This article was automatically translated from the original Turkish version.

Social inequality is one thing; attributing every advantage to guilt and every success to suspicion is another. Class hatred loses its measure of legitimate justice and descends into envy; envy then transforms into a moral claim of superiority; and this claim, in turn, becomes a desire for revenge aimed not at elevating others but at dragging down those who stand above. For this reason, class hatred is not merely a matter of economic inequality but also of how we interpret inequality itself.
Differences between social classes do not appear only in income distributions or property records. Class position shapes a broad sphere of life, determining where one is born, what education one can access, how one speaks and which social circles one is naturally accepted in, which spaces one can enter without hesitation, and how seriously one’s voice is taken. The fact that economic opportunity does not always align with social prestige renders any explanation of class solely in terms of wealth inadequate. Max Weber’s distinction between class, status, and political power demonstrates that social recognition and acceptance can constitute an independent domain of domination alongside material position.【1】
In this sense, inequality is not merely about some people having more than others. It is about some people being perceived as more credible, more competent, and even more human because of what they possess. Where wealth, education, and cultural capital are presented as moral superiority, economic difference becomes a symbolic hierarchy.
A person’s class position can strongly influence their opportunities and limits, but it does not automatically determine all their actions, intentions, or moral worth. Being wealthy is not inherently virtuous, nor is it inherently criminal. Poverty does not automatically confer moral superiority. The notion that deprivation makes all people wise and compassionate while wealth renders everyone cruel and corrupt produces not a sociological analysis but a class-based mythology.
Therefore, the central issue is not whether inequality exists. We must question how inequalities arise, how they are reproduced, and what moral responses they provoke. For knowledge of inequality can direct people toward the pursuit of justice, but it can also legitimize an excessive resentment toward those who possess what one lacks.
Class consciousness and class hatred are precisely distinguished at this threshold.
Class consciousness involves understanding one’s economic and social conditions; recognizing that one’s hardships stem not merely from personal failure but from institutions, unequal opportunity, educational systems, property relations, and political choices. Such awareness can produce constructive outcomes such as demands for legal rights, solidarity, organization, public responsibility, and expanded social mobility.
Class hatred, by contrast, is a form of distorted consciousness that abandons structural analysis and turns to targeting individuals. At this stage, the debate is no longer about how wealth was acquired or whether labor was fairly compensated. People’s homes, clothing, speech, travel, meals, education, and tastes are treated as if they were evidence of guilt.
Class hatred reveals itself most clearly at this point: It desires not the alleviation of poverty but the punishment of wealth; not the expansion of opportunity but the deprivation of those who possess it. Its ultimate goal is not for everyone to attain conditions worthy of human dignity, but for no one to be in better conditions than oneself.
In this sense, class hatred is not a demand for equality but a desire for downward leveling. Equality seeks to lift up those left behind and open closed doors. Downward leveling, however, considers it sufficient to expel those inside rather than open the doors. The former multiplies opportunities; the latter generalizes deprivation. The former strives to produce justice; the latter presents shared privation as a moral victory.
Class hatred’s psychological structure is usefully illuminated by Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment is the internal accumulation of a reaction that cannot be externally expressed, which begins to generate new values. The individual does not merely reject a value they cannot attain or against which they feel powerless; they declare it morally evil, thereby reinterpreting their own deprivation as superiority.【2】
During this mental process, deprivation ceases to be a condition to be overcome and becomes a cherished identity. Powerlessness becomes evil; wealth becomes dirty; inability to access cultural capital renders distinction entirely false; lack of discipline transforms every success into the mere result of privilege. The individual temporarily consoles themselves by devaluing what they cannot possess.
At this point, the question “What opportunities have I been denied, and how can these conditions be changed?” is no longer asked. Instead, the question “Why do they have it?” is imposed.
The first question requires the individual to reckon with themselves, their circumstances, and the social order. The second redirects all attention toward the life of another. A will that abandons construction begins to observe; a mind that abandons learning begins to discredit.
Max Scheler emphasizes that ressentiment is not merely a temporary anger but a more complex emotional structure formed by the persistence of feelings of powerlessness, suppression, comparison, and the desire for revenge. 【3】Over time, resentment becomes a filter through which the individual evaluates the world. Such a mind struggles to believe that any success could be legitimate, because acknowledging that someone else may have genuinely earned their rise would require confronting one’s own life and shortcomings.
For this reason, class hatred does not stop at identifying privilege; it seeks to explain every form of success as the result of privilege. Starting from the fact that some people gain advantages through inheritance, connections, family, or closed circles, it concludes that every success is fraudulent, every competence a performance, and every merit claim ideological.
Yet the existence of privilege does not prove the impossibility of merit. The presence of false distinctions does not mean genuine competence does not exist.
Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses of cultural capital and taste demonstrate how class differences are reproduced even in the most mundane aspects of daily life. It is clear that people’s preferences in art, music, literature, food, clothing, and leisure are shaped not merely by personal taste but by education, family, and social origins.【4】
A person raised in a particular environment may present the speech patterns, aesthetic standards, and social ease they learned since childhood as evidence of innate refinement. Mistaking their inherited cultural capital for the product of personal ability, they may label those without such opportunities as tasteless, inadequate, or crude.
This is one of the most invisible forms of class domination. Because privilege presents itself not as privilege but as natural talent and effortless elegance. Learned behaviors are mistaken for innate disposition; inherited opportunities are treated as merit; social ease derived from environment is framed as moral strength.
Yet recognizing the social origins of cultural values is not the same as invalidating all cultural standards. Unequal access to quality education does not render education worthless. The difficulty of accessing high art does not negate the concept of artistic competence.
The fact that some circles transform cultural refinement into a tool of exclusion does not make refinement itself guilty.
One of the most prominent fallacies of class hatred emerges here: Deeming a value illegitimate simply because access to it is unjust.
According to this logic, art confined to certain groups renders art itself suspect; academic knowledge produced within closed institutions renders knowledge itself suspect; expensive education renders education itself suspect. Ultimately, the problem ceases to be unjust access and becomes a resentment directed at excellence itself. Yet the correct path is not to pull down what is elevated but to expand access to it. It is not to belittle good education but to universalize it; not to dismiss cultural refinement as fake but to open it to broader social circulation; not to destroy elite institutions but to make them permeable to merit and ability.
Explaining the issue of class hatred solely through economic and sociological concepts is insufficient. For the issue also concerns the moral stance individuals take toward others’ blessings, their own deprivation, and their own advantages.
In the Islamic moral tradition, envy is linked to wishing others deprived of their material or spiritual advantages; pride is linked to regarding oneself as superior and belittling others.【5】These two concepts are illuminating for understanding the reciprocal moral distortions of class tension. One desires the loss of another’s blessing; the other turns their own blessing into a means of diminishing others.
Objecting to genuine injustice is not envy. Resisting the privatization of public goods and the devaluation of labor is a moral and public duty. Yet there is an insurmountable difference between opposing injustice and presuming all wealthy, educated, or prestigious individuals are inherently guilty.
Similarly, prosperity achieved through lawful and legitimate means is not inherently immoral. Yet when wealth becomes a tool of ostentation, belittlement, and the public display of social distance, it cannot be viewed as innocent.
Class hatred often disguises itself in the language of justice. Yet justice and revenge aim at different targets.
Justice seeks to eliminate injustice; revenge seeks satisfaction in inflicting pain on the person who committed or is assumed to have committed the injustice. Justice corrects rules and institutions; revenge merely swaps the positions of the parties. Justice aims to improve the poor’s life, expand opportunities, and protect the value of labor. Revenge considers it sufficient that the wealthy person’s life deteriorates.
Therefore, the impoverishment of the wealthy does not demonstrate the enrichment of the poor. The discrediting of the educated does not mean the uneducated have gained knowledge. The destruction of elite institutions does not prove that ordinary institutions have acquired quality. Destroying those above does not automatically elevate those below.
The hardest condition of justice is to acknowledge the rights of those we dislike or feel anger toward. The Qur’an’s principle that hatred toward a community must not lead people to injustice offers, in this sense, a universal moral boundary that transcends class hostility.【6】
No person, merely because they are wealthy, can be excluded from the realm of law, prestige, and human dignity. No person, merely because they are poor, can have their rights deferred or diminished. Justice is not about romanticizing the downtrodden or demonizing the privileged; it is about evaluating both according to their actions, responsibilities, and rights.
Class hatred is not the name for every anger directed against injustice. It begins when anger loses its direction—when it seeks to punish individuals rather than transform structures, and when it aims to eliminate privilege rather than alleviate deprivation.
Therefore, the value of a class-based critique must be measured not by how harshly it speaks but by what it targets. Is it demanding rights or feeding on others’ losses? Is it expanding opportunities or sanctifying deprivation? Is it eliminating unjust privilege or turning every success into guilt?
Serious social thought must rise above two easy temptations: the class arrogance that regards inequality as natural and entirely deserved, and class hatred that deems every advantage illegitimate.
The former mistakes its own advantages for virtue; the latter transforms its deprivation into moral superiority. The former belittles those below; the latter takes pleasure in the fall of those above. Both are different manifestations of the same measurelessness that poisons communal life.
A society’s level is not measured by how much it drags down its successful members but by how much it elevates those left behind. The goal of justice is not to unite everyone in the same privation but to ensure that no one lives below the dignity of a human being.
Therefore, what must be opposed to class hatred is not resignation to inequality but a higher conception of justice: a justice that does not idolize wealth but does not condemn legitimate success; that limits distinction with responsibility; that eradicates poverty without romanticizing it; that expands access to excellence rather than dragging it down.
Civilization arises not from people watching each other’s downfall but from a social order that enables them to rise without crushing one another.
Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. Accessed June 25, 2026.
Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe, 2nd revised ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), First Essay, §10, 20–21, Accessed June 25, 2026.
Ling, Yi, Bin Gao, Bo Jiang, Changqing Fu, and Juan Zhang. “Materialism and Envy as Mediators between Upward Social Comparison on Social Network Sites and Online Compulsive Buying among College Students.” *Frontiers in Psychology* 14 (2023): 1085344. Accessed June 25, 2026.https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1085344/full
Max Weber, “Class, Status, Party,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 180–195, Accessed June 25, 2026.
Montes, Enoch, “Inspiring or Demoralizing? Deservingness Perceptions Help Explain the Effects of Social Media Success Posts.” *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 29, no. 4 (2024): zmae006. Accessed June 25, 2026.https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmae006
Çağrıcı, Mustafa. “Haset.” *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1997. Accessed June 25, 2026.https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/haset
“Kibir.” *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. Ankara: TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2022. Accessed June 25, 2026.
[1]
Max Weber, “Class, Status, Party,” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology içinde, haz. ve çev. H. H. Gerth ve C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 180–195. Erişim: 25 Haziran 2026. https://bpb-us-e2.wpmucdn.com/sites.middlebury.edu/dist/d/2396/files/2010/09/Weber-Class-Status-Party.pdf
[2]
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, haz. Keith Ansell-Pearson, çev. Carol Diethe, 2. gözden geçirilmiş bs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Birinci İnceleme, §10, 20–21, Erişim: 25 Haziran 2026. https://ia601907.us.archive.org/21/items/nietzsche-on-the-genealogy-of-morality/Nietzsche%20-%20On%20the%20Genealogy%20of%20Morality.pdf
[3]
Max Scheler, Ressentiment, haz. Lewis A. Coser, çev. William W. Holdheim (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 21–26, Erişim 25 Haziran 2026. https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Scheller/Ressentiment.pdf
[4]
Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, çev. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 1–7, 56–63 ve 466–484, erişim 25 Haziran 2026. https://www.mit.edu/~allanmc/bourdieu1.pdf
[5]
Mustafa Çağrıcı, “Haset,” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/haset (erişim 25 Haziran 2026); Mustafa Çağrıcı, “Kibir,” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, erişim 25 Haziran 2026. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kibir
[6]
“Mâide Suresi 8. Ayet Tefsiri,” Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, erişim 25 Haziran 2026. https://kuran.diyanet.gov.tr/tefsir/M%C3%A2ide-suresi/677/8-ayet-tefsiri
Material and Symbolic Dimensions of Inequality
Where Class Consciousness and Class Hatred Diverge
The Mechanism of Resentment’s Value Production
Cultural Capital and the Dual Face of Distinction
Identifying Envy and Pride on the Same Moral Ground
The Boundary Between Justice and Revenge
Conclusion: Elevate or Drag Down?