First Important Step for United Syria: Deyr Hafir and Meskene Operations

One of the most critical issues in the post-civil war period in Syria revolves around how the country’s territorial integrity can be restored. A key development shaping this process has been the military and political tension that began with the failure to implement the agreement signed on March 10 between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is dominated by the terrorist organization YPG/PKK.

Following the failure to implement the agreement aimed at integrating the SDF into the central government, Syrian Army launched an operation on January 8 targeting the neighborhoods of Ashrafiya, Sheikh Maksud, and Beni Zayd south of Aleppo. Although this move may initially appear as a limited military intervention, when considering that the SDF controls approximately one-third of Syrian territory, it must be understood as the first phase of a broader and longer-term military strategy.

The SDF’s Position on the Ground and U.S. Support

Since 2017, the SDF has controlled a significant portion of Syria’s most strategically vital regions east of the Euphrates, including the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, with the support of USA.

Washington has continued providing military and logistical support to the SDF under the pretext of combating ISIS, thereby strengthening the group’s operational effectiveness and territorial dominance.^【1】 However, the power dynamics in Syria have undergone fundamental changes as of 2025.

The New Syrian State and the “One State, One Army” Policy

Following the overthrow of the Assad regime by opposition groups in 2025, the newly established Syrian state has taken significant steps toward reconstruction, the establishment of centralized authority, and the restoration of territorial integrity during its first year in power.

In this context, the Damascus administration initiated operations against remnants of the old regime in the Latakia and Tartus regions, in line with the “one state, one army” principle, and intervened in internal disturbances in the Suwayda region in southern Syria.

Under this policy, the integration of the SDF into the new state structure was targeted; however, these efforts yielded no results. Consequently, the Syrian Army launched a military operation against SDF/YPG elements in the areas of Ashrafiya, Sheikh Maksud, and Beni Zayd around Aleppo.^【2】

As a result of the operation, which began on January 8 and was completed within three days, the aforementioned neighborhoods were fully cleared of YPG/PKK elements. However, continued attacks originating from Deyr Hafir and Meskene—towns located west of the Euphrates and administratively under Aleppo’s jurisdiction—toward Aleppo, Syria’s economic capital, indicate that the conflict has entered a new phase.^【3】

Following these developments, the Syrian government publicly announced that its next target would be Deyr Hafir and Meskene, and declared these areas military zones.^【4】

Deyr Hafir and Meskene: The Path to a New Front

As a potential operation targeting Deyr Hafir and Meskene appears imminent, the Syrian government finds itself at once with significant advantages and serious risks. The success of such an operation is directly tied to the international context, geographic conditions, front-line density, and the Syrian Army’s recently enhanced capacity.

Changing International Context

The new Syrian administration has achieved notable diplomatic progress in a short time. Relations developed with the United States and with European countries have gradually increased the legitimacy of the new government, while simultaneously eroding the SDF’s legitimacy base.

The meeting between Syrian President Ahmet al-Shara and U.S. President Donald Trump during the former’s visit to Washington, followed by the normalization process initiated with Israel^【5】 and Syria’s accession to the anti-ISIS coalition, have been crucial steps in integrating the Damascus administration into the international system. Additionally, the commencement of joint U.S.-Syrian Army anti-ISIS operations^【6】 has largely invalidated the YPG/PKK’s long-standing claim of being the “only effective actor” against ISIS.

Regionally, developments in Iran and the possibility of intervention by the U.S.-Israel axis have rendered Syria a more critical actor, thereby enhancing its strategic value.

Geographical and Sociological Advantages

Deyr Hafir and Meskene, located west of the Euphrates, are characterized by a predominantly Arab population, proximity to Aleppo both logistically and geographically, and expansive, flat terrain. These features facilitate operations by the Syrian Army using armored and mechanized units.

Moreover, it is assessed that the SDF/YPG has limited capacity to generate social legitimacy in these areas, whereas the Damascus-based administration demonstrates greater political and administrative integration capacity. This situation renders the Deyr Hafir–Meskene axis relatively more vulnerable from a sociological resistance standpoint.

Multifront Pressure

The front lines the YPG/PKK must control are extremely broad. Potential Arab tribal mobilizations and the possibility of the Syrian Army opening new fronts in regions such as Manbij and the Tishrin Dam area, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah make it difficult for the group to concentrate its military strength in a single location.

This multifront pressure is fragmenting the SDF’s defensive capacity and increasing its vulnerabilities in specific areas.

Reconstruction of the Syrian Army

The new Syrian state has rapidly reestablished centralized authority, crossing a critical threshold as armed groups that overthrew the regime have disbanded and unified under the Ministry of Defense.^【7】 This development has solidified the institutional foundation of the “one army” principle.

As the Syrian Army transitions from a fragmented structure to a centralized command-and-control system, battlefield experience accumulated over years of conflict has significantly enhanced its effectiveness, particularly in urban operations. The military education, advisory, and technical support agreements signed with Türkiye has also played a vital role in this capacity increase.

Türkiye’s Supportive Role

Türkiye has clearly stated its support for any potential Syrian operation against the SDF.^【8】 Ankara views both the preservation of its “terror-free Türkiye” process and Ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria as strategic priorities.

In the context of the Deyr Hafir and Meskene operations, Türkiye’s strategic location, air support capabilities, and logistical capacity render it critically important. Türkiye’s proximity—approximately 30 to 40 kilometers from the operational areas—provides advantages in rapid deployment and uninterrupted support. Türkiye’s ability to supply weapons and ammunition, fuel, maintenance and repair assistance, communication infrastructure, medical evacuation capabilities, and personnel and equipment deployment are critical factors directly influencing the Syrian Army’s operational continuity and battlefield effectiveness.

In addition to its geographical advantages, Türkiye possesses advanced UCAV/MALE drone capabilities that enable it to significantly enhance operational effectiveness in reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and precision strike domains. Contribution to air domain awareness and control could exert a strategic multiplier effect on the overall success of the operation.

Under these circumstances, Türkiye is likely to assume a decisive role in the process not as a direct combatant, but through operational coordination and deterrence.

Challenging Factors in the Operation

Despite all these advantages, two key disadvantages stand out: the potential for U.S. diplomatic or military intervention and the SDF’s manpower and military capacity.

Both scenarios carry the potential to prolong the operation and increase its cost.

The U.S. Stance

During the Aleppo operations period, the United States called on the parties to adhere to the March 10 agreement and emphasized a ceasefire.

In a written statement regarding the clashes in Ashrafiya and Sheikh Maksud, U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack indicated that Washington was “seriously concerned” by developments on the ground, urged all parties to exercise restraint, and stressed that the protection of civilians must be the top priority. Barrack also recalled that the The integration agreement signed between the Syrian government and the SDG on March 10, 2025, process was nearing completion and affirmed that this objective remained achievable.^【9】

In addition, the U.S. military presence in Syria continues to serve as a significant security umbrella for the SDF. According to official U.S. statements, approximately 2,000 American troops were stationed in Syria as of December 2024.^【10】 However, following President Donald Trump’s assumption of office in January 2025, statements have been made indicating a shift in policy. Reports have also emerged that the U.S. has withdrawn from its bases in Al-Wazir and Tel Beydar in Hasakah province.^【11】

Considering all these developments together, it appears more likely that the United States will continue to use diplomatic pressure to encourage the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian administration, rather than completely withdrawing its support for the SDF as a ground force in the short term.

The Armed Capacity of the SDF

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose core consists of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)—the Syrian branch of the terrorist organization PKK—possess an organizational and armed capacity that constitutes one of the most challenging aspects of any potential operations planned east and west of the Euphrates. Various reports estimate the number of armed elements under the SDF. According to a 2024 report by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), the SDF’s total military capacity is approximately 100,000 personnel.^【12】 Other open-source analyses estimate the number of armed elements affiliated with the SDF at around 60,000,^【13】 with a significant portion directly composed of YPG members from the PKK’s Syrian branch.

This military capacity is not limited to manpower alone. Intensive weapons, ammunition, and equipment support provided by the U.S.-led coalition under the pretext of combating ISIS has significantly enhanced the group’s operational effectiveness on the ground.^【14】 In addition to light and medium infantry weapons, the SDF’s inventory includes anti-tank systems, armored vehicles, heavy machine guns, mortars, ammunition, and advanced communication equipment. This support has enabled the SDF to evolve from a classic irregular armed structure into a hybrid military capacity incorporating conventional elements.

The SDF has established a centrally managed, semi-institutionalized structure in northeastern Syria. While certain levels of cohesion have been achieved through shared command-and-control mechanisms, logistical lines, and training programs, it does not possess the characteristics of a fully homogeneous army. The SDF’s ranks are predominantly composed of YPG and YPJ elements, but also include Arab, Syriac, and other local groups, as well as militants from the former Assad regime.

Considering this armed structure, it is assessed that the SDF may be inclined to deploy units affiliated with PKK/YPG, particularly those equipped with heavy weapons, along the Deyr Hafir–Meskene axis. Given that these areas serve as critical transit corridors west of the Euphrates, they are expected to function as forward defense and pressure elements. However, this deployment is likely to be limited and supplementary compared to the SDF’s main force concentrations in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.

Therefore, although precise figures cannot be provided, it is reasonable to assume that the SDF’s presence along the Deyr Hafir and Meskene line constitutes only a very limited portion of its total military capacity, and that the line is primarily represented by locally deployed groups and limited reinforcements.