Anthropomorphic as Human and Theomorphic as God

At the core of the triple conception emerging in the concept of the individual lies the idea of a source upon which both the individual and external objects depend. Therefore, let us first examine the notion of “source.”

What Is a Source?

In Turkish, “kaynak” means the point of origin, beginning, or cause of something—like the spring from which a river emerges. As long as it remains connected to its source, the existence of that thing cannot be extinguished. Thus, “source” is not merely a static foundation but also something dynamic that moves and flows. Like water bubbling from a spring, the source appears fixed yet continuously flows.

In classical philosophy, terms such as “substance,” “essence,” or “töz,” as well as Greek concepts like ousia and hypostasis, primarily denote an underlying, motionless foundation. By contrast, the Turkish “kaynak” encompasses movement, flow, and bubbling. Therefore, the concept of “source” is not merely a matter of translation; it is an original concept that reflects the very possibilities of thinking in Turkish.

The Relationship Between Action and Agent

In the triple conception, understanding the source of both the individual and the cosmos requires examining their actions and movements.

• From the perspective of the individual, the problem lies in the fact that action and agent (the doer) do not fully coincide.
• From the perspective of the cosmos, the problem is the inability to identify a stable foundation underlying the changes of objects.

Consider an example: Thinking is an action. There must be a “thinker” who performs thinking. If the thinker and the act of thinking were entirely identical, there would be an action without an agent—an impossibility. Every action rests upon a fixed point. In the act of thinking, this fixed point is the thinker. Yet thought alone cannot confer existence upon either the action or the agent. Thus, the relationship between action and agent is far more complex than it appears.

The same situation occurs in everyday life. When someone attacks in anger, flees, or expresses love, these are merely observable actions; yet they often stem from causes the person themselves is unaware of. This reveals how ambiguous the alignment between action and agent truly is.

Movement and Cause

Everything changes: a flower wilts, a book ages, a pen breaks. We call these changes “movement.” Yet every change has a cause. Humans often take the visible cause as sufficient, but this cause is not the true source of the change. When the true cause remains unknown, the individual deceives themselves and constructs a conception of existence based on illusion.

This is precisely why the individual cannot become a true “ferd”—why they cannot attain genuine existence. The individual who fails to find their source cannot defend their own rights; for one who does not know their rights does not truly exist.

The Concept of God and Cause

Throughout history, the concept of God has frequently emerged as a concept of cause.

• In polytheistic beliefs, names such as “god of thunder” or “god of love” were understood as causes of specific events.
• In monotheistic beliefs, a single God is conceived as the underlying cause of all causes.
• Aristotle speaks of the “unmoved mover”^【1】; Spinoza defines God as “the cause of itself” (causa sui)^【2】.

The common thread in all these approaches is the conception of God as a cause. Yet the problem here lies in the nature of the concept of “cause” and the framework by which it is defined. How we define “movement” determines how we conceive the “unmoved mover.” Thus, our understanding of God depends on how we construct the concept of cause.

The Debate on Anthropomorphism

Throughout history, God has often been described in anthropomorphic terms—as resembling a human. This has been criticized and even regarded as reductive. Yet in reality, since humans can only comprehend the source through themselves, they have inevitably depicted God using their own analogies.

Xenophanes expressed this critique by saying, “If horses had gods, they would depict them as horse-like”^【3】. Spinoza also criticized prophets for their anthropomorphic conception of God based on imagination. Yet Spinoza’s own God is ultimately grounded in a mental structure—that is, in the human essence itself. Therefore, his conception of God is fundamentally anthropomorphic.

The central issue is not whether God is likened to humans, but the question: “What is a human?” Any conception of God remains incomplete unless the human essence is properly understood.

Connection to the Source and the “Trace”

For a human to connect with the source, they must possess within themselves a “trace.” This trace is a link that points to the source while remaining distinct from it. Therefore, equating God entirely with humanity or viewing God as entirely separate from humanity does not resolve the issue. The correct path lies in recognizing both similarity and dissimilarity through this “trace.”

Conclusion: The Theomorphic Human

As long as the individual’s source remains hidden, the human cannot become a true “ferd.” Anthropomorphic conceptions diminish God, but the real problem is the human’s failure to find their heart. The human grounded in the heart transcends all anthropomorphic conceptions of God. Therefore, the true human is only the theomorphic human—one oriented toward God through the heart. The human’s attainment of the source is possible only through the heart and through speech (kelâm).