Thucydides Trap

The Thucydides Trap is a concept in international relations used to describe the strategic fear, competition, and risk of conflict that arise when a rising power begins to challenge the existing global hegemon. The term derives from the work of the ancient Greek historian and general Thucydides, who chronicled the Peloponnesian War, and is particularly applied in the context of global power competition between China and the United States.

The foundation of the Thucydides Trap lies in the Peloponnesian War, which began in 431 BCE. The war lasted approximately 27 years between the two dominant Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. This phenomenon was first articulated over 2,500 years ago (5th century BCE) by the Athenian Thucydides, regarded as the father of “scientific historiography” and the realist school of political thought. In explaining the root cause of the war, Thucydides wrote:

“It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”

This perspective established the historical basis for the idea that a rising power generates security concerns in the existing power, potentially leading to large-scale conflict.

In the ancient era, Athens rapidly emerged as a rising power due to its naval strength, economic capacity, and network of allies. Sparta, by contrast, had long been viewed as the most powerful military and political actor in the Greek world. Athens’ expanding influence led Sparta to perceive its own security order as under threat.

The phrase “Thucydides Trap” was popularized in modern international relations literature primarily by American political scientist Graham Allison. In articles published in 2012 and later in his 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Allison argued that the competition between China and the United States could evolve into a structure resembling historical great-power wars.

Allison examined 16 major historical cases of rising powers challenging established hegemons and found that 12 of them ended in war. In these analyses, rising powers such as Germany, Japan, and Napoleonic France were typically cited as examples, while the British Empire or other dominant actors served as the incumbent hegemon.

In modern interpretations, China is commonly identified as the “rising Athens” and the United States as the “existing Sparta.”

In the 21st century, the concept is most intensively applied within the framework of strategic competition between China and the United States. China’s rapid advancement in economic, technological, military, and diplomatic capabilities is assessed as exerting pressure on the United States’ position as global leader.

In this context, issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, artificial intelligence competition, trade wars, semiconductor technologies, energy security, and Indo-Pacific strategies occupy the center of Thucydides Trap debates.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly referenced this concept in his speeches, arguing that China and the United States can develop a new model of great-power relations without falling into this “trap.” During his 2026 meeting in Beijing with US President Donald Trump, he posed the following question:

“Can China and the United States transcend the so-called Thucydides Trap and create a new model of great-power relations?”

Xi Jinping also warned during the same meeting that strategic miscalculations on the Taiwan issue could drag the two countries into conflict. The Chinese government maintains that the most critical crisis area between the two nations lies in Taiwan’s potential moves toward independence and US military and political support for Taiwan.

The Chinese government does not view the Thucydides Trap merely as a theory of inevitable war but as a strategic risk that must be avoided. In past speeches, Xi Jinping emphasized that war is not inevitable and warned that great powers can create their own traps through flawed strategic calculations.

Chinese diplomats also frequently invoke the concept. Cui Tiankai, China’s former ambassador to Washington, argued that China and the United States should establish a “win-win partnership” rather than a zero-sum competition. Chinese ambassador to the United States Xie Feng noted that “China is neither Athens nor Sparta,” highlighting the inadequacy of direct historical analogies.

Generally, China asserts that the United States should not perceive China’s rise as a threat and that the two countries can coexist peacefully.

Although the Thucydides Trap is widely used in international relations literature, it has drawn significant criticism from numerous scholars. Experts in ancient Greek history argue that directly comparing modern power struggles to the Peloponnesian War constitutes a historically reductive approach.

Some historians contend that Sparta’s decision to go to war was driven not solely by fear but also by pressure from its allies, the structure of its alliance system, and the geopolitical balance of the era. Moreover, it is often recalled that after the war, not only Athens but also Sparta suffered severe long-term decline.

Following the Peloponnesian War, Sparta briefly became the dominant power, but its hegemony provoked fear among other Greek states and ultimately contributed to its collapse. Athens, despite losing the war, eventually recovered and maintained its status as a regional power.

For these reasons, some experts argue that the Thucydides Trap does not imply inevitable war; rather, its true lesson is that great powers risk catastrophic outcomes due to fear, miscalculation, and excessive competition.

The concept is not only discussed in China but also extensively debated within US foreign policy and security circles. H.R. McMaster, National Security Advisor during Trump’s first term, is known for his work on Thucydides. Trump’s former strategist Steve Bannon has also frequently framed the US-China competition through the lens of the Thucydides Trap.

Some US strategists argue that China’s rise must be contained, while others warn that direct conflict would have devastating consequences for the global economy, technology supply chains, and nuclear deterrence.

Today, the Thucydides Trap is not merely an academic theory but has become one of the most important geopolitical frameworks for explaining global strategic competition. China’s economic scale, military modernization, technological investments, and expanding global influence, alongside the United States’ efforts to preserve the existing international order, have reinforced the concept’s relevance.

The concept centers on the question of whether great-power competition can be managed without war and is regarded as one of the most critical debates concerning the future of the international system.