir Karaburun. The ironware, arms, ammunition, and mercury produced in these facilities were marketed both domestically and internationally.
After leaving the military and entering civilian life, Nuri Killigil moved to Istanbul and established the Zeytinburnu Ironware Factory in 1933.
This factory, as its name suggests, was initially organized as a facility focused on “ironware” production. In subsequent years, it transformed into a mixed structure engaged in both ironware and arms and ammunition production. The factory continued its operations in Zeytinburnu until 1946, after which its equipment was relocated to Sütlüce.
In the Zeytinburnu Factory, not only military supplies but also various civilian metal products were manufactured, giving the factory’s production program a diverse content.
From its inception, the Zeytinburnu Ironware Factory produced a wide variety of items. Records indicate the following products for the factory’s initial production:
Additionally, it is recorded that during idle times, the factory produced German-style double-walled “Meller-type” stoves, placed importance on firebrick and ceramic manufacturing, used tar as fuel in firebrick kilns, and that the ceramic kiln was known by a special name among workers.
It is also mentioned that Nuri Killigil occasionally attempted motor production, particularly focusing on diesel engine manufacturing.
Thus, the Zeytinburnu Ironware Factory operated as a mixed facility producing both civilian iron and metal goods and weapons and ammunition.
While the Zeytinburnu factory was operational, Nuri Killigil initiated efforts to acquire a second facility, the Metalware Factory in Sütlüce.
According to historical records, the facility was originally a limited company-owned factory on Şişli Ergenekon Street producing coal coke in 1933, later converted into a metalware factory, relocated to Sütlüce in 1936, and began operations in casting, with the addition of a foundry, 16 workstations, and a press in 1937.
In 1938, the aforementioned limited company was liquidated, and the metalware factory was transferred to Nuri Killigil under license number 2251 according to the Industrial Incentive Law.
On 31 March 1939, Nuri Killigil applied to the Ministry of Economy to approve the factory’s internal regulations; the license identified the factory as the “Metalware Factory,” but the first article explicitly stated that the factory could produce military supplies.
After this transfer, the Sütlüce factory became a facility producing both metalware and military supplies; in subsequent years, with the relocation of equipment from Zeytinburnu, it became the main center of Nuri Killigil’s industrial activities.
After acquiring the Sütlüce factory, Nuri Killigil made investments to increase production capacity at both the Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce facilities. New motors and workstations were added to the factories, expanding production capabilities.
With the development of the Sütlüce factory, Nuri Killigil began manufacturing handguns. Records indicate that he carried out serial production of a 9 mm handgun known as the “Nuri Handgun” or “Killigil Handgun,” and an example of this handgun is displayed in the Military Museum in Istanbul.
It is also recorded that the production of officer handguns was assigned to Nuri Killigil’s factory, and the necessary extensions of production time were officially recognized through decrees.
Nuri Killigil’s 9 mm Nuri Handgun Produced for Fevzi Çakmak (Anadolu Agency)
Nuri Killigil signed a contract with the Ministry of National Defense for the production of the 81 mm infantry mortar. Under the contract dated 21 January 1939, he undertook the production of 480 units of 81 mm mortars. When delivery could not be completed within the contracted period, the reasons of wartime conditions and difficulties in obtaining parts were cited; as a result, the delivery deadline was extended twice, on 24 October 1942 and 19 February 1943.
Thus, the production of 81 mm mortars at Nuri Killigil’s factory is recorded as an official activity conducted under government orders since 1939.
Various weights of aircraft bombs were also manufactured at the Sütlüce Factory. Records indicate that among the products sent to the İzmir International Fair were 250 kg, 50 kg, 10 kg, and 1 kg aircraft bombs, along with artillery and mortar shells, tapas, handguns, and other materials.
Additionally, aircraft bombs and demolition molds are explicitly listed among the military supplies produced at the Sütlüce Factory.
Nuri Killigil’s factories also produced ammunition and tapas for anti-aircraft guns. According to decree records, tenders were conducted through negotiation for the production of precision tapas for 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and the necessary fragmentation shells for these weapon systems. It is also stated that artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft shells and tapas were produced under this scope.
During these productions, it is recorded that various machines and equipment acquired during wartime were provided to Nuri Killigil’s factories as per decree, and it was decided that these would be sold through negotiation under Law No. 2490.
In addition to ironware and arms and ammunition production, Nuri Killigil operated a mercury mine in İzmir Karaburun. The mercury extracted from this facility was sold both to the domestic market and international markets.
According to correspondence records, after a Belgian company operating in Belgium requested mercury from the Karaburun facility, 100 grams of mercury were requested as a sample; additionally, it is noted that a Japanese company obtained government permission to purchase 95 bottles of mercury, and Nuri Killigil inquired how quickly this order could be prepared.
It is also mentioned in the letters that efforts were made to procure compressors and centrifugal pumps from France and Germany for the mercury facility, and instructions were given regarding the amount of lime needed to neutralize wastewater generated during mercury production.
This information demonstrates that the Karaburun mercury mine was a business conducted with both technical equipment and international trade connections.
Nuri Killigil sold part of the arms and ammunition produced in his Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce factories to the Ministry of National Defense and part to foreign countries. Records indicate that he received orders from, and sold arms and ammunition to, particularly Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan.
According to records in the Grand National Assembly minutes, Nuri Killigil applied for permission to export arms to Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan in 1948. Due to the United Nations Security Council’s embargo on Syria and Egypt, export permission was denied; however, permission was granted for exports to Pakistan as there was no embargo on that country.
Regarding the scope of arms exports, it is recorded that among the products manufactured at Nuri Killigil’s factories were mortar guns, various caliber artillery and mortar shells, aircraft bombs, tapas, handguns, and other military supplies, and these products were specifically displayed at the İzmir International Fair.
Thus, during the Republic period, Nuri Killigil’s factories in Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce, along with the Karaburun mercury facility, operated as industrial and commercial centers conducting sales to the domestic market and exports to Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and various other countries.
Aircraft Bombs Produced by Nuri Pasha (Killigil) at the Sütlüce Factory (Anadolu Agency)
With the outbreak of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Middle Eastern countries turned to various sources to obtain arms and ammunition. During this period, Nuri Killigil’s Sütlüce factory also came under the attention of some actors in the region. While the factory was engaged in production for the Ministry of National Defense and arms exports to foreign countries, demands related to the intensifying conflicts in the Middle East created connections between the weapons and ammunition produced at the factory and regional needs.
In this context, Nuri Killigil increased arms and ammunition production in response to requests from the Middle East, and some production items became oriented toward foreign buyers. These activities were part of the factory’s export program.
During 1948, requests for arms and ammunition for Arab forces in Palestine reached Nuri Killigil; it is stated that the factory produced certain items in response to these requests. These products included handguns, mortar ammunition, aircraft bombs, and various tapas.
In this context, it is observed that some of the military supplies produced at the Sütlüce factory were prepared for shipment to the Middle East, and transportation and customs procedures became a priority. The produced military supplies were included in the export authorization processes of the period.
Arms sales to foreign countries were subject to the permission of the Ministry of National Defense and relevant government authorities under the legislation of the period. According to Grand National Assembly minutes, requests for arms export permissions for Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan in 1948 were evaluated by the government. During this process:
These records demonstrate that Nuri Killigil’s arms export activities to foreign countries were officially recorded, controlled by the government, and subject to country-specific permissions.
The production list of the Sütlüce Factory includes products directly related to the war needs in the Middle East:
These products were used both for the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces and in export processes during the same period. The product list sent to the İzmir International Fair detailed these military supplies and documented the variety of production.
Regarding the Palestine front, it is understood that a portion of these products was prepared at the factory upon the request of Arab forces, and a period of intensive production occurred at the factory for shipment purposes.
These activities conducted during 1948–1949 were interrupted by the major explosion at Sütlüce on 2 March 1949. The explosion completely destroyed a large part of the factory, eliminated production capacity, halted shipment preparations, and left existing military supplies buried under rubble.
After the explosion, the factory could not be restarted, effectively halting shipments to foreign countries. Consequently, the production and shipment preparations related to the Palestine front could not be completed within the process ended by the Sütlüce explosion, and Nuri Killigil’s international sales connections ended with his death.
Nuri (Killigil) Pasha’s political ideology was shaped by the geographical areas where he served and the environments he encountered throughout his military career, centered on Turkish nationalism and Turanism. His military assignments in Tripolitania, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Front, particularly during his command of the Caucasian Islamic Army, established direct connections with Muslim–Turkic communities in Azerbaijan and North Caucasus. His military activities along the Baku, Ganja, Karabakh, and Dagestan lines brought him into contact not only with Turkic communities within Ottoman borders but also with those beyond them.
This orientation continued during the Republic period. After settling in Istanbul and entering industry and trade, he maintained contact with figures associated with the Turkish world. Various accounts indicate that Turkish nationalist and Turanist thinkers such as Zeki Velidi Togan, Kazım Taşkent, and Cevat Rıfat Atilhan visited Nuri Pasha’s factory and engaged in intellectual exchange with him.
These same accounts describe Nuri Pasha’s ideological stance as “Turkish nationalist and Turanist,” while emphasizing that he rejected an ethnically narrow approach and instead used the phrase “Whoever says ‘I am Turk’ is Turk.” This phrase reflects the inclusive nature of Nuri Pasha’s Turkish identity and is cited alongside his political and intellectual character.
In this context, Nuri Pasha’s political identity is defined along a line connected to Turkish nationalism and Turanism, through his military assignments in the Caucasus and North Africa during the late Ottoman period and his relationships with Turkish nationalist intellectuals and officers during the Republic era.
Some of Nuri Pasha’s military assignments, particularly during his service in Tripolitania and Benghazi and the Caucasus, intersect with the operational areas of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. During the Tripolitania War, the organization of local forces along the Tripoli, Derna, Benghazi, Tobruk, Homs, and Misrata lines, the movement of volunteer officers to the front, and the guerrilla-style battles against Italian forces were conducted in close coordination with the secret organizational structures of the time.
During World War I, his role as Commander of the African Groups encompassed the command and coordination of operations against British and Italian forces along the western border of Egypt and within Libya, in coordination with the Senussi movement. In this framework, the Tripolitania, Fizan, Sudan, and Benghazi groups were organized as a mixed structure integrating regular units with local mujahid forces, and an autonomous command structure was established with a chief of staff and supply–repair branches.
In the Caucasus phase, as Commander of the Caucasian Islamic Army, he conducted military operations centered in Ganja and Baku; the organization of local Azerbaijani units, the mobilization of Muslim forces in Karabakh and Dagestan, and relations with committees in North Caucasus intersected with secret and semi-official structures. The North Caucasus Committee’s assignment of command over Turkish and Muslim forces in Dagestan to Nuri Pasha is cited as an example of such organizational arrangements.
The connection with Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa is not indicated by an official organizational chart but rather by the presence of Nuri Pasha’s activities in Tripolitania, Africa, and the Caucasus within the sphere of secret and semi-official military-political operations that overlapped with the mission of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.
During World War II, as Germany waged war against the Soviet Union, a large number of Soviet soldiers of Turkish and Muslim origin were captured by the German army. The idea of organizing some of these prisoners into Turkish or Turkestan units under German control emerged in the later stages of the war.
In this context, it is stated that Nuri Pasha traveled to Berlin and met with German military and political authorities to discuss the formation of an army or units from Turkish prisoners of war. The scope of these discussions concerned the use of units formed from Turkish and Muslim prisoners of war by Germany on the Eastern Front or in Central Asia.
Studies indicate that this initiative was not merely military but also linked to political objectives regarding the Turkish world, and that Nuri Pasha focused on the idea of a new Turkish army or legion and engaged in negotiations with German authorities for this purpose.
The talks with Germany yielded no results due to the course of the war and conflicting expectations between the parties. No agreement was reached on the status, command, and deployment of the proposed units formed from Turkish prisoners of war, and as Germany’s military situation deteriorated in later years, the project was effectively shelved.
Available information indicates that Nuri Pasha’s initiatives during World War II remained at the level of discussions in Berlin and proposals for forming units from prisoners of war, without developing into a lasting military organization on the ground.
Nuri (Killigil) Pasha lost his life on 2 March 1949 in an explosion at his metalware and weapons factory in Sütlüce, Istanbul. The explosion occurred at approximately 4:50 PM and destroyed a large portion of the factory.
On the day of the incident, a fire broke out in certain sections of the factory, particularly affecting areas where chemical substances were stored. Most workers were evacuated, but Nuri Pasha moved toward the section where explosive materials were stored. Shortly afterward, the fire spread to the storage area, triggering a powerful explosion that caused the factory building to collapse, rendering most machinery and workstations unusable.
The force of the explosion affected not only the factory building but also structures around the Haliç; nearby buildings experienced shaking and broken windows, and the incident quickly became public knowledge in Istanbul.
After the explosion, searches in the rubble failed to locate Nuri Pasha’s body in its entirety. Some personal belongings identified as his were found at the scene, but his complete body was not recovered.
About ten days after the explosion, a body part believed to belong to him was found in the Haliç. This discovery was used as the basis for official confirmation of death; however, since his complete body was not recovered, a traditional funeral ceremony could not be performed.
The burial was carried out under these conditions. Accounts indicate that during the funeral, the coffin did not contain a complete body, and the burial had a symbolic nature.
Salute to Martyr Nuri Pasha (Atilla Oral Archive)
The cause of the explosion in Sütlüce on 2 March 1949 was officially recorded as an “inexplicable detonation”. Although technical investigations after the explosion found that a fire in the chemical processing area had spread to the explosives storage, leading to a major explosion, no conclusive report definitively established the exact cause.
In later writings, some accounts suggest the explosion may have been an accident, while others raise the possibility of sabotage. However, no official documents or court rulings have substantiated these sabotage claims. Available information confirms that the explosion is officially recorded as an incident with an unidentified cause.
After the explosion, judicial and administrative authorities initiated an investigation, conducted technical inspections of the factory rubble, and collected witness statements. The investigations focused on the types of chemical substances used in the factory, the condition of the explosive storage areas, and the factors contributing to the fire and subsequent explosion.
The investigation concluded that the incident was officially recorded as a “detonation at the factory”; the case file contained technical observations regarding the chain reaction of fire and explosion rather than a definitive determination of the origin. No evidence of deliberate intent or external interference was found, and the file was closed accordingly.
After the explosion, the factory’s production activities ceased entirely. The Sütlüce building, rendered unusable by the explosion, was never reopened; arms and ammunition manufacturing activities could not continue under the same roof after this date.
Nuri Pasha’s date of death is officially recorded as 2 March 1949, with the place of death listed as his factory in Sütlüce. Due to the inability to recover his complete body, the funeral ceremony was conducted outside standard procedures; accounts indicate that the funeral prayer was not performed.
Newspaper clipping announcing that Nuri Pasha’s funeral prayer would not be performed (Atilla Oral Archive)
Nuri Pasha’s grave is located in the Edirnekapı Cemetery in Istanbul. For many years, the grave remained unchanged without any major renovation or restoration; over time, damage occurred to the tombstone and surrounding area.
In 2016, a project was initiated to restore the grave and renovate its surroundings. As part of this, the tombstone was replaced, the grave area was landscaped, and a special ceremony was held at Edirnekapı Cemetery for Nuri Pasha. During the ceremony, the previously unperformed funeral prayer was recited as a form of compensation, and soil brought from Baku and Kastamonu was scattered on Nuri Pasha’s grave.
Representatives from official and civil institutions in Turkey and Azerbaijan, along with citizens, participated in the restoration and commemoration program; during the ceremony, Nuri Pasha’s activities in Tripolitania, the Caucasus, and the Republic period were highlighted, and his grave at Edirnekapı Cemetery gained a more orderly appearance and improved accessibility from this date onward.
In Memory of Nuri Killigil (Presidency of Communication of the Republic of Türkiye)
Nuri Killigil’s legacy is based on his military roles during the late Ottoman period and his industrial activities during the Republic era. His operations in 1918 as Commander of the Caucasian Islamic Army in Baku and surrounding areas have become a lasting element in Azerbaijani historiography and serve as a historical reference point in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. During the Republic period, the production of handguns, mortars, aircraft bombs, tapas, and various types of ammunition at his factories in Zeytinburnu and Sütlüce is recognized as an example of private sector involvement in early domestic defense industry initiatives. The production program at these facilities encompassed both Ministry of National Defense orders and export and shipment efforts to foreign markets; the mercury mine in Karaburun complemented these industrial activities. Although his activities ended with his death in the 1949 Sütlüce explosion, his position in the history of Turkey’s defense industry and his military role in the Caucasus continue to be discussed as independent subjects in biographical and historical studies.
Family Origins, Lineage, and Childhood Years
Gagauz Origins
Migration Path: Crimea–Kilya–Abana
Father Hacı Ahmet Bey, Mother Ayşe Hanım, and Siblings
Details of the Family Genealogy
Dispute Over Birthplace: Manastır–Istanbul Records
Childhood Years in Manastır
Educational Life
Rüştiye and İdadi Period in Manastır
Kuleli Military High School
Entry into the War School and 1909 Graduation
Transition from Education to First Assignments
First Military Period (1909–1911)
Service in the 3rd Army
Assignment to the Palace Infantry Battalion
Relationships with Halil Pasha and Enver Pasha
Palace Guard Context After the 31 March Incident
Activities Prior to the Tripolitania War
Historical Background of Tripolitania
Causes, Development, and Declaration of the War
Departure for the Tripolitania Front
Route: Istanbul–Paris–Marseille–Tunis and Attempts to Reach Tripolitania
Duties on the Front
Volunteer Officer Movement and Local Forces on the Front
Ushi Treaty and Return to Istanbul
Balkan Wars and Diplomatic Assignments (1912–1914)
Participation in the Çatalca Battles
Military Attaché Posts in Rome and Vienna
Position of Aide-de-Camp at the Ministry of War
Activities in Tripolitania and Benghazi During World War I (1914–1918)
Outbreak of War and Assignment to Libya
Authority of the African Groups Command
Operations Against the British in Egypt–Sollum
Struggle Against the Italians
Rank Promotions and Medals Received
Disagreements in the Headquarters and Recall to Istanbul
Command of the Caucasian Islamic Army (1918)
Bolshevik Revolution, Brest–Litovsk, and the Situation in the Caucasus
Appointment as Commander and Sultan’s Decree
Transition from Mosul to Ganja
Army Organization: Ottoman Units and Local Forces
Military Operations: Gökçay–Salyan–Aksu–Kürdemir–Şamahı
Gökçay Operation
Salyan Region
Aksu and Kürdemir
Şamahı
First and Second Baku Offensives
Capture of Baku (15 September 1918)
Operations in Karabakh and Dagestan
Impact of the Caucasian Islamic Army in Azerbaijan
Post-Mudros Period and British Captivity (1918–1919)
Arrest in Batum
Escape from Ardahan Barracks
Resumption of Struggle in Azerbaijan and Dagestan
Clashes with Bolshevik Forces
Final Activities in Karabakh
National Struggle Years (1919–1923)
Arrival in Erzurum and Contact with Kazım Karabekir Pasha
Joining the Eastern Front
Role in the Recapture of Sarıkamış
Technical Activities in the Military Factories in Erzurum and Kars
Independence Medal
Activities in the Republic Period
Transition to Commerce
Establishment of the Zeytinburnu Ironware Factory (1933)
Production: Weapons, Matara, Tapa, Ammunition, Stove, etc.
Acquisition of the Sütlüce Metalware and Weapons Factory (1938)
Expansion of Production Capacity
Handgun (“Nuri Handgun”)
81 mm Mortar
Aircraft Bombs
Anti-Aircraft Ammunition
Mercury Mine in Karaburun and Exports
Arms Exports to Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria
Arab–Israeli War and Support Activities for Palestine
Outbreak of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and Requests from the Middle East
Preparations for Arms Shipments to Palestine
Correspondence with Middle Eastern Countries and Authorization Processes
Overlap of Production Items with Needs on the Palestine Front
Disruption of Shipment Efforts by the Sütlüce Explosion
Political Identity and Turkish Nationalist Activities
Turkish Nationalist Thought
Role in Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa
Meetings with German Authorities During World War II
Project to Form an Army from Turkish Prisoners of War
Termination of Negotiations
Sütlüce Explosion and Death (2 March 1949)
How the Explosion Occurred
Body Not Recovered
Accident or Sabotage?
Investigations After the Explosion
Burial Process and Restoration of the Grave Years Later
Legacy
