U.S.-Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (123 Agreement)

The U.S.-Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (officially known as the 123 Agreement) is a bilateral accord regulating cooperation in the field of civil (peaceful) nuclear energy between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The agreement was signed on 22 July 2026 by the U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and the Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, and announced by the U.S. Department of Energy on 23 July 2026. The agreement derives its name from Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and is therefore commonly referred to in international media and official statements as the "123 Agreement". A separate document, the Bilateral Safeguards Agreement, accompanies the signed text.^【1】

Projected to last 30 years and valued at tens of billions of dollars, the agreement grants U.S. companies priority partnership status in Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear energy program. The most controversial aspect of the agreement is the potential for Saudi Arabia, following a joint U.S.-Saudi effort, to acquire the capacity for uranium enrichment on its own soil. The full text of the agreement has not been made public, and under U.S. Constitution and relevant legislation, it will be submitted to the U.S. Congress for review.^【2】

The agreement was signed on 22 July 2026 (Wednesday) in Washington by the U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and the Saudi Minister of Energy and Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz. Following the signing, the U.S. Department of Energy described the agreement as “historic”.

In an official statement issued on behalf of the Saudi government, it was stated that the signed agreement completes the understanding announced during the visit of Crown Prince and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to the United States in November 2025. The same statement emphasized that the agreement was signed within the framework of the strategic partnership between the two countries and aims to strengthen cooperation in energy and advanced technologies.^【3】

It was reported that the U.S. nuclear reactor manufacturer Westinghouse Electric Company is among the companies expected to contribute to the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear sector under the agreement. Westinghouse’s Chief Executive Officer Dan Sumner described the agreement as a “turning point” that strengthens energy security, creates opportunities for U.S. industry and workforce, and delivers long-term economic growth for both nations.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the signed 123 Agreement and its accompanying Bilateral Safeguards Agreement establish the legal foundation for a partnership lasting decades and worth tens of billions of dollars. The agreement is stated to aim at expanding nuclear technology exports, creating high-paying jobs and long-term economic growth in the United States, strengthening U.S. energy and national security posture, reinforcing global nuclear nonproliferation standards, and deepening the strategic partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.^【4】

In a written statement following the signing, Energy Secretary Wright said, “These agreements reflect our shared commitment to strengthening U.S.-Saudi commercial ties and ensuring prosperity at home and security for our allies abroad. Rest assured, these agreements are grounded in the world’s best nuclear technology and scientific expertise developed in the United States, while upholding the highest nuclear safety and nonproliferation standards.”^【5】

The legal basis for the agreement is Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq.). This provision permits the United States to enter into large-scale civil nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries, requiring such agreements to meet specific nonproliferation criteria and be submitted to the U.S. Congress for review. Agreements concluded under this framework are commonly referred to as “123 Agreements”.

The U.S. Department of Energy’s statement did not include any direct details regarding uranium enrichment.

According to international news agencies, the agreement may allow Saudi Arabia to develop uranium enrichment capabilities on its own soil for civil reactor fuel, but without the international safeguards equivalent to the “gold standard” accepted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2009.^【6】

According to CNN, the agreement prevents Saudi Arabia from developing or purchasing enrichment technology independently for ten years, but provides for the establishment of a joint U.S.-Saudi team to examine the necessity and commercial feasibility of enrichment. Following this study, the facility is planned to be constructed by U.S. companies without transferring sensitive technology to Saudi Arabia.^【7】.

It has been reported that the agreement does not include the Additional Protocol, which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) broader inspection and verification powers. Instead, a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement, modeled after the standard IAEA protocol, has been signed, and its terms are required to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.^【8】

Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, after the agreement is submitted to Congress, two separate review periods totaling 90 legislative days are provided. If the President does not exempt the agreement from the requirements of Section 123(a), the agreement will enter into force unless Congress passes and enacts a joint resolution of disapproval during this period. For Congress to block the agreement, a two-thirds majority in both chambers would be required to override a potential presidential veto.^【9】

According to a CRS report, between the 2020–2025 fiscal years, Congress adopted provisions limiting the use of funds from the Export-Import Bank for nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until specific nonproliferation criteria were met. In previous congressional sessions, some members introduced bills that would have required prior congressional approval for any 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia to enter into force.^【10】

Additionally, under Section 1264 of Public Law 116-92 (42 U.S.C. §2153 note), the executive branch is restricted from submitting a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) required for Congressional review of any 123 Agreement with countries like Saudi Arabia that have not accepted certain international security controls, unless otherwise specified. According to excerpts from an administrative report published alongside the submission to Congress, the draft U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement will be implemented under a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement containing additional security and verification measures, involving the IAEA and not yet made public.^【11】

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while in the Philippines, responded to criticism by stating, “The United States will not enter into any agreement with any country in the world that carries a proliferation risk.”

The Saudi Ministry of Energy stated that the agreement strengthens efforts to diversify energy sources, develop pioneering technologies, and expand cooperation and investment opportunities in the mutual interest of the two friendly nations.

The spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington stated that the agreement reflects the shared vision of both countries to expand cooperation in energy and future technologies.

Nuclear cooperation discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia have spanned multiple U.S. administrations. In 2008, the two countries signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing intent to cooperate in nuclear activities for medical, industrial, and power generation purposes; the MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intention to rely on existing international nuclear fuel markets rather than pursue enrichment or reprocessing.^【12】

The Obama administration initiated negotiations for a 123 agreement in 2012, and the first Trump administration pursued similar efforts in 2018. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in a 2020 report, noted that significant progress toward a nuclear cooperation agreement had not been achieved due to persistent disagreements between the two governments, particularly regarding the Additional Protocol and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing. These disagreements reportedly continued under the Biden administration.^【13】

Under the Biden administration, nuclear cooperation talks were linked to efforts to encourage diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. According to a former U.S. official with direct knowledge, the original understanding proposed that enrichment be conducted solely at a U.S.-controlled facility using only U.S.-origin material. This process was suspended following the start of the Gaza massacre on 7 October 2023.^【14】

The Trump administration revived the negotiations and removed the normalization condition with Israel. During Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the United States in November 2025, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation. According to the White House, this declaration “establishes the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership between the Kingdom and the United States; confirms that the United States and American companies will be the Kingdom’s preferred partners for civil nuclear cooperation; and ensures that all cooperation will be conducted in accordance with robust nonproliferation standards.”^【15】

In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Nuclear Energy Program that includes plans to construct large and small-scale nuclear reactors for electricity generation and water desalination.

This project is described as part of the Kingdom’s broader efforts to diversify its economy and expand non-fossil fuel energy use. Saudi Arabia holds 16 percent of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and the fourth-largest natural gas reserves. In 2023, approximately 41 percent of the Kingdom’s electricity was generated from oil and 58 percent from natural gas.

In March 2018, Saudi Arabia established the Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority, and in March 2022, it created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company (SNEHC) to develop and operate planned nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed a nuclear infrastructure review in the Kingdom in 2018 and published its final report in January 2019.

Saudi Arabia became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1988 and has had a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA covering all nuclear facilities since 2009. The Kingdom has not yet signed the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which enhances the agency’s authority to investigate clandestine nuclear facilities and activities. In 2024, Saudi Arabia terminated the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which had suspended most CSA procedures for states with limited nuclear activities.

In a 2019 statement, the Saudi Minister of Energy said, “We want to enter the entire cycle from uranium production to enrichment and the use of enriched uranium.” In January 2023, he further stated that Saudi Arabia aims to use its domestic uranium resources to produce low-enriched uranium fuel.^【16】

Criticism of the agreement has emerged in the U.S. Congress. Democratic Senator Ed Markey (Massachusetts) condemned the 123 Agreement for “enabling nuclear weapons proliferation in Saudi Arabia and potentially triggering a regional arms race.” Markey also accused Rubio and Trump of “hypocrisy matched only by recklessness,” stating, “While pretending to prevent Iran’s nuclear bomb, they are granting nuclear weapons technology to Saudi Arabia — an aggressive and authoritarian state.”^【17】

Democratic Senator Chris Murphy, in a social media post on the issue, stated that “this agreement will launch a nuclear arms race in the region and further deter Iran from limiting its own program.”^【18】

Democratic Representative Brad Sherman (California), speaking before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reminded members that U.S. military force had been used to target Iran over its insistence on enrichment and reprocessing, and added, “Now it appears that U.S. officials are giving Saudi Arabia a green light on enrichment and reprocessing through this agreement. The only difference I see is that Westinghouse will make enormous profits from this deal, while the Iranians are not enriching for American companies.”^【19】

Rosemary Kelanic, Director for the Middle East at the think tank Defense Priorities, said it would be “quite startling” for the United States to allow Saudi Arabia enrichment capabilities on its own soil under the agreement, noting, “The United States has never done this before; we have never helped another country enrich uranium on its own territory.” Kelanic added that the reason is simple: “If you can produce your own nuclear fuel, you become a much greater risk.”^【20】

Henry Sokolski, Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told CNN he was concerned the agreement could open the door for similar arrangements with other countries, asking, “What new standard will the Saudi deal set for the UAE, Turkey, and Egypt?”^【21】

Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, called on Congress to “block” the agreement, stating, “If you do not block it, hopefully the policy will be reversed by a future administration before too much damage is done — in terms of weakening safeguards, setting negative precedents for other states, and failing to prevent enrichment proliferation.”^【22】